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This thesis is concerned with the career of a concept wi th in 
a t r a d i t io n  of thought which combines social and p o l i t i c a l  theory and 
revolut ionary ideology. The concept is 1 bureaucracy' ;  the t ra d i t io n  
is revolut ionary Marxism. The thesis attempts to explore the role and 
importance of the concept in the wr i t ings of  several wr i te rs  who stand 
at central and stra teg ic  points in the development of Marxist re f lec t ion  
on bureaucracy, and to discuss the adequacy and u t i l i t y  of these 
w r i te rs '  analyses of what they take ' bureaucracy1 to be.
Marxists were not the only th inkers , nor were they the 
f i r s t ,  to discuss the ro le of bureaucracy in comtemporary and future 
socie t ies. The thesis has therefore considered the thoughts of 
a number of pre- and non-Marxists. In p a r t icu la r ,  the wri t ings 
of two thinkers who gave special a ttent ion to the social and 
p o l i t i c a l  consequences of administra t ive imperatives - Henri Saint-Simon 
and Max Weber - have proved p a r t i c u la r ly  i l lum ina t ing .  Saint-Simon 
bequeathed to, or at least shared with Marxists, many important 
ideas and predict ions which re late  to our theme. Weber was both 
profoundly influenced by Marxist social theory, and, with regard to 
bureaucracy, profoundly c r i t i c a l  of revolut ionary Marxism. In th is  
century the theories and prophecies of both w r i te rs ,  as of Marxists 
themselves, have been put to test .
The ideas discussed here have been concerned w i th ,  and 
greatly  affected and at times challenged by, economic, social and 
p o l i t i c a l  developments in the past two centur ies, and in pa r t icu la r  
by the course and fate of the f i r s t  successful Marxist- led revolut ion, 
the Russian Revolution of 1917. The thesis has sought to take these 
developments, and th e i r  pract ica l  and theore tica l  consequences,
into account.
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Preface
This thesis grew out of an interest in problems which 
the existence and growth of modern bureaucratic structures pose for 
social and political theory generally, and for Marxism in particular.
It seemed to me when I began the thesis, and it still seems to me, 
that the role in contemporary societies of huge administrative 
organizations employing millions of trained staff presented special 
difficulties for those who believed in the possibility of totally 
transforming and transcending existing administrative arrangements.
I was curious to find how revolutionary Marxists regarded such problems 
and how they coped with them.
There have been many Marxists and I have not sought to 
deal with them all. Rather, I have concentrated on thinkers who stand 
at what might be called nodal points in the growth of Marxist reflection 
on bureaucracy: nodal in the botanical sense of points on a stem from
which leaves spring. The ideas of these thinkers, the epochs at 
which, and the events about which, they wrote, have been of fundamental 
importance in shaping modern thought about, and attitudes to, bureaucracy. 
Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and the new class theorists, wrote the works discussed 
here at three strategic points in the career of 'bureaucracy' within 
Marxism: before, during and after the first successful revolution
led by Marxists. Marx provided later Marxists with an analysis 
and condemnation of existing society, and with reasons to believe 
that it would be replaced by one in which 'bureaucracy' would cease 
to plague men's lives: 'governmental functions' would be 'transformed
into simple administrative functions' and functionaries would no longer 
be 'bureaucrats'. Lenin, who was more responsible than anyone else
f o r  the Bolsheviks' success in seizing state power, had l i t t l e  
time a f te r  1917 fo r  prophecy. However, he led a regime in which 
at f i r s t  the e l im inat ion ,  and then the contro l ,  of bureaucracy 
were claimed to be of  central importance. One of his most immediate 
and pressing concerns was to t ry  to f ind  the proper s ta f f  and 
forms of  organization with which to administer post-revolut ionary 
society. Since 1917, social and p o l i t i c a l  theory, and above a l l ,  
revolut ionary ideology, have had to take the results of the 
Bolsheviks' momentous experiment in to  account. For Trotsky and the 
new class theor is ts ,  the consol idation of  the Revolution l e f t  a huge 
amount of  ideological and theore tical debris in i t s  wake. I t  
threatened both th e i r  hopes fo r  proletarian revolut ion and th e i r  
understanding o f  capital ism and i t s  fu ture .  Use of the concept of 
bureaucracy has been one way in which these wr i te rs  have t r ie d  to 
pick up, reassemble and occasionally replace, pieces of the 
theore tical  s tructure with which they began. Moreover, quite 
apart from the importance of the phenomena and events about which 
they wrote, these men's own wr i t ings and a c t i v i t i e s  have profoundly 
inf luenced the development of Marxist, and not only of Marxist, 
thought about bureaucracy and i t s  ro le in society.
In the course of w r i t ing  th is  thes is ,  I have been struck, 
on the one hand, by the re la t i v e ly  cava l ie r  way in which pre- 
revol ut ionary Marxists dealt  with problems associated with bureaucracy, 
and on the other hand, by the frequently exaggerated prominence 
given to bureaucracy by more recent w r i te rs .  In attempting to 
understand and assess these and other matters, I have enl is ted 
the aid of two social theor is ts  fo r  whom an appreciation of 
administra t ive imperatives and th e i r  consequences appeared crucial
to the understanding of contemporary society.  These theor is ts  
are Henri Saint-Simon and Max Weber. To adapt Oliver Wendell 
Holmes's famous character izat ion of natural law, the i r  writ ings 
form a kind of 'brooding omnipresence' hovering over the thesis .  
Saint-Simon is extraordinar i ly perceptive about many of the 
consequences of administrat ion in industr ial  society.  His thought 
exhibi t s ,  however, a number of s t ra ins ,  tensions and lacunae 
which find repeated echoes in the writings I discuss.  Weber's 
analysis of bureaucracy and i t s  role in modern society presents 
a challenge, in terms of bureaucracy, to some of the deepest 
hopes of Marxists. I believe that  on the whole this has been 
a successful challenge.
Martin Krygier
Lavender Bay, Sydney, 
February, 1979.
PART 1
INTRODUCTION
2ONE
STATE AND BUREAUCRACY IN EUROPE: 
THE GROWTH OF A CONCEPT
Administration as an institutionalized activity has been 
carried out in all complex societies. However, the ways in which it 
is carried out, the forms of administrative organization employed, 
the qualifications required of administrators, their number, and 
the importance and pervasiveness of administrative agencies have 
varied greatly from society to society and from one age to another.
So too have the amount and kinds of writing about administrative 
organizations and officials and the extent of public consciousness 
of their existence, activities and roles.
In all industrially developed societies today, unprecedented 
numbers of large-scale organizations employ unprecedented numbers of 
people to deal with an unprecedented range of tasks. As Hans 
Rosenberg observes,
Everywhere government has developed into a big business 
because of the growing complexity of social life and the 
multiplying effect of the extension of the state's 
regulative functions. Everywhere government engages in 
service-extracting and service-rendering acvitivies on a 
large-scale. Everywhere the supreme power to restrain 
or to aid individuals and groups has become concentrated 
in huge and vulnerable organizations. For good or for 
evil, an essential part of the present structure of 
governance consists of its far-flung system of professionalized 
administration and its hierarchy of appointed officials 
upon whom society is thoroughly dependent. Whether we live 
under the most totalitarian despotism or in the most liberal 
democracy, we are governed to a considerable extent by a 
bureaucracy of some kindJ
1. Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy 3 Aristocracy and Autocracy: The 
Prussian Experience 1660-1815, (Boston, 1966), p.l.
3In so-called c a p i t a l i s t  soc i e t ies ,  s t a te  apparatuses
have become massive and continue to grow. Government agencies
prol i fe ra te  and spread, and there are no signs that  the enormous
number of people employed in government off ices will diminish.
Since the l a s t  century,  moreover, huge non-state bureaucratic
st ructures have come to assume profound importance in both economic
and pol i t i ca l  a f f a i r s .  The s o i-d is a n t  soc i a l i s t  countries are
managed and directed by central  party and government organizations
which employ al l  those who are employed, to such an extent that  many
believe that  the U.S.S.R. i t s e l f  is best understood as a large
complex bureaucracy. Everywhere, ' there is organization,  everywhere
bureaucrat izat ion;  l ike the world of feudalism, the modern world
is broken up into areas dominated by cas t les ,  but not the cast les
2
of le s  ohansons de g e s t e , but the cas t les  of Kafka'.
'Bureaucracy' has become one of the most examined 
phenomena in academic social science: research prol i fera tes  on the 
internal s t ructure of bureaucracies,  on what is functional and 
dysfunctional for e f f i c i en t  bureaucratic performance, on the 
relat ionships between d i f f er en t  categories of bureaucrats,  between 
bureaucrats and thei r  soc i a l ,  economic and pol i t i ca l  environment, 
between bureaucrats and the i r  ' pub l i cs ' ,  between bureaucracy and 
socio-economic development. Bureaucrats are studied by psychologists,  
sociologists and pol i t i ca l  s c i en t i s t s ;  bureaucracies are studied 
individually and comparatively, within and between socie t ies ,  in 
government and outside i t .
1. See Alfred G. Meyer, The S o v ie t  P o l i t i c a l  System , (New York, 
1965), pp.467-68.
2. Sheldon S. Wolin, P o l i t i c s  and V is io n 9 (Boston, 1960), p.354.
4Outside the academy, and often not very far outside,
' bureaucracy' has also had a busy career as a weapon of popular invect­
ive. As we shall see, the term may not be conspicuous for i ts  clarity 
but i ts  force in such expressions as 'bureaucratic red-tape', 'the 
bureaucratic run-around' or simply a despairing ' bureaucracy 1' is common­
ly understood. In political argument, opposition to bureaucracy creates 
strange bedfellows. The vehement opposition of the New Left to 
bureaucratic forms of organization and those who staffed them is fully 
shared by writers who have l i t t l e  else in common with that movement. 
Robert Nisbet, for example argues that,
Unhappily, as is now a matter of full record, the bureaucratic 
instrument has taken command. I t  is impossible to so much as 
glance at the thousands of miles of bureaucratic corridors, 
the millions of f i le  cases, the millions of bureaucratic 
employees organised in a complexity that gives fresh meaning 
to Laocoön, as all these become revealed in ordinary human 
experience, without realizing that once again in history means 
have conquered endJ
But while there has been a massively accelerated growth of 
large-scale, centralized administrative structures in this century, 
such structures have a considerable ancestry. Similarly, there is a 
good deal of continuity between present and past discussion and c r i t i c ­
ism of administrators and their methods.
1 The Growth of the Administered State
The growth of powerful, hierarchical and centralized admini­
strative institutions in Europe was a crucially important element in 
the development of the modern European nation-state and in the consoli­
dation of several hundred more or less independent political units in 
1500 into twenty-odd states in 1900. On the one hand, huge and cen­
tralized administrative structures could not develop in the absence of- 
a powerful centre. On the other, the centre, especially in culturally
1. R. Nisbet, The T w il ig h t  o f  A u th o r i ty (^New York, 1974)^p.54.
5heterogeneous communities with specific historical traditions was led 
to rely on such structures to subdue and replace provincial power- 
holders, establish central authority, and collect taxes.
Such developments were especially marked in the European 
absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What 
particularly distinguished these monarchies from their forebears was 
the increasing concentration of military and administrative power in 
centrally directed institutions, a concentration which occurred at the 
expense of the church, corporations and estates, of local aristocrats 
and provincial centres of power. Moreover, centrally controlled 
institutions did not simply supersede these 'intermediate bodies' in 
the performance of existing functions. They and their successors came 
to perform a whole range of new and more demanding functions.
Nowhere were these developments more strikingly apparent than 
in France from the early seventeenth century and in Prussia from the 
mid-eighteenth. France and Prussia were important because of the 
degree of central dominance achieved by their rulers and because they 
served as models for other administratively ambitious rulers. In France, 
effective, centrally controlled administrative institutions began to 
develop in the second quarter of the seventeenth century, primarily 
because of the need for effective collection of taxes. The crucial 
institution in this development was the provincial Intendant. Royal 
commissaires had existed before the seventeenth century and were known 
as intendants from the mid-sixteenth century. However, they differed 
from the seventeenth century intendants appointed by Richelieu and 
Mazarin in three respects:"' they were not appointed
1 See Roland Mousnier, 'Etat et Commissaire. Recherches sur la
creation des intendants des provinces (1634-1648)' in his La Plume,
La Faucille e t  le Marteau, (Paris, 1970), pp.179-99.
6on a permanent basis, but for specific, temporary, purposes; they 
were not sent throughout France; and they were not administrators but 
emissaries and inspectors of the activi t ies of local, independent, 
o f f i c i e r o . Between 1634 and 1648, however, in te n d a n ts were sent to 
every g e n e ra lity ' in France except for two or three outside Paris, they 
were established as permanent provincial officials,  and, most important 
of a l l ,  'from an inspector-reformer, the provincial In ten d a n t [became] 
an administrator' .^ By the mid-seventeenth century, the in ten d a n ts  
supervised^ the assessment and collection of royal taxes, the organizat­
ion of local police or mil i t ia,  the preservation of order and the conduct 
of the courts. They were temporarily suppressed after intense opposit­
ion from local officials during and after the Fronde3 but from 1658 onward 
they were gradually re-introduced. Louis XIV and Colbert ini t ial ly 
tried to limit their powers and the range of their act ivi t ies,  but after 
France's war with Holland of 1672 the in te n d a n ts acquired an extraordin­
arily broad range of responsibilit ies.  Apart from their administrative 
functions, Colbert's insistence on full and accurate reports had the 
effect of extending the in te n d a n ts ’ function as information officers and 
led to the development of a hierarchy of subordinate officials - snb- 
delegueSj m aires and ech ev in s. At the centre, Louis - ' te  r o i  a d m in is tra t-  
e u r '-  and Colbert reorganized the administrative apparatus into functional 
ministries with staffs of assistants and secretaries and links to the 
in te n d a n ts, parlem ents and other officials in the provinces. By the 
end of Louis XIV's reign, a system of administration had been established 
which was clearly under the direction of the central authority, and 
extended over virtually the whole terr i tory of France.
It is important not to exaggerate the efficiency of this 
burgeoning administrative machine; to say the least,  i t  deviated consid-
1 Ib id , p. 181 .
7
erably from Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy,1 2 in structure and in 
performance. The in te n d a n ts  constantly vied with independent o f f i c i e r s , 
local notables and local t ra d it io n s .  The extent to which the in te n d a n ts  
managed e f fe c t iv e ly  to subordinate the la t t e r  remains a matter of controv­
ersy. Most g e n e ra l i te s  were large and the in te n d a n ts ' power did not 
always match the range o f th e ir  re spons ib i l i tes . Moreover the in te n d a n ts  
themselves were not always easy to con tro l. The s itua tion  is  well char­
acterized by Franklin Ford:
The structure o f French government in the eighteenth century has 
been variously described by a series o f metaphors, a l l  of them 
designed to convey the impression o f a complexity bordering 
on u tte r  confusion. Behind th is  s itua t ion  lay the long pro­
cess o f accretion inherent in the crown's e f fo r ts  to maintain 
control o f i t s  unavoidable delegations o f au tho rity . By the 
time o f Louis XV, tha t process had produced a bewildering 
array o f governmental organs, many o f them fa l le n  in to  contempt 
and near uselessness, but each s t i l l  asserting i t s  claim to 
control over some portion o f the conduct, the personal property, 
the taxes, the disputes or the physical services o f  the French 
popu la tion .. .Moreover, the e ffec ts  o f the long reign ju s t  
ended were apparent in the tremendously over-expanded bureau­
cracy, swelled by the thousands of sinecures which the government 
sold to increase i t s  monetary income....
To these factors there must be added the in f in i t e  number 
o f regional va r ia t ions , deriv ing from the manner in which the 
modern French monarchy had been formed.. . L i t t l e  wonder tha t the 
to ta l e f fe c t  should have been one o f seeming chaos.
Nevertheless, French government did function. In e f f ic ie n t ,  
to be sure, loaded down w ith  overlapping and c o n f l ic t in g  
features, i t  s t i l l  managed to provide greater power fo r the 
king and greater protection fo r  the people than did any of 
i t s  r iv a ls  on the continent, with the possible exception o f 
the new Prussian monarchy. 2
In the years before the French Revolution, central d irec tion  of 
the in te n d a n ts  became fa r  less e f fe c t ive  than under Louis XIV and there 
was a great deal o f confusion and turnover among central o f f ic ia ls .
Moreover, under the a n c ie n  reg im e public and pr iva te  spheres were in e x t r ic ­
ably confused, in two senses. F i r s t ,  there was s t i l l  no c lear concept­
ion o f the state or nation separate from the person o f the king;
1. See below chap. 4.
2. Franklin L. Ford, Robe and Sword. The R egroup ing  o f  th e  French  
A r is to c ra c y  a f t e r  L o u is  X IV3 (New York, 1965), pp. 35-36
8officials were the king's servant, not the nation's. Second, as a
result of the widespread venality of public offices, government posts -
though, as Tocqueville emphasizes,^ not those of the Intendant and
his subordinates - were quite literally the private property of royal
officials. France's finances, for example, were in the hands of:
private businessmen and the Crown could control them only by 
occasional legal process, not by continuous administrative 
direc t i o n .
__ The aristocratic society of the ccneien regime inevitably
undermined all general laws and regulations because privileges, 
graces, favours and marks of distinction consisted in person­
al exemptions and exceptions. We know this best, perhaps, 
in the field of taxation, where any general law merely gave 
the Crown fresh opportunities for awarding exemptions.
But in every other field, too, the personal, the idiosyncratic, 
or what in America today would be called the 'individualistic'  ^
always prevailed over the general law and the general interest.
The French Revolution changed this situation dramatically, in 
public consciousnesss and to a great degree in fact; it was a profoundly 
significant landmark in what Barker calls the 'disengagement' of the 
State. No longer the King's servants, public officials came to be 
regarded as servants of the nation, that nation which, the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of Citizens had proclaimed, was 'essentially 
the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual or body of men 
be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it'. 
Moreover, as Bosher emphasizes,^ French officials began to form a 
'bureaucracy' in a modern sense: they became public servants who were 
paid regular salaries by, and were answerable to, the state.
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Ancien Regime and the French Revolution
trans. by Stuart Gilbert, (London, 1974), pp.64 ff.
2 J.F. Bosher, French Finances 1770- 179 5. From Business to Bureaucracy,
(Cambridge, 1970), p.xii, pp.277-78.
3 See Ernest Barker, The Development of Fublic Services in Western 
Europe3 1660-19 39, (L o n d o n , 1945).
4 J.F. Bosher, op.cit.3 passim and esp. at pp.276-318.
9After the fa ilure of the experiments in local self-govern­
ment in it ia ted  by the Revolution, Napoleon radically reorganized, 
recentralized and rationalized the administrative structure. The 
Prefects were the heirs of the in te n d a n ts .  Appointed by Napoleon and 
under absolute central control, the Prefects governed the provinces 
through o o n s e i ls3 sub-prefects and the mayors of communes. On Napol­
eon 's f a l l :
What the Bourbons found to hand in 1814 was a system purged 
of frustrations, inhibitions and vested interests that had 
clogged the machine before the Revolution and guaranteed its  
destruction ...no government could resist the temptation to 
exploit this modern instrument of po lit ica l direction and 
control . . . *
...The prefect had been invented for a system to which 
the Restoration was in principle profoundly opposed. Yet 
he was retained as an indispensable instrument of po lit ica l 
control, with, of course, certain modifications that re f le c t­
ed the change of regimes . . .
The post-Napoleonic administrative apparatus is the result 
of the revolutionary rationalisation of the inconsistent, 
ir ra t iona l,  frustrated and inhibited centralism of the old 
regime into a juggernaut of modern bureaucracy.2
A second great centre and example of bureaucratic development
was Prussia of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The three
great Prussian rulers of those centuries - the Great Elector [ r e g .1640-
1688), Frederick William I { r e g .1713-1740) and Frederick I I  (reg.MQO-
1786) - bequeathed a remarkably centralized administrative apparatus
to nineteenth century Prussia. In the mid-seventeenth century, the
Great Elector drew together the hitherto independent Prussian Estates
under an 1 2a11-Prussian' central government, with centralized financial
and m ilita ry  administration. In 1722 Frederick William I introduced
a centralized supervisory body, the 'General Directory', and provincial
1 Alan B. Spitzer, 'The Bureaucrat as Proconsul: The Restoration 
Prefect and the p o l ic e  g e n e ra le ' _, Comparative S tud ies in  Soc ie ty  
and H i s t o r y vo l. v i i ,  1964-1965, p. 371 .
2 I b id .  pp. 391-92.
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domains boards, and subordinated local associations - estates, muni­
cipal corporations and provincial courts - to central direction.
These were all highly significant innovations, though i t  should be 
borne in mind that Frederick William's bureaucracy had 'been conceived 
and constructed by the monarch of a second-rate power whose ambitions 
were real is t ic and modest'^ and that at  the end of his reign 'the 
civil service was small in size and provincial in outlook and i ts aims
2were frankly housekeeping or custodial in nature rather than innovative'.
Under Frederick the Great, Prussia became a major European
power, and the outlook, role and organization of i ts administrators
changed markedly, though perhaps neither as quickly nor as dramatically
as is often suggested. Besides the enormously increased scale of the
functions which Frederick asked his officials to perform, there were
at least three profoundly important innovations which took place in his
reign. First of a l l ,  ' the greatest example Prussia gave to Europe
3
during the eighteenth century' was the large-scale institution of 
specialist  training and the regularized recruitment of civil servants. 
Frederick William I had made some steps in this direction: for example, 
he set up chairs of Cameralistics at Halle and Frankfurt in 1727. But 
recruiting practices remained haphazard until well into Frederick's 
reign. Indeed, though some of the bureaucrats themselves sought 
regularity in recruitment and training, Frederick II resisted their 
attempts until the end of the Seven-Years War. Until then, the only 
major innovation in this f ield,  which served as a model for later 
reforms, occurred outside the central and traditional bureaucratic 
structure - in the judicial system.
1 Hubert C. Johnson, Frederick the Great and His O ffic ia ls , (New 
Haven, 1975), p.157.
2 Ibid, p. 30.
3 Brian Chapman, The Profession o f Government3 (London, 1359), p.23.
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The central bureaucracy and the boards lagged behind the courts 
and indeed were kept behind as a result of the judiciary's control over 
education.^ By 1770, however, the General Directory's chief minister 
von Hagen had persuaded Frederick to support the establishment of a 
centralized recruiting system for the whole executive corps of the 
bureaucracy, and in February 1770 a Superior Examination Commission 
began to operate; 'the professionalization of the Prussian civil service 
began'. By the end of the century a merit system applied to all posts; 
a degree in cameralistics was required for higher posts and was follow­
ed by a period of practical training and a further oral and written
3examination.
A second innovation under Frederick concerned the mode of 
organiza tion  of administrative structures. Prussian administration 
had traditionally been organized on a principle quite different from 
that of both modern and eighteenth-century French organizations. In 
the modern 'monocratic' form of organization, offices are usually 
responsible, function-related ministries which are organized hierarch­
ically under a single head of department. In the eighteenth-century 
Prussian, Austrian, Swedish, Russian, and, for much of the century, 
British monarchies, organization was 'collegial ' .  The 'colleges' or 
boards in Prussia were organized on a te rr i tor ial  rather than function­
al basis. They comprised several members whose 'seat and voice' 
determined their importance; all affairs were discussed collectively, 
and all members of the college were responsible for the actions of the 
majority. The basic purpose of this inherently slow-moving form of 
organization, together with supplementary devices such as the royal 
spy, the Fiscal, was to enable the king to control, and, i f  necessary,
1 See Hubert C. Johnson, o p . c i t p . 115.
2 Ib id ,  p.223.
3 Chapman, o p . c i t . p.24.
discipline, his functionaries. I t  was, as Rosenberg remarks, to 
protect the king 'against idlers, saboteurs, l ia rs ,  crooks, and rebels 
on the royal payroll1 234.
Under Frederick, collegiali ty was not abolished in the General
Directory and i t  remained in the seventeen provincial chambers. But,
without being overthrown, collegial bodies were being surrounded on all
sides, and even subverted from within, by new specialist, functionally 
2
based ministries.
Finally, associated with these developments there occurred a 
profound change in the relations between the king and the proliferating 
ministries which he had encouraged, set up and supervised. The Pruss­
ian off ic ia ls  of the reign of Frederick William I and the early part of 
that of Frederick I I ,  were regarded as the k in g 's  servants, for the
fiction was maintained that i t  was he, quite l i t e r a l ly ,  who ruled.
3
While the situation was far more complicated that that, the king
4
retained an extraordinarily powerful, pivotal, role.
Frederick the Great himself appeared to favour, and contri­
buted to, the 'disengagement' of public officialdom from the King or 
dynasty; and, in any case, the ' f i r s t  servant of the state' was finding 
i t  increasingly d i f f ic u l t  to control the other servants. The various 
ministries he had set up, independent of, and often in competition with 
the traditional system had led to a proliferation of ministries at the 
centre; these were not easily co-ordinated and were beginning to slip 
beyond even Frederick's control. The leading off ic ia ls  were very keen 
to replace royal arbitrariness with general rules and with their own
1 O p . c i t .3 p.96; see also Reinhold August Dorwart, The A d m in is t r a t iv e  
Reforms o f  F re d e r ic k  W i l l ia m  I o f  P r u s s i a (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 
pp. 190-91.
2 For examples see Hubert C. Johnson, o p . c i t .  p.154, and Walter L. Dorn, 
'The Prussian Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Century I I ' ,  P o l i t i c a l  
Science Q u a r te r ly _, vol.47, 1932, pp.80-81.
3 See Johnson, o p . c i t . p a s s i m .
4 cf.  Re in ho Id August Dorwart, o p . c i t .  3 p. 189.
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dominance, and, as Rosenberg observes, the bureaucracy:
almost automatically .. .derived great advantage from the 
impersonal basis of i ts strength; from its huge size as an 
organization; from its permanence, functional indispensability, 
and monopoly of expert knowledge; from its self consciousness 
as an aristocratic status group and power el i te;  and from 
its patient and oblique obstructiveness.*
Finally, Frederick's successors, Frederick William II and III ,  had
neither the talent nor the inclination to combat the bureaucracy1 2s
increasing self-direction.
The Prussian General Legal Code of 1794, which was drafted
while Frederick was alive, subjected the monarch to binding rules in
matters of personnel administration, curbed his power, placed him under
the law and generally 'depersonalized' government. Erstwhile 'royal
servants' were now called 'servants of the state'  and 'professional
officials of the s ta te ' .  The Code gave them the qualified legal right
to permanent tenure and the unqualified right to due process of law in
regard to questionable conduct. It recognized them 'as a privileged
corporation subject to i ts  own separate jurisdiction, dist inct in t i t l e
2and rank, and exempt from many of the ordinary civil obligations' .
The decisive change in the form and the role of the bureau­
cracy, however, came only after Prussia's catastrophic defeat by France 
at Jena in 1806. Enlightened bureaucrats were given the job of re­
forming the Prussian bureaucracy. Though the Reform Era was short­
lived - i t  ended effectively in 1812 - its legacy was a remarkably 
modernized and rationalized administrative structure. In place of the 
'  K abinett= Systern  a rationalized system of departments was established,
in which each minister was responsible for a separate area of service. 
Ministries were reorganized on functional rather than provincial lines, 
the jumbled, overlapping collection of central agencies was rationalized, 
and the connections between these ministries and the judicial and
1 Rosenberg, o p . c i t . ,  p.176
2 John R. Gill is,  The P russian  Bureaucracy in  C r is is :  1840- 18604
(Stanford, 1971),p.23.
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administrative agencies of the provinces were clarified and organized 
in a hierarchical and relatively efficient manner.
This growth of centralized power wielded by permanent bodies 
of offic ials ,  while more conspicuous and further developed in France 
and Prussia than elsewhere, was, of course, not confined to them.
Marc Raeff has pointed to 'the drive for centralization and uniformity, 
as well as the excessive mania for regulation that we observe in the 
absolute monarchies of the later seventeenth century1^ and Brian Chap­
man, to 'the general tightening of the administrative structure through-
2out western Europe' about the middle of the eighteenth century. Nor 
was only western Europe involved. The Petrine reforms in Russia, for 
example, were closely modelled on the police ordinances of the German 
states. In Austria, Maria Theresa, and more dramatically Joseph II, 
promoted secular education, designed modernized curricula for the 
training of public servants, professionalized the civil service, intro­
duced recruitment on merit, and maintained surveillance over bureaucrats 
by police agents modelled on the Prussian F i s c a l Indeed,
in the eighteenth century, we witness in the European countries 
taken as a whole (except for those that ceased to exist, such 
as Poland) a resurgence of the power of states ...Throughout 
Europe (except for England) - in Russia, Spain, Austria,
Naples, Portugal, etc. - there was a tendency to establish 
a bureaucratic monarchy having a hierarchical nature and 
patterned on the French model, which thus consisted of both 
a central government and local governments run by delegates 
appointed directly by the ruler, who were the equivalent to 
the intendants sent by Versailles to each generality.5
1 Marc Raeff, 'The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of
Modernity in Seventeenth - and Eighteenth Century Europe: An Attempt
at a Comparative Approach', American Historical Review, vol.80.1975, 
p .1226.
2 Op.ci t . ,  p.21.
3 Marc Raeff, op. a it. p.1234; see also his Plans for Political Reform 
in Russian, 1730-1905._, (New Jersey, 1966 ) ,pp.3-9.
4 Perry Anderson, Lineages o f the Absolutist State , (London, 1974), 
p.354; see also Klaus Epstein, The Genesis o f German Conservatism,
(Princeton, 1966), pp.406-7.
5 Gabriel Ardant,' Financial Police and Economic Infrastructure of Modern 
States and Nations', in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation o f Rational 
States in Restem Europe,(Princeton, 1975), pp.198-99.
lb
Finally, in the light of the widely-held view that England lagged 
far behind the absolute states in administrative development, that com­
pared to Frederick William I 's Prussia, English civ il  service was 
'barbarian ' ^  and that 'the f i r s t  extensive ef fort  on the part of the
9
British to move toward the bureaucratic state' was the Northcote- 
Trevelyan reforms of the 1850's, L.J. Hume's dissenting view should be 
kept in mind:
. . .  Britain's early achievement of legal unity and centrali ­
zation, the relat ive unimportance of 'venality' in appoint­
ments to office, the relat ively early sloughing off  of 'farm­
ing' in taxation and the relat ively  effective control of local 
authorities by the centre brought the country more rapidly 
towards the modern bureaucratic state than the Continental 
monarchies. The lat ters '  claims were repeatedly frustrated 
or fa ls if ied by nobles, the Church, provincial courts and 
estates and recalcitrant of f ic ia ls  and financiers whom the 
state could neither discipline nor do without. The North- 
cote-Trevelyan reforms were a mopping-up operation, not the 
start of the campaign.3
In the nineteenth century, the Napoleonic model and the 
Prussian example, especially in education, had a profound impact on the 
administrative and legal systems of other states. This is partly 
because, as Chapman remarks, 'administrative arrangements can be copied 
more easily than political institutions, particularly when they are
4
couched in clear and comprehensive terms'. But ease of emulation is 
inadequate to explain the similarit ies between, and massive growth of, 
European bureaucracies in the nineteenth century. For the European 
states faced, more or less in common, a strikingly novel order and 
range of social, political and economic changes and di f f icu lt ies .
Growth in continental European population - from 187 millions in 1800 
to 401 millions in 1900, and in roughly similar proportions in every
1 Herman Finer, Theory and P ra c t ic e  o f  Modem Government> (New York, 
1949), p.724.
2 Joseph La Palombara, 'Values and Ideologies in the Administrative 
Evolution of Western Constitutional Systems' in Ralph Braibanti, (ed.) 
P o l i t i c a l  and A d m in is t r a t iv e  Developm ent3 (Durham, N.C.),1969, p.206.
3 L.J. Hume, 'The Executive in Eighteenth Century Thought' a chapter in 
his forthcoming study of Jeremy Bentham's Theory of Government. I am 
grateful to Dr. Hume for allowing me to make use of this chapter.
4 Chapman, o p . c i t p.29.
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European country^ - led to great expansion in the number of officials 
required to perform traditional tasks; and governments undertook new 
tasks. Government expanded into areas formerly managed by others, for 
example the responsibilit ies of former serf-owners, and there was an 
equally important growth of tasks hitherto not performed at a l l ,  but 
stimulated by nineteenth century industrial,  economic, and technological 
developments:
In addition to expansion of traditional responsibility for 
public finance, police, judiciary, the military and foreign 
affairs - each with i ts bureaucracy - came functions novel in 
kind or extraordinary in extent. These functions included 
responsibility for roads, canals, bridges, harbours, and 
later ,  for railways and telegraph and telephone, each requir­
ing a corps of officials with a degree of training. Intro­
duction of military conscription necessitated creation of a 
civilian bureaucracy to administer details and to provide 
scientific and technological services for a modern army, 
and on a smaller scale, for the navy. Education, ecclesiast i­
cal affairs,  and cultural agencies, with the institutions for 
commerce, industry and agriculture either entirely new or 
greatly enlarged, required similar bureaucratic services.
Social problems connected with modern industry - factory 
inspection, legislation for working conditions, poor rel ief ,  
workers' compensation and insurance, public housing, public 
health and other services - called for administrative per­
sonnel on a large scale, for laws affecting these matters 
could not be executed entirely by local amateurs, whether 
elected or voluntary.?
Moreover, the Industrial Revolution not only encouraged governments to
perform new functions; i t  made possible the levying of far greater
amounts in taxation and the employment of many more officials than, ever 
3
before. In consequence of such developments, pressures, and new 
resources, Continental administrative organizations grew enormously
1 Eugene N. Anderson and Pauline R. Anderson, P o l i t i c a l  I n s t i tu t io n s  
and S o c ia l Change in  C o n tin en ta l Europe in  th e  n in e te en th  Century
(Berkeley, 1967], pp.19-20.
2 Ib id .  p. 168.
3 On the importance of taxation to the growth of state power, see 
Gabriel Ardant, op . c i t .  passim .
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in size^ and in importance and were constantly reorganized and reformed 
during the nineteenth century.
2 Early Modern Sources of 'Administrative Science1
It would have been extraordinary if  these profound changes 
in the nature, size, organization and role of the state and of its 
administrative structures, throughout Europe over several centuries, 
had found no echo in political thought. Indeed these changes were not 
simply followed, but at times facili ta ted, by many equally profound 
changes in the subjects and concerns of writings on polit ics, the 
state, and, later, administrative functions and functionaries. Hobbes 
assumed that the political institution which mattered most was the 
central, sovereign power; the natural rights theorists who followed 
him and disagreed with him on so much else, shared this assumption.
And while Hobbes and Locke were confident that the most important 
political activity was legislation^ Rousseau believed that this should 
be the case but doubted that i t  would be, and Saint-Simon had no doubt 
that administrators would inherit the earth.
Though Hobbes was primarily concerned with the supreme law­
maker, he does make several remarks in the Leviathan about the role and 
tasks of public officials.  In the eighteenth century, many writers began
1 One striking laggard in this development was Russia. Szamuely 
writes of an 'inflated, oppressive and predatory bureaucracy1 in 
the seventeenth century and he claims that under Nicholas I
. . . the  ehinovnik, the government official became the most charact­
e r is t ic  figure of Russian l i f e 1. According to Pipes, however, 
the total staff  of the central administrative apparatus at the end 
of the seventeenth century was around 2000, and until the communist 
revolution 'Russia's officialdom was relatively small and not very 
effective' . In the mid-nineteenth century Russia had 11 to 13 
officials for 10,000 people, which was 3 to 4 times below the West 
European ratio. See Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition 
(Leiden, 1974), p.55; p.135; Richard Pipes Russia Under the Old 
Regimej  (London, 1974), p.108; p.281.
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to discuss administration directly, and one form which such writings 
took throughout Europe was that of observations, especially by 
offic ials ,  about existing administrative practices and also about 
proposals for administrative reform. The most sustained tradition of 
such writings existed among the Prussian and Austrian Cameralists, 
beginning with Osse and Obrecht in the sixteenth century, but similar 
observations and proposals also proliferated in eighteenth century 
England, France and Russia. These writings often discussed problems 
of administration merely on the way to what were regarded as more 
important matters, and they rarely put such problems at the centre of 
political theory (as opposed to administrative advice). Nevertheless, 
by the end of the century, a substantial body of ideas about the executive 
had emerged. Nor did these ideas develop in a vacuum. They contri­
buted to, and were influenced by, far broader and more profound movements 
in attitudes to and expectations of the state; movements which led to 
increasing demands being made on the state and increasing regard being 
paid to the sta te 's  means of satisfying these demands - i ts  administrative 
apparatus and its  officials.
One profoundly 'modern' attitude to the state sees i t  as
capable of deliberately harnessing i ts  resources to promote social and
economic development and change.1 23 The philosophes, with their ' lus t  for 
2improvement', clearly exhibited this attitude, but i t  did not begin
with them. The mercantilists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centur-
3
ies sought to maximize the s ta te 's  wealth and especially its  power, 
and seventeenth century Protestant eudaemonists, and especially Pietists ,
1 See Daniel Tarschys, Beyond the S ta te . The Future P olity  in Classical 
and Soviet Marxism, (Stockholm, 1972), pp.22-28; Marc Raeff, 'The 
Well-Ordered Police S ta te . . . '  p. 1222.
2 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment. An In terpreta tion , vo1.II (London, 
1970), p.321.
3 See Jacob Viner, 'Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy 
in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries' in The Long Vied and the 
Short, (Chicago, 1958), pp. 277-305; and Peter Gay, op. c i t . ,p p .  345-47.
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insisted that:
. . .  The subjects' welfare and prosperity would increase 
productivity and foster their creative energies and indust­
riousness, which in turn would rebound to the benefit of the 
state and the ruler's power and provide the proper framework 
for a Christian way of l i f e . . .
By the beginning of the eighteenth century the responsibility 
for this goal was thrust onto the person ( i . e .  the ruler) or 
single secular institution ( i . e .  the state) through the 
virtual elimination of all other institutions that the Middle 
Ages had developed to this same end - the Church, monastic 
orders, and fraternit ies.  As a result, the traditional  
mandate of government ( i . e .  rulership) shifted from the 
passive duty of preserving justice to the active, dynamic 
task of fostering the productive energies of society and  ^
providing the appropriate institutional framework for i t .
Given this dynamic conception of the state's responsibilities, 
the qualities of its administrative structure gained in importance, 
whether off ic ia ls  were called upon to establish and encourage industries, 
gather revenues or supply burgeoning armies. This conception might 
indeed have been sufficient to stimulate writing about administration, 
without any other changes in attitudes to the nature or proper role of 
the state; and among the early Cameralists, king's servants a l l ,  i t  appears 
to have been. In principle, of course, and to a large extent in practice, 
this dynamic conception could be seen as serving a variety of 'masters'
- the ruler himself, the state, the nation or the people. But many of 
the most significant writers about administration in the second half of 
the eighteenth century no longer regarded the government as simply 
incarnate in the ruler and they shared conceptions of the proper role of' 
government which suggested that the quality of administration was a 
p u b lic  concern, that the purposes which off ic ia ls  served were public 
purposes, and that such purposes must be served diligently and well.
We have seen already that the interests of the 'state' in 
Prussia and of the 'nation' in France had been 'disengaged' to a signi­
ficant degree from those of the ruler by the beginning of the nineteenth
1 Marc Raeff, 'The Well-Ordered Police S ta te . . . '  pp. 1225-26.
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century; a similar process of disengagement was inaugurated in Russia 
by the Petrine reforms.^ This process did not suddenly reduce the ruler 
to primus in te r  pares but i t  did change the status of his servants and 
in particular,  of what were perceived to be their responsibilities.
The state or the nation, not to mention the 'people' , might remain exclud­
ed from participation in politics and administration, but administration 
and tutelage was to be exercised on their behalf.
One claim repeatedly made by writers in the eighteenth century
was that rulers held power in tru s t  for their people, and must exercise
their power in accordance with the terms of that trust.  Hobbes might
insist  that the sovereign owed his subjects nothing but what Oakeshott
2describes as the 'general duty of being successful' - which i t se l f  need 
not always be a small matter - but Locke soon held that the 'supream 
legislative authority'  had no right to breach the terms of i ts t rust ,  and 
Rousseau, by distinguishing sharply between the sovereign people and 
the mere government which the sovereign appoints and might peremptorily 
dismiss, underlined the obligations of the la t ter  to the former. This 
conception of government as a trust  held on behalf of citizens was 
triumphantly proclaimed in America in 1776 and in France in 1789, and even 
authors who rejected all talk of 'natural rights'  nonetheless had a 
similar conception of the obligations of government. Burke was not 
always consistent on this matter, but at least when he was opposing 
official policy, he was prepared to invoke this conception in striking 
terms:
1 Marc Raeff, Flccns fo r  P o litic a l Reform in  Imperial Russia, 1730- 
1905, pp. 6-11.
2 M. Oakeshott, ' Introduction' to Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Oxford, 
1949), p.XL.
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. . .  all political power which is set over men and . . . a l l  
privilege claimed or exercised in exclusion of them, being 
wholly ar t i f ic ia l  and for so much a derogation from the natural 
equality of mankind at large, ought to be some way or other 
exercised ultimately for their benefit ...such rights or 
privileges, or whatever else you choose to call them, are all 
in the s t r ic tes t  sense a trust: and i t  is of the very essence 
of every trust to be rendered accountable - and even totally 
to cease3 when i t  substantially varies from the purposes for 
which alone i t  could have a lawful existence.
Bentham, similarly, called the central government a 'public
trust '  and argued that
public powers differ no otherwise from private fiduciary 
powers than in respect of the scale on which they are 
exercisable: they are the same powers exercisable on a
greater scale.
In i t se l f ,  this conception only suggests to whom duties are
owed, not what they entail .  It is equally compatible with a 'night
watchman' and a 'service'  state,  with Seckendorff' s or even Catherine
I I ' s  ' camera!iStic' sense of responsibility and Bentham's or the philo-
sophes' more adventurous ut i l i tar ian claims, with Locke's insistence
on rights against the state and Paine's prophetic demand that claims
from the state by the aged or poor be regarded 'not as a matter of grace
3
and favour, but of r ight ' .  The conception of government as a public 
t rust  is important for our theme, however, in two respects. First of
al l ,  i t  was connected with an eighteenth century shift  in views of 
government from what Krieger has called 'an authority of origins' to 
what he calls 'an authority of ends' or, less happily, ' the telic view 
of pol i t ics ' .^  The governments of European states were beginning to be
1 Edmund Burke, Selected Writings and Speeches3 ed. Peter J. Stanlis, 
(New York, 1963), pp.370-71 (Speech on Fox's East India Bill).
2 Of Leus in General3 ed. H.L.A. Hart, (London, 1970), p.86.
3 Rights o f Man,, (Harmondsworth, 1976) p.265. Paine himself, however, 
was confident that this demand was compatible with a substantial re­
duction in the expense and size of government. This combination of 
beliefs is strongly echoed in Marxist thought.
4 Leonard Krieger, An Essay on the Theory o f Enlightened Despotism^
(Chicago, 1975),pp.52, 56.
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assessed in terms of success in achieving public goals rather than 
simply in terms of their genealogical or Divine claims, and this 
criterion of assessment placed demands on, and turned attention to their 
machinery for achieving these goals.
Secondly, the idea of government as a trust came increasingly, 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, to be put to the service of 
a specific kind of end - the welfare, prosperity and happiness of citizens. 
That government should advance these goals had, as we have seen, already 
been suggested in the seventeenth century, but they were s t i l l  frequently 
regarded as subsidiary,, as instrumental to the greater wealth, power or 
virtue of the ruler, or as obligations owed solely to God, rather than as 
obligatory secular goals whose performance might be demanded by a ruler 's  
subjects. For example, the Austrian Cameralist Schroder argued on the 
one hand that:
the prosperity and welfare o f the subjects is the foundation 
upon which a ll happiness o f a prince as ruler o f such subjects 
is  based}
but he repeatedly emphasized, on the other hand, that a prince's obligat­
ions were a matter purely between him and God:
the right which inheres in the royal o f f ice . . . i s  conferred 
upon the prince by God, not by the people...God le f t  the 
people no freedom by which they were entitled to dispute 
with kings, or to hamper them with restr ic t ions.2
In the eighteenth century, however, there appeared what Raeff has called
'the "enlightenment amendment" . . . the transformation of felic i ty  from
a mere instrument of a transcendent political goal into an end to be
3achieved for i ts  own sake .
1 Fürstliche Schatz-und Rent-Cammer 3 in Albion W. Small, The Cameralists _,
(Chicago, 1909), p.142.
2 Ibid, p.140.
3 Marc Raeff, 'The Well-Ordered Police S ta te . . . ' , p .1239.
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According to the Prussian Cameralist, von J u s t i :
The ultimate aim of each and every republic is .. .unquestion­
ably the common happiness . . .  I t  is unnecessary to enlarge upon 
the proposition, therefore, that the subjects do not exist 
for the sake of the ruler . '
Just i ,  who had no intention of attacking absolutism - his book was
dedicated to Maria Theresa - clouded the issue on occasion by referring
to the interests of the s ta te  rather than those of the subjects, but in
either formulation the ruler was taken to be serving this-wordly interests
other than his own. The Austrian Cameralist Sonnenfels also had no
intention of cri t icising absolutism but he too insisted that the function
2of administrative 'science' was to increase public welfare. In France,
ut i l i tar ian doctrines became popular in the second half of the eighteenth
century, and the Physiocrats, who disagreed with the Cameralists on so
much else, agreed at least that the goal of society was 'the whole sum
3
of happiness and enjoyments possible for humanity'. In England,
Bentham, following Priestley, Beccaria, Helvetius and others, enunciated 
the 'greatest happiness' principle in 1776,^ and even in Russia where the 
interests of the people, the state and the ruler were s t i l l  far from 
being sorted out, the influence of Benthamite and French 'enlightened' 
ideas was considerable. The 'Project for a most graciously granted 
Charter to the Russian People' which was drawn up by, among others, Count 
Vorontsov,who later became Chancellor, and Michael Speransky, the most 
important Russian ' bureaucratic' reformer of the nineteenth century, 
proposed that the Tsar announce that:
1 J.H.G. von Just i ,  S ta a ts u ir th s c h a f t  . . . 3 in Albion W. Small,
The C am eralists  , p.319, see also p.413.
2 Robert A. Kann, A Study in  A u str ia n  I n te l l e c tu a l  H is to ry . From Late  
Baroque to  Romanticism3 (London, 1960), p.172.
3 Le Mercier de la Riviere, L 'ordre  n a tu re l e t  e s s e n t ie l  des s o c ie te s  
p o l i t iq u e s } ed. Eduard Depitre, (Paris 1910), p.vii ,  quoted in
L. Krieger, o p . c i t . 3 p.50.
4 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government3 (Oxford, 1967), p.26.
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For ourselves, we take as a rule the truth that i t  is 
not the people who have been made for the Monarchs, but 
i t  is the Monarchs who have been established by Divine 
Providence for the benefit and welfare of the peoples 
living under their ru le J
For our purposes, the fact that such declarations are often
self-serving or not consistent with government practice is unimportant.
What is important is that they begin to occur and increasingly to recur
in the writings of a wide range of writers who were also paying an
unprecedented amount of attention to the role and deficiencies of
administrative structures. Moreover, the attachment of both the
Cameralists and the Russian reformers to autocracy was n o t inconsistent
with these affirmations of the public purposes of government; they
dovetailed very comfortably. Johnson has argued, for example, that the
early Austrian Cameralists and their successors were well aware that
'with each attempt to glorify the power and theoretical authority of the
prince the prestige and effective authority of the ambitious bureaucrat 
2also rose1 2, and the combination of reliance upon the sovereign with an 
extension of the perceived obligations of government had potent reper­
cussions. Writing of the eighteenth century German supporters of 
'enlightened government' - principally the Cameralists - Geraint Parry 
comments that:
Administrative training for 'enlightened government' derived 
its  importance from the central part which administration 
played in the political task of welding together a disparate 
and non-political ruled mass. Whatever unity civil society 
possessed was not contributed by the atomized mass of non­
participating subjects but by the organized administration. 
Society, Frederick the Great argued, had to be lent the unity 
of a philosophical system, and this was possible only if  the 
system had its  source in one place - the sovereign and his 
administration. To ensure the achievement of this rationalist 
ideal of unity and uniformity social behaviour was directed
1 Marc Raeff, Plans fo r  P o l i t ic a l  Reform in  R u ss ia 3 1730-1903 3 p.77.
2 Hubert C. Johnson, 'The Concept of Bureaucracy in Cameralism',
P o l i t ic a l  Science  Q u a rter ly3 vol. 79, 1964, p.387.
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towards i t s  single goal of 'happiness' by central 
planning. The f i r s t  essential of any wise government 
was a wel1-conceived plan, which was to be the guide 
fo r  a l l  state a c t i v i t i e s .  But though a bold welfare plan 
was essential to the happiness of a society, i t  was of no 
avail  without the administrat ion which drew up and implemented 
the plan. Material resources, size of population or t e r r i t o r y  
were nothing without organization. Administrat ion made the 
f ina l  d i f ference between strength and weakness in a s ta te . '
More general ly, and even outside the 'enl ightened despotisms1,
the eighteenth century witnessed a novel, often obsessive, concentration
on the government's means of f u l f i l l i n g  what had come to be regarded
as i t s  duties. This concentration i n i t a l l y  was expressed by t reating
le g is la t io n  as the central a c t i v i t y  of government. The eighteenth
century theor is ts  of 'p o l i c e ' ,  of 'economy', and even of ' p o l i t i c a l
economy' a l l  emphasized the ro le of cen t ra l ly  made and directed laws;
and these theor is ts  devoted a great deal of a t tent ion to the arrangement,
improvement, c la r i f i c a t i o n  and organization of bodies of rat ional laws.
Strenuous attempts were made to cod i fy ,  s imp l i fy  and make more e f fec t ive
the laws emanating from the sovereign. One implicat ion of th is  at tention
to le g is la t io n ,  and to ways of increasing i t s  uniform a p p l i c a b i l i t y  and
effect iveness, became increasingly evident during the eighteenth century:
i f  fo r  Hobbes covenants without swords were but words, i t  was now becoming
obvious that  le g is la t ion  without e f fec t ive  administra t ive agencies and
services was l i t t l e  d i f fe re n t .  Proposals fo r  governmental reform came
increasingly to focus not merely on le g is la t i v e  in s t i tu t io n s  and reforms,
but also on sp e c i f i c a l l y  administrat ive ones. The cast of mind of many
of such reformers, of thinkers such as J u s t i , and Speransky, or indeed of
1 Geraint Parry, 'Enlightened Government and i t s  C r i t ics  in Eighteenth- 
Century Germany', The H is t o r ic a l  J o u rn a l3 v o l . VI, 1963, p-184; see
Raeff's almost identica l  observation about Alexander I and the ' Un- . 
o f f i c i a l  Committee' in his M ich a e l Speransky. Statesman o f  Im p e r ia l 
R u s s ia ,{The Hague, 1957), p.44.
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Frederick the Great and Alexander I, is revealed by Sonnenfels in his 
Uber d ie  L iebe des V a terlandsy if  more candidly in the second sentence 
than in the f i r s t :
For forms of government, I say with Pope, le t  fools contest! 
Whichever is best administered is best. '
Sonnenfels ; was a member of what Gay has aptly described as a 'tr ibe of
p
authoritarian rationalis ts '  and kin of this tribe could be found through­
out Europe at this time. What Parry observes of the Cameralists is 
equally true of Bentham and of Alexander I 's  'Unofficial Committee':
Political discussion is of solutions and techniques . . .
The study of politics became the study of organization, 
of how given ends of government could be attained with 
the utmost economy of effort. The theorists of 'enlight­
ened government' regarded themselves as scientists of 
administration entering on a new way in the study of politics 
ignored hitherto by scholars.3
One of the most favoured metaphors for administrative
institutions throughout Europe was that of machinery. Ju s t i , who
made frequent use of this metaphor, wrote that:
a properly constituted state must be exactly analogous to a 
machine, in which all the wheels and gears are precisely 
adjusted to one another; and the ruler must be the foreman, 
the main-spring, or the soul - if  one may use the expression 
- which sets everything in motion.4
In France, as a modern scholar puts i t ,
. . .  the word 'machine' had been increasingly used to describe 
administrative organizations. By the end of the eighteenth 
century the machine had become an obsessive image. Anson used 
i t  to describe the projected Ministry of the Interior, Camus 
to describe the entire administration, Marat to represent 
municipal administrations,and to sum up, the machine image in 
the writings of Lebrun, Roederer, Laffon de Ladebat and many 
others seems to show that this generation thought of admini­
strative and political agencies as analogous to machines.
The other possible analogy, comparing the organization to the
1 Quoted in Robert A Kann, o p .c i t .  p. 170.
2 Peter Gay, o p .c i t .  p.488.
3 Geraint Parry, o p . c i t .y pp.181; 184. For the appositeness of these 
remarks to Alexander I, Speransky and the 'Unofficial Committee' see 
Marc Raeff, M ichael Speransky. Statesm an o f  Im peria l R ussia  1772-1839y 
p.44 and passim .
4 Von Just i ,  Gesammelte P o l i t i s c h e -  und F in a n z s c k r if te n yIII,(Leipzig,1764)ppS! 
Quoted in Parry, lo c . c i t .  y p. 182, Krieger, o p . c i t . y p.40.
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human body as Hobbes for instance had done, seldom appears 
in the writings of the late eighteenth-century French reformers 
and revolutionariesJ
In Russia, the 'Principles of Government Reform1 2, drafted by the
'Unofficial Committee' in 1802 explain that:
Just as radii starting from different points on a circumference 
converge all at a common centre, so all the parts of the admini­
stration are interlocked and must converge to the same goal.
If ,  therefore, the movement of the individual parts is not 
calculated in terms of this general rule, the general result 
can only be an incoherence which will hamper their regular 
performance. To avoid this defect, those who are entrusted 
with the task of renovating the shapeless edifice of our 
social contract according to correct principles must know the 
structure of the whole machine; and by constantly keeping in 
view its  movement, they shall be in a better position to 
see the defects of i ts  wheels and gears. This will enable  ^
them to have a better grasp of what improvements are required...
The conception of administrative institutions as machinery was particularly 
apt for rationalis t  reformers in an 'enlightened' state, for i t  legitimized 
both their role and that of their ruler. An administrative machine 
needs to be tended by qualified mechanics, and i t  can be designed, re­
designed and manipulated according to the technical knowledge which these 
mechanics monopolise. As a machine, i t  is indeed e s s e n t ia l ly  manipul able 
by those with appropriate knowledge and skil ls ;  i t  is not, as conservative 
cri t ics  such as Justus Moser maintained, an organic growth which could 
be altered only with caution, patience and restraint.  Viewing administrat­
ive institutions as machinery allowed many of these thinkers to distinguish 
and stress the central, guiding role of the ruler, who was not part of 
the machine but was required to run and oversee its  workings. For Justi 
he was the foreman; for the 'Unofficial Committee', and for Bielfeld who 
used an almost identical image, he was the centre on which all the 
administrative ' radii '  converged.
1 J.F. Bosher, o p . c i t . ,  p.296.
2 Marc Raeff, Plans fo r  P o l i t i c a l  Reform in  R ussia  1730- 1 9 0 5 p.89.
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Viewing the administration as a machine was also appropriate 
to the increasing attention which was directed to its  parts - the officials 
- to the heightened perception of the importance of their role within i t ,  
and to ensuring that they were good parts, suited to the tasks they had 
to perform. Äuget de Montyon, one of the earl iest  and most perceptive 
French writers on administrative reform, who insisted that 'we must apply 
to the composition of social power the general rules of mechanics', 
devoted a chapter of an unpublished manuscript Des agents de l ’administrat­
ion, to officials ,
because, he said, they are such necessary 'administrative 
instruments' that good ones can bring success to the weakest 
administrator and bad ones can bring to nothing the decisions 
of even the most enlightened, or else so overload him with 
work that he will lose sight of his true objectives.!
Montyon was original in France, though not in Europe, in 
advocating written examinations in administration, and its  development 
as a proper discipline to be studied. The Cameralists, of course, had 
advocated this long before and constantly attempted to improve the 
education and recruitment practices of the Prussian and Austrian 
administrations. Bielfeld in the 1760s, Bentham in his f i r s t  articles
on administrative themes in the 1770s, and on a number of occasions there­
after, Necker in the 1780s, all emphasized the importance of recruiting
2competent officials.
A parallel and possibly related emphasis on the role and 
importance of officials can be seen in the outpourings of sinophiles in 
eighteenth century Europe, outpourings which were frequently intended as 
thinly-veiled recommendations for reforms at home. Already in the six­
teenth century, European reports about China, such as Mendoza's, dealt
1 J.F. Bosher, o p .a it . ,p.135.
2 See L.J. Hume, o p . e i t dd.44-45 and Hume 'Bentham and Bureaucracy' 
unpublished paper delivered at History of Ideas Unit Seminar, 1st 
November, 1971 pp.1-2; pp.22-23.
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with i ts administrative system and almost invariably drew attention to 
the effectiveness of Chinese government, to i ts  provision of social 
services and courier systems, and especially to the importance and charact­
er of i ts officials,  trained in state-supported schools and recruited on 
the basis of written examinations.^ In the seventeenth century similar 
observations were made by the Jesuit missionaries who wrote of China, and
9
La Mothe le Vayer, ' the chief precursor of eighteenth-century sinophilism' 
in France, and tutor to the young Louis XIV, emphasized and praised the 
role of the scholar-official in China and alleged that 1 234i 1 n'y a que les
3
philosophes qui gouvernent'. In eighteenth century Europe, fascination 
with China reached i ts peak and again attention was drawn to the importance 
of i ts  officials and to their mode of training and recruitment. Silhouette, 
for example, who in 1759 spent a year as Controller-General of France, 
published The Chinese Balance in 1764, which contained a series of let ters 
purportedly written by a Chinese scholar. In the fourth of these let ters 
the scholar wrote that in China government servants were promoted solely 
on the basis of virtue and talent,^ and i t  was this which attracted many 
other virtuous and talented writers such as Voltaire, Nicolas Clerc and 
the abbe de Marsy, to praise the functionaries of the Middle Kingdom.
Much of this praise was more prescriptive than descriptive in design.
Along with the increasing attention being paid to the official 
went a much more definite attention to function, well conveyed in the
1 See esp. Donald F. Lach, Asia in the Making o f Europe} vol. l .  (Chicago, 
1965).
2 Basil Guy, 'The French Image of China before and after Voltaire' ,  in
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth C e n tu ry vo 1.21 , 1963,p. 119.
3 Quoted in ibid. 3 pp.121-22.
4 Lewis Maverick, China a Model for Europe_, (Texas, 1946), p.29.
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mechanistic terms that prevailed at the end of the eighteenth century.
This concept was at the root of discussion of collegial versus individual
responsibility and of terr i tor ial  versus function-based administrative
units, and of the moves in most European countries toward the la t ter .
In France i t  was reflected in terminology used soon after the Revolution:
Whereas the posts of officials during the ancien regime 
had been o f f i c e s , charges or p la c e s , they now 
began to be called em plois or fo n c tio n s  and the officials 
themselves were for the f i r s t  time described as fo n c tio n n a ire s .  
. . .  This u ti l i ta r ian  vocabulary was used to describe organizat­
ions with quasi-mechanical virtues . . .  the idea of function 
became a principle of quasi-mechanical organizationJ*
Finally, mechanical analogies combined easily with the profound 
ly influential l e g i s la t i v e  framework on which many of the reformers 
relied. Legislation was treated as one of the most important means of 
implementing administrative reforms and administrative institutions were 
frequently assessed in terms of the criteria  traditionally applied to 
bodies of laws. The European administrative reformers were concerned 
above all to establish streamlined, simplified, harmonious administrative 
structures in which all the parts fi t ted and worked smoothly together. 
This concern was a central objective of all the schemes of this period, 
from Bentham to Speransky, and the legislative model was enlisted to 
this end. Bentham and Speransky exemplified the 'legal rational1 
approach of all of these writers whose passion was for simplicity, clar­
ity,  order, clear assignment of functions and responsibility, effective 
and clearly identifiable chains of communication and command.
These schemes and proposals contain a great deal which anti­
cipates Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy, both in the elevation of 
legal-rational authority and in many of the specific organizational 
measures proposed and goals served. And within these broader concerns.
1 J.F. Bosher, o p .c i t . , p.297.
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and preoccupations, a welter of specific suggestions and practical 
measures was advanced for their achievement. Rules were drawn up 
specifying how departmental functions were to be performed; venality 
of offices was condemned in post-revolutionary France and elsewhere 
long before, and payment by salary was often proposed; the use of 
records, inspection and reporting as instruments of control was almost 
universally recommended.
The general character of these writings was that of prescript­
ive, technical advocacy, not of social theory and certainly not of 
revolutionary ideology; i t  was advice to, and often by, those charged 
with carrying out a broad and increasing range of tasks. I t  was rarely 
systematic and was frequently embedded in pedantic discussion of detail 
and in consideration of other matters, but i t  was not negligible either 
in quantity or in intelligent appreciation of the problems and d if f icu l t ­
ies of large-scale and active administration.
3 Nineteenth Century 'Anti-Bureaucratic1 Polemic
The administrative thought which began to flourish at the end 
of the eighteenth century discussed many problems and administrative 
imperatives which seemed to take twentieth century revolutionaries by 
surprise. Revolutionaries, however, were well acquainted with, and 
contributed much to, a quite different kind of writing about administrat­
ive institutions and personnel: polemic against ' bureaucracy'.
The coining of a term is ,  of course, no sure guide to the 
importance of, or level of concern about, a phenomenon. Eighteenth 
century cri t ics  of 'despotism', for example, argued that a despot's 
power would be lost to his 'vizier '  and that this was not accidental 
but was a basic tendency of despotic states; they did not, however, 
show any need for terms such as 'vizier  -'  or ' bur-' ' eaucracy' to express
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their belief. Again, in 1791, Wilhelm von Humboldt had no need of
the term to argue against state intervention for the positive
welfare of citizens, on the grounds, i n t e r  a l i a , that:
. . .  i t  arises that in most states from decade to 
decade the number of the public officials and the 
extent of registrations increase, while the liberty 
of the subject proportionately declines.!
Moreover, even when a term has come into use, i t  is not the only
possible vehicle for expressing similar thoughts: Saint-Simon to my
knowledge never wrote of 'b u r e a u c r a tie ' but his complaints about
officials are often indistinguishable from those of people who did.
Neologisms are however, not merely coined; they also need
to be received, and the reception accorded some terms is far wider and
more enthusiastic than that granted to others. ' Bureaucracy1 2 has
had an extraordinary reception since the late eighteenth century
and, as a Marxist might observe, this is 'no accident' in view
of the poli t ical ,  economic, social and administrative developments
to which I have alluded above. The pervasiveness of the word, and
its strong init ial  associations with France and Prussia, are clearly
related to the concern in Europe, from the eighteenth century
onwards, with the pervasiveness of the things which i t  was being
used to describe.
Secondly, notwithstanding the various uses of the term, 
specific concentration on ' bureaucracy' is interesting for, though 
natural enough, i t  is not an inevitable, nor the only possible, response 
to the development of centralized state power. One might be concerned 
instead with 'despotism', or liken one's government to an Oriental 
Despotism - a l e i tm o t i f  of many eighteenth century French writings^
1 Wilhelm von Humboldt, The L im its  o f  S ta te  A c tio n , ed. I.W. Burrow 
(Cambridge, 1969), p.34.
2 See Richard Koebner, 'Despot and Despotism: Vicissitudes of a 
Political Term', Journal o f  the  Warburg and Courtauld I n s t i t u t e s , 
vol. 14, 1951, pp.275-302 and Franco Venturi, 'Oriental Despotism', 
Journal o f  the H istory  o f  Id e a s , vol. 24, 1963, pp.133-42.
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- and be basically concerned wtih the amount of power monopolized 
by the despot. One could follow Rousseau in lamenting the inevitable 
process by which 'all the governments of the world, once armed with 
public force, sooner or later usurp the public authority'.^ And one 
could direct one's attack against 'the State ' ,  as so many nineteenth 
century writers did. To direct one's attacks against ' bureaucracy1 23
was to focus on the body of government offic ials ,  those who staffed 
the bureaux3 or on the organizations of bureaux themselves.
Finally, there is one specific reason why ' bureaucracy' is 
of special interest from our point of view. Though the term has, a l ­
most from the s ta r t ,  been a vessel into which many different meanings
2have been poured, etymologically, as Albrow notes, i t  represents an 
addition to the Greek classification of governments, suggesting govern­
ment by a new group of rulers - officials.  The word i t s e l f ,  whether 
used pejoratively or not, elevates the status and potential of officials: 
they are no longer subordinate 'viziers'  who might usurp power from those 
who should rule,but a social category which might rule in its  own right, 
i ts  own way. The term is often used in quite different senses from 
this, but this sense has, for example, come to haunt the history of 
Marxism much as another spectre was once alleged to have haunted Europe.
The term 'bureaucracy' appears to have begun i ts  career with 
this meaning. The term is usually attributed to Vincent de Gourr.ay, 
a Physiocrat and mentor of Turgot - he is alleged to have also coined
3
the phrase ''l a i s s e z - fa i r e 3 la is s e z - p a s s e r '. I t would be appropriate 
i f  both attributions were accurate, for the chief vice of which bureau­
cracy was in i t ia l ly  accused was an inability to leave anything alone.
1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The S o c ia l C ontract, (1762) translated and 
introduced by Maurice Cranston, (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.147.
2 Martin Albrow, Bureaucracyy(London, 1970), pp. 16-17.
3 See Gustav Schelle, Vincent de Cbumay. L a is s e z - fa ir e 3 la is s e z -  
passer^  (Paris, 1897); also Joseph A. Schumpeter, H isto ry  o f  Economic 
A n a ly s is3(New York, 1954),pp.244-45.
34
De Gournay is said to have coined the term in 1745; from the start  its 
use appears to have been pejorative and i ts  focus to have been on govern- 
ment officials .  In July 1764, Friedrich Melchior von (or Baron de)
Grimm wrote to Diderot advocating the free export of grain. He com­
plained of the multitude of public officials to whom, because they would 
be robbed of the opportunity to regulate, 'free trade in grain must be 
an abominable hydra1 2. France, he wrote, was 'obsessed by the spir i t  
of regulation, and our Masters of Requests do not want to understand 
that there is an infinity of objects in a great State with which a govern­
ment ought not concern i t s e l f ' .  One who had so understood was 'the 
late M. de Gournay . . .  who . . .  sometimes used to say: "We have an i l l ­
ness in France that appears likely to ravage us; this illness is call­
ed bureaumania". Sometimes he used to invent a fourth or fifth form 
of government, under the t i t l e  of bureaucracy ' . A year la ter ,  Grimm 
complained in a similar vein that: 'not to over-govern is one of the 
great principles of government which has never been known in France . . .
The true sp ir i t  of the laws of France is that bureaucracy of which the 
late M. de Gournay used to complain so much; here the bureaux, clerks, 
secretaries, inspectors, in ten d a n ts  are not established to benefit the
public interest, indeed the public interest appears to have been
2established so that there might be bureaux'. Here, bureaucracy is 
seen as a form  of government, government by officials ,  characterized 
by its tendency to meddle, to exceed its  proper functions.
It was in this sense, or in the claim that officials were the 
real locus of governing power, whatever the superficial form, that
1 Baron de Grimm and Diderot, Correspondance l i t t e r a i r e ^  ph ilosoph ique  
e t  c r i t iq u e  1753- 693 (Paris, 1878 edition), vol.6, p.30.
2 Ibid.  pp.323-24.
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complaints about bureaucracy began to appear in France in the 1780s.^
In 1787 one writer complained of the General Control of Finances that:
The clerks do everything and give a twist to everything 
according to whether they are honest or paid by interested 
parties. From this ,  the frightful Dureaucratie which 
exists and which is such that what made seven or eight 
departments under abbe Terray now makes twenty seven or
th i r ty .2
And Mercier explained in 1789 in Le Tableau de Paris :
Bureaucracy is a word created in our time to designate 
in a concise and forceful manner the extensive power 
of mere clerks who in the various bureaux of the 
ministry are able to implement a great many projects 
which they forge themselves or quite often find in the 
dust of bureaux, or adopt by taste or by whim.2
Early uses of the word outside France appear to have been
consistent with its  French meaning. In Prussia, apart from press
reports of the French Revolution, the f i r s t  recorded use of the word
appears to have been by Christian Kraus, a colleague of Kant. 'The
Prussian s ta te ' ,  he wrote with reason in 1799, 'far from being an
unlimited monarchy . . .  is but a thinly veiled aristocracy ...which
4
blatantly rules the country as a bureaucracy'. An 1813 edition of
a German dictionary of foreign expressions defined bureaucracy as:
The authority or power which various government departments 
and their branches arrogate to themselves over fellow
citizens.5
1 Bosher would appear, however, to be clearly mistaken in claiming 
that 'the word "bureaucracy" f i r s t  began to appear in the 1780s, 
with its  modern meaning at leas t ' ,  o p . c i t . 3 p.46. On the other 
hand, Albrow's claim that 'Balzac was largely responsible for 
popularising the word in French 'appears to be belied by Mercier's 
claim in 1789 that the word had been created by the common people, 
which suggests that i t  at least had some currency. The word 
is also said to have been used as a term of abuse by orators of 
the French Revolution. [Sauvy La Bureaucra tic ,  (Paris, 1956), 
p.20] cites Mirabeau.
2 Jean-Louis Carra.,[/n p e t i t  mot de reponse, 1787, p.48; quoted in 
J.F. Bosher, o p . c i t . 3 pp.45-46.
3 Quoted in J.F. Bosher, op. c i t .  , p.135.
4 C. Kraus, Vermischte S c h r i f t e n  (Königsberg, 1808), vo1.11, p.247.
5 Quoted in Albrow, o p . c i t . 3 p.17.
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Similarly, the earl iest  English use of the term which I have found (1818) 
refers to ' the bureaucratie  or office tyranny by which Ireland had been 
so long governed' . ^
In all of these uses, bureaucracy is seen as rule or arrogation
of power by officials.  In complaining of the ways in which bureaucracy
rules, attention is focused on i ts relations with and effects on citizens
and their act ivi t ies .  Another theme which recurs in many of the early
accounts of bureaucracy is concerned with the nature and working s ty le
of bureaucrats. Here the focus is not on the relationship between
bureaucrats and subjects, but on what kinds of people bureaucrats are,
and on bureaucratic predilections. In this usage, 'bureaucracy' is not
necessarily confined to a certain kind of government, but, like
' aristocracy' ,  used to characterize a group of people or a l i fe style.
In early nineteenth century France, the bureaucrat was frequently the
butt of ridicule and satire.  For example, Henry Monnier published two
volumes of lithographs, the f i r s t ,  Moeurs adm inistra tives3 dessinees
d'apres nature in 1828; the other, Scenes de la vie  bureaucratique3
in 1835. In these volumes Monnier portrayed a day in the l i fe of a
bureaucrat: at nine o'clock the employees arrive at the Ministry and
warm themselves around an excessively hot stove; at ten they have tea
and sharpen their quills;  at ten thirty they chat; at one they have
lunch; at two they go for walks inside the Ministry. The only time
they work is midday, when the head of their division makes his tour 
2
of inspection. In his novel, Les Employes3 published in 1836, Balzac, 
too, poured scorn on bureaucracy. He linked his attack with the f i rs t
1 Lady Morgan, Florence Macarthys vol . l l ,  p.35, quoted in C.A.M. 
Fennell, The Stanford Dictionary o f  Anglicised Words & Phrases ,
(Cambridge, 1892), p.176.
2 Jean-Herve Donnard, Balzac3 Les re a lite s  economiques e t sociales  
dona la Comedie Humaine3 (Paris, 1961),pp.354-55.
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theme by d ist inguish ing bureaucracy from o f f i c i a l s  and re s t r i c t in g  i t  to
the s i tua t ion  where the o f f i c i a l  was overweeningly powerful in government:
Under the monarchy, the bureaucratic armies did not ex is t  
at a l l .  Fewer in number, employees obeyed a min is ter who 
was always in communication with the king, and thus they 
served the king almost d i r e c t l y . . .Since 1789, the State,
la  p a t r ie ,  i f  you prefer , has replaced the Prince___
clerks have become, despite our beauti fu l  ideas of la  p a t r ie 3 
government employees3 and th e i r  chiefs f l o a t  with every 
breath of  a power cal led the Min is t ry  which never knows one 
day whether i t  w i l l  ex is t  the ne x t . . . th us ,  Bureaucracy, a g i ­
gantic power set in motion by dwarves, is born. Possibly 
Napoleon retarded i t s  inf luence fo r  a time, for  a l l  things 
and a l l  men were forced to bend to his w i l l . . . i t  is  d e f in i te l y  
organized under const i tu t iona l  government, the natural fr iend 
of  mediocri ty with a penchant fo r  categorical statements and 
reports, a government as fussy and meddlesome as the wife of 
a p e t i t  bo u rg e o is .
In Germany bureaucracy was also attacked as much fo r  i t s  a t t i tudes ,  
s ty le  and charac te r is t ic  modes of  behaviour as fo r  what i t  did to i t s  sub­
jec ts .  The German picture was d i f f e re n t ,  however, and altogether more 
solemn. In 1821 Freiherr vom Stein who, o f  a l l  people, should have known - 
complained:
We are ruled by salaried, book-taught, dis interested 
propert i less B u re a u lis te n  . . .  These four words express 
the s p i r i t  of  our own and s im i la r  s p i r i t l e s s  governmental 
machines: salaried,  therefore they s t r ive  a f te r  mainten­
ance and increase of th e i r  numbers and sa lar ies;  book- 
taught, therefore l i v in g  in the pr in ted, not the real world; 
without in te res ts ,  since they are t ied to no class of c i t ­
izens of  any consequence in the State, they are a class fo r  
themselves - the c le r ica l  caste (S c h re ib e rk a s te ) ; p rope r t i ­
less, therefore unaffected by any change in property. I t  
may rain or the sun may shine, taxes may r ise or f a l l ,  ancient 
r ights  may be destroyed or l e f t  in ta c t ,  none of  th is  worries 
them. They receive th e i r  salary from the state treasury and 
w r i te ,  wr i te  in s i lence,  in th e i r  Bureaux behind specia l ly  
provided locked doors, unknown, unnoticed, unpraised, and 
again they cu l t iva te  th e i r  chi ldren fo r  equal ly useful 
state machines - I saw one machine (the m i l i ta r y )  f a l l  on the 
14th October, 1806. Perhaps the writing-machine w i l l  also 
have i t s  14th October 1 That is the ruin of our dear fa ther -  
land: o f f i c i a l  power [Beamtengewalt] and the n u l l i t y  of  i t s  
c i t izens !2
1. Honore de Balzac, Les Employes3 (Reprinted, Paris, 1950), p. 16.
2. Die B r ie fe  des F re ih e rm  vom S te in  an de'n F re ih e rrn  von Gagem3 
1813- 18313 (S tu t tga r t ,  1833), pp. 90-92.
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In the late 1830s the Prussian government became increasingly 
unpopular, and, as Gillis notes, ' the target of political agitation 
in the decade before 1848 was not the monarchy i t sel f  but the form that 
the monarchy had assumed since the late eighteenth century. Bureaucrat­
ic absolutism, not royal despotism, was the issue1 2] In 1844 an anony­
mous pamphlet, Bureaukratie und Beamtenthum in Deutschland, (Bureaucracy 
and Officialdom in Germany) appeared in Hamburg. The author, who claimed 
to be an English visi tor,  endorsed Stein's remarks and agreed with him 
(and with the young Marx) that bureaucrats formed a caste with purposes 
of i ts own, 'a people within the people, a state within the s ta te ' .
He insisted, as so many other cri t ics have, that bureaucracy was of no 
productive use but, on the contrary, was 'a powerful cancer (which) 
feasts voraciously, insatiably, and lives off the marrow and blood of 
the people'. He emphasized the hierarchical nature of bureaucratic 
organization, intended to produce craven obedience to anyone who con­
trolled the bureaucracy and unfeeling domination of those under i ts  sway, 
and he attacked bureaucratic devotion to authority and secrecy :
. . .  Bureaucracy can as well be compared with a military 
system as with a hierarchy, and is often compared with i t .
The three are parallels: military, hierarchy, bureaucracy: 
all rest upon the divine right of despotism, which wills 
no exception, no leniency, no progress, but only blind 
devotion and the eternally unchangeable acknowledgment 
of i ts infal l ibi l i ty .  The three maintain themselves by 
unconditional obedience; the means by which obedience 
is maintained is fear; and this is maintained by 
dependence. The dependence of Prussian Civil Servants 
is rigidly secured by two devices: secret reports and 
the s t r i c t  maintenance of official secrecy. The former 
reminds officials every moment of their superiors; the 
lat ter  of the office . . .  2
1 J.R. Gillis,  o p .c i t . j  p. 15.
2 Anon., Bureaukratie und Beamtenthum in  D eu tsch la n d X. Preussen y
(Hamburg, 1844) pp.34-35. This passage is quoted in Herman Finer,
Theory and Practice o f  Modem Government_, p.738. I have followed 
Finer's translation.
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Like so many opponents of bureaucracy, this author insisted that there 
was an excessive number of bureaucrats and he arrived at a figure of 
700,000 for Prussia. In 1845 Karl Heinzen, the radical friend and 
later foe of Marx and Engels, published Die preuso ische  B u re a u k ra t ie ^  
in which he made the exc e ss iv en e ss  of bureaucracy, in numbers, authority 
and activity,  his central theme. Heinzen also quoted von Stein's 
remarks, substituting 'bureaucrat'  for ' bureauli s t ' . He contrasted 
bureaucracy with popular sovereignty, and claimed that i t  had developed 
out of Prussian absolutism and that i t  had reached i ts apogee under
2
Frederick William III ,  who 'had allowed bureaucracy to become a system'.
The essence of bureaucracy, Heinzen explained, was:
. . .  what has generally come to be understood as 
bureaucracy; the excess of officials and their 
activity,  the abuses and evils of domination 
by officials and bureaus. The word bureaucracy 
is one of those words of invective which, like, 
for example, despotism, canaille, etc. ,  cannot., 
be properly translated into our mother tongue.
It should be evident already that,  beyond i ts usual pejorative
core and i ts focus on officials,  'bureaucracy' is a peculiarly malleable
and adaptable word, and this was clear to Robert von Mohl who in 1846
4
made the f i r s t  academic analysis of the concept. Mohl noted that
'since a relatively short time ago, in every place and on the most varied
5occasions, talk has been about "bureaucracy" but, besides being about
1 Darmstadt, 1845.
2 Ib id .  p. 15 .
3 Ib id ,  p . 1 3
4 Mohl, 'lieber Bureaukratie', S t a a t s r e c h t V ö l k e r r e c h t  und P o l i t i k ,
(reprinted Graz, 1962), vol. 11, chap. 2, pp. 99-130.
5 Ib id .  p.99.
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'a social power or a system of rule'"*, the content of this talk varied
greatly within and between social groups. Nobles complained about
denial of their privileges and the inconsiderateness of officials;
industrial ists complained 'on the one hand about indolence and apathy
2and on the other about unnecessary and harmful overgoverning'.
Some of them alleged 'ignorance of l i fe and of industry' while others
3
complained of 'clumsiness and pedantry in administration' ; churches 
complained that the bureaucracy interfered with a 'free and autonomous 
religious l i f e ' S  artisans of useless paperwork; scholars of bureaucrats' 
ingorance; municipalities of interference; and statesmen of delay and 
obstructionism. Notwithstanding this bewildering variety, Mohl insists 
that ' bureaucracy' does refer to something real and that what i t  really 
means is :
the false conception of the tasks of the state 
accomplished through an organism of numerous 
professional off icials ,  in part composed of very 
mediocre members satisfied with purely formal  ^
conduct and liable to much personal incivili ty.
Typically Mohl is more successful in distinguishing between existing 
conceptions of bureaucracy than in devising a satisfactory and inclus­
ive definition which links them.
Criticisms of both the nature and characteristics of bureaucracy 
and i ts  effects on citizens were prominent in early English accounts.
g
As Albrow has noted, they were joined by a peculiarly British theme - 
bureaucracy was foreign. De Gournay's and Balzac's assessment of French 
government was endorsed with special fervour by English writers.
1 Ibid, p.100.
2 Ibid, p. 103 •
3 Ibid, p.104.
4 Ibid, p.104'
5 Ibid. p. 108 *
6 Albrow, o p .c it .  pp.21-26.
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Throughout the century 'bureaucracy' was referred to as the unfortunate 
'Continental' (usually meaning Prussian or French) way of doing things, 
which the English were wise to avoid. An article on French educat­
ion published in 1836, suggests some of the manifold evils of bureaucracy. 
Bureaucrats are omnipresent, and in universities, 'the obscure power of 
the Bureaueratie3 that is , of the menials of the university is fe l t  in 
all appointments except the very h i g h e s t * T h e y  are the instruments 
of French centralizers whose doctrines Englishmen abhor 'because they
know that by them is formed the most complete, the most rigorous, and
2most complicated, system of despotism the world has ever known'. On 
the other hand, the bureaucracy is inefficient, but to the French, ' i f  
the machinery is found to be inefficient the remedy is add more machinery.
It  never occurs to Frenchmen, who have a lead in this matter, that 
the plan is inefficient, simply because i t  is machinery, as far as men
3
can be changed into tools ' .  Finally the author explains that in large
governmental organizations men 'having no other original esprit du corps 
than what their salaries and officers excite . . .will  not sink into but
4
will never rise out of the character of a bureaucratie ’.
Similar points were made about Prussian bureaucracy in an un­
relieved attack on 'Prussia and the Prussian System' which appeared in
5
1842. Again, the bureaucracy is seen as all-powerful and everywhere:
'the King of Prussia through his hundred armed bureaucracy l i te ra l ly
r
manufactures everything in his dominions'; 'as there is no church
even now better organized externally than the Romish, so there is no govern- 
___________________ __________  ment
1 Arnaut O'Donnel, 'State Education in France', Blackpool's Edinburgh 
Magazine, vol. 40, 1836, p.580.
2 Ibid. , p.583.
3 Ibid. , p. 583,
4 Ibid. , p. 583 k
5 J'.S. Blackie, 'Prussia and the Prussian System', Westminster Review3 
vol.37, 1842, pp.135-71.
6 Ibid. pp.144-145.
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which, by virtue of an all insinuating bureaucracy, is more complete in
its machinery and more strong physically in i ts frame-work than the
Prussian'.^ The effects of the bureaucracy are insidious: 'for this
grand privilege of being governed by a scientific bureaucracy the
Prussians make a sad sacrifice; they sacrifice the independence, the
energy, the enterprise, of the great mass of the people. The governors
govern well, but the governed, by overmuch cherishing, are made weak;
they are mere clods; political nul l i t ies;  children certainly in every 
2sense'. Finally, much of the bureaucracy's work is simply self­
generated: 'The principle being . . . tha t  the people shall be allowed 
to do nothing for themselves, i t  follows as a necessary consequence 
that a vast multitude of men must be paid at the public expense for
doing that which in other countries nature is allowed to do spontan-
3
eiously, as the rain fal ls  and the wind blows'.
British opponents of centralization frequently linked its
sins with those of bureaucracy: Joshua Toulmin-Smith, the leading
member of the Anti-Centralization Union founded in 1854, attacked
centralization as ' the system of Functionarism and Bureaucratic control' ,
and the Union's objects were:
to resist  the adoption, renewal or extended powers, 
of Boards or. Functionaries for controlling local 
or independent action; to oppose Bureaucracy as 
a Government system; and to promote practical measures 
for developing and extending municipal and parochial self- 
government, guaranteed by and responsible to unevadible and 
certain law.**
Hostility to bureaucracy ran deep, even among those who saw an 
important role for the State. Thomas Carlyle, in a series of articles
1 Ibid , p. 159.
2 Ib id , p.161.
3 Ib id , p.163.
4 J. Toulmin-Smith, Government and i t s  Measures (London, 1857), p.2 
quoted in W.H. Greenleaf, 'Toulmin-Smith and the British Political 
Tradition1 234, in Public A dm inistration , vol. 53, 1975, pp.25-44 at p.42.
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published in 1850J  exhorts government to be more intelligent and
intelligently active. He insists that 'the State is a reality and not
a dramaturgy; i t  exists here to render existence possible, existence
2desirable and noble, for the State's subjects',  and he strenuously 
attacks 'the notion that any Government is or can be a No-Government
3
without the deadliest peril to all noble interests of the Commonwealth'. 
Nevertheless, whatever the new and active government he hopes for will 
be, i t  will not involve bureaucracy: 'Of the Continental nuisance called
"Bureaucracy", - if  this should alarm any reader, - I can see no risk 
or possibility in England. Democracy is hot enough here, fierce enough;
i t  is perennial, universal, clearly invincible among us henceforth. No 
danger i t  should le t  i t s e l f  be flung in chains by sham-secretaries of 
the Pedant species, and accept their vile Age of Pinchbeck for its 
Golden Age!
The themes I have outlined recur constantly in the nineteenth 
century, but they are also joined by more specialized, discriminating 
uses of the term. ' Bureaucracy' maintained the pejorative connotations 
I have described. Indeed, these connotations could be called on when 
required; just as in contemporary polemics, an attack on ' bureaucracy' 
appears to have more force than the same attack directed at 'o ff ic ia ls ' .  
But conceptions do emerge which recognise that there are differences 
other than those of power and size between groups of officials and modes 
of organization.
1 Thomas Carlyle, 'Downing Street' and 'The New Downing Street ' ,  
reprinted in Collected Works (vol.20, London 1898) pp.87-171.
2 Ib id . p .164.
3 Ib id , p.100.
4 Ibid , p.143.
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One of the most important of these conceptions transfers attent­
ion from officials as a social group, to the mode of organization of the 
institutions in which they serve. This use of 'bureaucracy' is import­
ant as a forerunner of the widespread twentieth century habit of applying 
the terms 'bureaucracies' or 'bureaucratic' to institutions,  rather than 
to the officials employed in them; these la tter  are thus called bureaucrats
as much because they work in the institutions as because they are members 
of a social group. In Germany especially, the transformation of the 
civil service from collegial to monocratic organization led to the use 
of 'bureaucracy' by many writers to refer to the monocratic organization 
into bureaux as distinct from collegial administration. Heinzen accept­
ed that bureaucracy arose in organizations of this form, though he 
quickly added that he was more interested in its  essence than its  form.
In 1846, Mohl suggested wrongly that this sense had historical priority 
over the pejorative, less discriminating uses of the term. Even in 
1873 the French D ie tio n n a ire  Generale de la  P o l i t iq u e } explained to French­
men that this was the German use of the termJ By the nineteenth century 
i t  was generally agreed that monocratic ministries were more efficient 
and potentially more powerful than colleges; defining bureaucracy as a 
form of organization could therefore easily slide into polemic against 
bureaucracy as rule by officials.  The link between the two conceptions 
is clearly brought out in a passage which Albrow quotes from the Brock- 
haus encyclopedia of 1819:
The modern form of public administration executes with 
the pen everything which previously would have been done 
by word of mouth. Hence many pens are set into motion.
In every branch of administration bureaux or offices have 
multiplied, and have been accorded so great a power
1 (Paris, 1873), p .269.
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over citizens that in many countries a veritable 
bureaucracy, rule by offices, has developed. This 
bureaucracy becomes increasingly dangerous as the 
previous custom of conducting business through 
c o lle g ia  fal ls into disuse. The directors of a 
bureau, in addition to their authority over i ts 
personnel, have acquired an often inordinate amount 
of power over citizens at large.1
Albrow suggests that 'the identification of the bureau system and bureau-
2cracv made an extremely useful polemical point' for opponents of the 
German state,  who could begin with an apparently neutral definition 
of bureaucracy as monocratic administration, and then ascribe to i t  all 
the negative connotations of bureaucracy as government by officials.
A similar leap from analysis of a form of administrati ve 
organization to exploitation of the many polemical advantages of 
' bureaucracy' was taken in 1864 by the French sociologist, Frederic Le 
Play, whose La Re forme so c ia le  en France contained a long chapter con-
3
demning what he called bureaucracy in European government. He apolog­
ised for introducing into social science ' this hybrid word created by 
a light l i t erature ' ,  but nontheless used i t .  Rather than choose the 
common approach of defining bureaucracy as the cause of sundry i l l s ,  
le Play identified i t  with the i l l s  themselves, with what in Soviet 
discussion is often called ' bureaucratism'. He regarded bureaucracy 
as a 'vice ' ,  an ' i l lness '  which occurred when actual power in government 
was wielded by anonymous middle- and lower- level functionaries who 
were accountable to no-one. It  could only be avoided by making heads 
of bureaux a c tu a lly  responsible for what was done within them, as 
happened, le Play claimed, in England. From this relatively modest
1 Allgem eine deutsche Re a t-E ncyclopaed ic  oder C onversations lex ico n
(Leipzig, 1819), vol.2, p.158, Albrow, o p . c i t . , p.28.
2 Albrow, o p . c i t . ,  p.28,
3 ( Paris, 1887), pp.344-91.
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beginning, le Play goes on to attribute most conceivable dangers 
of government, and some not so conceivable, to this diseased form of 
administration. Bureaucrats are not only inefficient, arrogant, 
irresponsible and lazy, but they indirectly encourage revolution by 
weakening respect for authority; they erode the role of parents, 
especially by their proliferation of complex examinations for which 
special training is necessary; they encourage communism; they destroy 
individual init iat ive and keep subjects as children - a common nine­
teenth century criticism; and because of their power lust they are in 
fact the cause of excessive centralization.
This looseness, not to say wantonness, of the term was as 
common in nineteenth century uses of 1 2bureaucracy' as i t  is today. 
Nevertheless, a writer's response to the growth or increased importance 
of state power did not have to be expressed as a response to 1 bureaucracy1 
or have much to do with what he understood by that word. This is 
especially true of a greater and more rigorous thinker than we have yet 
discussed, John Stuart Mill.
Though he contrasted England favourably with the 'bureaucracy- 
ridden nations of the continent'^, Mill was less interested than his 
contemporaries in drawing facile polemical contrasts between England 
and Europe. While he used the concept 'bureaucracy' and used i t  
suggestively, he did not use i t  simply as a blanket characterization of 
continental over-governmental but as a specific, almost technical 
description of one way of governing. According to Mill, this way of 
governing occurs where 'the work of government has been in the hands of
9
governors by profession; which is the essence and meaning of bureaucracy.'
1 Representative Government (1861), in John Stuart Mill, U tilitarian ism , 
L iberty3 Representative Government. (London, Everyman, reprint, 1964) 
p.227.
2 Ibid, p.245.
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For Mill, 1 2bureaucracy' has to do with expertise and profession­
alism. He has often been taken to be saying far more about bureaucracy 
than he actually is ,  however, because this has been ignored. For example, 
in the Principles o f  P o litic a l Economy Mill advances a number of arguments 
against the growth of governmental functions and powers, and J. M. Robson 
says of these that they include 'almost every consideration advanced by 
opponents of bureaucratic growth1'*'. This may be true of later and (earlier) 
writers, but only one of the six arguments Mill advances has to do with what 
he calls bureaucracy. The other arguments are directed against the growth 
of governmental activity in  general and have nothing specifically to do with 
1 bureaucracy1 or bureaucratic government. Nor does Mill suggest that they 
do. In the Principles  only one sort of problem is raised which, while 
not necessarily confined to bureaucracies, is necessarily faced by them.
Mill considers this problem of central importance, and raises i t  f i r s t  of 
all as his final argument for la is se z - fa ir e ,  and several pages later ,  he 
repeats i t  to deal with a supposed exception to the principle, and uses the 
word 1 bureaucracy1 for the f i r s t  time in these pages. Anticipating James 
Burnham, Mill concedes that where individuals manage concerns only'by 
delegated agency' as in joint stock companies, the interested persons 
(the share-holders) are no closer to the power exercised by directors 
than individuals would be to enterprises managed by public officers.
Nevertheless, Mill rehearses the arguments against government inter-
2vention, and pre-eminent among them is 'the [st i l l  greater] inexped­
iency of concentrating in a dominant bureaucracy, all the skill and 
experience in the management of large interests ,  and all the power of 
organized action, existing in the community; a practice which keeps 
the citizens in a relation to the government like that of children to 
their guardians, and is a main cause of the inferior capacity
1. The Improvement o f  Mankind: The Social and P o litic a l Thought o f
John S tuart M ill, (Toronto, 1968 ), p.208.
2. These words were omitted after the 1848 and 1849 editions of the
P rinc ip les .
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for political l ife  which has hitherto characterised the over-governed 
countries of the Continent, whether with or without the forms of repre­
sentative government'.^
In the light of Mill's definition of bureaucracy i t  is not hard
to see why excessive concentration of talent and init iative was regarded
as a likely consequence of i t .  But while over-government of any kind
presented dangers for Mill, not every kind of over-government was
bureaucratic and not every kind of danger was a bureaucratic danger.
Some writers have considered i t  significant that in On L ib e r ty  (.1859),
'the dangers of bureaucracy were singled out for the peroration of that
2immensely influential essay'. But Mill himself says, 'I have reserved 
for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of 
government interference, which, though closely connected with the subject 
of this essay, do not, in strictness belong to i t .  These are cases in 
which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle 
of l iberty ' .  And Mill is again talking generally about the limits 
of governm ental rather than b u rea u c ra tic  intervention. Within this 
discussion what Mill held to be the 'third and most important reason for
4
objecting to government interference' was not the danger of bureaucracy 
but the dangers, already referred to in the P r in c ip le s , involved in add­
ing unnecessarily to governmental power. This is a general problem.
What i s  true is that powerful governments become particularly dangerous 
i f  they are staffed in the most efficient way by the ablest men in soc­
iety. For in those sp e c ia l  circumstances, a specific and important
1 P r in c ip le s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy eBooks IV - V, (Toronto,1965), p.955
2 Martin Albrow, o p .c i t .  p.22.
3 On L ib e r ty 3 in John Stuart Mill, o p .c i t .  pp.163-164.
4 Ib id ,  p . 165.
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problem would arise: 'all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence 
in the country, except the purely speculative, would be concentrated in 
a numerous bureaucracy, to whom alone the rest of the community would 
look for all things1 23. 1 It would become the focus of all ambition, and 
the people outside the bureaucracy would fail to be 'accustomed to transact 
their own business.. . f o r . . .where everything is done through the bureau­
cracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at 
2
a l l . '  Part of one of the arguments in On L iberty , then has to do with 
bureaucracy, and i t  is clear that i t  is important to Mill. But he is deal­
ing with much besides bureaucracy when he discusses the limits of govern­
ment intervention, and i t  is a distortion of his view both of the dangers 
of such intervention and of the specific problems associated with bureau­
cracies, to run the discussions together.
Moreover, despite Schaffer's claim that Mill's 'opposition to 
3
bureaucracy was unambiguous' , the truth is that his attitude to bureau­
cracy is quite ambiguous. Mill moved, I believe, between at least three 
uses of 'bureaucracy', and while none of these is ruled out by his definition 
he comes to reject claims for bureaucracy in two of the uses while advocat­
ing i ts cultivation in the third sense. Crudely stated, the distinction is 
between bureaucracy as a form of government, to be contrasted with democ­
racy, oligarchy, etc. ;  as the real locus of governing power, whatever the 
form; and as an instrument of government, to be contrasted with non-profess­
ional administration. Since Mill does not bother to make these distinctions 
explicit ,  the sense in which ' bureaucracy' is used must be gleaned from the 
context in which i t  appears.
Mill clearly used 'bureaucracy' to refer to a form of govern­
ment. The definition I have quoted occurs in the context of a discussion of
1. Ib id , p .166.
2. Ib id , p .167.
3. B. Schaffer, 'The Idea of the Ministerial Department: Bentham, Mill and
Bagehot', The Adm inistrative Factor. Papers in Organization, P o litic s  anc
Development,(London, 1973), p.17.
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the claims of rivals to representative government as the ' ideally best 
pol i ty ' ,  and Mill concludes that 'the comparison as to the intellectual 
attributes of a government, has to be made between a representative 
democracy and a bureaucracy; all other governments may be left  out of 
account'. But though bureaucracies are expert, operate by 'well-tried 
and well-considered traditional maxims' and are staffed by people train­
ed in the practical requirements of their tasks, 'the disease which 
af f l ic ts  bureaucratic governments, and which they usually die of, is 
routine. They perish by the immutability of their maxims; and, s t i l l  
more, by the universal law that whatever becomes a routine loses its 
vital principle, and having no longer a mind acting within i t ,  goes on
revolving mechanically though the work i t  is intended to do remains un- 
2done'. Bureaucracies need elements of free opposition, for otherwise 
they will become stul t i f ied over time.
The same defects will exist where the bureaucracy is powerful 
enough to be the r e a l  governing power. We have already seen the effects 
of a dominant bureaucracy on citizens'  capacities for self-reliance, 
but the point is also made, in On L ib e r ty  and elsewhere, that an over­
powerful bureaucracy will of necessity do its own job badly. Unless 
a governing body can receive informed criticism from outside i t se l f ,  i t
will occasionally be entranced by 'some half-examined crudity which has
3
struck the fancy of some leading member of the corps' , but usually i t  
will simply be trapped by routine.
However, in the third sense in which the concept is used, 
bureaucracy is a prerequisite to good government. While Mill argues 
that the bureaucracy must not absorb all available talent,  i t  is this 
absorption which is dangerous, rather than the mere existence of a
1 R ep resen ta tive  Govemmentj o p . o i t . 3 p.246.
2 Ib id .
3 On L ib e r ty , o p . c i t . ,  p .158.
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bureaucracy i tse lf .  Indeed, in this third sense, bureaucracy is the thing 
endangered, for ' i f  we would possess permanently a skilful and efficient 
body of functionaries. . . i f  we would not have our bureaucracy degenerate 
into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross all the occupations which
I
form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind'.
One of the central dilemmas for Mill was to reconcile the need 
for freedom with the need for skilled government. He valued both and indeed 
thought that neither was attainable without the other; 'to secure as much 
of the advantages of centralized power and intelligence as can be had with­
out turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general
activity - is one of the most diff icult  and complicated questions in the art 
2of government.' In the 'ideally best poli ty ' ,  governments would be select­
ed, watched and 'when needful' controlled by their constituents; the actual 
business of governing, however, had to be done, or at the very least, closely 
supervised, by the skilled - skilled legislators and bureaucrats.
Mill's respect for expertise and professionalism was, of course, 
not particularly exceptional in the nineteenth century. Given the contrast 
between the highly professionalized Prussian bureaucrat, with whom the word 
was in any case associated, and the English civil servant, for whose train­
ing schemes were only beginning to be devised, the association of bureaucracy
3
with professionalism was not rare. But Mill was less concerned than many 
of his contemporaries to f i l l  the word with purely polemical ballast. He 
also paid attention to distinctions between circumstances in which bureau­
cracy might be useful and circumstances in which i t  might do harm. Unfortun­
ately, making distinctions has not always been the strong suit of writers 
on bureaucracy.
1. Ib id .
2. Ib id .
3. Bagehot also made this association but he was far more suspicious of 
purely 'expert' bodies than Mill was. See Bagehot, The E ng lish  Const­
i t u t i o n  (reprinted London, 1966), esp. pp. 195-99.
PART TWO
BUREAUCRACY AND THEORIES OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION
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TWO
SAINT-SIMON AND THE NEW SOCIETY: 
FROM GOVERNMENT TO ADMINISTRATION
ei ne  volkommene G e s e l l s c h a f t  h a t  keine  Regierung,  sondern 
e i ne  Verwal tung.
Wi1 heim Wei t l  i n g , Garantien der Harmonie und 
Freiheit (1842)
Marxism, as one o f  i t s  r e c e n t  exponent s  has obse rved ,  ' c l a i ms  to 
be both a s c i e n c e  and a guide  to s o c i a l i s t  a c t i o n ' ^  and in i t s  combinat ­
ion o f  a n a l y s i s  and e x p l a n a t i o n  wi th  p r e d i c t i o n  and a d v i c e ,  i t  was s c a r c e l y  
a lone  or  even unusual  in t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  cen t u r y .  P r o u d h o n i s t s , F o u r i e r i s t s ,  
a n a r c h i s t s ,  s o c i a l i s t s  and v i s i o n a r i e s  o f  a l l  kinds  shared t h i s  de t e r mi n ­
a t i o n  both to  e x p l a i n  how the  wor ld ,  o r  more p a r t i c u l a r l y  ' s o c i e t y 1, 
worked and to  demons t r a t e  t h a t  i t  could and would work very d i f f e r e n t l y  
and very much b e t t e r  than i t  had h i t h e r t o .  More p a r t i c u l a r l y  t he s e  and 
many o t h e r  n i n e t e e n t h  ce n t u r y  t h i n k e r s  shared  a number o f  profoundly  i n ­
f l u e n t i a l  b e l i e f s  in t he  c o n t e x t  o f  which t h e i r  ana l yse s  o f  and s p e c u l a t i o n s  
about  s o c i e t y  and p o l i t i c s  proceeded.  Europe in  the  n i n e t e e n t h  cen t u ry  
was crowded wi th  t h e o r i s t s  and ideo logues  who agreed  t h a t  ' s o c i e t y ' , r a t h e r  
than p o l i t i c s ,  was fundamental  in human a f f a i r s ,  t h a t  s o c i e t i e s  evolved 
and changed g r e a t l y  over  t i me ,  and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e ,  p o l i t i c a l  a r rangements  
had to be a d j u s t e d  to such changes .  Moreover,  t h e s e  w r i t e r s ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  
the  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  among them,  were e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  they 
knew t he  direction Of h i s t o r i c a l  change and the  s t a ge  which had been reached 
they shared a profound f a i t h  in p r og r e s s  and a b e l i e f  t h a t  the  goal of  . t h i s
1. Goran Therborn,  Science3 Class and Society. On the Formation o f 
Sociology and Historical Materialism^ (London,  1976) ,  p .37 .
progress - a transition from existing society to a new and in every 
way better society - was very near.
54
1 Politics in the Old Society
In their critiques of existing political and administrative 
arrangements, nineteenth century revolutionary social theorists contrib­
uted a good deal to anti-bureaucratic polemic, but their conviction that 
a totally new society was attainable, indeed inevitable, and that 
political forms were malleable derivatives of society, frequently result­
ed in the dissolution of many conventional problems of political organiz­
ation and leadership. Common to much revolutionary social theory and to 
much nineteenth century sociology was the belief that politics as 
commonly understood would be irrelevant to and transcended in the new 
society, the birth of which they were witnessing. As Wolin observes:
In the nineteenth century the anti-political impulses 
nurtured by classical liberalism took on a depth and 
pervasiveness unmatched in previous centuries. 'The irk­
some situation' of today, Proudhon declared, was due to 
'une c e r ta in e  maladie de l ’o p in io n . . .q u 'A r i s to te . . .a  
norme POLITIQUE. The abolition of the political was 
proclaimed by almost every important thinker, and most 
projects for a future society excluded political 
activity from the routine of daily l i f e . l
The thought of the French social theorist and visionary,
Claude Henri de Rouvroy Comte de Saint-Simon, is striking in that he shared
his contemporaries' order of pr iori t ies ,  their faith in progress and
contempt for the polit ical,  and yet did not allow his vision of a new
society simply to dissolve all of the problems that had so preoccupied
earlier writers on politics and administration. Instead, he took seriously,
and devoted considerable attention to, the kind of central administrative
organization appropriate to the coming society. Saint-Simon is
exceptional, too, in the amount of attention he pays to the
1. Sheldon Wolin, P o l i t i e s  and V is io n , { Boston, 1960), p. 414.
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a d m in is tra tiv e  im pera tives  of modern society, the need for co-ordinat­
ion of a 'non-poli t ical1 kind and i ts characteristics,  the permeation 
of government by industrial concerns and requirements, and the necessity 
for the State to util ize managers, scientists,  technicians, engineers.
Saint-Simon is not a consistent thinker, or even, at times, a 
particularly coherent one. His works are full of bad history, bad 
philosophy and bad applied science. Yet they have the effect of a 
kind of intellectual Catherine wheel. Again and again one is startled 
by bright and sometimes astonishingly prescient apercusj which often 
appear fleetingly and disappear again, undeveloped or even contradict­
ed by their author. Saint-Simon's work embodies many of the themes 
and preoccupations, strengths and weaknesses, ambivalences and tensions 
which recur in later revolutionary social theory. But more than much 
of the la t ter ,  i t  points to central and pervasive characteristics of 
the modern world.
Saint-Simon believed that the society in which he lived was 
undergoing, and also approaching the end of, a profound cr isis ,  a crisis,  
he wrote, in which 'society today presents this extraordinary phenomenon: 
a nation which i s  e s s e n t ia l l y  in d u s t r ia l3 y e t  whose government i s  
e s s e n t ia l l y  feudal' }  In putting forward that paradox, he was making two 
implicit claims - one about the general relationship between societies 
and the institutions which exist within them, and another about the 
specific incompatibility between feudalism and industrialism.
Saint-Simon's general claim - later ,  in revised and sharpened 
form, made even more familiar by Marx - is that political institutions 
cannot endure or even operate effectively unless they mesh closely 
with the state of 'social forces' in their epoch. The p a r t ic u la r  
predicament of Western society stemmed, for Saint-Simon, from the co-
1 Oeuvres Completes de Saint-Simon e t  Enfantin  (Aalen, 1963-64) 
[henceforth cited as OC] vol.37, p.33.
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existence and competition of two quite different kinds of forces - 
feudal and industrial. Even after the French Revolution (which he 
considered a failure for this reason) feudal institutions and el ites 
s t i l l  persisted, if  falteringly, and sought to retain their dominance.
The ostensible temporal and spiritual leaders of society were feudal 
left-overs, relics.  But the ' r ea l ' ,  'positive'  forces were not feudal, 
they were industrial; ' i t  is in industry . . .  that,  in the last  analysis, 
the real forces of society reside' .^
One difference between feudal and industrial societies lay in 
the goals they served. Feudal society was devoted to military conquest. 
Military government, dominated by men of the sword (sabreurs) organized 
for war and conquest and ruling by authoritarian command backed by 
force, was therefore appropriate to i t .  Such government is quite in­
appropriate to the goal of industrial society, which is production. 
Industrial society is essentially pacific; i ts  development is impeded
by precisely those activi t ies that are most characteristic of the mi 1i t -
2ary way of working.
A second difference between feudal and industrial forces could 
be seen in the classes associated with each, and one of the clearest 
indices of the current crisis was the absolute uselessness of the feudal, 
and ostensibly ruling, class. For classes are of quite fundamental 
importance in Saint-Simon's theory, as they were to be in Marx's.
Class position is determined by social function, and carries with i t  
characteristic ways of acting, values, competence and beliefs. Except 
for one mention of individual anomalies such as Saint-Simon himself,
3
whom the 'hazards of birth'  had placed in the class of nobles,
1 OC vol. 19, p.18 .
2 See OC Vol. 19 note at p.157.
3 OC. vol.23 p.28.
57
there is no discussion in Saint-Simon's work of people betraying their
class, or of sources of individual action that stem from something other
than class position. There is throughout the unruffled assumption
that all one needs to know of a person's worth and usefulness can be got
from knowing his class. In one of his most famous sal l ies,  and the
f i r s t ,  i f  for perverse reasons, to gain him notoriety, since i t  led
to his prosecution for sedition, Saint-Simon wrote:
Let us suppose that France were suddenly to lose her f i f ty best 
physicists, chemists, physiologists, mathematicians, poets, 
painters, sculptors, musicians, writers; her f i f ty best 
mechanical engineers, civil engineers, ar t i l lery experts, 
architects,  doctors, surgeons, pharmacists, seamen, clock- 
makers; her f i f ty best bankers; her two hundred best merchants; 
her six hundred best farmers . . . [he l i s t s  a wide array of 
ar t isans] . . .  and one hundred other persons of unspecified 
occupations, the most capable in the sciences, fine arts,  arts 
and professions, making in all the three thousand leading 
scholars, ar t i s t s  and artisans of France.
Since these men are the Frenchmen who are the most essential , 
those who direct the enterprises most useful to the nation, 
and those who render i t  productive in the sciences, fine 
arts ,  arts and professions, they are really the flower of 
French society; they are of all Frenchmen the most useful 
to their country, they gain for i t  the greatest glory, they 
hasten most i t s  civilization and i ts prosperity. The nation 
would become a body without a soul as soon as i t  lost them 
. . .  France would require at least a whole generation to repair 
this misfortune, for men who distinguish themselves in works 
of positive ut i l i ty  are real anomalies and nature is not 
prodigal of anomalies, especially those of this kind.
Let us pass to another assumption. Suppose that France 
preserves all the men of genius that she possesses in the 
sciences, fine arts,  arts and professions but has the misfort­
une to lose in the same day M. the King's brother, M. le 
due d'Angouleme . . .  [etc.]
Suppose that France loses at  the same time all the great 
officers of the crown, all the ministers (with or without 
departments), all the councillors of State, all the Maitres 
des vequets , marshals, cardinals, archbishops, bishops, vicars- 
general and canons, all the prefects and sub-prefects, all the 
government employees, all the judges, and in addition the 
ten thousand richest proprietors of those who live as nobles.
This accident would certainly distress the French, because they 
are good people . . .  But this  loss of thirty thousand individuals, 
reputed to be the most important in the State, would only grieve 
them for purely sentimental reasons, for no political harm to
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the State would result from i t J
The simple test  of political institutions and political people 
for Saint-Simon is whether they are useful to industry. None of the 
second group was, and consequently none was of any use to France. And 
since men of industry were in fact subordinated to princes and other 
dominateurs and ro u tin ie r s , one obviously had a monde renverse. More­
over, feudal officials were not simply the least useful of men, while 
the in d u s tr ie ls  were the most useful; the carriers of feudalism did 
actual harm. So far as I know, Saint-Simon never called them bureau- 
cra tes ' nor derided them collectively for being a 'bureaucratic'. But 
he did complain that these government officials treated their positions 
as theirs by right and not as sources of duties, that they governed in
their own interests instead of those of the governed, that they therefore
2sought high pay for themselves and exacted high taxes from the people.
They were not merely idlers (fa ineants, o is i fs )  but were an immense, 
growing, and expensive crowd of incompetent parasites. Since they had 
the same needs and desires as producers, but produced nothing themselves, 
'these people necessarily live on the work of others, either they are given 
or they take; in a word, they are idlers,  that is to say, thieves.
(The idlers who are not thieves make themselves beggars; this la t ter
o
class is scarcely less contemptible or dangerous than the former ) ' ,
Contemptible and pernicious though they be, however, i t  was not 
really their fault. For socio-historical determinism pervades Saint- 
Simon's writing. He was very careful not to appear to be arguing that the 
forces of industry were real because he liked them; they were real as a 
result of ineluctable historical developments which stretched, he took
1 OC. vol.20, pp.17-21.
2 cf. OC vol. 39, p.144-
3 OC. vol. 18, p.130.
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pains to show, over several centuries. Similarly, he recognized
that i t  is difficul t  to blame someone who is being dumped by the
wave of history or, as Trotsky might put i t ,  being thrown into its
rubbish bin. I t  was 'absolutely fa l se1 23 to claim, as the Encyclopedistes
had, that public officials had always been a harmful, parasitic presence
retarding 'the progress of the human spir i t '^ - the very fact that feudal
institutions and classes had existed for so long and had had great
strength proved that they had given 'long and important services to
2the majority of the nation. '  Again, he stressed that he was not
impugning the motives of these parasites. He did not believe that
'each of those who has a part in this grand enterprise of pillage senses
the radical immorality of the state of affairs from which he profits.
I am, on the contrary, persuaded that almost all are well intentioned,
and that they fancy themselves in all good faith very useful, and even
absolutely indispensable to the producers. Such an illusion is natural.
But the force of their situation draws them irresist ibly,  without their
realising i t ,  and in spite of their intentions, in the direction which
I have indicated. The result  is absolutely the same for the producers,
3
as i f  the governors had been led by the purest machiavel1ianism.'
In any event, for Saint-Simon, the fault did not lie primarily 
with the members of the feudal classes as individuals, but in the inst i t -  
utionsand activi t ies of pre-industrial government i t sel f .  In a society 
devoted to production, the needs of industry and commerce are of pivotal 
importance. But control or regulation by government is inherently and 
absolutely inimical to those needs, and to attempt, as feudal government 
does, ' to control everything, to submit everything to rules, to calculat-
1 OC. vol. 21, p.182 .
2 OC. vol. 21, pp.167-168.
3 OC vol. 22, p.173.
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ions, is the greatest of human fol l ies '  J  For, as ' I ’immortel' Adam 
Smith had shown, industry develops spontaneously by an ' interior force' ,  
and to meddle with this development from outside is to destroy i t .
In his earl ier writings Saint-Simon was prepared to allow government 
a slightly greater role than in his later works, but at all times, if 
government is necessary, i t  is only a 'necessary evil '  to prevent anarchy. 
In industrial society, then, the proper role of government is to
p
be an agent not a principal, the 'charge d'affairs  of society' and not 
in any sense i ts directing power. Government functions should be 
extremely circumscribed - all that i t  is appropriate for government to 
do is to protect workers from the unproductive activi t ies of idlers and 
to maintain order, security and freedom in production. Even this 
policing function, Saint-Simon suggests, may become, with the develop­
ment of industrial society, 'almost totally the collective responsibility
3
of all the ci t izens' .  Government at such time will merely prevent 
disorder, and since disorder will be rare, the task will not be onerous.
2 Administration in the New Society
Saint-Simon is not merely a cr i t ic  of existing institutions.
He is an ideologist with a vision of the good society, certain that i t  
is attainable. His critique of contemporary society forms only the 
backdrop for his portrayal of the inevitable future course of history 
and for his demonstration that what is presently inappropriate will 
become non-existent.
I t  can do an ideologist 's confidence no harm to have History 
(and in Saint-Simon's case, God also) on his side, in order to provide 
the otherwise elusive link between what ought to happen and what wi l l
1 0C vol.18, p.77.
2 0C vol.19, p.36.
3 0C.vol.20, p.202.
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happen and Saint-Simon was quite aware of this advantage. In the seventh 
le t te r  of L 'O rgan isa teur  he explained that his arguments for the system 
of social organization he proposed were 'in general of two types: those
of one type will consist in establishing the advantages of this system; 
those of the other will aim to prove that, apart from all i ts  advantages, 
i t  is ,  with respect to its  principal provisions, a forced result of the 
course which civilization has followed for seven to eight centuries; 
from which results the proof that i t  is not at all a utopia. This 
second class of arguments is the more important, for i t  is certain that 
one cannot resis t  at all the course of civilization.'^ It is not, then, 
start l ing to discover that these arguments demonstrate that 'the indust­
rial system is that towards which the human species has always tended;
this system will be the final system; all the other political systems
2which have existed must only be considered as preparatory systems.'
Some of the characteristics of this final system will not surprise 
anyone familiar with the prophecies of European ideologists, or for that 
matter, of Melanesian cargo cultists .  When industrial society is fully 
developed, the whole basis and rationale of governmental domination will 
have disappeared. For industrial society is a co-operative activity of 
producers, all of whom play some productive role and all of whom have 
worth by virtue of their active participation. In the words of L'Organ­
is a te u r  j  the leaders of this industrial co-operation do not need to 
regim ent or command s u b je c ts 3 they corrbine w ith  and g ive  d ir e c tio n  to 
p a r tn ers  (a s so c ie s3 s o c ie ta ir e s )  and co lla b o ra to rs . The only commands 
exercised by the new leaders will be those s tr ic t ly  necessary 'to main­
tain good order in work, that is to say very few. Industrial capacity
1 OC, vol.20 p.63, cf. vol.39, p.33.
2 OC, vol.21, p.166.
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of its  nature loaths to exercise arbitrariness as much as to support i t
. . .  besides, in a society of workers, everything tends naturally to
order, disorder comes always, in the last analysis, from id le rs '.^
National hatreds w il l  disappear, since 'th is  s p ir i t  of discord and of
hatred is essentially contrary to the industrial s p i r i t ;  i t  is nothing
2
but the result of feudal influence'. Industry, he explained in
another passage, ' is  one, a ll i ts  members are united by the general
interests of production, by the needs that they a ll have for security
3
in work and freedom of trade.'
Notwithstanding this id y l l ic  vision, Saint-Simon does turn his 
attention to the problem so many of his contemporaries ignore or merely 
hint at. For Saint-Simon never suggests that the coming decline in 
the role of government implies or is l ike ly  to lead to any decline in
the need for organization and co-ordination of the extremely complex 
and interconnected a ffa irs  of industrial society. Gbvernment> he
frequently says, w i l l  give way to a d m in is t r a t io n , and in his scheme of 
things administration is no small a f fa ir .  Industrial society m ust be 
well administered by those most talented to do so, for otherwise i t  w il l 
fa l l  into anarchy, and this is a fate even worse than that of being 
governed. Administrative capacity, then, is the ' f i r s t  capacity in
4
po lit ics ' ; once a nation is well administered, the form of government 
is of l i t t l e  moment. Saint-Simon does not refer to Pope's often- 
quoted couplet:
1 OC vol.20, pp.151-52.
2 OC vol.19, pp.62-63 .
3 OC vol.19, p.47.
4 OC vo l.19, p.201 .
5 cf. OC Vol.20, p.191
For forms of government le t  fools contest ;
Whiche'er is best administered is best.
but he quotes one of his mentors, Jean-Baptiste Say, to identical 
effect^ ,  and his own view is hardly more dismissive of government 
or less of administration.
To what extent is Saint-Simon's aphoristic  contrast  between
government and administration a mere verbal s le ight  of hand, and to what
extent does i t  represent d i s t in c t  ways of conducting public a f fa i rs?
A large part  of what Saint-Simon has in mind is suggested by his famous
prediction that  in industria l  society the government of men will be re-
2
placed by the administration of things. The contrast  here appears 
to be that  between mil i ta ry  government or command of men by the exp lic i t  
or implici t use of coercion and the a c t iv i ty  of, say, an a r t i san  who is 
d i rec t ly  related through his work to his raw materials  and his product.
But there must be a good deal more to the story than th i s ,  for 
Saint-Simon's schemes are riddled with men ins t ruct ing ,  exhorting, manag­
ing and organizing other men. Savants3 for instance, are responsible 
for educating everyone, and in one scheme they are to devise and organize 
the teaching of a national catechism in which every Frenchman must pass 
an examination before being admitted to c i t izenship .  Ar t is ts  are r e ­
quired to explain the benefi ts of the new system and the horrors of the 
old; businessmen must manage large numbers of people in fac tor ies  and 
on farms. Those key figures responsible for the 'haute adm inistration ' 
of society have, in one way or another, to run the whole national en ter­
prise . The men administering things, in other words, have themselves 
to be administered. And what is th is  i f  not government ?
63
1 OC vo l . 18, p .183.
2 See OC v o l .20, pp.126-127 and p .192.
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Elements of Saint-Simon's answer are scattered through his 
w r i t ings .  He allowed 'adminis tra t ion ' of men where i t  was 'secondary' 
and 'co-operates in the exercise of a greater act ion on nature'^
Industr ia l  management is  an example of th is  sort of a c t i v i t y .  The co­
hesive, harmonious, nature of industr ia l  society el iminates in large 
part the need fo r  force; and i t  is  force, above a l l ,  which for  Saint- 
Simon characterizes the a c t i v i t i e s  of government.
A th i rd  dif fe rence between the new and the old is of central
importance in Saint-Simon's argument. Once more i t  can be approached
through a Saint-Simonian aphorism. ' In  the old system', Saint-Simon
wr i tes ,  'society  was essent ia l ly  governed by men; in the new i t  is
2
governed by nothing but p r inc ip les '  . Here the technocratic s t ra in  
in Saint-Simon emerges p a r t i c u la r ly  c lea r ly .  The goal of industr ia l  
society is given - i t  is to increase production and prosperity  through 
u t i l i z a t i o n  of the sciences, f ine a r ts ,  arts and professions. For Saint-
Simon there is no room fo r  dispute about the goal: i t  is clear and un­
ambiguous and capable of generating open and precise c r i t e r ia  fo r  the 
judgment of performance. What is required of the people is that they 
cu l t iva te  the ta lents  best suited to such judgment. There is no need 
and iideed no place fo r  bl ind obedience to a r u le r ;  there is only a place 
fo r  deference to tested and acknowledged expert ise. I t  is in th is  
context that Auguste Comte's prophetic ins ight  into the role of the 
engineer in industr ia l  society occurs, and i t  is in the same context 
that he wr i tes ,  as Saint-Simon's secretary in Saint-Simon's name:
' I  do not say a new power r ises beside each of the two old powers
o
[temporal and s p i r i t u a l ] ,  but a capacity  r ises beside a pother' .
1 .
2 .
3.
OC v o l . 20, p.192. 
0C v o l . 20, p.197. 
OC V o l . 20, p.86.
Given the goal, all that remains to be done is to adjust the means 
available for attaining i t ,  and this is a purely technical matter, 
a matter of reasoning, of expertise, not of will or of power. 'The 
action of governing', Saint-Simon himself writes, ' is  then at nought 
or next to nought, in so far as i t  signifies the action of commanding. 
All the questions which ought to suggest themselves in such a political 
system . . .are  eminently positive and judgeable; decisions can only be 
the result of scientific demonstrations, absolutely independent of 
all human will, and susceptible of discussion by all those who have the 
degree of instruction sufficient to understand them'"*. Politics, 
in other words, gives way to technique.
Saint-Simon is not, however, prepared to leave i t  at that. For 
production and the application of technique must be organized and co­
ordinated in the most useful way by the class of people best suited to 
this task. And i t  is therefore of crucial importance to determine what 
is the best form of organization and who is best f i t ted for i t .  It is 
in his thoughts on how best to organize the application of technique 
that the in d u s tr ia l  focus of Saint-Simon's thought is most apparent.
For what Saint-Simon does is take completely seriously his claim that
the nation i s  industry. When he says that 'France has become a great
2factory and the French Nation a great workshop', he is not merely 
indulging in metaphor, nor is he simply saying that the nation is 
absolutely dependent on industry, though he certainly believes this.
He is also pointing, as Max Weber later pointed, to the tremendous 
similarities in the operations and management of State and non-State 
enterprises. If the State really is thought of as a factory, then i t
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1 OC. vol. 20, pp.198-99.
2 OC vol. 23, p.91.
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becomes more plausible to argue that the problems to be coped with by
a State will have a lot in common with those facing industry, that
therefore the skil ls involved in coping with the lat ter  will be required
to cope with the former, and that if  some men have these skil ls and
others do not, this fact should be socially recognised.
Saint-Simon frequently says that government by the desoeuvreo
will be replaced by administration by the i n d u s t r i e l s 3 but this lat ter
concept is somewhat rough around the edges. Especially in his earl ier
writings, ' industry' is used in a very broad sense to include 'every
kind of useful work, theory as well as application, works of the mind
as well as those of the hand'."* Elsewhere, and particularly later,  i t
suffers an unannounced narrowing to include only the works of practical
men as dist inct from those of ar t is ts  and scientists.  All are useful
but not all are i n d u s t r i e l s .  Other distinctions and imprecisions muddy
2the picture further, and in any case, whatever precision can be given 
the term, i t  is clear that Saint-Simon does not intend the leaders of 
industrial society to be co-extensive with i t .  For the idea of a 
proper industrial hierarchy pervades Saint-Simon's work. As with so 
many words used by him, the 'equality'  he favours must be understood 
in a quite special sense; i t  is apparent that in industrial society some 
in d u s tr ie ls  will be more equal than others. Industrial society, Saint-
3
Simon writes, allows 'the greatest degree of equality possible.
But what is possible, and Comte adds, desirable, is not I 'e g a l i t e  tu rque3 
' the equal admissibility to the exercise of arbitrary power' but its 
'contrary . . .  true equality . . . industrial  equality which consists in each 
deriving benefits from society exactly proportionate to his social con­
tribution, that is to say to his positive capacity, to the useful employ-
1 OC vol.18, p.165.
2 of_. Georges Gurvitch, Les Fondateurs de la  S o c io lo g ie  Contemporaine j
(Paris, 1958),.vol. 1.
3 OC. vol. 37, p.35.
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1
ment he makes of his means...1 . The meritocratic judgment implicit 
in this definition is consistent both with his attack on privileges 
of birth and with his constant appeals to and praise for 'the most 
important', 'the most capable', 'the most positive' in d u s tr ie ls3 those 
who should direct 'the general interests of society.. . . [since their]
2
capacities are of the most general and most positive u t i l i ty  to society'. 
To grant status on grounds of birth is ,  on Saint-Simon's theory, quite 
irrational since the criterion is irrelevant to one's productive potent­
ial.  But those performing important roles deserved their high status, 
and were the only persons who did. 'There are today', he wrote, 'no 
other notables in France, with the exception of savants and a r t i s t s ,  
than the heads of works of agriculture, of manufacture and of commerce'.
He goes on to explain:
(I understand here by heads [chefs] of different works, 
all the in d u s tr ie ls  who are not purely workmen [ouvrierslj 
that is to say executants, and who take a more or less 
major part in the direction of works). I t  is exclusively 
with them that the power to act on the people is found, 
because i t  is to them that the people is habitually 
subordinated in i ts  day-to-day relations. ^
Saint-Simon stresses the importance of educating the masses
and increasing their capacity for choice and self-reliance, and there is
good reason to think that he would welcome upward mobility among the men
of industry. But the national enterprise will be run by the most
talented , selected by a process le f t  opaque. And while a worker might.
somehow rise to leadership, the distinction at any point of time between
leaders and led will be clear.
However, i t  is far from clear how much 'administration' these 
talented leaders will be required to do. Saint-Simon speaks, as i t
1 . OC vol. 22, P-17.
2. OC vol. 39, p.3-4.
3. OC vol. 22, pp.217-18
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were, with two voices. One voice constantly explains the cheapness 
and efficiency of having national affairs managed by induetrielo .
Essentially their function is reduced to preparing the budget of indust­
rial administration. One is reminded again and again of ' the fundament­
al truth in finance: tha t the budget should be made by those who are 
in te re s ted  in  economy and in the good employment o f  public monies'^ , 
and there is never any doubt that Saint-Simon is referring to the leaders 
of industry. Beyond their particular skil ls within a branch of indust­
ry ' there is a capacity which is common to all of them; i t  is the admini­
strative capacity; i t  is the capacity necessary to make a good budget,
and they are the only ones who possess this capacity; they were its 
2creators' .  They alone 'make a permanent application of i t ,  and at 
their personal risks. Thus when the temporal power is entrusted to 
them, the only impulse of their habits, eminently economical, will lead 
them to reduce the costs of management and administration to the lowest 
rate possible' . ^
Saint-Simon has variously been seen as the precursor of fascism, 
socialism, and of what the contemporary Israeli historian Jacob Talmon 
calls ' total i tar ian technocracy'.^ I t  is therefore important ,to keep 
in mind the modesty of central administration as he characterizes i t .
When asked whether the in d u s tr ie ls  will lose their all-important talents 
i f  they devote themselves to national administration, he explains that 
the public functions of the heads of industry can be discharged on a 
part-time basis and need not interfere with their private industrial
1. OC vol.21, p.142.
2. OC vol.21, p.137.
3. OC vol.22, p.178.
4. J.L. Talmon, P o litic a l Messianism. The Romantic Phrase^ (London, I960), 
p. 35.
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enterprises. This, he points out, is the way in which they already
participate in chambers of commerce and manufacture.^ Anyway, 'in all
times those who have directed public affairs,  are those who have the
fewest occupations . . . [ in]  all Europe . . .  [it is] the supreme directors
of public affairs who hunt the most, give the most festivals,  balls,
2grand repasts, who frequent the most spectacles etc . . . ' .  Elsewhere 
he explains that the most important in d us tr ie ls  will prepare the budget 
free of charge, and therefore ' this function will only be weakly desired' 
in the interests of economy functionaries will be paid only moderately, 
and thus government places will not be much sought after and their 
number will diminish considerably. Finally, an order will be establish­
ed in which a great number of places will be exercised free of charge
'because the rich o i s i f s  will find no other means of procuring consid-
3
eration for themselves'.
But this is not Saint-Simon's only way of speaking. He has 
another, insistent,  voice which rings particularly loud in some of the 
detailed descriptions he gives of the central authorities of the new 
society, and of some of the functions they are to perform. The detail 
of each scheme is deceptive, since i t  is never the same from scheme to 
scheme. But there is enough here to bother Adam Smith. In one scheme, 
admittedly the most detailed, we find that projects of public works are 
to be drawn up 'to increase the wealth of France and ameliorate the 
lot of i ts  inhabitants under every heading of ut i l i ty  and amenity',^ 
and these will be carried out by a chamber of execution staffed solely
1. OC vol. 21., p.148.
2. OC vol.21, p.149 .
3. 0C.vol.37, p.10.
4. 0C.vol.20, p.51.
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from among the 'principal heads of industrial houses'. The most import­
ant ac t iv i t ie s  wi l l  be drainage, clearing, cutting of roads, and opening 
of canals. By the roads and canals w i l l  be parks with museums of 
natural products and industrial products of surrounding countries, 
f a c i l i t i e s  for a r t is ts  who wish to stop, and always there wi l l  be musi­
cians inflaming the inhabitants' passion ' for  the greatest good of the 
nation'^. There is absolutely no textual warrant for Stark's claim 
that Saint-Simon, as a fa i th fu l  disciple of Smith, 'thought only . . .  of'
useful projects which were not profi table enough to otherwise be under-
2
taken by private industry. Saint-Simon makes no mention of this 
l im i ta t ion ,  and I see no evidence that he had i t  in mind. Rather, 
these schemes are part of a general programme of redistribution of 
luxury. Hitherto 'luxury was concentrated in the palaces of kings, 
the residences of princes, in the mansions and chateaux of a few power­
ful men . . .  The present circumstances are favourable to rendering luxury 
national. Luxury w i l l  become useful and moral when i t  is the entire
3
nation which enjoys i t .
In what Saint-Simon calls the spir itual sphere - science, educat­
ion and morality - the amount of work to be done and the amount of con­
trol to be exercised is also considerable. This j$ the sphere of 
the savan ts  and in la te r  works the moralists of the Neu C h r is t ia n i t y ,  
and i t  includes, among other things complete responsibil ity for educat­
ion. These leaders w i l l  ensure the observance of ordinances such as 
the following:
Considering that the strongest l ink which can unite the 
members of a society consists in the s im ilar i ty  of their  
principles and of the ir  knowledge and that this s imilar i ty
1. 0C. vol.20. p.52.
2. Werner Stark, 'The Realism of Saint-Simon's Spiritual Program',
The J o u rn a l o f  Economic H is to r y ,  vo l . V, 1945, at pp.32-33.
3. 0C. vol. 20, pp.52-53.
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can only exist as a result of the uniformity 
of the instruction given to all  the citizens, we 
have directed what follows:
ARTICLE I The Institute will  be responsible for the 
surveillance of public instruction; nothing will  be 
taught in the schools contrary to the principles 
established in the national catechism.
ARTICLE I I  The ministers of different cults will  be 
submitted, for their preaching as well as for their 
teaching of children, to the surveillance of the 
Institute.!
Elsewhere Saint-Simon explains that the i n d u s t r i e l s  will need
an army and courts, and that existing proprietors will  not be forced
to put their capital into industry. But the i n d u s t r i e l s ,  not they,
will  lead, and what the leaders are to do is suggestive:
the most important i n d u s t r i e l s  will take on g r a t i s  the 
direction of administration of the public fortune; they 
will f ix  the rank which the other classes will  occupy; 
they will  accord to each of them an importance proport­
ionate to the services which each of them renders to industry 
. . .  when this result is obtained, tranquil ity will  be com­
pletely assured, public prosDerity wil l  march with al l  possible 
rapidity, and society will  enjoy all the individual and 
collective happiness which human nature could claim.2
There is in all  this a rather hefty work-load for part-time volunteers.
Even leaving out of the account the various propaganda activit ies  
of the artists and the new moralists, the activities of the leaders of 
industrial society lend a busyness  to the central authority which Saint- 
Simon's f i r s t  voice does not suggest at a l l .  How is this to be ex­
plained ? How is i t  that Saint-Simon could use b o th  voices so fre ­
quently, apparently with equal conviction? I have no confident answers, 
only a few tentative suggestions. One is that there may be no real 
problem at a l l :  to hold someone of Saint-Simon's scattiness of mind
responsible for inconsistencies among his desires might be to ask for 
too much. This may be all that one can say, but i f  so i t  should be
1 .
2 .
OC. vol. 22, pp.238-39. 
OC vol. 37, p.42.
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kept as a last  resort,  failing more adequate explanation. A second 
possibility is that Saint-Simon has sufficient faith in the natural harmony 
of industrial society, the natural deference within i t  to i ts  leaders, 
and the obviousness of the p r in c ip le s  on which decisions are made, 
to believe that decisions once taken will not need to be implemented 
by the central authority, that they will simply be implemented by the 
populace. Saint-Simon does not say this,  but i t  is,  at least,  consist­
ent with much that he does say. Third, and most important, there is 
a striking lacuna in Saint-Simon's work: Saint-Simon, the ideologist
of organization and administration and the withering cr i t ic  of existing 
bureaucracies, had no conception of the role and consequences' of 
administrative structures and officials in the new society. There are 
extraordinarily few references to functionaries in the new society: 
on one occasion, he explains that in d u s tr ie ls  will not scramble after 
government places because, i n t e r  a l ia ,  they 'will feel themselves less 
appropriate to exercise government than those who have become accustom­
ed to this kind of work'J But i f  the functionaries are not the old 
fa in e a n ts , who are they ? Elsewhere, as we have seen, he explains 
that they will be moderately paid and that therefore their numbers will 
diminish. What is completely lacking in Saint-Simon is a sense of the 
pressures which the tasks of the State will exert on i ts central appar­
atus, and of the possibility that these tasks will distort  the nature 
of this apparatus beyond recognition. I t  is an insufficiently remark­
ed upon lapse by this otherwise most modern of men. Yet, the paying 
of scant attention to the role of functionaries and function-perform­
ing institutions in the new society, combined with eagerness that such 
functions be performed better than ever before, was destined to be far. 
more than a specifically Saint-Simonian idiosyncracy.
1 OC. vol. 21, p .134.
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THREE
MARX: BUREAUCRACY, CAPITALISM 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY
There a r e  many fundamental  d i f f e r e n c e s  between the  t hought  of  
Saint-Simon and t h a t  o f  Marx. Sa in t -S i mon ,  f o r  example,  pa id  l i t t l e  
a t t e n t i o n  to  c o n f l i c t s  between i n d u s t r i a l  employers  and employees;  Marx 
put  such c o n f l i c t s  a t  the  c e n t r e  o f  h i s  a n a l y s i s  of  modern s o c i e t y .
Sa int -Simon hoped f o r  a s o c i e t y  dominated by i n d u s t r i a l  managers ;  Marx, 
as the  world knows, did no t .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  Marx and l a t e r  Marxi s t s  a b s o r b e d , 1 
o r  a t  l e a s t  d u p l i c a t e d ,  to  a s t r i k i n g  e x t e n t  c e n t r a l  e l ement s  of  S a i n t -  
Simon' s  t hough t .  In t he  Marx i s t  t r a d i t i o n ,  as in Sa in t -Si mon,  we r e p e a t ­
ed l y  f i nd  Manichaean d i chotomies  between the  old s o c i e t y  and the  new; 
command and c o - o p e r a t i o n ;  c o n f l i c t  and harmony; government  and a d m i n i s t r a t ­
ion ;  p a r a s i t i s m  and p r od u c t i on .  Marx and Saint -Simon shared the  b e l i e f  
t h a t  e x i s t i n g  forms of  government  and of  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  were t o t ­
a l l y  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  to the  new s o c i e t y ,  and they shared the  f a i t h  t h a t  they 
could r e a d i l y  be d i spensed  wi th t h e r e .  In h i s  hopes f o r ,  and unde r s t and i ng  
o f ,  the r o l e  o f  government  in the  new s o c i e t y ,  Marx r e t a i n e d  many o f  the 
ambivalences  and t e n s i o n s  which pervaded Sa i n t -S i mo n ' s  t hough t .  Marx i s  a 
f a r  more profound t h i n k e r  than Saint -Simon but  h i s  thought s  on the r o l e  o f  
bureaucracy  both in contemporary s o c i e t y  and in the good s o c i e t y  to come, 
a r e  not  f r e e  o f  the  s t e r e o t y p e s  and lacunae which c h a r a c t e r i z e d  the  w r i t i n g s  
o f  h i s  p r ed e c e s s o r .
1 .
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1 The Theoretical Context of Marx's Discussions of Bureaucracy
(i ) The Analysis of Class Societies.
Social theorists may use or examine the same concepts - capitalism 
and socialism, class and property, bureaucracy and the state, for example - 
and yet have different things to say aboout them and with them. They may 
use or define such concepts in different ways; they may also differ greatly 
in the amount of weight which they place on specific concepts, and in the 
centrality and pervasiveness of these concepts within the structure of 
their thought. Marx wrote about bureaucracy frequently, and at times dev­
oted serious attention to i t .  But neither bureaucrats nor the activities 
in which they were involved stood at the centre of Marx's concerns: they 
were, almost invariably, overshadowed by more important actors and activities .  
The reasons for this are not obscure: the most important activity in every 
society, according to Marx, is not administration but direct economic 
production, and the fundamental social groupings are not the bearers of 
administrative forms or sk i l ls ,  but of productive relations, not bureau­
cracies but, in all but the 'Asiatic mode of production', social classes.
It  is unnecessary to rely on Marx's pamphleteering summaries of
his doctrines, which find so l i t t l e  favour among many contemporary Marxists]'
to discover the fundamental importance which he attaches to production.
Within economic ac t iv i t ies ,  he explains in the introduction to the Grundrisse3
production, distribution, exchange and consumption ' all form the members
2of a to ta li ty ,  distinctions within a unity' and each sphere, including 
production, is affected by every other sphere. But not every sphere has 
the same importance, for:
1. See, for example, Michael Harrington, The Tw ilight o f  Capitalism,
(New York, 1976), p. 59. cf, Raymond Aron, D'Une Sainte Familie 
a l'A u tre3 Essais sur les marxismes imaginaire_, (Paris, 1969), pp.130
Karl Marx, Grundrisse} t r .  Martin Nicolaus, (Harmondsworth, 1973), 
p. 99.
2 .
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. . .  Production predominates not only over i tsel f ,  in the 
antithetical definition of production, but over the other 
moments as well. The process always returns to production 
to begin anew. That exchange and consumption cannot be 
predominant is self-evident. Likewise, distribution as 
distribution of products; while as distribution of the agents 
of production i t  is i t se l f  a moment of production. A 
definite production thus determines a definite consumption, 
distribution and exchange as well as d e f in i te  r e la t io n s  
between these  d i f f e r e n t  moments 1
Moreover, production gains i ts importance not simply from its 
predominance over other spheres of economic activity,  but also from the 
fundamental significance of economics for every other aspect of social 
l i fe.  Marx is far from consistent in his analysis of the relationships
between the economic 'base' and poli t ical ,  ideological, legal, intellect-  
ual and other ' superstructures' ,  but even his least 'mechanical' char­
acterizations of these relationships make i t  clear that forms of economic 
production need to be the prime objects of study, for an understanding 
of social formations. In the f i r s t  volume of C a p ita l, for example,
Marx replied to a cr i t i c  of the C ritiq u e  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy who had 
argued that,  while in the modern world:
the method by which the material necessities of l ife were 
produced, determined the general characteristics of social, 
poli t ical ,  and intellectual l i fe . . .  this did not apply to 
the Middle Ages, where Catholicism held sway; and i t  did not 
apply to ancient Greece and ancient Rome, where political 
considerations were dominant . . .3
Marx was less concerned to challenge his c r i t i c ' s  factual claims than 
to show that,  even i f  they were true, they represented no challenge to 
Marxism, for:
. . .  This much, at any rate, is certain, that the Middle Ages 
could not live upon Catholicism nor yet classical antiquity on
1. Ib id .  See also pp.88-89.
2. For a succinct and intelligent discussion of Marx's indiscriminate, 
movement between terms such as 'correspond', 'condition' and 
'determine', see Michael Evans, Karl Marx, (London, 1975) pp.64ff.
Karl Marx, C a p ita l, vol. 1, tr .  by Edan and Cedar Paul, (London, 
1972), pp.56-57.
3 .
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polit ics.  On the contrary, the way in which, during classical 
antiquity and the Middle Ages (respectively), people gained 
a livelihood explained why, in the former case poli t ics,  and 
in the la t ter  case Catholicism, played the leading role. 
Moreover,(to concentrate attention on a specific instance) 
a very l i t t l e  knowledge of the history of the Roman republic 
suffices to acquaint us with the fact that the secret core 
of i ts history is formed by the history of i ts  system of landed 
proprietorship. On the other hand, i t  is centuries since
Don Quixote had to pay for the mistake of believing that knight 
errantry was equally compatible with all the economic forms 
of society. '
Each mode of production, according to Marx, is composed of 
productive forces and relations of production of a sort and in a 
combination which are uniquely characteristic of that mode. The 'bear­
ers'  of relations of production are social classes, and their conflicts
are the motor of historical change; 'the history of all hitherto-exist-
2ing society is the history of class struggles' .  In each mode of pro­
duction a fundamentally important distinction exists between that class 
which owns the means of production and that which does not; these two 
classes are the fundamental actors in each society and their relation­
ship and conflict are at the root of the definition and capacity for 
change of the society. As Marx explained in the third volume of 
C apita l, relying on though not explicitly invoking the concept of class:
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus- 
labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the 
relationship of rulers and ruled, as i t  grows directly 
out of production i t se l f  and, in turn, reacts upon i t  as 
a determining element. Upon this,  however, is founded the 
entire formation of the economic community which grows up 
out of the production relations themselves, thereby 
simultaneously i ts specific political form. It is always 
the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of 
production to the direct producers - a relation always 
naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the develop­
ment of the methods of labour and thereby its social 
productivity - which reveals the innermost secret, the 
hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with i t  the 
political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, 
in short, the corresponding specific form of s t a t e .3
1. Ib id , p.57.
2. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party' 
in Selected  Works (SW), vol. 1 ,( Moscow, 1951), p .  33
3. Karl Marx, C apital, vol. I l l ,  (Moscow, 1974), p.791.
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Marx does not maintain that relationship to the means of 
production is s u f f i c i e n t  to define and distinguish between classes; 
indeed his scattered and unsystematic comments on class suggest a complex 
and not always consistent set of cr i ter ia .^  But Marx does believe that  
ownership of the means of production is a necessary  condition for a 
social group to form an exploiting class, and, conversely, that 
exploited classes do not own such means. Secondly, though Marx's d e ta i l ­
ed analyses of contemporary events, such as The C lass S tru g g le s  in  France  
and The E ig h te e n th  B rum aire  o f  L o u is  B o n a p a rte , make clear that he 
recognised the existence of far  more than two classes and of important 
subdivisions within classes in existing societies, his insistence on 
the fundamental importance of two classes in each society is not incon­
sistent with this recognition. Poulantzas has made this point with 
uncharacteristic c la r i t y ,  by means of his distinction between a mode 
o f  p ro d u c t io n  and a s o c ia l  fo rm a tio n :
. . .  I f  we confine ourselves to modes of production alone, 
we find that each of them involves two classes present in 
their  fu l l  economic, po l i t ica l  and ideological determination - 
the exploiting class, which is p o l i t i c a l ly  and ideologically  
dominant, and the exploited class, which is p o l i t i c a l ly  and 
ideologically dominated . . .  But a concrete society (a social 
formation) involves more than two classes, in so far  as i t  
is composed of various modes and forms of production. No 
. social formation involves only two classes, but the two 
fundamental classes of any social formation are those of the 
dominant mode of production in that fo rm a t io n .2
The cap ita l is t  mode of production is dominant in contemporary
class society and the two classes whose mutual dependence and confl ic t
are therefore of most importance are capita lists  and proletarians.
1. For an interesting attempt to 'complete' the unfinished chapter on 
classes in C a p i t a l , see Ralf Dahrendorf, C lass ■ and C lass C o n f l ic t  
in  I n d u s t r ia l  S o c ie ty 3 (London, 1976), pp.9-18. For an analysis 
which emphasises the inherent comolexity of 'class' in Marx's work, 
see Bertel 1 Oilman, 'Marx's Use of "Class"', Am erican J o u rn a l o f  
S o c io lo g y , vo l . 73, 1967-68, pp.573-77.
2. Nicos Poulantzas, C lasses in  Contem porary C a p ita lis m  (London,1975), 
p.22. Giddens makes a similar distinction between Marx's ‘ a b s t ra c t  o r  
"p u re " model o f  c la s s  d o m in a tio n  w h ic h  a p p lie s  to  a l l  types o f  c la s s  
system ; and more concrete descriptions of the specific characteristics  
of classes in part icular societ ies ' ,  The C lass S t ru c tu re  o f  the  
Advanced S o c ie t ie s ,  (London, 1974), p.27.
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And these classes are destined to be pre-eminent in a more d i rec t
way than any classes in e a r l ie r  soc ie t ies ,  fo r  a unique feature of
the c a p i ta l i s t  mode of production is that i t  has a continuous, dynamic
tendency to s impl i fy  the class structure :
. . .Soc ie ty  as a whole is more and more s p l i t t i n g  up 
in to  two great hos t i le  camps, in to  two great classes -j 
d i re c t l y  facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Pro le ta r ia t .
Cap i ta l is ts  and pro leta r ians, then, are not merely the most important
classes in modern society; they are destined to become the only such
classes.
In th is  theoretica l context, ne ither bureaucratic a c t i v i t y  
nor bureaucrats as a social category were or needed to be central foci 
o f  a t ten t ion .  Moreover, so fa r  as I can discover, the on ly  times when 
Marx wrote at any length about a bureaucracy were when i t  seemed to 
him to be, or to appear to be, independent o f  social classes.
When Marx portrayed the state as o b v io u s ly  subaltern, he had l i t t l e  to 
say about i t s  bureaucracy; he was fa r  more interested in i t s  commanders 
and in the a c t i v i t i e s  in which they were involved.
( i i ) A Missed Opportunity: The As ia t ic  Mode of Production
There remains, however, one anomaly in Marx's thought which 
is  not s a t i s fa c to r i l y  explained in th is  way, and which, I suspect, defies 
sa t is fac to ry  explanation. This is the problem of the 'As ia t ic  mode o f .  
product ion' .  On a number of  occasions a f te r  1853 Marx and Engels 
discussed a fourth ' h i s t o r i c a l '  mode of  production beside the ancient, 
feudal and c a p i ta l i s t  modes. This was the As ia t ic  mode of  production, 
in which, uniquely, pr ivate property owning classes had never developed, 
and where the d i rec t  producers were:
1. SW3 v o l . l ,  pp.33-34.
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. . .  under direct subordination to a state which stands 
over them as their landlord and simultaneously as 
sovereign . . .  The state is then the supreme lord.
Sovereignty here consists in the ownership of land 
concentrated on a national scale. But, on the other 
hand, no private ownership of land exists,  although there 
is both private and common possession and use of landJ
In these circumstances, the role of the state is quite different from 
that exercised by any other state,  for in the Orient the state is a 
crucial element of the economic base as well as of the political super­
structure :
Climate and terr i tor ial  conditions . . .constituted ar t i f ic ial  
irrigation by canals and waterworks the basis of Oriental 
agriculture . . .  This prime necessity of an economical and 
common use of water, which, in the Occident drove private 
enterprise to voluntary association . . .  necessitated in 
the Orient where civilisation was too low and the t er r i to r ­
ial extent too vast to call into l ife voluntary association^ 
the interference of the centralizing power of Government.
Hence an economical function devolved upon all Asiatic 
Governments, the function of providing public works.2
It  is clear which group Marx believed was exploited in 'Asiatic'
society - the peasantry*, indeed, he and Engels believed that ' in a
peasant country the peasant exists only to be exploited'. But if
this is the case, i t  is legitimate to ask, as Wittfogel has done
relentlessly,^ who the exploiters are. On this question, his cri t ics
and supporters agree, Marx is uncharacteristically terse and vague.
He speaks of 'the s t a te ' ,  ' the government', ' the ruler ' ,  'the sovereign',
but he does not explain who in the state or government, or why alone in
Asia an individual, has power. Endless speculation as to why Marx has
1. Capital, vol. I l l ,  p.791
2. 'The British Rule in India' ,  in Shlomo Avineri, ed., Karl Marx 
on Colonialism and Modernization, (New York, 1968), p.85.
3. Engels to Bernstein, 1882, in Ib id ., p.447.
4. See Karl A. Wittfogel, 'The Ruling Bureaucracy of Oriental Despotism: 
A Phenomenon that paralysed Marx', Review o f Politics, vol.15, 1953. 
pp.350-59; Oriental Despotism, (New Haven, 1957), pp.369-89; 'Results 
and Problems of the Study of Oriental Despotism', Journal o f Asian 
Studies, vol.xxviii.  pp.357-65.
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l i t t l e  to say about this problem is possible, and a good deal of i t  has 
occurred. Wittfogel believes that Marx refused to acknowledge that 
the state bureaucracy was actually the ruling class in Oriental society, 
because he feared the implications which anarchists were eager to draw, 
about the ruling class under ' state socialism1. Lichtheim in an extreme­
ly balanced and judicious account of Marx's writings on Oriental Despot­
ism argues that in relation to Asiatic society:
...Marx for some reason shirked the problem of bureaucracy.
Yet the l a t t e r ' s  role is frequently alluded to in his 
other writings, notably in his diatribes against Bonapartism.
His failure to make more of i t  in connection with the 
'Asiatic Mode' remains an oddity. Perhaps the fact that 
he thought of i t  as a 'caste'  as distinct from a 'class'  of 
society lessened his interest in the subject; but though a 
possible explanation this is hardly an adequate defense.
Tucker rejects Wittfogel's interpretation on the grounds that Marx was 
only interested in systematic analysis of bourgeois society;2 3 this is,  
of course, true but i t  does l i t t l e  to explain why he wrote a considerable 
amount about other aspects of Oriental societies, but remarkably l i t t l e  
about those who had ruled these societies over millenia and about how 
they had managed to do so. Marxists such as Melotti and Sawer concede 
that Marx had l i t t l e  to say about these issues, and Melotti is particu­
larly embarrassed because he wishes to call 'Oriental'  bureaucracy a 
ruling class. He rejects Wittfogel's interpretation but admits that:
1. 'Oriental Despotism1 in The Concept o f Ideoloqy and Other Essays,
(New York, 1967), p.90.
2. The Marxim Revolutionary Idea, (London, 1970), p.67.
3. Hal Draper, who also maintains that Oriental bureaucracy is a class, 
is nevertheless emphatically ^embarrassed by Marx's silence on this 
issue. In a work of unrelieved scorn for other Marx-exegetes and 
particularly Wittfogel, Draper explains:
It is certainly true that i t  never occurred to Marx to reassure 
future marxologists about a question no one was yet asking, since 
his unsophisticated era knew no special inhibition about the con­
cept of a bureaucratic ruling power . . .
The fact is that Marx took i t  for granted that everyone and his 
or her mother knew who ruled under Oriental despotism and similar 
regimes. I t  was an easy question, not a difficulty . . .
(Karl Marx's Theory o f Revolution.I : State and Bureaucracy, New 
York, 1 977), p.561;. Such an explanation of gaps in a writer 's 
work does indeed make problems 'easy' .
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. . .  i t  cannot really be said that the class structure of 
Asiatic society emerges with full clarity from Marx's analysis. . .  
What remains fairly obscure is who made up the exploiting class. . .  
Since Marx is usually very aware of the problem of bureaucracy, 
i t  must be admitted that in this case there may have been some 
resistance on his part to openly recognising the class nature 
of bureaucracy in a State that was not based on the private 
ownership of the means of production - or at least,  to use his 
words, a certain ' judicial blindness' on his part.*
Melotti is content to explain Marx's 'biindess'  in terms of the l a t te r ' s
aphorism that ' the anatomy.of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape':
Marx, unlike Melotti, could not draw on 'the historical experience and
the dawning of self-criticism in the Russian and Chinese bureaucratic
collectives, which were founded largely on the remains of the old Asiatic 
2society' .  This deficiency, Melotti appears confident, has now been 
rectified.
Finally, and most recently, Sawer denies that Marx regarded, or
should have regarded, Oriental bureaucracy as a ruling class, for Marx,
regarded Oriental society as being antithetical to the real 
development of the private ownership of the means of production, 
on which his definition of class rested. Although military 
and civil officials might be benefited their tenure remained 
precarious and the state was always 'the real landlord' .3
Unfortunately, Wittfogel's question whether Marx's continued talk of
' the state '  without analysis of the social groups involved was, in Marx's
terms, 'fetishism' remains unaffected by this passage.
There is no way of conclusively verifying these speculations
concerning Marx's lack of discussion of the nature and role of Oriental.
bureaucracies; i t  remains true that, for whatever reason, Marx did not
undertake such a discussion. This is particularly unfortunate, not
simply for an elucidation of the nature of Oriental society, but also
because such a discussion might have provided an opening for interesting
Marxist analyses of the nature and functions of bureaucracies.
1. Marx and the Third Wortd3 (London, 1977) pp.59-61.
2. Ibid. p.62.
3. Marxism & the A sia tic  Mode o f  Production3 (The Hague, 1978), p.62.
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On one occasion Engels claimed that in the East, 'the orginal servant 
gradually changed into the master...the individual rulers ultimately 
united into a ruling class '^,  and elsewhere he wrote of 'the large army
of bureaucrats which overflows Russia, robs the country and forms a real
2  3 4
class' . However, as Wittfogel and Sawer have pointed out, Engels
comes to these conclusions as a result of confusion - though I believe
suggestive confusion - rather than clear argument. Like Marx, Engels
traces the power of these erstwhile servants to the social functions
they perform, and their independence from society to the 'indispensability'
of these functions; unlike Marx, however, he claims that the performers
of such functions constitute a class. As Sawer remarks, Engels:
made no attempt to reconcile such a function-based 
definition of class with the Marxist definition of  ^
class in terms of ownership of the means of production.
In Anti-Duhring Engels simply separated the sources of class-power
geographically: private property in the West, 'indispensable' social
function in the East. In Origin o f  the Family, Private Property and State
the dilemma was resolved, and Oriental despotism and the source of
Oriental bureaucracies' class power were not mentioned at al l .
Marx's reticence on these matters and Engels' confusions
are early intimations of difficult ies which later Marxists have encountered
in coming to terms, within Marxist social theory, with the role of
extremely powerful bureaucracies; all the more striking intimations
given that they were rarely mentioned and often not read by many of these
1. Anti-Duhring, (Peking, 1976), pp.229-30.
2. 'Russia and the Social Revolution' in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
The Russian Menace to Europe, Paul W. Blackstock & Bert F. Hoselitz, 
eds., (London, 1953), p. 208.
3. Oriental Despotism, pp.383-87.
4. o p .c i t . ,  pp.70-75.
5. Ib id .,  p.75.
6. (Moscow, 1968).
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Marxists. As we have seen, however, Marx's attention was chiefly 
focussed elsewhere; not only was he far more interested in European 
than Asiatic society, but he also believed that the capitalist  mode of 
production was, unlike any earl ier mode, to become dominant throughout 
the world:
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all 
instruments of production; by the immensely facili tated 
means of communication, draws al l ,  even the most barbarian, 
nations into civilisation . . .  I t  compels all nations, on 
pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; 
i t  compels them to introduce what i t  calls civilisation 
into their midst, fe. to become bourgeois themselves. In 
one word, i t  creates a world after i ts  own image.!
Marx's thought should be judged primarily on the basis of the social 
order which he thought to be of most importance, rather than of those 
which he believed to be doomed. And, notwithstanding that bureaucracy 
is not Marx's central preoccupation, i t  becomes, as we shall see, one 
of increasing importance in his writings and also one which came increas­
ingly to dominate his thoughts about the society which was to abolish 
and succeed the capitalist  mode of production.
2 Bureaucracy in Contemporary Society
Marx wrote his earl iest  and most extended critiques of bureau­
cracy in 1843, when he s t i l l  held the Hegelian conception of a true, 
rational, state as the goal of history and as the standard by which 
existing arrangements were to be judged. Bureaucracy was, therefore, ■ 
appraised in terms of i ts  effect on the ability of existing states to 
become rational states and Marx's appraisal was consistently hostile.
When Marx wrote of ' bureaucracy' he used the word in the pejorative sense 
familiar to his contemporaries and to ours: i t  is probably significant
that in his unpublished critique of Hegel's Philosphy of Right, Marx
1 . S W vol. I , pp.36-37.
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e x p l i c i t l y  substitutes the word B ürokra tie  for Hegel's Regierungsg ea a lt  
and S ta a tsb ea m ten?  The pejorative connotations of the word made i t  
a suitable vehicle for Marx's attitude to the institution. In his 
f i r s t  explicit  attack on bureaucracy, in 1843, Marx complained of the
9
presumptuous officiousness'  of government officials,  and 'the contra­
diction between the real nature of the world and that ascribed to i t  
in B üros’ . The individual off icial ,  according to Marx, is convinced 
that 'whether the administrative principles and institutions are good 
or not is a question that l ies outside his sphere, for that can only be 
judged in h ig h er  quarters where a wider and deeper knowledge of the 
o f f i c i a l  nature of things, that is,  of their connection with the state 
as a whole, prevails.^ Senior officials,  on the other hand, 'are bound 
to have more confidence in t h e i r  officials than in the persons admini­
stered, who cannot be presumed to possess the same official under-
5
standing.'  The result in the Mosel d is t r ic t  is that the administration,
. . .  has everywhere, alongside the actual real i ty,  a 
b u rea u c ra tic  real i ty,  which retains i ts authority however 
much the times may change. In addition, the two circum­
stances, namely, the law of the office hierarchy and the 
principle that there are two categories of citizens, the 
active, knowledgeable citizens in the administration, and 
the passive, uninformed citizens who are the object of 
administration - these two circumstances are mutually 
complementary . . .
...The administration . . .  owing to i ts b u rea u cra tic  nature, 
is capable of perceiving the reasons for the distress not 
in the sphere a d m in is te red , but only in the sphere of nature  
and the p r iv a te  c i t i z e n  which lies outside the sphere administered/
1. See Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, C o llec ted  Works [CW] (London,1975) 
vol.3 pp.44ff. In his f i r s t  use of the word in the C r it iq u e ,
Marx writes, 'As Hegel has already assigned the "police" and the 
"judiciary" to the sphere of c i v i l  s o c i e t y , the e x e c u tiv e  is 
nothing more than the administration, which he expounds as 
bureaucracy ’, i b i d . , p.44.
2. Werke (Berlin, 1964) vol.1., p.185.
3. Ib id .
4. Ib id .
5. Ib id .
6. I b id . ,  p. 186.
7. I b id . ,  p.348
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Marx repeats and expands all of these points in his f i r s t  
critique of the Philosophy o f  R ig h t, where he develops his most extended 
characterization of bureaucracy and of what Maoists have called the 
bureaucratic working style, and of what Marx calls the bureaucratic 
mentality (Gesinnung). Although Hegel did not use the word bureaucracy,
he described the institution in strikingly Weberian terms, and argued 
that i t  played a unique and necessary co-ordinating role between the 
particularity of civil society - ' the bat t le-f ield where everyone's
o
individual private interest meets everyone else ' s '  - and the universal­
ity of the state,which represented the common, universal interests of 
all citizens. The bureaucracy is a 'universal estate'  which, though 
i t se l f  an estate within civil society, sees to 'the maintenance of the 
state 's  universal interest,  and of legal i ty ' .^ Its uniqueness as an 
estate lies in i ts fu n c tio n  - not to serve the interests of i ts  members 
but those of society as a whole. Moreover, this function shapes the 
consciousness of bureaucrats, whose motivations and orientations to the 
world are dominated by i t .
Like Hegel, the young Marx believed that the rational state must 
represent the universal interests of the community, but he insisted that 
the existing state did not do so, and that the prominence of the bur­
eaucracy within i t  was one of the major reasons why i t  could not do so. 
Marx did not quibble with Hegel's description of the structure of bur­
eaucracy. In this respect he, too, was a Weberian. Indeed, he thought 
that the description, and Hegel's characterization of the civil service, 
were quite unoriginal: most of the paragraphs, he wrote with some justice,  
could have been taken verbatim from the Prussian Civil Code.
1. Translated, with notes, by T.M. Knox, (Oxford, 1953).
2. Hegel's account, like his new (after 1813) approval of the Prussian 
state,  is clearly influenced by the Stein/Hardenberg administrative 
reforms after 1806. See above, pp.13-14.
3. Hegel, o p . c i t . art.  289,p.189.
4. Ib id .
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All Hegel had done was give 'an empirical description of the bureaucracy, 
partly as i t  is in actual fact, and partly as i t  is on i ts own estimat­
ion.'^ But Marx insisted that Hegel, and therefore the bureaucracy, 
too, completely distorted i ts nature, self-conception and modes of be­
haviour. Far from being a universal estate,  bureaucracy is 'a p a r t ic u la r ,
2
c lo sed  society within the state, '  and the only interests i t  serves are 
i ts own:
The actual purpose of the state . . .  appears to the bureaucracy 
as an objective h o s t i l e  to the state . . .  The bureaucracy takes 
i t se l f  to be the ultimate purpose of the state . . .State object­
ives are transformed into objectives of the department, and 
department objectives into objectives of the s ta te .3 
...The bureaucracy has the state,  the spiritual essence of 
society, in i ts  possession, as i ts  p r iv a te  property  . . .
. . .  In the bureaucracy the identity of state interest and 
particular private aim is established in such a way that the 
s ta te  in t e r e s t  becomes a p a r tic u la r  private aim over against 
other private aims.5
Moreover, hierarchy, the central organizing principle of
bureaucracy, is not, as Hegel claimed, protection against abuse, but
a powerful source of i t .  It  encourages subordinates to rely only on
their superiors for rules and policy, superiors to t rust  only their
officials and both to present a united and impassable barrier against
outsiders. According to Marx, Hegel argued:
...As i f  the hierarchy were not the c h ie f  abuse,  and the 
few personal sins of the officials not at all to be compared 
with their in e v i ta b le  hierarchical sins. The hierarchy punishes 
the official i f  he sins against the hierarchy or commits a sin 
unnecessary from the viewpoint of the hierarchy. But i t  
takes him into i ts protection whenever the hierarchy sins 
in him; moreover, the hierarchy is not easily convinced of 
the sins of i ts members . . .^
If we ask Hegel, then, what protection civil society has against 
the bureaucracy, his answer is:
1. CW VO 1. 3, p.45.
2. Ib id .  , pp.45-46
3. lb id .  , d.46.
4. H i d .  , p. 47.
5. CW. VO 1.3, p.48
6. o> .3, p.52
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1) 'Hierarchy' of the bureaucracy: control. It is the fact 
that the adversary himself is bound hand and foot, and that 
if he is a hammer to those below, he is an anvil to those above. 
Where, then, is the protection against the 'hierarchy' ?
The lesser evil is indeed abolished by the greater insofar as 
it vanishes by comparison .. J
Within the bureaucracy, the official simply viewed 'the state
objective' as his 'private objective ...a chasing after higher posts,
2the making of a career' and, long before Marx explained that being 
determines consciousness, he made clear that the bureaucrat had little 
choice in the matter:
... actual life is material for the bureaucrat himself, i.e., 
it becomes an object of bureaucratic manipulation; for his 
spirit is prescribed for him, his aim lies beyond him, and 
his existence is the existence of the department.3
The bureaucracy shrouds all of its actions in secrecy, preserv­
ed internally by hierarchy and against the community by its closed, 
corporate nature. And when it does interact with the world, the 
relationship is essentially, not accidentally, manipulative. The world 
is clay to be moulded, resistance to be overcome, and it must be treated 
thus, for the bureaucracy
... wants to do everything ... by making the will the 
causa prima. For it is purely an active form of existence 
and receives its content from without and can prove its exist­
ence, therefore, only by shaping and restricting this content. 
For the bureaucrat the world is a mere object to be manipulated 
by him.4
Despite the harshness of these remarks, it is clear that, in 
his Hegel critique, bureaucracy is not Marx's first interest. Already’ 
in 1843, well before the materialist interpretation of society had 
crystallized, Marx argued that the 'bureaucracy' which he attacked 
grew not from any functional imperative or from pressures generated by 
or within bureaucracies, but primarily as a result of external, and 
pathological, social divisions. Marx's primary concerns at this stage
1. Ibid. , p .53,
2. Ibid. s d.47.
3. Ibid.
4. ■ CW, vol.3, pp.47-48.
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were with the form of the rational state and the reasons for the
actual s tate ' s  deviation from this form, and his fundamental objection
is to that sep a ra tio n  between the state and civil society, characteristic
of the modern state,  which the bureaucracy expresses and to which i t
contributes. The monumental inadequacy of the Philosophy o f  R ight was,
for Marx, less that Hegel got his facts wrong than that he had no idea
of what they meant. According to Marx, Hegel had rightly identified
the fundamental cleavage between modern man's civil and political l ife.
Hegel was also correct in describing man's civil l i fe as one of egoism,
hosti l i ty and distance from other men. But this is not a ra tio n a l
state of affairs;  i t  only occurs because man is alienated from his
essentially co-operative nature. He projects his co-operative truly
human essence onto the political state,  while withdrawing into egoism
in civil society. And the existence of a self-contained caste of
bureaucrats is an expression of this division:
Civil society and state are separated. Hence the citizen of 
the state is also separated from the citizen as the member 
of civil society. He must therefore effect a fundam ental 
d iv is io n  within himself. As an a c tu a l c i t i z e n  he finds 
himself in a two-fold organization: the b u rea u cra tic
organization, which is an external, formal feature of the 
distant state,  the executive,which does not touch him or 
his independent real i ty,  and the s o c ia l  organization, the 
organization of civil society. . . !
According to Marx, such a cleavage is not necessary - Hegel 
'has not proved that the executive power is more than one fu n c tio n 3 one 
a t tr ib u te  of state citizens as s u c h ' 2  - but pathological. Whereas Hegel 
argues that recruitment by public examination is a guarantee that every 
citizen has the opportunity to serve the general interest,  Marx replies
1. CW.j vol.3. p.77
2. Ibid. 3 p.41.
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that such recruitment simply reveals how far the state is from true
universality. It  makes manifest that in his a c tu a l  sphere of l ife
the ordinary citizen has no opportunity to serve universal ends:
In the genuine state i t  is not a question of the opportunity 
of every citizen to devote himself to the general estate as one 
particular estate,  but the capacity of the general estate to be 
really general - that is,  to be the estate of every ci t izen. . .  
The examination . . . i s  nothing but the b u rea u cra tic  baptism  
o f  knowledge, the official recognition of the transub- 
s ta n t ia t io n  of profane into sacred knowledge...'
Moreover, Marx insists ,  that however independent i t  appears, 
bureaucracy depends on existing divisions within society. First of 
a l l ,  i t  depends directly on the separation between civil society and 
the state,  without which i t  would have no ra iso n  d 'e t r e .  Secondly, i t  
rests on the existence of divisions within civil society, of corpora t­
ions 3 each concerned with i ts particular interests.  But this second 
relationship, as Marx explains i t ,  is a more complicated one. On the 
one hand, the bureaucracy considered other corporations as rivals and
fought against them. On the other hand, i t  presupposed  the existence
2of corporations or at least ' the spi r i t  of corporations', for like them,
i t  sought simply to serve i ts p a r tic u la r  interests; i t  tried, therefore,
to defeat them, but could not do without them:
Whenever the 'bureaucracy' is a new principle, whenever the 
general state interest begins to become something ‘distinctive 
and separate' and thus a ' real '  interest,  the bureaucracy 
fights against the corporations, as every consequence fights 
against the existence of i ts premises.. . [however] the same 
spi r i t  which creates the corporations in society creates 
bureaucracy in the s t a te . . .  i f  earl ier the bureaucracy 
combated the existence of the corporations in order to make 
room for i ts own existence, so now i t  tries forcibly to keep 
them in existence in order to preserve the spir i t  of corporat­
ions, which is i ts  own s p i r i t . 3
1. Ib id , pp.50-51
2. I b id . , p. 45.
3. Ib id .
In his famous preface to the Critique o f Political Economy
published in 1059, Marx recalled that his early work on the critique of
2Hegel had convinced him that law and state were neither autonomous nor 
emanations from 'the human mind1 234, but stemmed from 'the material conditions 
of l i f e ' ,  civil society, which in turn had to be analysed in terms of pol­
itical economy. There is ,  in fact, no evidence of political economy yet in
3
the 1843 Hegel critique, but there are hints of Marx's later analysis of 
Bonapartism in his suggestion that the bureaucracy might suppress but s t i l l  
depends on the fundamental groupings in society, that, in a convoluted way, 
i t  serves and must serve the groups i t  oppresses. However, the parallels 
should not be pressed too far, for in 1843, with his historical materialism 
not fully developed, Marx allowed the bureaucracy more autonomy than he was 
later prepared to concede. For,while the bureaucracy discussed in 1843 
can be said to be serving the corporations in a weak sense, by preserving 
their existence3 Marx does not make the stronger claim that i t  merely 
serves their interests. The objection to its  control over the state is not 
that other estates thereby control the bureaucracy, but that the bureaucracy 
is i t s e l f  a particular interest and that no particular interest should have
4
such control over a State supposed to represent the whole of society.
A few months before the Hegel critique, Marx had insisted that 
i t  was completely objectionable and abnormal for a state to be in the service 
of private interests,  and he argued that
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1. SW. vol. 1, p.328.
2. 'led to the result t h a t . . . '
3. Such evidence does appear in the 'Introduction to A contribution to the 
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', written in Paris between 1843 
and 1844 and published in the Deutsch Französische Jahrbücher. In re­
calling in 1859 his ‘crit ical review of the Hegelian philosophy of 
right, a work , the introduction to which appeared in 1844  ^ Marx appears 
to have had both the earl ier  unpublished critique and the introduction 
in mind.
4. In Giddens' brief account of Marx's analysis of bureaucracy, this is 
completely obscured. Reading the critique as though i t  had been written 
after 1845, Giddens writes that, for Marx, 'the state bureaucracy i s . . .  
the administrative organ through which the sectional power of the dom­
inant class is institutionalized',  Capitalism and Modem Social Theorys 
(Cambridge, 1971), p.237.
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Every modern state,  however l i t t l e  i t  corresponds to its 
concept, will be compel led to exclaim at the f i r s t  practical 
attempt at . . .  legislative power [by a body representing private 
interests]:  Your ways are not my ways, your thoughts are not 
my thoughts!^
The objection to bureaucrats controlling the state,  then, is the same 
sort of objection as that to estates having such control; the former is 
not a mere function of the lat ter.
By 1845, however, the doctrine usually taken to characterize 
' t radit ional '  marxism had been developed. In The Holy Family3 Marx 
argued that Napoleon I, who ' s t i l l  regarded the s ta te  as an end in  i t s e l f  
represented 'the last  battle of re v o lu tio n a ry  te r r o r  against the
2
bourgeois s o c ie ty  which had been proclaimed by this same Revolution' , 
but even he had appreciated and protected 'the essence of the modern
3
s ta te  . . . the  unhampered development of bourgeois society' .  By 1830, 
the bourgeoisie had matured,
. . . i t s  p o l i t i c a l  en ligh tenm en t was now com pleted  . . .  i t
no longer considered the constitutional representative 
state as a means for achieving the ideal of the state,  the 
welfare of the world and universal human aims but, on the 
contrary, had acknowledged i t  as the o f f i c i a l  expression 
of i ts  own e x c lu s iv e  power and the p o l i t i c a l  recognition 
of i ts  own s p e c ia l  interests .4
In the German Ideo logy  of 1846, the argument is extended. Marx and 
Engels claim that the state in bourgeois society is simply 'the form of 
organization which the bourgeoisie are compelled to adopt... for the
5
mutual guarantee of their property and interests. '  The independent
state,  they insist ,  is an anomalous and pre-bourgeois phenomenon which 
only remains where e s ta te s  have declined but c la sse s  are s t i l l  not fully
1. CW. vol.1, p.241.
2. CW. vol.4, p.123.
3. Ib id .
4. Ib id .  , p. 1 24 „
5. The German id eo logy  , (Moscow, 1976), p.99.
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developed, and where no one group has the power to overcome the r e s t J
Marx and Engels are here speaking speci f ical ly  of Germany, which for them,
stands,  as i t  were, between Europe's past and i t s  present.  No longer
feudal and not yet bourgeois, neither ruled by the e s t a t es ,  nor yet  by
a rul ing c lass ,  the German state  had become 'an apparently independent
force,  and this  posi t ion,  which in other countries was only t ransi tory
- a t ransi t ional  stage - i t  has maintained in Germany until  the present 
2
day' .  In America, on the other hand, Marx and Engels saw Europe's 
f u tu r e :
The most perfect  example of the modern s tate  is North America.
The modern French, English and American wri ters al l  express 
the opinion that  the s tate  exis ts  only for the sake of 
private p r ope r ty . . . 3
This t idy and uncomplicated formula dominated Marx's writing 
about the modern s ta te  unti l  1851, and while i t  did so, Marx had very 
l i t t l e  to say about bureaucracy. But nei ther  the relat ionship of 
bureaucracy to economic classes,  nor Marx's appraisal of i t ,  remained 
so unproblematic. In par t i cu lar ,  Louis Napoleon's coup d 'e ta t  of 
2 December, 1851, led to a fundamental sh i f t  in Marx's thought and to 
a deepening of his analysis of the relat ionship between a heavily 
bureaucratized state  and the class st ructure.
The success of the coup , the eclipse of bourgeois representat ives,  
and l a t e r ,  the s t a b i l i t y  in power of Louis Napoleon, would appear to 
s i t  uncomfortably with the view of the modern s tate  expressed in 
The German Ideo logy , and clearly the phenomenon of Bonapartism caused 
Marx some di f f icu l t y .  Though Marx wrote in The 18th Brumaive that  ' i f  
ever an event has, well in advance of i t s  coming, cast  i t s  shadow before>
1. Ib id . ,  p .99; p.211.cf F. Engels, 'Der Status quo in Deutschland' , .  
Werke, vol .4,  pp.40-57.
2 . The German Ideo logy , p . 210 .
3. Ib id . , p . 99.
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i t  was Bonaparte's coup d 'e ta t  he had written to Engels a week after
the coup i t s e l f ,  'Quite bewildered by these tragi-comic events in Paris,
?I have kept you waiting for an answer'. Repeatedly, within The 18th 
Brumaire Marx presents the coup as a puzzle, a whirl of bewildering and 
misleading appearances which must be sorted out and their essence carefully 
exposed. Marx recognized that the result of the coup appeared to be a 
triumph of Napoleon and the bureaucracy over society, a triumph of the 
executive over social classes. France, he wrote, seemed 'to have 
escaped the despotism of a class only to fall  back beneath the despot­
ism of an individual ...The struggle seens to be settled in such a way
that all classes, equally impotent and equally mute, fall on their knees
3before the r i f le  butt . '  But Marx refused to rest with these appearances, 
and the theoretical burden of The 18th Brumaire is to reconcile the 
materialist conception of history and i ts  emphasis on classes with the 
apparent omnipotence of a dictator with a bureaucratic machine.
Marx clearly believed that, in France, political power was in 
the hands of the bureaucratic state. It is equally clear that Marx's 
attitude to bureaucracy had not mellowed since 1842. In The 18th 
Brumaire he complained of:
This executive power with its  enormous bureaucratic and 
military organisation, with i ts  ingenious state machinery, 
embracing wide strata,  with a host of officials numbering 
half a million, this appalling parasitic body, which enmeshes 
the body of French society like a net and chokes all i ts  pores... 
Every common interest was straightway severed from society, 
counterposed to i t  as a higher, general interest, snatched 
from the activity of society's members themselves and made
an object of government ac t iv i ty . . .^
Given the strength, massive size, spread and intrusion of such 
a bureaucracy, Marx argues that a loss of ministerial power will
1. SW. vo 1.1, p. 293.
2. Werke3 vol.27, p.383
3. SW. vol. 1, p.300
4. SW. vol .1 , p.301
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inevitably result in loss of 'all real influence' unless administration 
is simplified, the number of soldiers and bureaucrats reduced and 'civil
society and public opinion' are allowed to set up their own organs 
independent of the government.^ But the French bourgeoisie could do 
none of these things. Its economic interests depended directly on a 
huge bureaucracy, for i t  offloaded i ts  surplus population there and 
received in salaries 'what i t  cannot pocket in the form of profit , 
interest, rents and honorariums. 1 234 P o lit ic a lly , and therefore indirect­
ly economically, the bourgeoisie was compelled to build up the power 
of the state, in order to defeat the classes which it  oppressed economi­
cally. But the sword i t  had honed was obviously two-edged; the strong­
er the executive became, the more precarious was the bourgeoisie's hold 
on i t ,  and the more threatening would be i ts  capture by anyone else.
Just at this point, where Marx had advanced powerful grounds 
for belief in the possibility of an autonomous bureaucracy, he reassert­
ed a somewhat modified form of historical materialism and i ts  class 
analysis. Marx had already suggested that where the bourgeoisie was 
weak i t  might prefer less rather than more political power, because of 
the camouflage which diluted control could afford. It was thus that 
he explained the attacks by bourgeois royalists on the bourgeois repub­
lic. Though the republic was 'the unlimited despotism of one class over
3
other classes' the royalists yearned 'for the former, more incomplete, .
more undeveloped and precisely on that account less dangerous forms of 
this ru le . '^  Bonapartism represents a more extreme example of weak­
ness being, as i t  were, a source of strength. Where the class struggle
1. Ib id , jp.257-258 .
2. l K d . , p .  258 .
3. Ibid . , P•232 .
4. Ib id .,  P-248.
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is severe, the bourgeoisie's economic position must be secured by a
strong state,  notwithstanding that the bourgeoisie is too weak to control
this state.  Materialism is thus vindicated by the phenomenon which
most appears to threaten i ts validity:
. . . the bourgeoisie confesses that i ts  own interests dictate 
that i t  should be delivered from the danger of i ts cam rule; 
that,  in order to restore tranquil l i ty in the country, its 
bourgeois parliament must, f i r s t  of a l l ,  be given i ts quietus; 
that in order to preserve i t s  social power intact,  i ts  political 
power must be broken, that the private bourgeois can continue 
to exploit the other classes and enjoy undisturbed property, 
family, religion and order only on condition that their class 
be condemned along with the other classes to like political 
nulli ty; that in order to save i ts purse, i t  must forfei t  
the crown, and the sword that is to safeguard i t  must at the 
same time be hung over i ts  own head as a sword of DamoclesJ
In the Bonapartist state,  then, a class may rule economically without 
ruling poli t ically;  indeed, i ts lack of political power is,  in these 
circumstances, a condition of i ts economic dominance.
But Marx is not satisfied simply to portray Bonaparte as a some­
what errat ic bourgeois lieutenant. There was, f i r s t ,  a theoretical need 
to explain Bonaparte's position, to ground this individual's apparent 
independence in a material base. But there was also a very practical 
need to explain Louis Napoleon's extraordinary and repeated electoral 
and plebiscitary successes. The material base which Marx chose, the 
smal1-hoiding peasantry, required l i t t l e  ingenuity, for i t  was the most 
populous class in France. But Marx's explanation of their choice is 
ingenious. Marx argues that the smal1-hoiding peasants were a class 
of a special sort, a vast mass of people living under similar economic 
conditions but isolated from each other and lacking the internal connect­
ions or sense of community which would enable them to organize to protect 
their class interests.  They require to be led and dominated:
1 Ibid. 3 p . 261.
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They are ...incapable of enforcing their class interest 
in their own name... They cannot represent themselves, 
they must be represented. Their representative must at 
the same time appear as their master, as an authority over 
them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects 
them against the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine 
from above. The political influence of the smal1-holding 
peasants, therefore, finds i ts final expression in the 
executive power subordinating society to i t s e l f J
Marx argues further that a dispersed peasantry forms the
ideal soil for the growth, not merely of a dictator,  but of bureaucracy.
In a passage which contains striking but, in regard to bureaucracy
totally undeveloped, parallels to Marx's later analysis of Oriental
Despotism, and which, with the substitution of 'democracy' for'smal1
holding property' , might have come from Tocqueville or Weber, Marx
exolains:
By i ts very nature, smal1-holding property forms a suitable 
basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy. It  
creates a uniform level of relationships and persons over the 
whole surface of the land. Hence i t  also permits of uniform 
action from a supreme centre on all points of this uniform 
mass. I t  annihilates the aristocratic intermediate grades 
between the mass of the people and the state power. On all 
sides, therefore, i t  calls forth the direct interference of 
this state power and the interposition of i ts immediate organs. 
Finally, i t  produces an unemployed surplus population for 
which there is no place either on the land or in the towns, 
and which accordingly reaches out for state offices as a 
sort of respectable alms, and provokes the creation of state 
posts.^
French Bonapartism, then, is a regime which, in times of bourgeois weak­
ness and fierce class struggle, serves the bourgeoisie's economic inter­
ests without being in their control. Moreover, i t  is not an example of 
a truly autonomous state or bureaucracy but i t  precisely a response to 
the special nature of i ts class base.
This is Marx's most extended attempt to account for the 
apparent independence of a modern bureaucratic dictatorship. It  is there-
1. Ib id . p.303.
2. Ibid . p.306.
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fore not suprising that i t  should figure prominently in attempts by 
contemporary Marxists to account for the modern bureaucratic state, and
i
in particular, for dictatorships such as those of Hitler and Stalin.
Recently, indeed, a number of writers have gone further to argue that
Bonapartism is the central model for Marx's analysis of the relationship
between classes and the modern state in general. Poulantzas, perhaps
the most extreme proponent of this view, contends that:
...Marx and Engels s y s te m a tic a lly  conceive  Bonapartism 
not simply as a concrete form of the capitalist  state,  
b u t as a c o n s t i tu t iv e  th e o r e t ic a l  c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  the  
very  type o f  c a p i ta l i s t  s t a t e . . . in Marx's own 1869 
Preface to The 18th B rum aire .. .he opposes Bonapartism 
as the  p o l i t i c a l  form o f  th e  modem c la ss  s tru g g le  in  
genera l to the political forms of formations dominated^ 
by modes of production other than the capitalist  mode.
Evans argues similarly, though far less extravagantly, that:
as the nineteenth century wore on, Marx himself became 
more aware that the class situation depicted in his 
pamphlet was more of a normal than a t r a n s i t io n a l  form.
The state as the instrument of the dominant class was 
seen more as the exception rather than the rule . . . the 
perspective of the Manifesto which sees the state as 
purely the instrument of a ruling class tends to recede 
into the background, to be brought out and austed down 
for special occasions of political polemic. 3
I believe that both of these authors are mistaken here for
reasons which bear directly on Marx's views of the role and possibilit ies
of autonomy of bureaucracy in modern society. They are both simply wrong
in maintaining that Marx saw Bonapartism as 'more a normal than a
4
t r a n s i t io n a l  form'. For Marx continually emphasized that Bonapartism
1. The model of Bonapartism plays a central role in dissident Marxists' 
discussions of the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's. Trotsky 
applied i t  to Germany immediately before Hitler's  victory; then to 
Hitler and finally to Stalin. See also R. Miliband, op. c i t . 3 p.94
& M. Rubel, Karl Marx devant le  bonapartism e3 Paris, 1960, p.68 & p.157.
2. P o l i t i c a l  Power and S o c ia l C la sses3 (London, 1974), pp.257-58.
3. M. Evans, op. c i t . 3 p. 118.
4. Miliband covers similar ground in attacking Poulantzas on this point, 
c.f . 'Reply to Nicos Poulantzas' in Robin Blackburn, ed. op. c i t . 3
p. 260 & 'Poulantzas & the Capitalist State ' ,  New L e f t  Review3 no. 82, 
Sept-Oct., 1973, pp.90-91.
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was in h eren tly  a transitional response to crisis.  In The 18th Brumaire 
i t se l f ,  Marx argued that,  as the archaic small-holdings were inevitably 
undermined, the bureaucracy which was based on them would collapseJ 
Again, as Rubel points out, in his journalism throughout the Second 
Empire, Marx 'seems at every moment only to see the symptoms of crisis,  
and he does not weary of predicting the imminent [prochain ] collapse 
of the regime*. I t  is true that Marx described 'Imperialism' as 'the 
only possible' state form, in the second draft of The C iv il  War in  France3 
and 'the ultimate' form in the published version, but he was, after a l l ,  
celebrating the Empire's collapse. Bonapartism may be 'ultimate' in 
the sense that the state reaches its ultimate bureaucratic consummation, 
and i t  is the bourgeoisie's 'ultimate' weapon. I t  may even be normal 
in certain historical epochs, without ceasing to be transitional.  Indeed, 
i t  would seem much closer to what Marx is saying in The C iv i l  War in  
France to call Bonapartism a normal, transitional form. On Marx's 
account i t  signifies the last ,  humiliating defence of a decadent bour­
geoisie,
the only form of government possible at a time when the 
bourgeoisie had already lost,  and the working class had not 
yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the n a t i o n . 3
Bonapartism is in no way a general characteristic of all capitalist
states: i t  is a specific stage through which such states pass on the
way to their doom.
In any event as Poulantzas certainly recognises but Evans leaves 
unclear, to argue that Bonapartism is normal is not necessarily to deny 
that the bureaucratic state serves the dominant class. Engels made 
this plain when, well before he wrote of 'determination in the last
1. SW3 vol. l .  p.308
2. o p . c i t . j p.149.
3. The C iv i l  War in  France (Peking, 1966), p.66. This edition includes 
the important f i r s t  and second drafts.
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analysis ' ,  he suggested to Marx that Bonapartism was
. . . the real religion of the bourgeoisie. It  is becoming ever 
clearer to me that the bourgeoisie has not the stuff in i t  for 
ruling directly i t se l f ,  and that therefore where there is no 
oligarchy, as there is here in England, to take over, for 
good pay, the management of state and society in the interests 
of the bourgeoisie, a Bonapartist semi-dictatorship is the 
normal form. It  upholds the big material interests of the 
bourgeoisie - i.e. even against the will of the bourgeoisie, 
but allows the bourgeoisie no share in the power of government. 
The dictatorship in i ts  turn is forced against i ts  will to , 
adopt these material interests of the bourgeoisie as i ts  own.
Except for the sweep of Engels' remarks, there is nothing inconsistent
with The 18th Brimaire in them. And Marx comes very near to complete
endorsement of them in The C iv il War in  France. In the second draft,
Marx claims of Imperialism that,  although:
at f i r s t  view, apparently, the usurpatory dictatorship of 
the governmental body.over society i tsel f ,  rising alike above 
and humbling alike all classes, i t  has in fact,  on the European 
continent at least,  become the only possible state form from 
which the appropriating class can continue to sway i t  over 
the producing class.2
Indeed, Marx suggests in this draft that,  in periods of intense class 
struggle, the state must 'more and more develop i ts character as the
3
instrument of class-despotism'. There is,  then, no necessary link 
between regarding Bonapartism as 'normal' and abandoning the conception 
of the state as the agent of the economically ruling class.
But, Poulantzas insists throughout his work, Bonapartism is a 
form of agency of a very special, ' relat ively autonomous 'kind, and so 
i t  is. Marx's early epigrammatic statements about the function of the " 
capital ist  state,  had nothing to say about the actual way in which the 
interests of the dominant classes were served, and they are open to at 
least two interpretations. One simple, and in principle falsifiable,
1. Selected  C orrespondence(Moscow, 1965),[SC] p.177.
2. The C ivil War in F r a n c e p.228.
3. Ib id ., p.229.
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claim which Marx might be making is that the state simply does the
b idd ing  of the dominant classes, that i t  is simply an organ of the lat ter ,
or an instrument in their hands. I t  is not at all obvious to me, as i t
1 2appears to be to Miliband and Poulantzas, that this 'vulgar' inter­
pretation is alien to Marx's thought - even in 1871, as we saw above,
Marx described the state as an 'instrument of class-despotism' - 
but i t  is not the only interpretation which is possible. For a subtler 
interpretation can be made, which has the twin advantage, for Marxists, 
of surviving the refutation of the above claim, while i t se l f  being 
very diff icult  to falsify.  On this interpretation the state serves 
the i n t e r e s t s  of the dominant classes, but i t  does so without being 
their to o l ,  indeed without necessarily being subservient to them at a l l ,  
at least until ' the last  analysis' .  An appropriate analogy here might 
be that of the relationship between a doctor and a patient: a doctor 
does not simply do what he is told by a patient but ministers to his 
' interests '  with a potentially great amount of independence from the 
patient 's immediate desires. Indeed the sicker a patient becomes, 
the more 'powerful' and less controllable the doctor will be. In certain 
circumstances also, the doctor may be required to administer quite drast­
ic treatment, often causing great pain, but allegedly in the patient 's 
interests.  For Marx, Bonapartism is s p e c i a l i s t  treatment meted out to 
a very il l  bourgeoisie. I t  is precisely at this point, however, that 
the medical analogy breaks down. For, i f  a patient dies after proper 
treatment, the doctor survives and is free to continue treating new 
patients. Marx was convinced or at least determined, on the contrary,
1. 'Poulantzas and the Capitalist State ' ,  op. c i t . ,  p.85
2. 'The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband1 2, Neuj L e f t  Review jNo .95, 
January-February, 1976, pp.63-93, especially at pp.72-76.
that capitalism would be Bonapartism's last  patient; with the death 
of the former would come necessarily the demise of the la t ter ,  and the 
bureaucratic apparatus which i t  employed.
Marx's analysis of Bonapartism, however, is central to his 
political thought in another sense. It  is linked with Marx's much 
greater concern with bureaucracy after 1851 and with his new insistence 
that the victorious proletariat  must not try to enlist  the services of 
existing state organizations and personnel, but must do away with them.
There is no evidence that, before 1851, Marx saw bureaucracy 
as a profound threat to the revolution. In the Communist Manifesto} 
for example, he advocated a number of measures of centralization for 
the victorious proletariat to undertake, and he gave no hint that such 
measures, which appeared to involve taking over and centralizing a large 
number of existing inst itutions,  might lead to bureaucratization on an 
unprecedented, or even a worrying, scale. While he may have been naive 
here, he was not inconsistent. For he did not avoid the problem of 
bureaucracy only when he came to write of proletarian  class rule; he 
had l i t t l e  to say about i t  when he wrote of direct bourgeois class rule. 
In The 18th B ru m a ire however, Marx suggested that,  rather than wrest 
control of the bureaucracy from its possessors, as Drevious revolutions 
had done, the proletariat  must smash the institution.^ In The C ivil 
War in  France in 1871, Marx's attack on the state is pre-eminently an 
attack on bureaucracy , and his espousal of the Paris Commune concentrates 
upon,and occasionally invents, i ts  anti-bureaucratic measures. In the 
f i r s t  draft, Marx claimed that previous revolutions had 'only perfected
p
the state machinery instead of throwing off this deadening incubus';
101
1. SW vol.1, p.301
2. O p.cit. p. 164.
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by contrast,  ' the true an t i thes is  to the Empire i t s e l f  - that is to
the state power, the central ized executive of  which the Second Empire
was only the exhausted formula - was the  Commune.'^ In the other two
versions, Marx emphasized s im i la r ly  that ' the working class cannot
simply lay hold on the ready-made state machinery and'Wield i t  fo r  the i r  
2
own purpose ' ,  and in the second d ra f t  th is  passage continued, 'The
p o l i t i c a l  instrument of  th e i r  enslavement cannot serve as the p o l i t i c a l
instrument of the i r  emancipation.' In a l e t t e r  to Kugelmann in 1871,
and in a speech to the Hague Congress in 1872, Marx again stressed that ,
in the bureaucratized countries of Europe, the task of the revolut ion
'w i l l  be no longer, as before, to transfe r  the bureaucratic m i l i t a r y
machine from one hand to another, but to smash i t . ' 1 234 5 F ina l ly ,  in the
1872 preface to the German ed i t ion of  the Communist M a n ife s to ,  Marx and
Engels explained that 'no special stress is la id  on the revolut ionary
measures proposed' in the M a n ife s to  and they added that 'one thing
especia l ly was proved by the Commune, v i z . ,  "the working class cannot
simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield i t  fo r  i t s  
„,5own purposes.
3 Bureaucracy and the Proletarian Revolution
For Marx, as fo r  Saint-Simon, then, there is a sharp break bet­
ween the bureaucratic arrangements of the old society and the administrat­
ive arrangements of the new. But what w i l l  these new arrangements be?
1 . I b i d . , p. 165.
2. I b i d . ,  p.228.
3. I b i d . , p.228.
4. S e le c te d  C orrespondence, p.262.
5. SW, v o l . 1, pp. 21 -22.
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How will the society born of the proletarian revolution do without
the bureaucracy which this revolution smashed? I t  is not possible to
give a precise answer to these questions both because Marx never did so
and because his thought displayed an unresolved ambivalence between an
extreme etatism e  and an extreme revulsion against the state. Both
tendencies exist in Marx's writings, each has appealed to many of his
followers, and i t  is diff icul t  to conceive of institutional arrangements
which could successfully satisfy them together.
In 1883, the Sydney Liberal published the following obituary:
Karl Marx, the ablest of all the Communistic writers is dead.
His great work, On Capital [sic] is a masterpiece. While, 
however, agreeing with most of i ts  crit ical portions, we are not 
in accord with his remedies. He was a State Socialist and -j 
advocated State control of all industries of all kinds whatever.
Though the Liberal is not usually cited as an authority in these
matters, i t  helps to show how widespread the belief that Marx was an
e ta t i s t  socialist  was, even in his own time. There is much in Marx's
writings to lend support to this view. The only thing for which Marx
praised bureaucracy, and the thing for which he consistently praised i t ,
was i ts role in centralizing nations. In Marx's and Engels' 1850 address
to the Communist League, Germans were told that they 'must not only
strive for a single and indivisible German republic, but also within
this republic for the most determined centralization of power in the
hands of the state authority . . .  As in France in 1793 so today in Germany
i t  is the task of the really revolutionary party to carry through the
2st r ic tes t  centralization. '  In The 18th Brumaire and The C ivil War 
in  France the reviled bureaucracy is s t i l l  credited with teleological 
virtue, as i t  were, by association with that centralization and destruct­
ion of feudal 'rubbish' which i t  was the ' task'  of the French Revolution 
to accomplish.
1. The L iberal, Sydney, 19th May, 1883, p.4, quoted in Henry Mayer,
Marx, Engels and A ustra lia  (Sydney, 1964), p.149.
2. SW., vol.1. p.308.
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Marx's endorsement of centralization is not confined to the 
achievement of bourgeois revolutions. In the Communist Manifesto3 as 
we have seen, proletarian centralization was regarded as an unqualified 
good. In The 18th Brumaire Marx wrote, in the context of proletarian 
revolution, of ' the centralization of the state that modern society 
requires'."* In 1870 Marx commented ironically (to Engels) on the 
' Proudhonised Stirnerism' of ' the representatives of "Young France" 
(non-workers) . . .  Everything is to be dissolved into small "groups" or
2"communes", which in turn are to form an "association", but no s tate. '  
Even in The C ivil War in  France3 Marx emphasized that the communards did 
not intend to break the unity of the nation and he warned that,  though ' 
i t  had been, the Commune should not be 'mistaken for an exaggerated
3
form of the ancient struggle against overcentralization. '
Moreover, as Evans points out,^ the state in the transition 
period would have an essentially aggressive ro le .  This arises partly 
from the sp e c ific  tasks involved in clearing the way for socialism and 
partly because, as Marx explained in another context, 'every provisional 
state set-up after a revolution requires a dictatorship, and an energetic 
dictatorship at that . ' ^
Finally, we have Marx's acknowledgments that,  even in the higher 
stage of socialism, direction and planning will be required, at least in 
economic production. In The C ivil War in  France Marx refers to a 'nat­
ional delegation' which was to have been established by the Commune, and 
'nowhere does he imply that this new body should ultimately disappear'.
1. SW. vol.l , p.308.
2. SC. p.179
3. O v .c it .3 p.70.
4. Michael Evans, Karl Marx, p. 149
5. Werke, vol.5, p.40 2.
6. Shiomo Avineri, The Social and P o litic a l Thought o f  Karl Marxy
(Cambridge, 1970), p.202, where Avineri comments that ' i t  is only 
natural that such statements [by Marx] have caused some consternat­
ion. '
105
Nevertheless, Marx's vision of the truly human society was a 
profoundly anarchist oneJ The new society was to eliminate speciali­
zation and division of labour, and was to be essentially productive 
and harmonious, no longer racked by the contradictions which scarred 
existing societies, nor held in thrall by a massive state machine of 
oppression. But how, given his e ta t i s m e and how, in any case, did 
Marx imagine that bureaucracy would cease to be a threat to the citizens 
of the new society? A few clues exist.
There is a strongly Saint-Simonian strain in Marx's attitude to 
existing bureaucracies and to their fate. First of a l l ,  like Saint- 
Simon, Marx frequently suggested that coercion and repression were 
central to the role of existing bureaucracies. Both thinkers' confid­
ence that the future society would be harmonious and co-operative led 
them to argue that this central bureaucratic function would become 
otiose. Neither Saint-Simon nor Marx is concerned to deny the necessity 
of public affairs but solely that of public coercive power in the new 
society. And with the end of the state as policeman comes a reduct­
ion in the number of functions and a complete change in the nature of 
functions carried out by the public power. After the abolition of 
classes, ' there will be no more political power properly so-called, since
political power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in 
2civil society. '  Similarly, there will be no need for masses of haughty,
brutal, repressive bureaucrats:
As soon as the goal of the proletarian movement, the 
abolition of classes, shall have been reached, the power 
of the state,  whose function is to keeD the great majority 
of producers beneath the yoke of a small minority of 
exploiters, will disappear and governmental functions will 
be transformed into simple administrative functions.3
1. cf. M. Rubel, 'Marx theoricien de 1 ' anarchisme' in Marx Critique 
de Marxismen (Paris, 1974), pp.42-59.
2. The Poverty o f Philosophy^ Moscow, n.d.,)p.!97 cf SW vol.l.p.51.
3. W erkevol.18, p.50.
But since the state ' s  functions are not a l l  coercive, will a 
need remain for bureaucracy to accomplish those that are not? Marx's 
conviction that there is no such need is again very Saint-Simonian.
Both writers shared a second image of bureaucracy, that of a huge and 
dangerous, but eminently dispensable, p a r a s ite .  Bureaucracy was 
parasitic,  both for Marx and Saint-Simon, because i ts historical role 
had been played and i t  was inappropriate to the new society. Now 
i t  did nothing productive but merely extorted incomes generated by real 
producers. Therefore,
the demolition of the state machine will not endanger 
centralization. Bureaucracy is only the low and brutal 
form of a centralization that is s t i l l  afflicted with its 
opposite, with feudal ismJ
But neither Saint-Simon nor Marx wished to argue that administrat­
ion per se  is unproductive; i t  is legitimate, therefore, to ask them in 
what ways the organization of future a d m in is tra to rs  will differ from 
those of contemporary b u rea u cra ts . I have already argued that Saint- 
Simon has nothing interesting to say about this question, indeed virtually 
nothing at al l .  Saint-Simon says a lot about the e l i t e s  of industrial 
society and about i ts  need for o rg a n iza tio n , but almost nothing about 
i ts bureaucrats. For most of his l i f e ,  Marx said even less. There is 
no evidence that Marx had given the matter close attention, nor that 
communal decentralization had appealed to him, before 1871, but in the 
Paris Commune he saw powerful intimations of the way in which a society'  
could be organized without bureaucracy. And in Marx's discussions of 
the Commune, his thought moves from strongly Saint-Simonian assumptions 
in a profoundly wnSaint-Simonian direction; not toward a hierarchy of 
talent but to a free association of equals.
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1. SW, vol. 1, p.308.
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Marx did not regard the Paris Commune as socialist ; i t  was
merely 'the political form of the social emancipation'1 23456and in its
2measures there was 'nothing so c ia l i s t . . .except their tendency./'. 
Nevertheless, Marx clearly regarded the anti-bureaucratic measures which 
he saw as its  core, as relevant to socialism and not merely to the trans­
itional regime. In Statism  and Anarchy, Bakunin asked, 'The Germans number 
around forty million. Will,for example, all forty million be members of 
the government ?' and Marx replied, 'Certainly 1 • Since the whole thing
3
begins with the self-government of the commune.' The Commune was 'the
4
people acting for i t s e l f  by i t s e l f '  ; i t  was this achievement which the 
communist society would emulate. In the transitional and the socialist  
societies the character and role of public functionaries would be trans­
formed because they would be really and completely under the control of the 
producers, that is,  at f i r s t  the proletariat and then the whole people.
And the institutional means to such control were to be communal. All 
public functions would be executed by communal agents rather than by agents 
of a central government, and this would apply even to the 'few, but import-
5
ant functions which s t i l l  would remain for a central government.'
In the second draft, Marx explained that
I t  is one of the absurdities to say, that the Central 
functions, not of governmental authority over the 
people, but necessitated by the general and common wants 
of the country,would become impossible. These functions would 
exist, but the functionaries themselves could not, as in 
the old governmental machinery, raise themselves over 
real society, because the functions were to be executed by 
communal agents, and, therefore, always under real control.
The public functions will cease to be a private property 
bestowed by a central government upon its  tools. 6
1. The C iv il War in  France, p .171.
2. Ib id .,  p.183.
3. The F irs t In ternational and A fter , p. 335.
4. The C iv il War in  France, p.141.
5. Ib id .,  p. 69.
6. Ib id , p.233.
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Moreover, the appointments of a l l  functionaries, including 
magistrates and judges, were to be revocable at any time, as is done,
Marx quaint ly  notes, by companies and ind iv iduals  ' in  matters of real 
business.'^ The bureaucrats were not to be members of  a pr iv i leged 
caste but were to be paid workmen's wages and the appointing and paying 
body, the commune, would comprise workers or th e i r  representatives who 
would be elected by universal suffrage and be 'responsible and revocable 
at short terms'.  This body would combine le g is la t ive  and executive 
funct ions.
Marx was confident that such measures would shatter the bureau­
c ra t ic  mystique, which he had already condemned in his f i r s t  c r i t ique  
of Hegel. I t  would destroy
The delusion as i f  administrat ion and p o l i t i c a l  governing 
were mysteries, transcendent functions only to be trusted 
to the hands of  a trained caste - s tateparas i tes, r i c h ly  paid 
sycophants and s ine cu r is ts . . .  Doing away with the state 
hierarchy altogether and replacing the haughteous masters 
of  the people with always removable servants, a mock res­
p o n s ib i l i t y  by a real respon s ib i l i ty  as they act continuously 
under publ ic supervision.3
The C i v i l  War i n  France is Marx's most e x p l i c i t  and detai led 
account o f  the in s t i t u t io n a l  arrangements which w i l l  replace bureaucracy, 
and th is  account can be supplemented to some extent from several of 
Marx's other w r i t ings .  The fol lowing character is t ics  emerge:
1. Administ rat ive functions w i l l  ex is t  and w i l l  be important in
the new society, but they w i l l  be merely 'simple administrat ive functions'
2. The need fo r  administra t ive fu n c t io n a r ie s  w i l l  also survive the
trans i t ion  to social ism.^ However they w i l l  be paid less and th e i r
1 . Ib id .  , p.70 ,
2. I b id . ,  p .67 ,
3. I b id .  3 p.169,
4. Marx makes th is  clear in his comments on Bakunin, reprinted in Marx 
and Engels.,The F i r s t  In te rn a t io n a l and A f te r  3 (New York, 1974),
pp. 335-56.
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tenure will be less secure;
3. Because functionaries will be paid less and because the standing 
army and ' state functionalsm1 2 will be eliminated, administrative costs 
will be less than before, and, in particular,  ' the general costs of all 
administration not directly appertaining to production . . .  will ,  from 
the outset, be very significantly limited in comparison with the present 
society. [They] will diminish commensurately with the development of 
the new society' J
4. Administrative functions will be divided in an unspecified way 
between central and communal institutions,  though all will be under the 
communes' control.
Nevertheless, as Marx unconsciously implies in his remarks on
Bakunin, all these safeguards may be worthless. Bakunin alleges that the 
Marxist people's state is simply the government of the people by a small
number of elected leaders, and Marx retorts ,
Asine'. This democratic twaddle, political drivel! Election 
is a political form present in the smallest Russian commune 
and ar tel .  The character of the el ection does not depend on 
this name, but on the economic foundation, the economic s i tuat­
ion of the voters, and as soon as the functions have ceased 
to be political ones, there exists 1) no government function,
2) the distribution of the general function has become a business 
matter, that gives no one domination, 3) election has nothing 
of i ts  present political character.
This is quite a tangle. Taken l i t eral ly ,  i t  implies that if the
economic foundation is not adequately developed, then the institutional
safeguards Marx advocates cannot succeed during the transition period,
when functions are s t i l l  'polit ical ones'. This version would satisfy
the Mensheviks, but not Lenin or Trotsky. But if the economic foundation
1. Ibid. , p.345 .
2. Ibid. 3 p.336.
no
is adequate, then there is no need for transitional proletarian dic tat ­
orship. In this case the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks, and Marx, were 
wrong.
4 The Organization of Labour
As we have seen, Marx's primary interest,  at least after 1845, 
was not the political ' superstructure1 23 but the economic base, and in 
particular the workings and fate of the capital ist  mode of production. 
What importance, then, did Marx attach to bureaucratic organization 
within that mode, and within i ts successor? Marx's comments on large 
scale capi tal is t  production are studded with political metaphors. He 
writes, for example, of the 'despotism' and the 'autocracy' of capital; 
he compares the power of capi tal ist  to that of 'Asiatic or Egyptian kings 
or of Etruscan theocrats and the l i k e . '  ^ So far as I know, he does not 
describe the factory as a bureaucracy but he does use m il i ta r y  metaphors 
which themselves are frequently used of bureaucracies. In modern 
industry,
Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are 
organized like soldiers. As privates of the industrial 
army they are placed under the command of a perfect 
hierarchy of officers and sergeants.2
Elsewhere Marx writes of the factory's
barrack-like discipline,  which is elaborated into a 
complete factory system, involving a full development 
of the. . .  work of supervision - this meaning the division 
of the workers into operatives and overlookers, into the 
private soldiers and the non-commissioned officers of an 
industrial army.3
Marx considered this form of productive organization abhorrent 
and doomed. But what was to replace it? Notwithstanding Marx's 
occasional fl ights of Arcadian and pre-industrial imagery, i t  is clear .
1. C a p ita l , vo1.1 p.350.
2. SW, vol . 1, p.39.
3. C a p ita l>v o l . 1, p. 452.
I l l
that he did not envisage any reversion to small-scale production.
On the contrary, 'only with large scale industry does the abolition
of private property become possible' .^ And if part of Marx's politica l
vision was anarchist, no part of his economic vision was. Modern
production required cooperation and cooperation required coordination,
2
management and supervision. There must be a 'commanding will '  where- 
ever production is a cooperative and not an independent effort ,  ie  in 
all capi tal ist  and post-capitalist societies. Engels makes the point 
with a disarming bluntness. In On Authority, his reply to anarchist 
criticisms, Engels argues that
...whoever mentions combined action speaks of organization; 
now, is i t  possible to have organization without authority?.. .  
wanting to abolish authority in large-scale industry is 
tantamount to wanting to abolish industry i t s e l f . . .  Why do 
the anti-authoritarians not confine themselves to crying out 
against political authority, the state?3
Similarly in a let ter  attacking Bakunin's views of the future society,
Engels writes:
In this [anarchist! society there will above all be no 
authority , for authority = state = absolute evil. (How 
these people propose to run a factory, operate a railway or 
steer a ship without a will that decides in the last  resort,  
without single management, they of course do not tell  us).^
There seens to me to be nothing in these passages with which
Marx disagreed, though as was often the case, some of the subtleties of
his thought were lost in Engels*' translation. For Marx argued that
the authority exercised in modern factories was composed of two elements:
one was the authority required in all forms of cooperation, the other
was only required when the owner of the means of production needed to
5
dominate the producer and extract surplus value from his labour.
'• The German Ideology, p.72
2. See the chapter XI, on 'Cooperation' in Capital, vol . l ,  pp.336-52.
3. SW. vol. l .  pp.575-77.
4. SC, p.274
5 See Capital vol.l pp.348-349; Capital vo1.111, pp.382ff.
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In communist society there would indeed be planning and coordination, 
and rather more of i t  than hitherto^; but since i t  was based on the 
willing cooperation of the direct producers rather than that imposed 
by capital ists, the 'commanding will '  would resemble that of an orchestra 
conductor rather than that of a field commander. Moreover the special­
ized cripple who is equipped only to perform one routine function will 
be replaced by
the perfect adaptability of the individual human being 
to the changing demands for different kinds of labour; 
so that the detai1-worker who has nothing more to perform 
than a partial social function, shall be superseded by an 
individual with an all-round development, one for whom  ^
various social functions are alternative modes of activity.
It is obviously useful to Marx's argument to be able to 
demonstrate how this new form of cooperation and authority is to come 
about, and Marx attempted to do so. In his attempt he largely ant ici­
pated part of Burnham's managerial thesis which was claimed by i ts  author 
to have superseded Marx. Marx seeks in vo1.III of Capital to show that 
capitalism is dissolving from within and his demonstration focusses 
largely on the role of the manager. Even in the ordinary capital ist  
firm, according to Marx, the capi tal is t  qua capitalist  is ceasing to 
have a function. The function of the money-capitalist who lends his 
money has nothing to do with production per sej i t  is simply a trans-
3
action between capital ists and is increasingly being taken over by banks. 
The productiverole of the industrial capital ist  who borrows money and 
runs the factory or firm, on the other hand, has nothing to do with 
the chance that he does or does not have capital of his own, but is 
simply made up of his supervisory or managerial work:
1. See eg Capital vol. I l l  p.851.
2. Capital vol. l ,  p.527.
3. Capital vol . I l l ,  p.388.
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the process of production, separated from capital is simply 
a labour-process. Therefore, the industrial capitalist  as 
dist inct from the owner of capital,  does not appear as operating 
capital,  but rather as a functionary irrespective of capital, or, 
as a simple agent of the labour-process in general, as a labourer, 
and indeed as a wage-labourer . . .
He creates surplus-value not because he works as a c a p i t a l i s t , 
but because he a lso  works, regardless of his capacity as 
capi tal ist .  1
But i f  this is the case, the capital ist  becomes redundant in the product­
ive process and can be replaced by a manager, who, Marx quotes approving- 
ly, has been called '"the soul of our industrial system.1 234" And he is 
not only redundant, but he has been recognized as such by co-operative 
factories, where ' the antagonistic nature of the labour of supervision 
disappears, because the manager is paid by the labourers instead of
3
representing capital counterposed to them' , and by joint-stock companies. 
Marx sees the la t te r  as quintessential evidence of the dissolution of 
capital from within, for the owners of capital have nothing to do with 
running of the enterprise and the managers of the enterprise do not own 
capital. This dissociation of the labour process from privately owned 
capital, Marx insists,  is 'a necessary transitional phase towards the 
reconversion of capital into . . .  the property of associated producers,
4
as outright social property'. It is
the abolition of the capital ist  mode of production within 
the capital ist  mode of production i tsel f ,  and hence a self­
dissolving contradiction which prima fa c ie  represents a 
mere phase of transition to a new form of production.5 
★  * *
1. I b i d . ,  p.382 .
2. Ib id . , p.386 .
3. I b i d . , p.387 ■
4. I b i d . ,  p.437 j
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By now i t  should be obvious that LichtheinH's claim, that while 
Marx noticed 'the commanding position of the state bureaucracy in Cont­
inental Europe, [he] did not accord i t  more than passing at tention' ^is 
false. Nor did Marx ignore threats that bureaucracy might pose to the 
achievement of socialism, or the existence of 'bureaucratic'  relation­
ships within industry. However, the legacy which Marx lef t  to those of 
his followers concerned with bureaucracy had two distinctive and res t r i c t ­
ive elements. First,  as we have seen, in his mature writings, Marx always 
treated bureaucrats as subordinate in importance to social classes, even 
where, as in Bonapartism, the bureaucracy was strong and the economically 
dominant classes admitted to be weak. The possibility that beyond short­
lived situations of crisis or class balance, a bureaucracy might rule a 
society in i ts own interests,  was not entertained.
Secondly, like Saint-Simon, Marx reveals striking and tantalizing 
gaps in his account of the future society. Like Saint-Simon, Marx had very 
l i t t l e  to say about questions of administrative and organizational imp­
eratives which might lead to bureaucratic growth in any complex indust­
rial society. Both in his discussions of the administration of the future 
society and of the organization of factory labour, Marx passes by function­
al organizational difficul t ies and contraints with barely a pause. However, 
the problems with which administrative theorists have grappled are not a l l ,  
or at least not obviously, amenable to solutions drawn from the Paris
Commune, where, as Marx and Engels proudly note, ' the proletariat for the
, 2f i r s t  time held political power for two whole months!
These gaps are not simply due to Marx's refusal to draw up blue­
prints for the future, for he writes a good deal about future possibi l i t ­
ies. But repeatedly, when a serious consideration of oganizational const-
1 .
2 .
Marxism _, (London, 1961), p.384. 
SW, vol. 1, p.22.
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raints is required, Marx's solutions and enthusiasms offer l i t t l e  but 
bathos. When Bakunin suggests that workers who gain representative 
positions under socialism might 'cease to be w o rk e rs ’, Marx considers 
i t  enough to reply, 'As l i t t l e  as a factory owner today ceases to be a 
capi ta l is t  i f  he becomes a municipal councillor'.'*" When he writes warmly 
of the 'individual with an all round development' who will replace the 
crippled specialist  in the factory, the only ' factors of this metamor­
phosis' which he refers to are polytechnic and agricultural schools, and
2schools of craft  training. After a lyrical evocation of ' that  develop­
ment of human energy which is an end in i t s e l f ,  the' true realm of freedom',
Marx concludes 'The shortening of the working day is i ts  basic prerequis- 
3i t e . '
These two problems - the relationship of bureaucracies to social 
classes and the effects of organizational and administrative imperatives 
on the form and role of administrative inst i tutions in the new society - 
both came to present major diff icul t ies for later  Marxists. Historically 
they arose for consideration in reverse order: in 1917, the Bolsheviks 
began their attempt to construct a new society and Lenin was immediately 
faced with the problems of administering and ruling i t ;  after the cons­
olidation of the revolutionary regime, Marxists were forced to consider 
again the relationships between powerful bureaucracies and social classes.
1. The F i r s t  In te r n a t io n a l  and A f t e r ,  p. 336.
2. C a p ita l ,  vol . 1, p .527.
3. C a p ita l , vol. I l l ,  p.820.
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MAX WEBER AND THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD
Ne i ther  Saint-Simon nor Marx l i v e d  to  wi tness the soc ia l  
r e v o lu t i o n s  which they p re d ic te d ;  f o r  Max Weber and above a l l  f o r  
Len in ,  the nature o f  o rgan iz a t ion  and the r o le  o f  'bureaucracy '  in 
the new s o c ie ty  became matte rs  o f  real  and immediate concern.  Weber 
and Lenin both regarded the p o s t - r e v o lu t i o n a r y  f a te  o f  bureaucracy 
as one o f  the cen t ra l  problems fac ing  r e v o lu t i o n a r i e s  - Weber on the 
basis o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  ana ly s is  o f  the nature and development o f  
modern s o c i e t i e s ;  Lenin on the basis o f  more hu r r ied  and unsystemat ic 
r e f l e c t i o n s  on problems invo lved in  r u l i n g  the f i r s t  Communist s ta te .  
Weber and Lenin are u s u a l l y ,  and in  many respects  c o r r e c t l y ,  
considered as po la r  oppos i tes .  In f a c t ,  however, t h e i r  thought 
u l t i m a t e l y  came to  bear s t r i k i n g  and im por tan t  s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  
s i m i l a r i t i e s  which we w i l l  exp lo re  in  t h i s  chap te r ,  concerned w i th  
Weber, and in  the nex t ,  concerned w i th  Lenin.
1 Dominat ion and the Importance o f  A d m in is t ra t i v e  Organiza t ions
Weber's most extended and systemat ic  d iscuss ion  o f
a d m in is t ra t i o n  occurs w i t h i n  his  soc io logy  o f  dominat ion,  which,  as
Roth has observed, is  the core o f  Economy and S o c ie ty ^ . Un l i ke
Saint-Simon and Marx, Weber in s is te d  t h a t  c o n f l i c t  and the s t rugg le
2
f o r  power are in e ra d ic a b le  elements o f  the human c o n d i t io n  , though
1 Economy and S o c ie ty  (EaS), (New York,  1968), p . l x x x i i
2. See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber und d ie  deutsche P o l i t i k  
1890-1920 , second rev ised e d i t i o n ,  (Tubingen, 1974),  passim .
On the r e l a t i o n  between t h i s  p o s i t i o n  and Weber's methodological  
p o s i t i o n ,  see H.H. Bruun, Science, Values and P o l i t ic s  in  Max 
Weber's M ethodology , (Copenhagen, 1972), pp .240-50.
118
the forms they take differ greatly between societies. Moreover,
1 2 Weber argued that domination (H errschaft) , 'a special case of power' ,
though not important in every case of social action, was one of the
3
'most important elements' of such action; 'without exception every 
sphere of social action is profoundly influenced by structures of 
dominancy
Structures of political domination, Weber points out, have 
often decisively influenced linguistic integration within and
5
differentiation between communities ; the nature of religion in the 
Middle East^ and in China'7 was greatly influenced by structures of 
dominance; education 'and with i t  the modes of status group formation' 
have been heavily dependent on the character and outcome of struggles
o
between chiefs and their administrative staffs , and on the cri teria
1 The diff icul t ies  of translating the term 'H errschaft' which Weber 
uses have received a good deal of attention and have been coped 
with in a variety of ways. Parsons originally preferred 'imperative 
control'  ' for the most general purposes' (Max Weber, The Theory o f  
Social and Economic Organization, ed. T. Parsons, (New York, 1964),
p.152), but later he chose ' leadership' ; he usually translated 
legitim e Herrschaft as 'authority'  (T. Parsons, review of Reinhard 
Bendix, Max Weher: An In te lle c tu a l Portrait^ American Sociological 
Review , vol. 25, 1960, p.752). Roth.and Wittich use 'domination', 
' authority' ,  ‘ru le1 2345678, depending on context. I have followed Aron, 
Mommsen and Runciman in using 'domination' throughout, though I 
have left  Beamtenherrschaft in the original because Weber uses i t  
in a specifically limited sense to suggest rule  by officials,  
which he opposes, in contrast to Herrschaft der Beamten, which 
he considers inevitable and in principle consistent with rule by 
polit icians. I have attempted in exposition to suggest more 
precisely than a rough English equivalent can, what Weber meant 
by H errschaft.
2 EaS, vol . 3, p.941.
3 Ibid .
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 The Religion o f China, (New York, 1964), p.21.
7 Ib id , p.25.
8 Eas, vol . 1, p.265.
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by which such staffs are recruited; and, of particular importance to 
modern society,
In a great number of cases the emergence of rational 
association [Vergesellschaftung] from amorphous social 
action has been due to domination and the way in which 
i t  has been exercised. Even where this is not the case, 
the structure of dominancy and i ts  unfolding is decisive 
in determining the form of social action and i ts orientation 
toward a 'goal ' .  Indeed, domination has played the decisive 
role particularly in the economically most important social 
structures of the past and present, v iz . ,  the manor on the 
one hand, and the large-scale capital ist ic enterprise on 
the otherJ
The significance of administrative organizations in general 
arises from the fact that they are integral parts of the kinds of 
domination with which Weber is concerned. Weber recognises that,  
in a broad sense, domination can be said to occur in a wide variety 
of forms and contexts, but he confines his attention exclusively to 
a narrower kind of domination, which he defines as authoritarian power 
of command. For the purposes of sociology, as opposed, he suggests, 
to those of law, for us to say that such power exists i t  must be
2actual, i . e . ,  i t  must be 'heeded to a socially relevant degree' , 
and for power to amount to domination in his sense i t  must be 
legitimated in one way or another, i t  must be obeyed by the ruled 
as if they 'had made the content of the command the maxim of their 
conduct for i ts  very own sake' . The habit of obedience which is 
essential to domination cannot, however, be maintained over time 
without a continually functioning administrative staff which enforces 
the order^. Organized domination therefore is always associated with 
and vitally dependent upon administration.
1 EaS, vol. 3, p.941.
2 Ib id , p.948.
3. Ib id , p.946.
4. cf Ib id , vol. 1, p.264 and 'Polit ics as a Vocation', in H.H. Gerth 
and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, (London, 1970), p.80.
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Such structures of domination become pol i t ica l ly  crucial and 
attain some stabi l i ty  in form and structure, as soon as the group in 
which they exist becomes at a ll  large, and, often as a result of 
increase in size, administration increases in complexity. Thus, for 
example, Weber explains that 'pure' or 'direct' democracy becomes 
impossible,
where the group grows beyond a certain size or where 
the administrative function becomes too d i f f ic u l t  to be 
satisfactorily taken care of by anyone whom rotation, the 
lo t ,  or election may happen to designate. The conditions 
of administration of mass structures are radically different  
from those obtaining in small associations resting upon 
neighbourly or personal relationships...
The growing complexity of the administrative tasks and 
the sheer expansion of their scope increasingly result in 
the technical superiority of those who have had training 
and experience, and will  thus inevitably favor the 
continuity of at least some of the functionaries. Hence, 
there always exists the probability of the rise of a 
special, perennial structure for administrative purposes, -| 
which of necessity means for the exercise of [domination].
In contrast to Saint-Simon and Marx, then, Weber denies not
2
only that domination of men by men is dispensable , but also that there 
is an unbridgeable difference in kind, let  alone an antithesis, between 
the imperatives of political and non-political, peaceful and coercive, 
forms of administration. To be sure, different sorts of administration 
will possess certain different characteristics. All of them, however, 
faced with substantial numbers of complex tasks, will  require relat ively  
stable administrative staffs to perform them.
On the other hand, Weber would agree with Saint-Simon that the 
way in which task-oriented institutions are organ ized  results in crucial
1 EaSj vol. 3, pp.951 -52. Roth and Wittich translate H e rrsch a ft 
here as ' ru le ' ,  which is appropriate to the political context 
of this passage, but appears to be too narrowly poli tical for 
the point Weber is making.
2 See Weber's le t ter  of 4.8.1908 to Michels, quoted in Mommsen, 
op. c i t .  , p .112.
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differences in their manner of operation and that certain modes of
organization are better adapted than others for a specific order
or range of tasks. It is the mode of o rg a n iza tio n  of officials rather
than, say, their number, social status or power position, that Weber
regards as the fundamental point of distinction between administrative
institutions.  He would certainly agree with Saint-Simon or with
those, like R.V. Presthus , who appear to believe they are criticizing
him, that forms of administrative organization cannot simply be
abstracted from the environment in which they developed and be
expected to perform identically in uncongenial environments. But
he insisted not only that administrative structures themselves had
powerful consequences, allowed certain act ivi t ies and inhibited
others, but also that these forms were not malleable epiphenomena of
their environments; often there were basic internal a d m in is tra t iv e
reasons for organizational forms, which had l i t t l e  to do with their
social, polit ical or economic environments. At one point in his
discussion of the city,  for example, Weber points to similarit ies
between the development of the popolo  in medieval Italy and the
p le b s  in the Roman Republic, and he observes:
These similarit ies between the medieval Italian and the 
early Roman development are very striking, especially 
since they appear in spite of fundamental poli t ical ,  
social and economic differences. . .  It is a fact ,  after a l l ,  
that only a limited variety of different administrative 
techniques is available for effecting compromises between 
the status groups within a city.  Similarities in the 
forms of political administration can therefore not be 
interpreted as identical superstructures over identical 
economic foundations. These things obey their own laws.
1 See R.V. Presthus, 'Weberian v. Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional 
Society1, A d m in is tra tiv e  Science  Q uarterly  , vol . VI (1961-62), 
pp.1-24.
EaS, vol. 3, p.1309.2
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2 Bureaucracy as a form of Organization
In his scholarly writings Weber used the word ' bureaucracy1 2, 
not to refer disparagingly to rule by officials,  which in his 
political writings he attacked as Beamtenherrschaft , but to designate 
a quite specific kind of administrative organization. He demonstrated 
in considerable detail that there were other kinds, which differed 
in appearance, function and importance, and he insisted that modern 
bureaucratic organization as a form of apparatus was sui generis.
He never defined  bureaucracy in the explicit way in which, for example, 
he defined 'class'  or ‘status group'. But on a number of occasions 
he outlined in some detail the characteristies of the ideal type of 
bureaucracy, which he had drawn from Prussian administrative theory 
and European administrative history. These characteristics are 
generally known. The enterprise is organized on the basis of 
permanent official agencies, divided into jurisdictional areas and 
ordered by rules which apply generally and impersonally. Within any 
area authority is hierarchically arranged, management is based on 
written documents ( ' the f i l e s ' )  and follows more or less stable general 
rules which can be learnt and knowledge of which 'represents a special 
technical expertise which the officials possess' . Whereas in many 
other forms of administrative organization official business is 
discharged as an avocation, as a secondary activity,  the job of the 
modern bureaucrat demands his full working capacity. Central to his 
way of working is the separation of his official from his private 
l i fe ,  workplace, activity,  monies and equipment; 'the more consistently 
the modern type of business management has been carried through, the
1 See, for example, Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften ,
3rd edition, (Tubingen, 1971), pp.320-50.
2 EaS, vol . 3, p.958.
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more are these separations the case1 23'*'. Only people who qualify
under general rules are employed, and, finally, their professional
obligations are based not on loyalty to personal superiors in or
above bureaucracy, but rather to the organization's ’impersonal and
2
functional purposes'.
Two things should be noted about this conception. First,
i t  must be remembered that this is the idea l type of bureaucracy which
is never found in 'pure' , 'unmixed', form in reality. When Weber
writes of certain actual administrative organizations he calls them
bureaucracies, even though none of them possesses all and only these
characteristics, and even though some are closer to the pure type than
others. They warrant the name to the extent that they, as opposed to
non-bureaucratic organizations, share characteristics of this type.
Thus Weber argues that administration in China and Egypt under
the New Kingdom was bureaucratic, even though i t  also had strongly
patrimonial elements, such as personal loyalty to the leader, and
appropriation of positions by staff .  Similarly, he argues that in India,
Kingly administration became patrimonial and bureaucratic.
On the one hand, i t  developed a regulated hierarchical 
order of officials with local and functional competences 
and appeals; on the other hand, however, administrative 
and court offices were not kept separate and the ju r is ­
dictional spheres of a bewildering manifold of offices 
were fluid, indeterminate, ir rational,  and subject to 
chance influences.3
Secondly, since Weber was interested in the form of organ­
ization rather than in the uses to which i t  was put, he was not limited 
to talking of government. He recognized that the sta te 's  monopoly of 
legitimate force put i ts  bureaucracy in a unique position, and in his 
political writings he usually referred specifically to
1 Ibid,, p.957.
2 Ibid3 p .959.
3 The Religion o f India, (New York, 1958), p.67.
124
state bureaucracy when he used the word, but he repeatedly stressed 
that bureaucracies were found in all kinds of enterprise.
From the viewpoint of the sociology of domination, bureaucracy 
is merely one among several types of administrative structure. Such 
structures, whatever their form, are likely to be of social and 
political significance. But Weber does not regard bureaucracy as 
just another administrative apparatus. It  is specifically the most 
rational form. Again and again, Weber emphasises the r a t io n a l i t y  of 
the pure type of bureaucracy, and the technical superiority over all 
other forms of administration of the modern Western bureaucracy which 
most closely approximates to that pure type. He claims, for example, 
that
Experience tends universally to show that the purely 
bureaucratic type of administrative organization - that 
is ,  the monocratic variety of bureaucracy - is,  from a 
purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the 
highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally 
the most rational known means of exercising authority over 
human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, 
in stabi l i ty,  in the stringency of i ts  discipline and in 
i ts  rel iabi l i ty.  It  thus makes possible a particularly 
high degree of calculability of results for the heads of 
the organization and for those acting in relation to i t .
It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and 
in the scope of i t s  operations, and is formally capable of 
application to all kinds of administrative tasksJ
3 The Indispensability of Bureaucratic Organization
As a result of i ts  technical superiority to all other forms 
of organization, rational bureaucracy is in d isp en sa b le  both to the 
modern State and to modern economic organization. The modern State, 
i t se l f  a unique development, is dependent on bureaucracies, for no 
other form of organization can cope with the enormous scope and 
complexity of mass administration:
1 EaS, vol. 1, p.223.
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If bureaucratic administration is ,  other things being 
equal, always the most rational type from a technical 
point of view, the needs of mass administration make i t  
today completely indispensable. The choice is only that 
between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of 
administrati on. '
The modern economic order, too, can work in no other way.
Weber recognizes that bureaucracy is not an 'unmoved mover', and 
among the many preconditions necessary for i t  to develop in its 
purest form is the rational economic base of capitalism. But Weber's 
social theory allows reciprocal relations to occur between institutions, 
and the factors explaining the role of bureaucracy in capitalism lie 
at  the core of this theory.
Like Marx, and like Werner Sombart whose work he knew well,
Weber regarded the developed capitalist  order as a system with
imperatives, with rules of action which the individual capitalis t  had
to obey to survive. The Protestant ethic had been the source of a
cluster of beliefs and attitudes to the world - the sp ir i t  of
capitalism - which enabled ascetic capitalism to emerge. But with
the development of 'the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic 
2order' , religious sanction for capita lis t  behaviour is now unnecessary.
Rather, i t  is this cosmos and this order which now envelop the
individual capitalist .  Modern capitalism
presents i t se lf  to him [the capita l is t ] ,  at  least as an 
individual, as an unalterable order of things in which 
he must live ....
. . .  the capitalism of to-day, which has come to dominate 
economic l i fe ,  educates and selects the economic subjects 
which i t  needs through a process of economic survival of 
the f i t t e s t . 3
In this system, the imperatives of mechanized production and 
incessant competition force enterprises continuously to maximize
1 Ibid.
2 The P rotestant Ethic and the S p ir it  o f Capitalism , (London, 1971) ,P*181•
3 Ib id , pp.54-55.
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p r o f i t  and therefore to operate in the most e f f i c ie n t  way possible.
For th is ,  bureaucracies are essential in two areas. In te r n a lly , large
scale c a p i t a l i s t  enterprises are 'unequalled modes of s t r i c t
bureaucratic organization' , simply because bureaucracies get things
done better  than any other form of organization. For the prisoner of
the ' i ron  cage' of capital ism th is  considerat ion is and must be
decisive. External ly , the c a p i t a l i s t  enterprise is equal ly dependent
on the p red ic tab i1i t y  and ca lcu lab i1i t y  provided by a rat ional  legal
order and State administrat ion, staffed bureaucratical ly  and working
according to s t r i c t l y  formalized ru le s .1 2 34 Rational enterprise cannot
develop in the face of the i r r a t i o n a l i t i e s  and consequent unpred ic tab i l i ty
of kadi j u s t i ce  or non-bureaucratic forms of administrat ion. In the
patrimonial s tate , such as China, fo r  example,
Rational and calculable administrat ion and law enforcement, 
necessary fo r  industr ia l  development, did not e x i s t ^ . . .  
the ra t iona l  indus tr ia l  capital ism which is speci f ic  
fo r  modern development or iginated nowhere under th is  regime. 
Capital investment in industry is fa r  too sensi t ive to such 
i r ra t io n a l  ru le  and too dependent upon the p o s s ib i l i t y  of 
ca lcu la t ing the steady and ra t iona l  operation of the state 
machinery to emerge under an administrat ion of th is  type.4
One can argue, as Weber does, that bureaucracy is indispensable
to f u l l y  developed capital ism without claiming that these phenomena
are a l l  parts of the same development, or tha t  bureaucracy developed
simply because i t  was useful to capital ism. Weber recognizes th is
and points out that:
early  modern capita l ism did not o rig in a te  in the 
bureaucratic model states where bureaucracy was a 
product of the s ta te 's  rat ional ism. Advanced capita l ism,
1 EaSy v o l . 3, p.974.
2 I b id , p .1394.
3 The R e lig ion  o f China , p.100.
4 Ib idy  p . 103.
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too, was at f i r s t  not limited to these countries, 
in fact,  not even primarily located in them . . .
Today, however, capitalism and bureaucracy have found 
one another and belong intimately together.*
And bureaucracy was 'found' by modern capitalism for the same reason
that i t  has advanced in all areas of administration: i ts  technical
superiority to any other form of organization.
4 The Inescapabi1ity of Bureaucracy and the Power Position of 
Bureaucrats
Weber regarded this indispensability of developed bureaucracy, 
with its expertise born of long and specialized training, as the 
pivotal political fact of the modern age. The individual bureaucrat 
is a powerless cog 'in a ceaselessly moving mechanism which prescribes
p
to him an essentially fixed route of ma r c h .  The ruled in a mass
state are increasingly dependent on bureaucracy,
for i t  rests upon expert training, a functional 
specialization of work, and an attitude set on habitual 
virtuosity in the mastery of single yet methodically 
integrated functions. If the apparatus stops working, or 
if  i ts  work is interrupted by force, chaos results,  which 
i t  is dif f icul t  to master by improvised replacements from 
among the governed.3
Finally, whoever gains power is similarly unable to govern without
this organization, and he has l i t t l e  incentive to. For the bureaucrat's 
'impersonal' attitude to office,  unlike the patrimonial functionary' s
personal loyalty, allows him to work for anyone who gains control of 
his organization:
a rationally ordered officialdom continues to function 
smoothly after the enemy has occupied the terri tory;  he 
merely needs to change the top officials.  It continues
1 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany', Appendix II 
in EaS, vol. 3, p.1465; cf EaS, vol. 1, p.224.
2 EaS, vol. 3, p.988.
3 Ib id .
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to operate because i t  is to the vi tal  in teres t  of everyone 
concerned, including above al l  the enemyJ
Moreover, not only is bureaucracy indispensable but i t s
influence is inescapable. As an administrat ive organization found
in every kind of enterpr ise i t s  influence is more pervasive than
that  of other car r i er s  of the ' r a t i o n a l i t y 1 23 of the modern world, and
as the most advanced form of administrat ive organization i t  is
stronger than any previous form:
Bureaucracy is dist inguished from other histor ical  
agencies of the modern rat ional  order of l i f e  in that  
i t  is far  more pers i s ten t  and ' escape-proof ' .  History shows 
that  wherever bureaucracy gained the upper hand, as in China, 
Egypt and, to a lesser  extent ,  in the l a t er  Roman empire 
and Byzantium, i t  did not disappear again unless in the 
course of the total  collapse of the supporting cul ture.
Yet these were s t i l l ,  re l a t i ve ly  speaking, highly 
i r ra t ional  forms of bureaucracy: 'Patrimonial bureaucracies' .
In contrast  to these older forms, modern bureaucracy has 
one charac ter i s t i c  which makes i t s  'escape-proof'  nature 
much more def in i te :  rat ional  special izat ion and t r a i n ing . . .
Wherever the modern specialized of f ic ia l  comes to 
predominate, his power proves prac t ical ly  indestruct ible  
since the whole organization of even the most elementary 
want sa t i s fac t ion has been tai lored to his mode of operation.
As a r esul t  of the at tent ion which has been given to Max
Weber's pol i t i ca l  writ ings in recent years , i t  is now well known that
1 Ib id , pp.988-89.
2 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany', EaS, 
vol. 3, p.1401.
3 An early discussion in English was J.P.  Mayer, Max Weber and German 
P o li t ic s , (London, 1945). Wolfgang Mommsen's book, op. a it .*  
f i r s t  published in 1959, stimulated a great  deal of discussion
in Germany of Weber's pol i t i ca l  thought. See Mommsen, op. c i t .  , 
pp.442-43, for a l i s t  of reviews and cr i t iques .  See also David 
Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory o f Modern P o litic s  , (London, 
1974); I lse Dronberger, The P o litic a l Thought o f  Max Weber: In 
Quest o f  Statesmanship , (New York, 1971); Anthony Giddens, P o litic s  
and Sociology in  the Thought o f Max Weber , (London, 1972); Karl 
Loewenstein, Max Weber’s P o litic a l Ideas in  the Perspective o f  
Our Time, (Massachusetts, 1966); Arthur Mitzman, The Iron Cage: An 
H istorical In terpreta tion  o f Max Weber , (New York, 1970); Wolfgang 
J.  Mommsen, The Age o f  Bureaucracy3 Perspectives on the P o litic a l  
Sociology o f Max Weber, (Oxford, 1974); Guenther Roth, 'Pol i t ical  
Cri t iques '  in Reinhard Bendix and Guenther Roth, Scholarship and 
Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber, (California,  1971), pp.55-69; 
Otto Stammer, ed. ,  Max Weber and Sociology Today, (Oxford, 1971).
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he was profoundly uneasy about the social and political consequences
of the contemporary, i r r es i s t i b le , spread of bureaucracy. There are
two principal foci of Weber's unease. The f i r s t  is the bureaucratization
of the whole of society, in the sense of the permeation of bureaucratic
values, ways of thought and of behaviour throughout a population. At
the 1909 meeting of the Verein fü r  S o z ia lp o litik  Weber and his
brother Alfred bit terly opposed older members of the Verein , such as
Gustav Schmoller and Adolf Wagner, whose 'passion for bureaucratization
. . .  drives one to despair'^, and Max Weber's interventions passionately
evoked the danger of bureaucratization in this f i r s t  sense. In
Economy and Society  Weber pointed to the effect of feudal and
patriarchal structures of domination on the ethos and style of l i fe
2of the societies in which they occurred . Given the far greater 
pervasiveness which he attributed^ to bureaucratic domination, one 
would expect the lat ter  to have even stronger effects of this kind.
In Economy and Society  Weber also drew attention to the ' socially- 
levelling'  effects of bureaucracy on status structure , on the one 
hand, and to the kind of status hierarchy which bureaucracy i tsel f  
encouraged, on the other: one based on the 'patent of education' and
on education of a uniquely important kind, in specialized functional 
ski l ls .^ Status in a bureaucratized society, Weber argued in his 
political writings, went to 'Prüfungsdiplommenschen'^, who valued 
security and a comfortable, steadily increasing salary, based on 
status rather than performance, before all else.
1 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Soziologie und S o z ia lp o litik  
(Tübingen, 1924), p.414. On the conficts within the Verein see 
Dieter Lindenlaub, Richtungskampfe im Verein fü r  S o z ia lp o li t ik , 
(Wiesbaden,1967)
2. EaS, vol. 3, p.1104.
3 Ib id ,  pp.983-85.
4 Ib id ,  pp.998-1002.
5 Gesammelte P o litische  S c h r ifte n , p.278.
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Weber did not deny that bureaucratic values and 1A m tsehre'
(the sense of the dignity, calling and obligations of office) were 
important elements in proper bureaucratic performance^, but he feared 
greatly that they would come to expel all other kinds of values and 
all modes of behaviour inconsistent with them. He found i t  ' frightful 
to contemplate
that the world might be fi l led with nothing but these 
l i t t l e  cogs, with nothing but men clinging to a l i t t l e  job 
and striving after a slightly bigger one . . .  men who need 
'order' and nothing but order, who become nervous and 
cowardly if this order wavers for a moment.. .That the 
world should know nothing but these men of order 
[Ordnungsmenschen] - this is the development in which 
we are already caught up, and the central question is thus 
not how we can further promote and accelerate i t ,  but what 
we can oppose to this machinery, in order to keep a portion 
of mankind free from this parcelling out of the soul, from 
this total dominance of the bureaucratic ideal of l i f e . 2
Weber's second concern was related to but dist inct from the
one outlined above, and i t  was more directly political in focus.
This was the fear, which the term ' bureaucracy' had originally been
used to express, that those who manned bureaucratic organizations
might come to be the actual rulers of a State. It was less a fear
that we would all become bureaucrats than that we would all come
to be ru le d  by bureaucrats. In one sense Weber believed that this
was already the case in every modern society because all domination
was exercised through bureaucratic agencies rather than 'through
pariiamentary speeches [or] monarchical enunciations' . But rule,
in the sense of ultimate directive power, did not inevitably l ie in
the hands of officials,  for there was a fundamental distinction
between the functional in d is p e n s a b i l i ty  of bureaucratic forms of
organization and of bodies of trained officials,  and the power of
1 See H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., op. c i t .  , p.88.
2 Gesammelte A u fsa tze  zur S o z io lo g ie  und S o z ia lp o l i t i k , p.414.
3 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany', op. c i t .  , 
p.1393.
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those officials.  In Economy and S o c ie ty  Weber explained that:
. . .  i t  must . . .  remain an open question whether the 
power of bureaucracy is increasing in the modern states 
in which i t  is spreading. The fact that bureaucratic 
organization is technically the most highly developed power 
instrument in the hands of i ts  controller does not 
determine the weight that bureaucracy as such is capable 
of procuring for i ts  own opinions in a particular social 
structure. The ever-increasing ' indispensabi1i t y 1 234 of the 
officialdom, swollen to the millions, is no more decisive 
on this point than is the economic indispensability of 
the proletarians for the strength of the social and 
political power position of that class (a view which some 
representatives of the proletarian movement hold). If 
1indispensabi 1i t y 1 were decisive, the equally 'indispensable' 
slaves ought to have held this position of power in any 
economy where slave labour prevailed and consequently freemen, 
as is the rule, shunned work as degrading. Whether the 
power of bureaucracy as such increases cannot be decided 
a p r io r i  from such reasonsJ
This analysis, which emphasizes the central im portance of
bureaucracy but does not claim to pre-determine i ts specific power
position, seems to me to be enormously fruitful and too often ignored.
Indeed, Weber himself might well have kept i t  in mind in some of his
last ,  despairing political writings about Germany, and in his comments
on the Bolsheviks' chance of survival in Russia. On the other hand,
2there was far less of a gulf than is sometimes alleged between the 
fear of B eam tenherrschaft expressed in Weber's political writings 
and the analysis of bureaucracy in Economy and S o c ie ty .  For in the 
lat ter  work Weber argued that,  while the power position of officials 
could not be predicted in general terms, i t  was 'always great, under 
normal conditions over-towering'^. Compared with the trained off icial ,  
the political 'master' is always a di let tante,  and officials are 
always keen to secure their privileged access to technical and official 
knowledge against effective supervision^, by insisting on the need for
1 EaS, vol. 3, p.991.
2 Recently and notably by David Beetham, op. c i t . , esp. at pp.252-61.
3 EaS, vol. 3, p.991.
4 Ib id ,  p.992-94.
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official secrecy and by promoting their interests through
conveniently ambiguous ideas, such as that of 'Reasons of State'V
In his sociology, then, as in his polit ics,  Weber argued that,
while Beamtenherrschaft was not inevitable, bureaucrats had enormous
power resources at their disposal which might enable them to rule
unless they were kept under political control. In his later
political writings he was concerned to show that, in the absence
of effective p o li t ic a l  leadership, Beamtenherrschaft existed in
Germany, that this was poli t ically disastrous and that means of
controlling the Beamtentum must be devised.
In opposition to the 'conservative' members of the Verein
fu r  S o z ia lp o litik  who, like Hegel, argued that officialdom represented
2
the general common interests of society, Weber insisted that 
bureaucrats, far from constituting a 'universal es tate ' ,  fostered 
quite particular sectional interests.  In Prussia they were recruited 
predominantly from the one class - the economically declining 
Junkers - and they overemphasized the la t ters '  conservative interests.  
And in Prussia as elsewhere, officialdom generated i ts own values 
and a consciousness of i ts  own special interests,  which i t  was 
uniquely placed to promote.
But the real problem, for Weber, was not that bureaucrats 
feathered their own nests. Even if  they were determined to serve 
only the public interest - and Weber believed that many were - they 
were tragically and inevitably unsuited for the role of political 
leadership. For politicians and bureaucrats are different types of 
people; ' the "directing mind", the "moving spirit" - that of the
1 Ib id ,  p.979.
2 See Dieter Lindenlaub, op. c i t .  , passim ; on Schmoller's influential 
views see pp.240-50.
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entrepreneur here and of the politician there - differs in substance
from the "civil service" mentality of the official '^ .  Bureaucrats
cannot be adequate politicians because their training, their ways of
working, what they value as professionals, all deny that they should
fight for their convictions, that they should act on their personal
preferences in the execution of their tasks. Rather, the good
bureaucrat prides himself on demonstrating that 'his sense of duty
stands above his personal preference . . .  This is the ethos of 
2o f f i c e  . The polit ician, on the other hand, like the entrepreneur,
is forged through struggle. He seeks power, takes risks, and, most
importantly, must take personal responsibility for his acts and
decisions. Whereas the bureaucrat is to act as an impartial
administrator, e ine  ira  e t  s tu d io  , ' to take a stand, to be passionate
ir a  e t  stadium  - is the poli t ician's element, and above all the
3element of the political le a d e r ' .
What Weber feared most was that modern society might come 
to be dominated by the bureaucrats who controlled an incomparably 
effective and inescapable a d m in is tra t iv e  machine  and that throughout 
society only those attitudes and values would be generated which 
were appropriate to this machine. He considered i t  essential that 
non-bureaucra tic  leaders be selected who might, as i t  were, control 
the controllers. The failure of German polit ics,  he believed, 
could be attributed essentially to two things: the absence of real
politicians since Bismarck and as a result of his ini t iat ive - 
numbing dominance, and the fact that,  in default of such leaders, 
Germany was being governed by bureaucrats. In his last  years Weber, 
in increasing despair, sought to devise means to ensure leadership
1 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany', p.1403.
2 Ib id , p. 1404.
3. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. ,öp.  p.95.
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by men whose 'vocation'  was po l i t i c s .  Ultimately he argued that  
only a charismatic leader who appealed di rec t ly  to the masses could 
acquire the independence necessary for control l ing and set t ing the 
goals for German bureaucrats.  The changing deta i l s  of his proposals 
are less important for our purposes than thei r  fundamental aim: to
secure a pol i t i ca l  leadership able to control the bureaucrats who 
threatened to extinguish both Germany's chances of greatness and also 
1any remnants of " individual is t"  freedom in any s e n s e ' J
5 Bureaucracy and Socialism
Weber discussed socialism at  any length in only one speech,
2
delivered to Austrian army off icers  in Vienna in 1918 ; but in a
number of other contexts,  he developed the points made in that  lecture
concerning the consequences of bureaucracy for soc i a l i s t  aspi rat ions.
Weber commenced his lecture in a manner which would have seemed very
strange to Saint-Simon or Marx, for he began by speaking not of
socialism but of a r i s tocr a t i c  versus professional officialdom and
went on to talk not of countries where socialism did or was l ikely to
exis t ,  but of America. Weber explained that  development of professional
administrat ion is the fate  of al l  modern mass democracies and he traced
at  some length the movement in this direct ion of under-bureaucratized
America, hi therto administered by ' d i l e t t a n t e s ' .  The link between
these ref lect ions  and Weber's theme only becomes clear  on the sixth
page of the lecture where Weber explained that :
modern democracy is becoming everywhere where i t  is the 
democracy of a large s t a te ,  a bureaucratized democracy. And 
i t  must be so, for i t  replaces the distinguished a r i s toc ra t ic  
or other honoured o f f ic ia l s  by a salaried officialdom. That . 
is happening everywhere, i t  is also happening within par t ies .
1 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany1 2, p .1403.
2 ‘Der Sozial ismus' ,  Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Soziologie und 
S o z ia lp o li t ik , pp.492-518.
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It is inescapable, and this fact is the f i r s t  with which 
socialism also must reckon: the necessity of a long
training in ski l ls ,  always increasing specialization and 
management by a skilled officialdom shaped in this way. The 
modern economy can be managed in no other way.
Weber's analysis of capitalism clearly owes much to Marx,
but Marx, and socialists generally he argues, have simply failed to
come to terms with the i n e s c a p a b i l i t y  of bureaucracy. This myopia
vit iates both their analysis of contemporary society and what he
calls their prophecy. In their analysis, socialists rightly
emphasize the separation in capitalism of the worker from the means
of production. But they wrongly see i t  merely as an economic
phenomenon, and, more wrongly s t i l l ,  attribute i t  to the existence
of private property. In fact ,  i t  characterizes a l l  bureaucratized
2enterprises - factories, armies, governmental bodies, universities .
The university chemist does not own his laboratory equipment; nor
the soldier his gun. In part this separation arises from purely
technical considerations having to do with the nature of modern
equipment, but, quite independently, i t  flows from the imperatives of
bureaucratic organization. Bureaucratic 'discipl ine' ,  not private
property, gives the form to modern relations of administration and
of production. Moreover, Weber argues, i t  makes no difference in this
regard if  the head of an enterprise is changed, if a public functionary
replaces a private factory owner:
. . .T h e  'separation' from the means of production endures 
in any case. So long as there are mines, blast furnaces, 
railways, factories and machines, they will never be the 
property of a single or more than a single worker in the 
sense that the means of production of a trade in the middle 
ages were the property of a single master of a guild or 
of a local partnership or guild That is excluded by the 
nature of present day Technik. ^
1 Ibid. 3 pp. 497-98.
2 I b i d , pp.498-99. Cf. EaS, vol. 1, pp.137-39 and H.H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills, eds., op. c i t .  , pp.81-82.
'Der Sozialismus', op,, c i t . ,  p.499.3
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Weber argues similarly that those socialists who point to the
replacement of individual owner-entrepreneurs in public companies by
appointed managers, are identifying an important development, but he
insists that in describing i t  as 'socialization from within' they are
completely misconstruing i ts significance. This 'socialization'
in fact involves an increase in the role of trained officialdom
rather than in the role or power of the worker. Thus, here too, 'the
dictatorship of the off icial ,  not that of the worker is what - at any
rate for the time being - is constantly advancing'.^
And in their pred ic tions, too, socialists are no closer to
the mark, nor are their hopes any l ikel ier  to be achieved. A
socialist  revolution cannot result in a dictatorship of the proletariat.
In modern mass society i t  can only result in a consolidated dictatorship
of the bureaucrats. In economic enterprises bureaucrats would now be
in the highest positions, formerly held by private enterpreneurs; strikes
would be more dif f icul t  than ever before, and the possibility of appeal
or support from one enterprise against another would be gone. If
private capitalism were destroyed:
what would be the practical result? The destruction 
of the steel frame of modern industrial work? Mo! The 
abolition of private capitalism would simply mean that also 
the top management of the nationalized or socialized 
enterprises would become bureaucratic . . .  there is even 
less freedom, since every power struggle with a state 
bureaucracy is hopeless and since there is no appeal to an 
agency which as a matter of principle would be interested 
in limiting the employer's power, such as there is in the 
case of a private enterprise. That would be the whole 
difference.
State bureaucracy would rule alone if private capitalism 
were eliminated. The private and public bureaucracies, 
which now work next to, and potentially against, each other 
and hence check one another to a degree, would be merged
1 Ib id , p.508.
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into a single hierarchy. This would be similar to the 
s i tuat ion in ancient Egypt, but i t  would occur in a much 
more rat ional  - and hence unbreakable - formJ
■k'k'k'kic'k'kic
Weber was not the only wri ter  who warned against  the 
bureaucratization of modern society in general and post-revolutionary 
society in par t icular .  His friend Michels' analysis had much in 
common with Weber's, as,  independently, did the writ ings of Mosca and 
Pareto in I t a ly ,  and of the Polish revolutionary Jan Wacjaw Machajski 
in Siberia.  Of al l  these wr i ters ,  however, i t  was Weber whose 
analysis of the role and consequences of bureaucracy was the most 
profound and, for believers in the transforming power of soc ia l i s t  
revolut ion,  the most challenging. Many of the hopes and expectations 
of the wri ters  discussed in the following pages echoed those of 
Saint-Simon, and, more d i rec t l y ,  Marx. Many of thei r  reactions to 
f rus t ra t ion and f a i lu re  vividly call  Max Weber to mind.
1 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany', op. a i t . ,  
pp.1401-02.
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FIVE
LENIN AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION: 
FROM MARX TO WEBER
Contemporary o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h e o r i s t s  have c h a l l e n g e d ,  r e f i n e d  
and extended Weber ' s  idea l  t ype  of  bureaucracy  in a number of  usefu l  
ways,  though a t  t imes  they  appear  t o  have ignored Weber ' s  purposes  in 
deve l op ing  i t  and t he  l eve l  of  h i s t o r i c a l  and t h e o r e t i c a l  a b s t r a c t i o n  
a t  which he was w r i t i n g .  Since  Weber ' s  t i me ,  new forms of  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
have deve l oped ,  in r e s po n se ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  to ' p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l '  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  development s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  Weber ' s  work remains  an 
i n d i s p e n s a b l e  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t  f o r  modern i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of  bu reauc racy ,  
both a t  ' mi c ro '  and a t  'macro'  l e v e l s .
In h i s  d i a g n o s i s  o f  t h e  dangers  faced by t w e n t i e t h  cen t u r y  
Germany and the  West,  however,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in t he  p r e s c r i p t i o n  
he o f f e r e d ,  Weber seems to me in one r e s p e c t  to have been t r a g i c a l l y  
mi sguided:  b u r e a u c r a c i es have o f t e n  been l e s s  powerful  than he f ea r ed  
and p o l i t i c a l  l e ad e r s  c a t a s t r o p h i c a l l y  more powerful  than he hoped,  
in Germany and e l sewhere .  For example,  Weber ' s  conf i de nce  immediately 
a f t e r  t he  October  R e v o l u t i o n ,  t h a t  t he  Bolshevik ' d i l e t t a n t e s '  and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s  would l o s e  power wi t h i n  t h r e e  months was,  t o  say the  
l e a s t ,  mi sp l a c e d .  However,  as  Weber h i mse l f  emphasized,  t he  cogency 
and u t i l i t y  of his  s oc i a l  t he o ry  does not  depend on the  accuracy  of  
h i s  p o l i t i c a l  judgment ,  though they may, of  c o u r s e ,  be l i nke d .  In 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  as  Weber was c a r e f u l  to remind both h i s  r ea d e r s  and
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Michels, the functional in d is p e n s a b i l i ty  of large, hierarchical 
organizations of salaried, permanently-employed officials neither 
ensured nor depended upon the existence of Beam tenherrschaft. It  is 
no refutation of the claim that bureaucracies are indispensable 
in modern society to show that political rulers can exercise sway 
over, and indeed cut swathes through their administrative staffs. It 
would, however, be a refutation to show that bureaucratic organizations 
and staffs are readily dispensable in modern societies. I t  is , in 
effect, such a refutation that Lenin attempted in 1917.
1 The Simplicity of Administration and the Dispensability of
Bureaucracy
Before 1917, European Marxists had not paid conspicuous 
attention to the prediction of post-revolutionary institutional 
arrangements. Marx had provided epistemological objections to that 
sort of enterprise and, even where i t  was attempted, i t  was a far less 
central preoccupation than problems associated with bringing the 
revolution about. But on one central issue the mainstreams of 
German and Russian social democracy converged: most German and Russian 
Marxists agreed with Kautsky that the proletariat should take over 
and use the existing state apparatus rather than smash i t .*
Unlike Kautsky, Lenin did not believe that the State could 
be taken over peacefully, but he did believe that i t  should be taken 
over. In 1916, Lenin's colleague Bukharin became the f i r s t  Bolshevik 
to challenge this belief. He sent Lenin an essay, 'Toward a Theory of 
the Imperialist State' in which he described 'the final type of the 
contemporary imperialist robber state,  an iron organization which 
envelops the living body of society in i ts  tenacious grasping paws.
It  is a New Leviathan, before which the fantasy of Thomas Hobbes
1 . See Marian Sawer, 'The Genesis of "State and Revolution1" ,  
The S o c ia l i s t  R e g is te r , (London, 1977), pp.209-27.
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seems child's play . . . . ' J  Bukharin concluded that the socialist  
movement must 'emphasize s tro n g ly  i t s  h o s t i l i t y  in  p r in c ip le  to  
s ta te  pow er ' and that the proletar iat1 234s immediate aim must be to 
'destroy the state organization of the bourgeoisie . . . .  explode i t  
from w ith in '  In September 1916 Lenin wrote to Bukharin, rejecting 
the ar t ic le for publication, describing i ts conclusion as 'either 
supremely inexact, or incorrect'  and suggesting that Bukharin's
3
reflections 'about the state in general' be left  'to  m ature' .
Hurt but undeterred, Bukharin defended his views in correspondence,
and published another ar t icle repeating his earl ier characterizations
of the state. Lenin's published reply was unambiguously hostile. He
explained that Bukharin ['Comrade Nota Bene'] had ignored
. . .  the main point of difference between socialists and 
anarchists in their at titude toward the state. Socialists 
are in favour of util izing the present state and its 
institutions in the struggle for the emancipation of the 
working class,  maintaining also that the state should be 
used for a specific form of transition from capitalism 
to socialism. This transitional form is the dictatorship 
of the proletariat ,  which is a lso  a state.
The anarchists want to 'abolish' the state,  'blow i t  
up' (sprengen) as Comrade Nota-Bene expresses i t  in one 
place, erroneously ascribing this view to the socialists.
Lenin also promised to 'return to this very important subject in a
separate ar t ic le '  and in the f i r s t  two months of 1917 he systematically
worked through Marx's and Engels' writings on the state. The result
of this research was, in effect,  an abandonment of the Communist
M anifesto  for the C iv i l  War in  France and of the views of Kautsky
1 'Kteorii  imperialisticheskogo gosudarstva' quoted in Stephen F. 
Cohen, Bukharin and the  Boshevik R e v o lu tio n , (New York, 1975), p.30.
2 I b i d , p.34.
3 V.I. Lenin, C o lle c te d  Works, (Moscow, 1964) (henceforth referred to '  
as CW), vol. 35, pp.230-231.
4 CW, vol. 23, p.165.
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for those of BukharinJ The views to which Lenin came at this time
were systematically elaborated several months later in his famous
pamphlet, S ta te  and R e v o lu tio n .
Like Marx, Lenin claimed that bureaucracy was objectionable
because bureaucrats are 'a privileged group holding "jobs" remunerated
2on a high, bourgeois scale'  and because the police, . . .  the
bureaucracy . . .  are unanswerable to the people and placed above the 
3
people'. Appealing to a strong Russian, rather than simply Marxist 
tradition^, Lenin constantly attacked the existing state machinery as 
alien, separate, 'above' and not of the people.
But why was i t  necessary to smash the state machine? Since 
neither Marx nor Lenin had ever  argued that communist society would 
be administered by 'bureaucrats' ,  Lenin's new position on the 
p r o le ta r ia n  d ic ta to r s h ip  cannot follow simply from the inconsistency 
between ' bureaucracy' and communism. The only reason Lenin seems to 
give for the n e c e s s ity  to smash the existing machine is the connection 
between the bureaucrats, police and army and the bourgeoisie. Bureaucrats, 
he wrote, 'are the most faithful servants of the bourgeoisie' , connected 
to the lat ter  'by thousands of threads' .^ Bureaucrats could not be 
neutral, let  alone amiable to the proletariat;  as a result of their
1 When Bukharin returned to Moscow in May, Lenin's wife's f i r s t  words 
were 'V.I. asked me to tell  you that he no longer has any 
disagreement with you on the question of the s ta te ' .  See Cohen, 
op. c i t .  , p.42 and n.151 , p.399.
2 CW, vo1. 24, p.39.
3 CW, vol. 24, p.107.
4 See Roeber C. Tucker, 'The Image of Dual Russia', in The S o v ie t  
R o l i t ic a l  Mind, (New York, 1972), pp.121-42.
5 CW, vol. 24, p.181.
6 CW, vol. 25, p.407.
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social position, connections and conditioning, they would necessarily
take the side of the bourgeoisie. They 'would simply be unfit to
carry out the orders of the proletarian s t a t e ' J
Lenin was not arguing that the proletarian dictatorship could
do without a state; indeed i t  was precisely on this issue that he
distinguished his view from that of the anarchists. A state would
be required to suppress counter-revolutionaries, and i t  would also
2be required in the f i r s t  stage of socialism, to administer. In 1917, 
however, Lenin rejected all arguments which purported to link the 
persistence of state fu n c tio n s  with existing forms of organizing 
state fu n c t io n a r ie s :
. . .  When asked why i t  became necessary to have special 
bodies of armed men placed above society and alienating 
themselves from i t  (police and a standing army), the West 
European and Russian philistines are inclined to utter 
a few phrases borrowed from Spencer or Mikhailovsky, to 
refer to the growing complexity of social l i fe ,  the 
differentiation of functions, and so on.^
Arguments about the complexity of modern society failed to impress
Lenin, for he argued that the tasks of the proletarian state had been
rendered extraordinarily s im p le .  Since the new ' state '  would be, as
never before, a state of 'the majority of wage slaves of y e s te r d a y '
and since, again as never before, only a minority of former exploiters
would remain to be suppressed, suppression would become a relatively
simple task for which special machinery would hardly be required.^
Moreover, drawing on Marx's arguments that the forms of socialist
organization are immanent in highly developed capitalism, Lenin
claimed that on the basis of the creations of capitalism:
1 CW, vol . 25, p.434.
2 CW, vol. 25, p.425.
3 CW, vol. 25, p.389.
4 CW, vol. 25, p.463.
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large-scale production, factories, railways, the postal 
service, telephones, e t c . . .  the great majority of the 
functions of the old 'state power* have become so simplified 
and can be reduced to such exceedingly simple operations of 
registration, filing and checking that they can be easily 
performed by every l i terate person, can quite easily be 
performed for ordinary 'workman's wages', and that these 
functions can (and must) be stripped of every shadow of 
privilege, of every semblance of 'official grandeur'J
Finally, a recurrent refrain in Lenin's writings during 1917 was that
workers and peasants would administer better than bureaucrats. Like
so many of i ts  cr i t i cs ,  Lenin characterized bureaucracy as parasitic,
by which he meant both that i t  was completely dependent on bourgeois
society and would fall with i t  and that bureaucrats played no productive
role. Here too, capitalism had, as i t  were, provided that workers
with on-the-job training - ' i t  was not for nothing that we went to
2
learn in the school of capitalism' - which, according to Lenin, 
would equip them far better than parasitic bureaucrats for those 
administrative tasks which would need to be discharged in the new 
society.
Lenin, who in 1905 had called the Paris Commune 'a government
q
such as ours should no t he and who had never before regarded the 
Commune's institutional forms as models to be emulated, suddenly 
based his 1917 model of the proletarian dictatorship on the Commune; 
the Soviets were i ts heirs. Lenin's scheme was claimed to ensure 
popular participation in all public act ivi t ies and complete popular 
control over those functionaries who may be required; the scheme's 
central aim was to eliminate ' bureaucracy' from both politics and 
economics. Lenin conceded that the new state would require functionaries, 
but he insisted that these functionaries would not be bureaucrats, that
1 CW, vol. 25, pp.420-21. See also p.473.
2 CW, vol. 26, p .114-
3 CW, vol. 9, p.81.
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is,  people whose ' essence ' is to be 'privileged . . .  divorced from the
people and standing above the people'.^ There would be an apparatus,
but this apparatus will not be ' bureaucratic1. The 
workers, after winning political power, will smash the 
old bureaucratic apparatus, shatter i t  to i ts very 
foundations, and raze i t  to the ground; they will 
replace i t  by a new one, consisting of the very same 
workers and other employees, againab whose transformation 
into bureaucrats the measures will at once be taken which 
were specified in detail by Marx and Engels: (1) not only 
election, but also recall at any time; (2) pay not to 
exceed that of a workman; (3) immediate introduction 
of control and supervision by aZZ, so that a l l  may become 
' bureaucrats1 for a time and that,  therefore, nobody may be 
able to become a 1 bureaucrat' .
It  is with these measures, plus the conversion of parliamentary
institutions into 'working bodies, executive and legislative at the
same time', that Lenin turns on Kautsky:
According to Kautsky, since elected functionaries will 
remain under socialism, so will officials,  so will the 
' bureaucracy'1 This is exactly where he is wrong. Marx, 
referring to the example of the Commune, showed that under 
socialism functionaries will cease to be ' bureaucrats' ,  
to be ' o f f i c ia l s ' . . . .  3
Such a solution to the problems of controlling bureaucracies 
in mass societies would not have satisfied Weber, or indeed Lenin 
at any other time in his l i fe.  But while few people suggest that 
these writings typify Lenin's l ife work or that they were the model 
on which later Soviet developments were buil t ,  they have received a 
great amount of attention, and many extravagant claims have been made 
for them.
In fact ,  as Dr. T.H. Rigby has demonstrated, despite 'Lenin's 
constant stress on the non-bureaucratio character of the new proletarian 
state,  the task of equipping i tsel f  with an effective bureaucracy was
1 CW, vol. '25, p.486.
2 c w , vol. 25, p.481 .
3 CW, vol. 25, p.487.
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in fact the main preoccupation of the Soviet state during i ts 
init ial  phase, and predominantly this expressed i t se l f  in efforts 
to "take over" and "set in motion" the old ministerial machine'.
And quite apart from his subsequent p r a c t i c e , i t  is worth looking 
in some detail at  Lenin's w r it in g s  on these matters after 1917, for 
they are not simply a mass of ad hoc rationalizations designed to 
cope with individual problems as they arose. They show sufficient 
coherence to warrant as least as much attention as The S ta te  and 
R evo lu tio n  in the search for Lenin's views on bureaucracy in post- 
revol utionary society.
,2 The Difficulty of Administration; the Importance of Expertise 
It had been a fundamental art icle of faith among Marxists, and 
another reason for the shock which Lenin's April Theses caused, that 
socialism could only develop out of, and on the basis of, highly 
developed capitalism. Lenin played fast and loose with the problems 
which this belief created for his resolve to institute an immediate
o
proletarian revolution , but residues of the belief remained profoundly 
important in his thought. Even in The S ta te  and R evo lu tio n  i t se l f ,  
there are hints that the need to build on capitalism might qualify 
Lenin's wholesale rejection of the institutions of the ancien  reg im e .
In that pamphlet Lenin attributed four categories of tasks to the 
existing state: suppression of the masses in the interests of the 
bourgeoisie; keeping control and account of labour, production and 
distribution; management within industry; and tasks requiring technical 
expertise. Under the proletarian dictatorship, suppression would be 
carried out in a totally new way, for the mass of the people, organized
1 'Birth of the Central Soviet Bureaucracy' ,  P o l i t i c s , vol. VII , 
no. 2, 1972, p.124.
2 See Jonathan Frankel, 'Lenin's Doctrinal Revolution of April, 1917',
Journal o f  Contemporary H is to r y , vol. 4, pp.117-42.
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in people's mil i t ias,  would suppress the emeritus exploiters.
Accounting and control could also be carried out by the people at 
large, for the tasks had been so simplified by capitalism; 'reduced 
to the extraordinarily simple operations - which any l i terate person 
can perform - of supervising and recording, knowledge of the four 
rules of arithmetic, and issuing appropriate receipts'^.  Management 
within industry would require functionaries, but their positions would 
ultimately become accessible to al l ,  and, in any case the combination 
of workers' control and the measures of the Paris Commune would sharply 
distinguish the new situation from the old.
In one sphere, however, Lenin emphasized continuity between 
the arrangements of the new society and those of the old. He warned 
against confusing:
the question of control and accounting . . .  with the question 
of the scientifically trained staff  of engineers, agronomists 
and so on. These gentlemen are working today in obedience 
to the wishes of the capi tal is ts ,  and will work even better 
tomorrow in obedience to the wishes of the armed workers.^
Certainly, in The S ta te  and Revolution Lenin pays far less attention
to the technical tasks of the proletarian state than to i ts other
tasks; but his remarks on the former suggest a potentially important
point of continuity between the new and the old. The image which
emerges is less that of a monolith which must be 'razed to the ground'
to be replaced by something totally new and different,  than a
Saint-Simonian image of a growing and potentially healthy organism
afflicted by a harmful parasite. Harsh treatment must be administered
to destroy the parasite and certain precautions must be followed to
keep i t  at  bay. And at one point, though he mixes his metaphors,
Lenin says almost precisely that:
1 CW, vol. 25, p.426.
2 CW, vol. 25, p.473.
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. . .  Imperialism is gradually transforming all trusts 
into organizations of a similar type, in which standing 
over the 'common' people, who are over-worked and starved, 
one has the same bourgeois bureaucracy. But the mechanism 
of social management is here already to hand. Once we have 
overthrown the capital ists ,  crushed the resistance of 
these exploiters with the iron hand of the armed workers, 
and smashed the bureaucratic machine of the modern state,  
we shall have a splendidly equipped mechanism, free from 
the 'parasi te ' ,  a mechanism which can very well be set 
going by the united workers themselves, who will hire 
technicians, foremen and accountants, and pay them all*  -| 
as indeed a l l  ' s tate '  officials in general, workmen's wages.
Shortly before the Revolution, Lenin limited even more clearly the
amount of 'smashing' that the state should undergo, and here too,
Saint-Simon would have endorsed the terms in which this limitation
was cast. In Can the Bolsheviks Retain S ta te  Rower? Lenin made i t
clear that capitalism had bequeathed far more than the simplification 
of tasks to the new society. According to Lenin, the existing state 
rested, in effect,  on two separate apparatuses: one - police, bureaucracy
and army - was 'chiefly "oppressive"' and had to be smashed; the other 
apparatus, however, had:
extremely close connections with the banks and syndicates 
[ i t  is] an apparatus which performs an enormous amount of 
accounting and registration work . . .  This apparatus must 
not be smashed. It must be wrested from the control of 
the capital ists;  the capital ists and the wires they pull 
must be cut of f ,  lopped o f f , chopped away from this apparatus; 
i t  must be subordinated  to the proletarian Soviets: i t  must 
be expanded, made more comprehensive, and nation-wide. And 
this can be done by util izing the achievements already made 
by large-scale capitalism (in the same way as the proletarian 
revolution can, in general, reach i ts goal only by utilizing 
these achievements).2
A l i t t l e  later Lenin adds that:
We shall not invent the organizational form of the work but 
take i t  ready-made from capitalism - we shall take over the 
banks, syndicates, the best factories,  experimental stations, 
academies, and so forth; all that we shall have to do is to 
borrow the best models furnished by the advanced countries.
1 CW, vo1. 25, pp.426-27.
2 CW, vol. 26, p.106.
3 CW, vol. 26, p.110.
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Moreover, the pro leta r ian state would not merely preserve and copy 
exis t ing s t ru c tu re s  . I t  would take over the exist ing employees, ' the 
majori ty  of whom themselves lead a proletarian or semi-proletarian 
existence',  and deal '"severe ly" '  with c a p i ta l i s ts  and the higher
t
o f f i c i a l s ,  of whom there are very few, but who grav i ta te towards the 
c a p i t a l i s t s ' .  But i t  would not discard them; i t  would 'em ploy them in  
the  s e rv ic e  o f  the  new s t a t e . This appl ies both to the ca p i ta l i s ts  and
to the upper sections of the bourgeois in te l le c tu a ls ,  o f f ice  employees
. , 1 e tc . .
Though Lenin ins is ted that  the s im p l i f i ca t ion  of accounting and
control had made possible a vast in f lu x  of proletarians into the state
service, he cautioned that  'We are not Utopians. We know that an
unski l led labourer or a cook cannot immediately get on with the job
2
of state admin is t ra t ion ' .  He emphasized the need fo r  ' s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  
trained spec ia l is ts  of every k ind ' ,  and predicted that ' i n  a l l  p robab i l i ty  
we shal l introduce complete wage equal i ty  only gradual ly and shal l pay
3
these specia l is ts  higher salaries during the t rans i t ion  period'.
Almost a l l  of these proposit ions have the i r  contradic tories in 
other, more common, statements made by Lenin in 1917; they also contain 
the seeds of most of what he had to say on these subjects a f te r  power 
had been won. Just as he had distinguished between the oppressive and, 
in a broad sense, administrat ive tasks of the old state, so by March,1918 
he was dist inguish ing between suppression of explo iters and administrat ion 
and organization in the new s ta te, and he was emphasizing that
4
administrat ion had become ' the main and central task' of the state.
1 CW, vo1. 26, p .109.
2 CW, v o l . 26, p.113v
3 CW, v o l . 26, p .110.
4 CW, vol.  27, p.242; c f.  vol. 28, p.36; vol. 31, p.371 and v o l . 42, p.70.
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And the goal of administration was not simply the restoration and
maintenance of order. I t  was a truly  Saint-Simonian vision of
central ly  directed technical and economic advance. I t  required 'a
single state Bank, the biggest of the big '  ^ ; 'the transformation of
2
the whole state economic mechanism into a single huge machine' .
More prosaically, i t  required the most e f f ic ie n t  possible development 
of large-scale industry, for
Socialism owes i ts  origin to large-scale machine industry.
I f  the masses of the working people in introducing socialism 
prove incapable of adjusting their  inst itut ions to the way 
that large-scale machine industry should work, then there can 
be no question of introducing social ism.3
Together with these commitments, went a real passion for eff ic iency,
for people who could get things done, for practical men, well-versed
in the tasks they undertook. As Lenin somewhat apologetically explained
in 1918:
The slogan of practical a b i l i t y  and business-like methods 
has enjoyed l i t t l e  popularity among revolutionaries. One 
can say that no slogan has been less popular among them . . .  
[However] the chief and urgent requirement now is precisely 
the slogan of practical a b i l i t y  and business-like methods.4
The consequences of these commitments and this passion were
profound. F i rs t ly ,  they led to an insistence - convenient for the 'hard'
elements in the Party - that there were many important tasks which
the masses, at least at present, were unable to handle. In homely
fashion Lenin explained: 'No comrades, the art  of administration does
not descend from heaven, i t  is not inspired by the Holy Ghost. And
the fact  that a class is the leading class does not make i t  at once
5
capable of administering'. In 1921, he made the point more bluntly:
1 CW, v o l . 26, p .106.
2 CW, v o l . 27, pp.90-91.
3 CW, vol. 27, p.210.
4 CW, vol. 30, p.457.
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Does every worker know how to run the state? People 
working in the pract ical sphere know that th is  is not 
t rue ,  that m i l l ions  of our organized workers are going 
through what we always said the trade unions were, namely 
a school of communism and administrat ion. When they have 
attended th is  school fo r  a number of years they w i l l  have 
learned to administer, but the going is slow. We have not 
even abolished i l l i t e r a c y  . . .  How many of the workers have 
been engaged in government? A few thousand throughout 
Russia and no moreJ
That th is  insistence on the need fo r  administra t ive competence
was not merely a p o l i t i c a l  ploy is clear from Lenin's d is t in c t io n
between the s k i l l s  of administrators and those of communists. He
began re la t i v e ly  p o l i t e l y ,  stat ing as early as March 1918 that i t  was
understandable that revolut ionar ies and agi ta tors  know l i t t l e  about
large-scale administrat ion and organization; a f te r  a l l ,  th is  had not
been th e i r  m e t ie r  fo r  long. Moreover, some consolation and explanation
lay in the fac t  that there was no precedent fo r  the i r  new a c t i v i t i e s
and no canonical guide to show them the way:
We know about social ism, but knowledge of organization on 
a scale of m i l l io n s ,  knowledge of the organization and 
d is t r ib u t io n  of goods - th is  we do not have. The old 
Bolshevik leaders did not teach us. The Bolshevik Party 
cannot boast of th is  in i t s  h is to ry .  We have not done a 
course on th is  y e t . 2
In any event, the Bolsheviks were not only communists but also Russians,
and 'so fa r  as . . .  [organizing s k i l l ]  is concerned, the Russian is not
in the p i c t u r e ' .  ^ Lenin's remarks on th is  issue became increasingly
impatient and, towards the end of his l i f e ,  almost desperate. He
exhorted communists to ' f ra n k ly  admit our complete i n a b i l i t y  to conduct
a f f a i r s ,  to be organizers and administra tors '  and in 1922 he asked:
Will  the responsible Communists of the R.S.F.S.R. and of the 
Russian Communist Party rea l ise that  they cannot administer; 
that they only imagine they are d i rec t ing ,  but are, ac tua l ly ,
1
2
3
CW, vo1. 32, p.61.
CW, v o l . 27, pp.296-97. 
CW, vo l .  31, p.424.
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being directed? If they realise this they will learn, 
of course: for this business can be learnt. But one must 
study hard to learn i t ,  and our people are not doing this.
They scatter orders and decrees right and lef t ,  but the 
result is quite different from what they wantJ
As a result of these deficiencies of the masses and of the
communists, and as a result of the bourgeoisie's special talents,
Lenin insisted that lessons had to be taken from the bourgeoisie. It
was they who knew techniques of management, industrial production
and trade; they who were scientists,  technologists, engineers and
agronomists. Lenin insisted that 'we must take a lesson in socialism
p
from the trust  managers . . .  from capitalism's big organizers' , he
exhorted communists to bear in mind that 'the engineer's way to communism
is d i f f e r e n t  from that of the underground propagandist': and writer .
He recognized that the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie might contain
traitors and saboteurs, but 'they do know how to run shops'^, while as
he reiterated again and again, no one else did; there were 'no other
bricks'^ with which to build. In direct and conscious contravention
of S ta te  and R evo lu tion  he fought for better treatment and higher wages
for 'bourgeois special is ts ' ,  higher indeed than those of workers and even
of Party leaders. Finally, in his most extravagant, but not
uncharacteristic, appeal, he argued that:
Unless our leading bodies . . .  guard as the apple of their 
eye every specialist  who does his work conscientiously and 
knows and loves i t  - even though the ideas of communism are 
totally alien to him - i t  will be useless to expect any serious 
progress in socialist  construction. We may not be able to 
achieve i t  soon, but we must at all costs achieve a situation 
in which specialists - as a separate social stratum, which
1 CW, vol. 33, p.289
2 CW, vol. 42, r^.r".CL
3 CW, vol. 32, p. 144
4 CW, vol. 28, p.222
5 CW, vol. 29,
or-.CL
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will pers i s t  unt i l  we have reached the highest stage 
of development of communist society - can enjoy bet ter  
conditions of l i f e  under socialism than they enjoyed 
under capital  i smJ
By 1923, only 23-29 per cent of the di rectors  and managers of boards
were Communists, and according to Azrael , the vast majority of the
red Communists were bourgeois spec i a l i s t s .  By 1921:
. . .  o f f i c ia l  sources were able to report  that  specia l i s t s  
and ex-of f ic ia l s  occupied no less than 80 per cent 
of the 'most responsible posts'  in the VSNKh [Supreme 
Economic Council] and comprised 74 per cent of the 
membership of the administrat ive collegia of industr ial  
(jlavks . Moreover, the regime saw f i t  to order those 
communists who retained high posts ' to command less 
or,  more accurately,  not to command'.2
Lenin, indeed, was so imbued with Saint-Simonian technocratic 
zeal that  he, of al l  people, pleaded for the supersession of po litics  
by pract ical  control ,  technical competence and economic reorganization.  
At the Eight Congress of Soviets in December 1920 he applauded ' the 
beginning of that  very happy time when po l i t i cs  will recede into 
the background, when po l i t i cs  will be discussed less often and at  
shorter  length,  and engineers and agronomists will do most of the
3
talking . . .  Henceforth, less po l i t i cs  will be the best p o l i t i c s ' .
I t  is d i f f i c u l t  to recognize the Russia of the 1920s, or '30s or 
'40s, in these remarks, but there is no reason to doubt Lenin's 
s incer i ty .  At the very l ea s t ,  he was sa t i s f ied  that  his Party was 
competent to handle pol i t i ca l  problems and consolidate, i t s  power; these 
were not lessons which a Bolshevik needed to learn in or from 
Germany or America. The sk i l l s  required for large-scale economic 
administrat ion and technological development were. In Russia, they
1 CW, vo l . 33, p.194.
2 J.R. Azrael,  Managerial Power and Soviet Politics , (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1966), p.46.
3 CW, vol . 31, pp.513-14.
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were known only to those who had been involved in these act ivi t ies;  
they were, however, best known to those outside. For Lenin was not 
interested simply in employing the personnel, the administrators, 
traders and experts of the old regime; he was determined that 
Russian enterprises be modelled on those enterprises which really 
worked, those of the West. He sought, as he wrote in 1923, 'a staff 
of workers really abreast of the times, i .e.  not inferior to the best 
West European standards'.^ He called for German and American 
li terature to be obtained:
E veryth ing  more or less valuable should be collected, 
especially as regards normalizing b u reaucra tic  work 
(procedure for despatch of business, forms, control, 
typing of copies, inquiries and replies, etc. etc.)
In my opinion the m ost necessary  thing for us now is 
to learn from Europe and America.^
Lenin was fascinated by any technique which promised to increase
industrial production - piece-work; adjusting wages to productivity,
and, in particular,  the Taylor system:
The Russian is a bad worker compared with people in 
advanced countries . . .  The task that the Soviet 
Government must set the people in all i ts scope 
is - learn to work. The Taylor system, the last 
word of capitalism in this respect, like all capital ist  
progress, is a combination of the refined brutality 
of bourgeois exploitation and a number of the 
greatest scientific achievements in the field of 
analysing mechanical motions during work, the elimination 
of superfluous and awkward motions, the elaboration 
of correct methods of work, the introduction of the 
best system of accounting and control, etc. The Soviet 
Republic must at all costs adopt all that is valuable 
in the achievements of science and technology in this 
field.  The possibility of building socialism depends 
exactly upon our success in combining the Soviet power 
and the Soviet organization of administration with the 
up-to-date achievements of capitalism.^
1 CW, vol . 33, p.487.
2 CW, vol. 36, p.581.
3 CW, vol. 27, p.259.
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Finally, i t  was in aid of these same goals that Lenin
fought, against great opposition, for single as opposed to collegial
authority in industry. Already in March 1918 he called for the
separation of 'two categories of democratic functions'; on the one
hand the collegiate discussion of questions preliminary to execution,
and, on the other, ' the establishment of s t r ic tes t  responsibi 1ity for
executive functions and absolutely businesslike, disciplined,
voluntary fulfilment of the assignments and decrees necessary for
the economic mechanism to function really like clockwork . . .  the time
has come when the achievement of precisely this change is the pivot
of all our revolutionary reforms'. It  was accepted by Lenin and by
his opponents on this issue that single authority and, even more,
one-man management was ' d ic tator ia l ' ;  Lenin insisted, however, that
dictatorship by the competent was often necessary. Though he
encountered strong opposition, he managed to win acknowledgment for
his position - in March/April 1920 at the Ninth Party Congress. By the
end of 1920, one-man authority was established in 86 per cent of all
2Soviet enterprises.
These, then, were the essential ingredients of Lenin's 
programme for post-revolutionary administration and reconstruction.
The consequences of this progrannie for the doctrine of The S ta te  and 
R evo lu tio n  can be easily and chronologically charted. In April 1918, 
Bukharin was rebuked by Lenin for his laudatory review of The S ta te  
and R e v o lu tio n , which emphasized the message that the state had to be 
smashed. This task, Lenin argued, had been accomplished, i t  was a 
task of the past. What was now necessary and what Bukharin and the
3
Left Communists ignored, was 'accounting, control and discipline' .
1 CW, vol . 27, p.211.
2 J.R. Azrael , op. o i t .  , p.46.
3 CW, vol. 27, pp.302-303.
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In July 1919 Lenin wrote an art icle on The S ta te  which interpreted
the call to smash the state in a somewhat novel manner:
This machine called the state . . .  the proletariat 
will smash. So far we have deprived the capital ists 
of this machine and have taken i t  over. We shall use 
this machine or bludgeon, to destroy all exploitation.
And when the possibility of exploitation no longer 
exists anywhere in the world, when there are no longer 
owners of land and owners of factories, and when there 
is no longer a situation in which some gorge while 
others starve, only when the possibility of this no 
longer exists shall we consign this machine to the 
scrapheap. Then there will be no state and no -j
exploitation. Such is the view of our Communist Party.
Lenin claims that he has developed these ideas 'in more detail '  in
The S ta te  and R e v o lu tio n ! Finally in January 1923, Lenin called
for the reo rg a n iza tio n  of the machinery of state,  'which is utterly
useless and which we took over in i ts entirety from the preceding
epoch; during the past five years of struggle we did not, and could
2not, drastically reorganize i t ' .
3 ' Bureaucratism' ,  Participation and Administrative Efficiency
It would, however, be quite misleading to end here. For to 
do so would be to suggest that Lenin's views after 1917 were far 
more coherent than they were, and that they were sim ply  authoritarian 
and e l i t i s t .  In fact,  his views exhibit many tensions and strains: 
Lenin emphasized the primacy of politics in a revolutionary state 
and decried the excessively 'pol i t ical '  orientation of Communist 
administrators; he emphasized the need for bourgeois specialists and 
continually blamed them for their 'bureaucratism'; he insisted that 
they be treated well and ordered that they in particular should be
1 CW, vol. 29, p.488.
2 CW, vol. 33, p.474.
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harshly scrutinized.^ Moreover, the utopian and participatory 
elements of his thought did not simply effloresce and die in 1917, 
but continued to reappear in his later writings.
After the revolution, Lenin continually attacked ' bureaucracy1 234,
1bureaucratism1 and ' bureaucratic methods' in Soviet government. Before 
1921 cr i t ics  of ' bureaucracy1 such as Bukharin and Preobazhensky 
linked their criticism directly to the need to take steps towards 
the 'withering away of the s ta te ' .  Lenin no longer made this 
connection; the weakening or loosening of administrative arrangements 
was not on his post-revolutionary agenda. When Lenin attacked 
bureaucracy and bureaucratism after the Revolution, as he so often 
did, he was referring to 'system-immanent' abuses, excesses, and 
inefficiencies. An efficient bureaucracy staffed increasingly by 
workers is what he sought; the ' bureaucratism' he abused was a congeries 
of flaws in the creaking administrative system he knew he had.
The flaws which Lenin most often identified with 'bureaucratism' 
and ' bureaucratic methods' were of three general kinds. The f i r s t  
kind is a predilection for authoritarian dictation from above, for
3
'bossing' and ordering'. Lenin accused Trotsky of this. A second
flaw, related to the f i r s t ,  is the making of plans without any kind of
test ,  or real is t ic  assessment of their effects. Thus Lenin warned
4against ' i n te l1ectualist and bureaucratic projecteering' ,  and he 
confessed in 1921 that ' the principal mistake we have all been making 
up to now is too much optimism;as a result ,  we succumbed to bureaucratic 
utopias. Only a very small part of our plans has been realized. Life,
1 See A. Ulam, Lenin and th e  B o lsh ev iks  , (Glasgow, 1975), pp.485-86.
2 Daniel Tarschys uses this term to characterize all post-1921 
attacks on ' bureaucracy' in the Soviet Union. See his Beyond
the S ta te :  The Future P o l i ty  in  C la ss ic a l and S o v ie t  Marxism, p. 146.
3 See CW, vol . 32, p.41.
4 CW, vol. 32, p .143.
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everyone, in fact has laughed at our p lans ' J  Finally, and most
commonly, Lenin vented his fury against inefficiency and red-tape
by bracketing them with the sin of 'bureaucratism' or by subsuming
them under the category of 'bureaucratic methods'. Again and again,
Lenin railed against ' bureaucratism, red-tape and mismanagement', and
i t  would not really be appropriate to try to pin down his meaning
too closely; he was clearly writing for audiences which understood
with him that: 'approval from the bureaucratic standpoint means
arbitrary acts on the part of the grandees, the red-tape runaround,
the commissions of inquiry game, and the st r ic t ly bureaucratic
2foul-up of everything that is going'.
How had ' bureaucratism' become so prevalent a malaise of 
the Soviet state? At various times, Lenin suggested a number of 
different explanations. One simplistic suggestion of which he was 
particularly fond was that bureaucratism was simply a legacy of the 
old regime, and specifically of the need to employ the personnel of 
the old regime:
. . .  We dispersed these old bureaucrats, shuffled them 
and then began to place them in new posts. The t sar i s t  
bureaucrats began to join the Soviet institutions and 
practise their bureaucratic methods, they began to 
assume the colouring of Communists and, to succeed better 
in their careers, to procure membership cards of the 
Russian Communist Party. And so, they have been thrown 
out of the door but they creep back in through the 
window.3
Lenin had a substantial temperamental commitment to this sort of 
explanation, but i t  is di f f icul t  to believe that even he was satisfied 
with i t .  I t  smacks of a particularly vulgar Marxism to suggest that 
all of the problems associated with the attempt centrally to administer
1 CW, vol. 32, p.497.
2 CW, vol. 32, p .142.
3 CW, vol. 29, pp.182-83.
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a massive state can be explained by the social type of i t s
off iceholders . In any case, Lenin gives the l i e  to th is
explanation by his constant comparisons between the s k i l l s  of
the old o f f i c i a l s  and Communists' and workers' lack of s k i l l s ,  and
since many of the former had never been thrown 'out of the door'
there was no need fo r  them to return through the window.
On a number of occasions, p a r t i c u la r ly  towards the end of
his l i f e ,  Lenin acknowledged that the ' bureaucratism' of which he
complained a f f l i c te d  many people besides the old o f f i c i a l s .  He
admitted that the Party was becoming bureaucratized; indeed on one
occasion he explained that:
. . .  I t  is natural that the bureaucratic methods that 
have reappeared in Soviet in s t i tu t io n s  were bound to have 
a pernicious e f fe c t  even on Party organizations, since 
the upper ranks of the Party are at the same time the 
upper ranks of the state apparatus; they are one and 
the same th in g J
p
In th is  and other passages bureaucratism appears as a type of 
disease, which ce r ta in ly  a f f l i c te d  the t s a r i s t  bureaucracy, but 
was now a f f 1ic t ing  the whole range of Soviet of f ic ia ldom. And th is  
suggests a fa r  more pervasive and deep-seated problem.
Ulam has suggested that the disparate themes of Lenin's las t  
a r t i c le s  and notes, dictated between December 1922 and March 1923, 
can be l inked i f  one notes how often Lenin uses the word culture ; 
'cu l tu re and i t s  re la t ive s ,  so to speak, to le ra t io n ,  pol i teness, the 
a b i l i t y  to "attach people to oneself" . . .  are constantly ci ted by 
Lenin as necessary prerequis i te  of the a r t  of governing, as both 
the means and the ends of the achievement of socialism . . .  I t  
seems to me that th is  stress on the need fo r ,  and the Russian lack 
of,  cu l tu re ,  connects much more than Lenin's las t  w r i t ings .  I t  is
1 CW, v o l . 31, pp.421-22.
2 c f .  CW, vol.  33, pp.223-24.
3 A. Ulam, 'Lenin's Last Phase', Survey, vol. 21, no.1-2, 1975, 
pp.148-49.
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the Russian masses' lack of culture and education which for
Lenin explains their inability to step directly into government
and the consequent need to make use of bourgeois leftovers.^
Russian communists, too, lacked and needed 'a cultured approach to the
2simplest affairs of s ta te ' .  Not even the officials of the old regime
3
had much culture; they were all afflicted with the Russian disease.
What, then was to be done? The Mensheviks might, of course, 
have accepted Lenin's analysis, but he could never accept their 
solution. In fact,  his own answers varied, were not always consistent 
with each other and only became at all systematic in his very last 
brooding reflections. One measure which Lenin often encouraged was 
the punishment, by People's Courts or by sacking, of anyone found 
guilty of red tape. This accorded well enough with Lenin's fury with 
inefficiency, his tendency to view 'bureaucratism' as a moral fault ,  
and his desire to set examples for officials;  i t  would not,
4however, appear calculated to enhance the level of culture.
1 See CW, vo1. 31, p.421; Vol. 33, p.389.
2 CW, vol. 33, pp.295-97.
3 CW, vol. 29, pp.182-83.
4 One vivid example of this line of thought occurs in a let ter  written 
by Lenin to Kamenev in March 1922:
Here is what I would propose: authorise the All-Russia 
C.E.C. Presidium to adopt the following decision right 
away:
In view of the scandalous red tape on the deal 
(such-and-such) involving the purchase of food 
for Soviet rubles, order the State Political 
Administration {they need a little scaring!) to 
find those guilty of red tape and incarcerate for 
6 hours those working at the Moscow Gubernia Conference 
and for 36 hours those working at Vneshtorg (of course, 
with the exception of All-Russia C.E.C. members: 
after al l ,  we enjoy almost pariiamentary immunity).
After this,  instruct the press to ridicule both 
groups and pour dirt on them. For the disgraceful 
thin g here is that Muscovites (in Moscow!) have 
failed to cope with the red tape. For this they 
should be beaten with a stick . . .
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But Lenin did not hope to cure bureaucratism simply by
throwing people out of the administration; he also wished to bring
a new type of person into i t .  Again and again, he repeated the
claim that the only way to cure bureaucratism and red tape was to
'pour as many workers and peasants as possible into this apparatus'.^
In 1919 the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (Rabkrin) was set up
under Stalin as a means of drawing the masses into supervising the
bureaucracy and of training them in state administration. It  is in
these pleas more than anywhere else in Lenin's post-revolutionary writings
that the mystique of class origin survives. Just as Marx had quite
failed to take the point of Bakunin's charge that a communist government
would consist 'of former workers, who however, as soon as they become
representatives or governors of the people, cease to be workers', so
Lenin, at least until 1921, had boundless faith in the consequences of
2replacing 'hundreds of thousands of bourgeois bureaucrats' by trained 
workers.
Lenin's pleas are also strikingly reminiscent of the participatory 
themes of S ta te  and R evo lu tio n , but there is a crucial difference in 
this respect between his writings of 1917 and those of his period in
That is the only way to teach them. Otherwise, Soviet 
personnel, local and central,  will never learn. We 
cannot afford to trade freely: that is Russia's ruin.
But we can and will learn to transfer our red tapists 
on to a percentage basis: on every deal you get so 
much per cent (fraction of a percent), and jai l  - 
for failure to work.
And the men at the People's Commissariat for Foreign 
Trade need to be changed. The same applies to our state 
trusts . . .  [CW, vol. 45, pp.498-99.]
1 CW, vol. 30, p.351.
2 CW, vol. 31, p.435.
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power. In 1917 popular participation was seen as the a n t i th e s is  to
existing bureaucratic structures and forms of organization; in the
later years, i t  was seen, on the one hand, as a corrective to abuses
w ith in  the existing administrative system and, on the other, as a
goal, a good in i t se l f ,  but only to be approached at a pace and to an
extent consistent with centralized and effective administrative
organization. Workers and peasants were to learn from existing
specialists: they would 'gradually proceed from the simple duties
they are able to carry out - at f i r s t  only as onlookers - to more
important functions of s t a t e a n d  would replace the existing, tainted
functionaries only when they had learnt ' to administer the state
2(which was something nobody had taught us) ' .
In fact,  these devices came to nought. Rabkrin  very quickly
3
grew to some 12,000 officials,  very few of whom were workers and it
became 'one of the most bureaucracy-ridden agencies in the whole
government. Its officials,  who had nothing else to do but to snoop
around, complain, and censor the work of others, came to be considered
4the dregs of the Soviet administrative corps' . Nor is i t  easy to see 
that Rabkrin  under Stalin would have lessened bureaucratism even if 
i t  had introduced more workers into the adminstration. For in a system 
such as Lenin's, the Marxist habit of looking to the regime's Indians 
is often far less apposite than looking to its chiefs. In his last  
writings, Lenin seems to have begun dimly to perceive this.  At any 
rate,  he gave unprecedented attention to the manners, activi t ies and 
possibil i t ies of restraining the top leadership of the Communist Party.
1 CW, vol. 30, p.415.
2 CW, vol. 31, p.435.
3 M. Lewin, L e n in ’s L a st S tru g g le  , (London, 1973), p.120.
4 A. Ulam, Lenin and the  B o lsh ev ik s , p.701.
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Here, the proletarian mystique s t i l l  l ingered, and Lenin suggested 
that the Central Committee be leavened by 50-100 workers, whose 
functions and powers were rather sketchily defined but who were 
intended to check, restrain and remain independent of the personal 
intrigues and antagonisms within the Politburo. Lenin also suggested 
that the Central Control Commission be increased to 75-100 in number.
But the inst i tu t ion which was to play the big role in curing the 
administration of bureaucratism was of a quite d i f ferent  sort. R a b k rin
was to be revamped and reduced to 300-400 members, and these members
were to be a very select group:
specially screened for conscientiousness and knowledge 
of our state apparatus. They must also undergo a special 
test as regards their  knowledge of the principles of 
sc ient i f ic  organization of labour in general, and of 
administration work, off ice work, and so forth , in 
part icular . . .  they should be highly sk i l led ,  specially 
screened, part icular ly  re l iab le ,  and highly paid . . . '
S ignif icant ly ,  the only existing government inst i tut ion which Lenin
singled out for praise at this time was the Commissariat of Foreign
Affa i rs ,  which i t s e l f  was staffed with ex-Menshevik experts and
experts from the old regime, and which 'by current standards appeared
2
v i r tu a l ly  a p o l i t i c a l ' .  According to Ulam,
The ministry, in b r ie f ,  was more e f f ic ie n t ,  and i t  
worked, not at  the behest of some Party bigwig or 
faction, but for the Party as a whole.
Thus, in a somewhat roundabout way, Lenin defined 
his prerequisites for sound administration: efficiency  
and noninvolvement in the personal side of po l i t ics .
Lenin was, in other words, trying to replace the 'p a t r im o n ia l ' staffs
of 'Party bosses' with an impersonal and e f f ic ie n t  bureaucracy. This, 
I believe, is where we began.
1 CW, v o l . 33, pp.482-83.
2 A. Ulam, 'Lenin's Last Phase' , p. 157.
3 I b i d , p . 158.
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It is extremely doubtful whether Lenin's prescriptions would 
have been effective even if  he had survived. In particular,  i t  is 
worth noticing how limited his critique is. He never questions the 
decisive political fact of the regime - one-party dictatorship - 
nor does he consider the effect that the state 's  repressive 
apparatus and act ivi t ies ,  the ban on factions, etc. ,  might have 
on administrative efficiency, and much besides. No external constraints, 
checks or balances are proposed; merely internal manoeuverings among 
bureaucrats and Party overseers. In this context, Moshe Lewin 
is right to complain that:
Lenin, who always claimed to be an orthodox Marxist, 
who no doubt did use the Marxist method in approaching 
social phenomena, and who saw the international 
situation in class terms, approached the problems 
of government more like a chief executive of a s t r ict ly 
' e l i t i s t '  turn of mind. He did not apply methods of social 
analysis to the government i t sel f  and was content to -| 
consider i t  purely in terms of organizational methods.
However, the point is not simply that Lenin 'approached the problems
of government more like a chief executive of a s t r ic t ly "el i t is t"
turn of mind1 - that,  after a l l ,  is almost precisely what he was -
but that he had approached these problems like a chief executive who
had not expected them to arise and who had no theory for coping
with them.
1 Lenin’s Last Struggle, pp.121-22.
PART FOUR
BUREAUCRACY AND THE FATE OF THE REVOLUTION
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SIX
'BUREAUCRACY' IN TROTSKY'S ANALYSIS OF 
STALINISM
As we have seen,  ' bureaucracy ' played a s i g n i f i c a n t ,  but very 
r a r e l y  a cen t r a l  ro l e  in Marx's w r i t i n g s ,  while in the p o s t - r e vo lu t i o n -  
ary wr i t i ngs  of  Lenin i t  usual ly  appeared as a mat te r  of  p r a c t i c a l  
r a t h e r  than t h e o r e t i c a l  concern and a t t e n t i o n .  In Tr o t sky ' s  analyses  
of  the Sovie t  Union a f t e r  1923, on the o t he r  hand, the concept  of  bur ­
eaucracy plays a qu i t e  d i f f e r e n t  and a l t o g e t h e r  more s u bs t a n t i a l  pa r t :  
i t  s tands  a t  the core of  these  wr i t i ngs  - h i s t o r i c a l ,  t h e o r e t i c a l ,  polem­
ical  - in a way, and to an e x t e n t ,  t h a t  i t  never did fo r  Marx and t h a t  
i t  has r a r e l y  done for  Marxis t s .  In these  w r i t i n g s ,  Trotsky grappled 
p e r s i s t e n t l y  with the i s sues  t h a t  the ex i s t ence  of  powerful bureaucracies  
posed for  Marxis t s ,  and his  wr i t i ngs  had a cons iderable  inf luence  on the 
r ecep t ion  of  the concept  of  bureaucracy by l a t e r  Marxists  and by many 
non- or ex-Marxi s t s .  During most of  the h i s t o r y  of  Marxism, ' bureaucracy ' 
- unl ike  ' c a p i t a l i s m ' ,  ' c l a s s '  or  ' p r o l e t a r i a t '  - was not  a deeply 
' t h e o r i z e d '  concept ;  from Tr o t sky ' s  analyses  of S ta l in i sm i t  emerged a l ­
most overburdened with theory.
1 From 'Bureaucrat i sm'  to Bureaucracy as a 'Social  Phenomenon1
When Trotsky w r i t e s  of  ' bu r e auc ra cy ' ,  hi s  i n t e n t i o n  is  no t ,  as 
was, fo r  example,  Max Weber's in his s cho l a r l y  work, to r e f e r  n e u t r a l l y  
to a p a r t i c u l a r  form of  organ iza t i ona l  s t r u c t u r e .  F i r s t  of  a l l ,  what­
ever  they r e f e r  t o ,  ' bureaucracy ' and i t s  var ious  d e r i v a t i v es  - ' bureau­
c r a t i c ' ,  b u r e a u c r a t i z e d ' ,  ' bureaucra t i sm'  - do not  in Tr o t sky ' s  works
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refer neutrally. The possibility that a measure might be 'bureaucratic' 
and yet - let  alone hence - commendable, is entertained very rarely 
indeed. Secondly, Trotsky's focus is not on the organizational s t r u c t ­
ure at al l .  'Bureaucracy' for Trotsky is a collective designation for 
those people, the bureaucrats, who have come to man the organizations, 
f i r s t  of the state apparatus and through them increasingly of the party; 
bureaucracy is a s o c ia l  rather than an o rg a n iza tio n a l  phenomenon. Of 
course, the fortunes of the bureaucracy in this sense, and the organi­
zational structure, are intimately related, but they are not identical.
I t  is quite conceivable - i t  was in effect Trotsky's and, in part,
Weber's hope - that those who staff  the organization would be curbed or 
even purged without the organization suffering: 'a strong state but 
without mandarins; armed power, but without the Samurai'. Conversely, 
bureaucrats might draw status, money and power from sources quite indep­
endent of the organization in which they work. In Trotsky's analysis, 
i t  is bureaucracy as a social stratum which is the main actor and the 
leading culprit ,  not, say, the functional imperatives of large-scale 
organization.
The idea that the October Revolution had spawned a stratum of 
bureaucrats who were sabotaging its achievements came to dominate 
Trotsky's thought, but he did not arrive at i t  immediately. In December 
1923, Trotsky published a number of art icles in Pravda which were re­
published as The Neo Course early in 1924. In them he warned the 
party against the spread of 'bureaucratism', which was 'the result of 
the transference to the party of the administrative manners accumulated
1 Leon Trotsky, The R evo lu tio n  B etrayed, (London, 1 973), pp.50-51.
In future references to Trotsky's work, I will not repeat his name • 
in the footnote.
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during these las t  y e a rs 'J  Trotsky's language is much more restrained
at th is  stage than in la te r  w r i t ings ,  and is more calculated to suggest
a d isease  to which party leaders, and especia l ly those involved with the
state apparatus, might succumb, rather than to focus on and ide n t i fy  a
spec i f ic  group of carr iers  who are already irremediably a f f l i c t e d .
Indeed, whi le Trotsky gives an unmistakable idea of where the carr iers
are to be found - in the state apparatus - he ins is ts  that ' t h i s  does
not mean, to be sure, that the apparatus is composed exclusively of
bureaucratized elements, or even less, of  confirmed and inco r r ig ib le
2
bureaucrats. Not at a l l  1'
Secondly, unl ike Lenin, Trotsky ins is ts  here that Soviet bureau-
3
cratism is neu 3 i t  is a development of  'these las t  few years '.  In his 
wr i t ings on Tsarist Russia, Trotsky, fol lowing Parvus and the l ibera l  
h is to r ian  Mil iukov, had emphasized the exceptional ly powerful role 
played by the s ta te  in Russian development. On a number of occasions 
he remarked that Tsarism 'represents an intermediate form between Euro­
pean absolutism and Asian despotism, being, possibly, closer to the
4
la t t e r  of these two'.  However, as Wittfogel has correct ly  observed, 
Trotsky did not 'use the c r i t e r i a  of Oriental despotism when he c r i t i c -
5
ised S ta l in 's  bureaucratic despotism1 23456, and while he a t t r ibu ted  many of
g
the Soviet Union's problems to Russia's backwardness, he did not l ink  
the present danger of bureaucratism with the nature of  the previous
1 The C ha llenge  o f  the  L e f t  O p p o s it io n  (1922- 25) 3 (New York, 1975), 
p. 70.
2 I b id .  , p .69.
3 Sidney Monas has suggested to me that th is  may be because Trotsky was 
so strongly id e n t i f ie d  with the pol icy of keeping ex-Tsar ist  o f f ice rs  
in the Red Army.
4 1905 , (London, 1972), p.8.
5 O r ie n ta l D espotism 3 (New Haven, 1957), p.404.
6 For a masterly discussion of the imoortance of 1Dackwardness1 in 
Trotsky's analysis o f  Russian society, see Baruch Knei-Paz, The S o c ia l 
and P o l i t i c a l  Thought o f  Leon T ro ts k y 3 (Oxford, !978), pp.27-107
and passim  .
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Russian s t a ted  Rather, he argued,
The bureaucratism of the party, we have said and we now repeat, 
is not a survival of some preceding regime, a survival in the 
process of disappearing; on the contrary, i t  is an essentially 
new phenomenon, flowing from the new tasks, the new functions, 
the new diff icul t ies ,  and the new mistakes of the party.2
Linked with this insistence on the novelty of Soviet bureaucrat­
ism is Trotsky's account of the etiology of the disease. In 1923 Trot­
sky was not arguing, as he later came to, that leadership had been usurped 
by a different type of leader. Rather, he argued that the disease was 
coming to a f f l i c t  the old revolutionary leadership i t se l f  as a result of 
their post-revolutionary involvement in apparatus-work and in their new 
positions of power. I t  was, as i t  were, an in terna l  degeneration of the 
leaders - stemming from the necessity of building and maintaining an
3
effective centralized state and army apparatus - rather than the
supplanting of one group of leaders by men of a quite different sort,
which threatened the revolution. The f i r s t  chapter of The Neu) Course
counterposes the new, post-revolutionary generation of party members and
the old seasoned revolutionaries whose obligation is to lead, to educate
and to involve the young in decisions; and Trotsky writes:
It  is completely clear that in the complicated situation of 
the period immediately following October, the party made its 
way all the better for the fact that i t  utilized to the full 
the experience accumulated by the older generation, to whose 
representatives i t  entrusted the most important positions in 
the organization. . .On the other hand, the result of this 
state of things has been that, in playing the role of party 
leader and being absorbed by the questions of administration, ‘ 
the old generation accustomed i t sel f  to think and to decide, 
as i t  s t i l l  does, for the party. . .
The chief danger of the old course, a result of general 
historical causes as well as of our own mistakes, is that 
the apparatus manifests a growing tendency to counterpose a few 
thousand comrades, who form the leading cadres, to the rest of the 
mass, whom they look upon only as an object of action. If this 
regime should persist ,  i t  would threaten to Drovoke, in the long 
run, a degeneration of the party at both its Doles, that is,  among 
_______ the party youth and among the leading cadres.4
1 Perhaps because this may lead to unacceptable 'Menshevik' consequences.
2 The Challenge o f  the Lef t  Opposition} p. 76 .
3 I b i d pp.91-92.
4 Ib id .  pp.70-71.
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In the next chapter Trotsky warns that:
...we should be fully aware of the dangers of bureaucratic 
degeneration of the old cadres. It  would be vulgar fetishism 
to consider that just because they have attended the best 
revolutionary school in the world, they contain within them­
selves a sure guarantee against any and all dangers of ideo­
logical narrowing and opportunistic degeneration.•
This analysis, with i ts emphasis on the role of functional and
administrative imperatives and constraints, would not, of course, have
surprised Weber or Michels. But Trotsky is a Marxist, and already he
insists that ' i t  is unworthy of a Marxist to consider that bureaucratism
is only the aggregate of the bad habits of officeholders. Bureaucratism
is a social phenomenon in that i t  is a definite system of administration
2of people and things' .  For Trotsky bureaucratism is a 'social phenomen­
on' in two senses: i ts causes3 he argues, are ultimately social, 'the
heterogenen'ty of society, the difference between the daily and the
3
fundamental interests of various groups of the population' and its 
b e n e f ic ia r ie s  and promoters are not randomly or unrelatedly distributed. 
Trotsky observed that:
There is no doubt that the chairmen of the regional committees 
or the divisional commissars, whatever their social origin, 
represent a definite social type, regardless of their individual 
origin. During these six years, fairly stable social group­
ings have been formed in the Soviet regime.4
It  is on that 'stable social grouping' which constitutes the 
Soviet bureaucracy that the bulk of Trotsky's explanation of Stalinism 
is focused, and increasingly, what began as a description of a malign 
tendency which might a f f l i c t  members of the party becomes rather a way 
of characterizing the psychological make-up, the typical ways of behav­
ing, and the working style of a specific, identifiable s tra tu m , the
1 Ib id . 3 p.  7 5 .
2 I b id . , p . 9 1 .
3 I t  id . 3 p .  91.
4 Ib id . 3 p.  74 .
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bureaucracy. In 1929, fo r  example, Trotsky adopted Rakovsky's
analysis"1 234 and argued that 'a f t e r  the conquest of power, an independent
bureaucracy d i f fe ren t ia te d  i t s e l f  out from the working class mi l ieu
and that th is  d i f fe re n t ia t io n  was at f i r s t  only funct ional ,  then la te r  
2
became s o c ia l ' .  We w i l l  soon examine the nature and characte r isecs 
o f  th is  stratum; i t  is enough fo r  the moment to note that Trotsky was 
concerned with i t .
2 The Dictatorship of the Bureaucracy and the Instruct ion of
Po l i t ica l  Leadership
What role had th is  bureaucracy played since the revolut ion, or , 
since facts and values are never fa r  apart in Trotsky's w r i t ings ,  what 
was i t  g u i l t y  of? Expressed el 1i p t i c a l l y , Trotsky's charge was that 
' a l l  power is in the hands o f  the bureaucracy. The person who rules is
3
the head of  th is  bureaucracy: S ta l in ' .  I t  was the burden of most
of Trotsky's l i f e  in ex i le  to t r y  to show that the tru th  of these two 
propositions meant that the revolut ion had been betrayed.
Trotsky's object ion is not to strong central ized government.
In the in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  debates of  1924-28, he consistent ly advocated 
rapid, cen t ra l ly  directed in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n ,  and he repeatedly ins is ted
4
on the need fo r  a 'concerted general p lan '.  He never retreated from 
the b e l ie f  expressed in 1929 that 'these twelve years have shown that 
central ized planned economy is immeasurably superior to c a p i ta l i s t
1 'Power and the Russian Worker', The Neu I n te r n a t io n a l , November, 1934, 
pp.105-9. Reprinted as 'Bureaucracy and the Soviet S ta te ' ,  in Irv ing 
Howe (ed.) E s s e n t ia l Works o f  S o c ia lis m , (New York,1970),pp. 178-1 83.
2 W rit in g s  o f  Leon T ro ts k y  (19 29 ) ,  (New York,1975), p.47.
3 W r i t in g s . . . (1938- 3 9 ), (New York, 1974), p.43.
4 C ha llenge  o f  th e  L e f t  O p p o s it io n  (19 23 - 25 ) ,  p. 118. See also Isaac- 
Deutscher, The P rophe t Unarmed, (London, 1959) and Alexander E r l ich ,  
The S o v ie t  I n d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  Debates 1924-28, (Cambridge, Mass.,
1950).
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anarchy'^ or, later,  that ' the productive advantages of socialism,
centralization, concentration, the unified spir i t  of management, are 
2incalculable' .  Nor, within the economy, were individual industries
to be spared the benefits of modernity. Trotsky had nothing but scorn
for 'the old Tolstoyan-populist lucubrations on the advantages of home
3
industry as opposed to factory industry' . The goal of his economic 
schemes was to transform 'all of industry into a closed, automatically 
operating mechanism... But this task may only be solved by pursuing an 
ever bolder and more persistent specialization in industry, automation 
of production, and an ever more complete combination of the specialized 
production giants into a single producing chain' .^ Trotsky conceded 
that centralization carried risks - 'not only great advantages but also 
the danger of centralizing mistakes, that is,  of elevating them to an
5
excessively high degree' - but the risks were to be countered by a 
sensitive, intell igent,  flexible leadership rather than by the abandon­
ment of the principle of centralization i tsel f .  For the apparently 
extended ' t ransi t ional '  period before socialism, Trotsky, to put i t  
mildly, shares none of the anarchists'  antagonism toward the state, none 
of Mill's fear of overgovernment, and certainly none of Tocqueville' s 
opposition to the concentration of central governmental power; Trotsky's 
objection is that power is being concentrated in the wrong hands, and 
being exercised in the wrong way.
Nor could Trotsky have simply been objecting to d ic ta to r sh ip .
He insisted unreservedly on the need for proletarian dictatorship while 
classes s t i l l  existed, that is,  until socialism had been achieved. At
1 W ri t in g s . . .  (19 29 ) > p.369.
2 W ri t in g s . . .  (1932)3 p .278.
3 The Challenge o f  the  L e f t  Opposit ion (1923-25) f p. 365.
4 Ib id .
5 W ri t in g s . . .  (19 3 2 ) , p.260.
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the core of his theory of permanent revolution was the demand that the 
Russian proletariat take power immediately and i t se l f  carry through the 
'democratic1 2 and then the socialist  revolutions, and i t  was his ins i s t ­
ence on the necessity for proletarian dictatorship which his opponents 
in the 1920s used to accuse him of underrating the role of the peasantry. 
Even in defending himself against these attacks, Trotsky never doubted 
either the need for proletarian dictatorship, or the need within the 
dictatorship, for proletarian hegemony over even the most compliant 
and proletarianized members of other classes. Not only in the Soviet 
Union, but in all places of revolutionary struggle - in the 1930s, 
specifically China and India - the proletariat  must reject any idea of 
a 'two-class party' .  An alliance between the proletariat  and the
peasantry, he insisted, ' is  compatible with the socialist  revolution 
only to the extent that i t  enters into the iron framework of the dictator­
ship of the proletariat ' .^
Furthermore, throughout his analyses of Stalinism Trotsky accept­
ed the primacy of the Bolshevik Party in this dictatorship. He had, 
of course, not always been a Leninist in this respect. Before the 
Revolution Trotsky had consistently and vehemently attacked Lenin's 
conception of the Party, and in 1904 he had accused Lenin of 'substitut- 
ism', of desiring a party which would 'substitute i t se l f  for the working 
classes' ,  and he predicted that Lenin's methods would lead to the party 
organization substituting i t se l f  for the party as a whole, the Central
Committee substituting i t se l f  for the organization, and a single dictator
2substituting himself for the Central Committee. Despite the poignancy 
of this prediction, i t  was not much in Trotsky's mind during the 1920s 
and 1930s, for he treated the leading role of the party as axiomatic •
1 The Third In terna tional A fte r  Lenin, (New York, 1970), p.215.
2 Nashi Politicheskye Zadachi, p.54 quoted in Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet
Armed, (London, 1954), p.90. On Trotsky's writings in this period, 
which have generally,and notably from Deutscher, received far less 
attention than they warrant, see Baruch Knet-Paz, op. c i t . ,  ,pp.175-237.
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and, until 1935, like both his Bolshevik allies and opponents, he insis t ­
ed that the Party must have a complete monopoly of power. In 1927, for 
example, he complained that the 'growing replacement of the party by its 
own apparatus is promoted by a "theory" of Stalin which denies the Lenin­
i s t  principle, inviolable for every Bolshevik, that the dictatorship of 
the proletariat  will and can be realized only through the dictatorship 
of the party' }  And in regard to internal disputes within the party, 
the ' threat of factionalism', this relatively recent convert was - in 
the thick of a faction fight - plus catholique que le pope. In words 
later echoed by Koestler's Rubashov, Trotsky wrote:
Comrades, none of us wants to be or can be right against the 
party. In the last  analysis, the party is always right, 
because the party is the sole historical instrument that 
the working class possesses for the solution of i ts funda­
mental tasks. . .  I t  is only possible to be right with the 
party and through i t  since history has not created any other 
way to determine the correct position.
The English have a proverb: My country right or wrong. We 
can say with much greater historical just ification: Whether
i t  is right or wrong in any particular,  specific question at 
any particular moment, this is my par ty . 2
In reference to the 1936 Soviet Constitution declaring the 
Bolshevik Party to be the only legal party, Trotsky denied that the pro­
hibition of all other parties was a part of Bolshevik theory and he 
claimed that i t  had been merely a temporary 'measure of defence of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat  in a backward and devastated country,
3
surrounded by enemies on all sides' .  Even at this stage, however, he. 
insisted that 'the proletariat  can take power only through its vanguard... 
The Soviets are only the organized form of the tie between the vanguard 
and the class. A revolutionary content can be given to this form only 
by the party. .. The fact that this party subordinates the Soviets
1 The Real S itua tion  in  R u s s i a (New York 1923), p. 117. See also 
W ritings... ( 19 30-  31) ,  (New York, 1973), pp.210-11.
2 The Challenge o f  the L e ft Opposition ( 19 25- 25) 3 p.161.
3 Stalin ism  and Bolshevism3 (New York, 1937), p.23.
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polit ically to i ts leaders, has, in i t se l f ,  abolished the Soviet system 
no more than the domination of the conservative majority has abolished 
the British parliamentary system'.^ The Bolshevik dictatorship, Trotsky 
now concedes, 'served as a juridical point of departure' for the Stalin­
is t  dictatorship, but to confuse the two is anarchist - or Stalinist  - 
nonsense. They are, he insists ,  totally different kinds of phenomena, 
and the l a t te r  did and could hold sway only after the deliberate and 
complete emasculation of the party.
Trotsky explains at one point that the f i r s t  question to be 
asked of a workers' state in the period of proletarian dictatorship
. . .  has the party retained Marxist clarity of vision, ideo­
logical solidity,  the abili ty to arrive collectively at an 
opinion and to fight seif-sacrificingly for it? From this 
point of view, the state of the party is the highest test 
of the condition of the proletarian dictatorship, a syn­
thesized measure of its stabil i ty.  If,  in the name of achiev­
ing this or that practical aim, a false theoretical attitude 
is foisted on the party; i f  the party ranks are forcibly 
ousted from political leadership; i f  the vanguard is 
dissolved into the amorphous mass; i f  the party cadres 
are kept in obedience by the apparatus of state repression 
- then i t  means that in spite of the economic successes, 
the general balance of the dictatorship shows a d e f i c i t . 2
Trotsky had no doubt that this deficit  existed and was
massive; nor did he doubt that i t  had been brought about by the
bureaucracy' s machinations. By admitting to the party 'whole plants
1 Ib id .,  pp.21-22. Unless there is some procedure for supplanting 
the party, this analogy is not one of Trotsky's best.
2 W ritings. . . (1930- 31) p.211.
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and artels'^ the bureaucracy was effectively dissolving the party into
the working class; by doing so i t  was destroying the party's capacity
to function as the vanguard of the working class and i ts abi l i ty to
exert control over the bureaucracy. At the same time, by totally
purging the party of revolutionaries and replacing them with ' toadies' ,
with 'obedient, accommodating, spineless, and unprincipled functionar-
2ies or cynical administrators' ,  the bureaucracy was establishing a
dictatorship over the party. 'In other words', Trotsky writes, 'the
3
party was ceasing to be a party' .
One can, I think, distinguish two elements in this charge. The 
obvious element is the orthodox Bolshevik insistence on the vanguard role 
of the party in the period of the proletarian dictatorship. '  The immed­
iate context in which this element arises is one of choice between 
different forms of revolutionary leadership, and in this context a 
Leninist would object to threat to the vanguard from any source.
1 Writ ings. . . (1 9 3 0 ) , New York 1975), p.117. In fact this specific 
practice occurred only once - in 1930-31 - i t  was discontinued by 
1932, and recruitment was entirely halted in January, 1933. Even
in the two peak periods of worker recruitment - the 'Lenin Enrolment' 
of 1924, and the 1930-31 recruitment - there was no evidence that 
Stalin was attempting to dissolve the party into the class, and 
in 1925-26, when Stalin's supporters advocated slackening worker 
recruitment, they accused the Leningrad Opposition, whom they 
labelled ‘Makhaevists' and 'Axelrodists' ,  of precisely this sin.
(See for this whole period T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership 
in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1967, (Princeton, 1968), pp.57-235). However, 
Trotsky's fears were not totally without foundation. Overall, 
membership of the party increased from less than half a million 
to over three and a half millions between 1924 and 1933, and 
'throughout the middle and later 1920's, each time Stalin broke 
with his former al l ies and manoeuvred them into opposition he 
proceeded to swamp their supporters with masses of raw recruits whose 
political attitudes and behaviour could be freely moulded by a 
party bureaucracy totally controlled by Stal in \( lb id . , p.131).
Of course, in the 1930's the party's problems were of an entirely 
different kind - many of i ts  members were simply being 'dissolved'.
2 Writings. . . (1929) j  p. 381
3 My L i fe , (New York, 1970), p.514.
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But Trotsky's argument can be cast more broadly, and if i t  is, 
a strong parallel emerges between it  and the work of other, non-revol­
utionary and non-Marxist writers, in particular with the political 
writings of the greatest social theorist for whom bureaucracy was a 
central concern, Max Weber. It  is banal to observe that Trotsky and 
Weber shared few substantive political values, expectations or hopes. 
Nonetheless, central to the political outlook of both writers was a 
profound opposition to the supplanting of the politica l by the bureau­
cratic-administrative. Both argued that goals must be set, policies 
weighed and chosen, and peoples led by those whose vocation was polit ics.  
Both believed, one of the modern West, the other of the Soviet Union, 
that bureaucrats were threatening to take over these roles and that they 
were inherently incapable of carrying them out successfully. We have 
seen that this is true of Weber; i t  is equally true of Trotsky.
In The New Course Trotsky warned that bureaucratization 'threatens 
to detach the leaders from the masses; to bring them to concentrate 
their attention solely upon questions of administration, of appointments 
and transfers; to narrow their horizon; to weaken their revolutionary 
spir i t ;  that is,  to provoke a more or less opportunistic degeneration 
of the Old Guard, or at the very least of a considerable part of i t ' J  
Increasingly as Trotsky's use of the term ' bureaucratization' shifted 
from that of suggesting a spreading disease which might af f l i c t  the 
leadership, to that of characterizing a specific stratum, these vices 
were attributed to the bureaucracy. The bureaucrat was not simply 
distinguished from the rest  of the proletariat by his recently acquired 
social position; he was a distinguishable and objectionable sort of man,
1 The Challenge of the Left  Opposition3 p.72.
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a different psychological type from the Bolshevik revolutionary.
Beginning shortly after the revolution, and increasingly after Lenin's 
death, Trotsky wri tes, 'a division began to reveal i t sel f  between the 
leaders who expressed the historical line of the class and could see 
beyond the apparatus, and the apparatus i t sel f  - a huge, cumbrous, 
heterogeneous thing that easily sucked in the average communist... 
under cover of the traditional forms, a different psychology was develop­
ing'."1 2345678 The bureaucrat was deeply conservative, he was ' inclined to
2think that everything needed for human well-being has already been done',
he shared with the property-owner an 'organic antagonism... to world
3
revolution with i ts "permanent" disturbances' and with the petty
4
bourgeois he shared 'the yearning. . .  for tranquility and order . In 
matters of ideology, as perhaps befits a conservative, he was not at 
home; in fact he was monumentally inept. For him 'theory is an 
administrative formula', he was saturated with 'short sighted empiricism', 
though in the Marxist sense - and of course this too is considered a 
fatal flaw - 'bureaucrats are always ideal is ts ' .^  Perhaps appropriately, 
then, his head was 'so constructed that all the winds of eclecticism
g
constantly whistle through i t ' .  The bureaucrat as an individual and 
the bureaucracy as a stratum were characterized by an opportunistic and, 
given the times, fear-ridden clawing to secure and maintain their posit­
ions. The only interests they served, Trotsky wrote, were their 
personal or their 'caste'  interests,  and he explained in a passage 
strikingly reminiscent of Marx's C ri t ique  o f  Hegel 's  Philosophy o f  Rights
1 My L i f e ,  pp.502-03.
2 W r i t i n g s . . .  (1929),  p.48.
3 The Permanent Revo lu t ion  ccnd R esu l t s  and Prospec ts , (London ,1971) p. 35 .
4 Ib id .
5 W r i t i n g s . . .  (1930), p.329.
6 W r i t i n g s . . .  (19 32), p.37, cf. W r i t i n g s . . .  (1934-35) p. 150 -
7 W r i t i n g s . . .  (1932- 33),  (New York 1973), p. 7 3, W ri t in g s . . . ( 19 30- 31) p .285.
8 W rit ings . . . ( 1 9  30- 31) , p. 26 .
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that ' the growth of bureaucratism reflects the growth of the contra­
diction between the private and social interests.  Representing the 
"social" interests,  the bureaucracy identifies them to a large measure 
with i ts own interests.  It  draws the distinction between the social 
and the private in accordance with i ts own private interests' .^
But Trotsky's objection to bureaucratic dominance is not simply 
that a flock of mediocrities have come to feather their own nests at 
the expense of the workers' state. For quite apart from their personal 
venality, Trotsky repeatedly insisted that as adm in is tra to rs  they are 
simply incompetent in p o l i t i c a l  roles. Observe, for example, the terms 
in which he characterized Molotov. The man, he wrote, ' is unquestion­
ably the most complete embodiment of the bureaucracy that rose on the 
wave of reaction in 1924-29 and is deeply convinced that all problems 
are to be resolved by financial or administrative measures. These 
gentlemen are blind to the fundamental questions of world development. 
However, they are masters of corridor ski l ls.  With the help of blind
administrative might, they have already beheaded several parties and
2several revolutions' . There are here several of the l e i t m o t i f s  of 
Trotsky's attacks on bureaucracy. There is,  especially, his ins is t ­
ence that the bureaucrat naturally and typically conceives of social 
and political problems in purely administrative terms, he reacts 'with
3
mere administrative reflexes' .  According to Trotsky, these reflexes
1 W ritin g s . . . ( 1 9  33-34) ,  (New York, 1972), p.167.
2 W rit in g s . . . ( 1 9  29) ,  p.380.
3 The R evo lu tion  Betrayed ,  p.86. Similar observations have, of course, 
been made by other writers. Karl Mannheim, for example, argues
that 'the fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn 
all problems of politics into problems of administration... The 
attempt to hide all problems of politics under the cover of admini­
s t rat ion. . .  'Ideology and Utopia, (London, 1936), p.105. Ironically, 
this is probably part of what Lenin had in mind when he claimed in 
his 'Testament' that Trotsky was 'given too much to the administrat­
ive side of things' . Dr Rigby has informed me that in Russian this 
expression also suggests that he is too much given to coercion.
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manifest themselves in a blind adherence to plans conceived a priori, 
a complete absence of f lexibi l i ty or tempering of these plans in the 
light of poli t ical ,  social or economic circumstances. Instead of such 
f lexibi l i ty,  we have bureaucratic substitution of 'administrative goad­
ing, with the absence of any serious collective verification' ,^ 'the
naked administrative whip... [instead of] . . .  a Marxian analysis and
2flexible regulation of the economy'. This way of proceeding, Trotsky 
insists,  is and must be fundamentally misconceived. Planning is indeed 
essential,  but, especially in a backward country racked by 'contradict­
ions' ,  a plan ' is  not a fixed gospel, but a rough working hypothesis 
which must be verified and reconstructed in the process of i ts  ful f i l -  
ment . What is needed is in part financial and administrative nous, 
which Trotsky believes the existing crop of ' toadies'  is ill-equipped 
to display and - far more important - enlightened politica l  leadership, 
which bureaucrats by their nature are incompetent to give.
According to Trotsky, the Party's uniqueness lay not merely 
in the quality of i ts members, but also in the way this 'flower of the
4
class, i ts  revolutionary selection'  went about i ts tasks. The Party 
would be abdicating i ts function i f  i t  did not lead the masses toward 
socialism, but i t  was pointless and hopeless to attempt to dragoon them 
into i t .  Moreover, i t  was enormously wasteful, inefficient and often 
counterproductive to ignore their sentiments, local knowledge, fears 
and hopes. What, above al l ,  was unique about a properly constituted
5
Party leadership was the 'multiple collective experience' on which i t  
could draw:
1 Writings. ..(19 30- 31) pp.206-7
2 Ib id .,  p.282
3 The Revolution Betrayed, p. 66
4 Writings...(19  32- 33), p.170
5 The Challenge o f the Left Opposition (1925-25), p.77.
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The essential,  incomparable advantage of our party consists 
in i ts  being able, at every moment, to look at industry with 
the eyes of the communist machinist, the communist special­
i s t ,  the communist director, and the communist merchant, 
collect the experience of these mutually complementary work­
ers, draw conclusions from them, and thus determine i ts line 
for directing the economy in general and each enterprise in 
par t icularJ
But i f  this is how leadership shou ld  be exercised, i t  had 
l i t t l e  to do with the way in which the Stal inist  bureaucracy did  
exercise i t .  A crucial cause and index of the bureaucracy' s incapacity 
in i t s  new role, Trotsky argued, was i ts isolation from the masses. He 
treated i t  as virtually a defining character!'stic of bureaucracy that 
'everything is worked out at the top, behind closed doors, and then
9
handed down to the masses like the tablets from Sinai ' .  And while 
what was required to prevent such isolation was the encouragement of 
'soviet democracy', the bureaucrats were destroying i t .
I t  is not always easy to ascertain the substantive content, 
or even, for that matter, the sincerity of Trotsky's appeals for democracy. 
First,  as Cohen suggests in explaining Bukharin's anti-Trotskyism after 
1923, 'Trotsky's own motives and ambitions were not above suspicion, his 
sudden commitment to democratic procedures being suspect i f  only because 
previously he had been among the most authoritarian of Bolshevik lead-
3
ers. '  Secondly, Trotsky's appeals for democracy often ring louder 
in his attacks on the Stalinists than in his advice to his followers. 
Trotsky denies that the reconciliation of proletarian dictatorship with 
'soviet democracy' is at all problematic, and in fact he insists that 
the essence of correct political leadership consists in just  this recon­
ciliation. And indeed the sort of democracy that Trotsky favours is
1 Ib id .
2 W r i t in g s . . .(1930- 31) p. 51: 'Only fools and the blind can believe that 
socialism can be handed down from above, that i t  can be introduced 
bureaucrat!-cal ly '. Ib id ,  p.291.
3 Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin3 p.155.
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easier than most to reconcile with dictatorship. For 'soviet democracy' 
is not common or garden democracy and i t  is certainly not 'absolute' ,  
' formal' ,  or 'pure' democracy. As we have seen, the only democracy 
Trotsky was talking about until about 1935 was inner-party democracy.
Even here, Trotsky explained, 'the principle of party democracy is in 
no way identical with the principle of the open door'^ and the door was 
to be closed to all but the working class and some ' proletarian!zed' 
peasants of inferior status. And within the vanguard i t se l f  'we stand 
not for democracy in general but for c e n t r a l i s t  democracy . . .  The revol­
utionary party has nothing in common with a discussion club where every­
body comes as to a cafe. (This is Souvarine's great idea.) The party 
is an organization for action. The unity of party ideas is assured
through democratic channels, but the ideological framework of the party
2must be s t r ic t ly  delimited'. It is on this ground that Trotsky advo- 
cates the party's 'constant self-purging'. The problem with the Stalin­
is t s ,  i t  would appear, was not that the purges took place, but that the
4
wrong people were purged, many of the right people were not, and that
1 W r i t in g s . . .  (19 32- 33) p. 56.
2 The similarity between this passage and a 1932 attack on him by
Stalin, is striking: 'Stalin . . .  insisted . . .  that "the party is not
only a union of like-minded people, i t  is . . .  a fighting unit of 
common action . . . "  This meant to Stalin, "It  is necessary to put 
limits to discussion, to preserve the party, which is the fighting 
unit of the proletariat ,  from degeneration into a discussion club. '",  
in Robert Vincent Daniels, The Conscience o f  the  R e v o lu t io n , (New 
York, 1969), p.221.
3 W ritings . . .  (19 32- 33) p.88.
4 'We Bolshevik-Leninists never looked upon party democracy as free 
entry for Thermidorean views and tendencies; on the contrary, party 
democracy was trampled underfoot in the promotion of the lat ter .
What we mean by the restoration of partv democracy is that the real 
revolutionary proletarian core of the party win the right to curb 
the bureaucracy and to really purge the party: to purge the party
of the Thermidoreans in principle as well as their unprincipled and 
careerist cohorts who vote according to command from above, of the 
tendencies of tail-endism as well as the numerous factions of toadyism, 
whose t i t l e  should not be derived from the Greek or Latin but from 
the real Russian word for toady in i ts contemporary, bureaucratized, 
and Stalinized form. This is the reason we need democracy''
W ritings  . . .  (19 30- 3 1 ) ^ . ^ 1 .
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the purges were used as a means to terrorize the party. And even p a rty  
democracy was never for Trotsky an intrinsic good; i t  was 'not necessary 
in i t se l f  but as a means of educating and uniting the proletarian van­
guard in the spir i t  of revolutionary Marxism'.^
From 1935 Trotsky began to express views which only a short 
time before, he would have considered heretical,  and which, of course, 
orthodox Communists s t i l l  considered so. However, his few statements 
remained guarded. In The R evo lu tio n  Betrayed? Trotsky demanded 'a 
restoration of the right of criticism' and, as Deutscher notes, he made 
a 'new departure' in calling for 'genuine freedom of elections' .  But 
even this departure remains completely within the boudaries of the 
proletarian dictatorship: i t  occurs in the same chapter as an attack on
the equalization of workers' and peasants' political rights, and, further, 
as Deutscher somewhat coyly explains:
On this point, however, he was confronted with a dilemma: he 
had discarded the principle of the single party; but he did 
not advocate unqualified freedom of parties. Going back 
to a pre-1921 formula, he spoke of 'a revival of freedom of 
S o v ie t  part ies ' ,  that is of the parties that ‘stood on the 
ground of the October Revolution'. But who was to determine 
which were and which were not 'Soviet parties'? Should the 
Mensheviks, for instance, be allowed to benefit from the ' re­
vived' freedom? He left  these questions in suspense, no 
doubt because he held that they could not be resolved in 
advance, regardless of circumstances.3
Finally in 1938, Trotsky argued in his most liberal public
statement, that 'democratization of the soviets is impossible without
le g a l iz a t io n  o f  s o v ie t  p a r t ie s .  The workers and peasants themselves by
their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognize as soviet
4
part ies ' .  Even here, the lack of attention to what choice will be
1 W ritings . . . (19 32-33) 3 p.88.
2 at pp.289-90 .
3 The Prophet O utcast} (London, 1953), p.311.
4 The T r a n s itio n a l Program fo r  S o c ia l i s t  R evo lu tio n3 (New York, 1974), 
p.105.
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o f f e r e d  to the workers and peasants - whether and how heavily i t  will be 
delimited, and whether the proletarian dictatorship will be allowed any 
dilution - is ,  at the very least,  cavalier.
In any speculation as to how much more democratic than Stalin's a 
regime under Trotsky might have been, the qualifications which hedge his 
conception of democracy on all sides must be borne in mind. Trotsky, 
nonetheless, certainly believed that there was a q u a l i t a t i v e  difference 
between his 1democracy f o r  p ro le ta r ia n  d ic ta to r s h ip  and w i th in  the  frame­
work o f  th a t  d i c t a t o r s h i p ^ and bureaucratic dictatorship. The former 
would allow ideologically correct Marxists to have access to influence, 
i t  would encourage recruitment on the basis of talent and i t  would 
provide cues and information of value to the sensitive political leader­
ship at the centre. The la t ter  simply bludgeoned and bulldozed its 
way through obstacles, social and economic real i t ies ,  and of course 
people. Moreover, i t  recruited only those who were no threat to i t ,  
and was therefore bereft of any people with talents appropriate to the 
development of the Soviet Union.
Trotsky was not arguing that bureaucracy could be dispensed 
with, nor even that i t  should be diluted; the Maoist slogan 'Better Red 
than Expert' would have seemed nonsense to him and completely inconsist­
ent with what was required for the building of socialism. Though bur­
eaucracy would disappear after the coming of socialism, for the interim 
Trotsky was in effect a Weberian in his conviction that professional, 
trained bureaucrats manning an apparatus of great power were indispens­
able. But the bureaucracy had to be controlled and i ts goals and 
policies set by people of a quite different stamp with priori t ies and 
goals of a quite different order.
1 W ritings , . . ( 1 9 3 2 - 2 3 ) ,  p . 1 66.
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The Soviet tragedy, on Trotsky's view, was not so much that in a l l  
circumstances the correct p o l i t i c a l  regime must be superior to a bureau­
cra t ic  regime, and that here th is  wasn't so. After a l l ,  when socialism 
is achieved, the comparison w i l l  be empty of reference, fo r there w i l l  
be no state or p o l i t i c s  at a l l J  But in the Soviet Union in t r a n s i t i o n  
to socialism, the qua l i ty  of  the p o l i t i c a l  regime is of unique import­
ance, fo r  ' there is no other government on the world in whose hands the
2
fate of the whole country is concentrated to such a degree1 23. I t  was in 
th is  country, whose future was of fundamental importance fo r  world 
development and whose own development was uniquely dependent on talented, 
dedicated and ideo log ica l ly  sound p o l i t i c a l  leadership, tha t ,  instead, 
the ranks of farsighted revo lu t ionar ies were being decimated by a b loa t­
ed, incompetent layer of bureaucrats. Trotsky never gives an adequate 
explanation of how the crawlers of the years before 1928 became the racers of 
la te r  years^ but he ins is ted that  th e i r  e a r l ie r  t im id i t y  and th e i r  la te r  ‘ u l t r  
l e f t  lunacy' were merely two sides of the same coin. At the very least 
they were both manifestations of a fundamental lack of p o l i t i c a l  ta le n t ,  
which in ex is t ing circumstances was the most important ta len t  of a l l .
1 Cf. W r i t in g s  . . .  (1933 -34 ) ,  p.225 and The R e v o lu t io n  B e trayed ,
pp.268,271.
2 The R e v o lu t io n  B e tra ye d ,  p . 43.
3 In fac t  Trotsky explained that the d i r e c t i o n  of the turn was due to 
the combined pressure of the Lef t  Opposition and the fa i lu re  of the- 
ru le rs '  previous po l ic ie s ,  and he claimed that the bureaucrats turned 
unw i l l ing ly  and that the turn was far  more extreme than they had 
wished. But faced with the problem of accounting at the p s y c h o lo g i ­
c a l  level fo r  the reckless zeal which now characterized these pre­
viously t im id ,  conservative, s e l f - s a t i s f ie d  bureaucrats, Trotsky 
doesn't turn a hair.  In a formula of blunt i f  somewhat mysti fying 
s im p l ic i t y ,  he explains: 'A f te r  the f i r s t  new successes the slogan 
was advanced: "Achieve the f ive-year plan in four years". The 
s tar t led  empirics now decided that everything was possible. Opport­
unism, as has often happened in h is to ry ,  turned into i t s  opposi te , '  
adventurism'. The R e v o lu t io n  B e tra ye d ,  p.35.
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3 Polit ical_versus Bureaucrat i c Leadership ; the Role of Stalin
This contrast between the revolutionary poltician's way of 
approaching tasks and solving problems and that of the bureaucrats is 
called on by Trotsky to perform some very weighty tasks. It is the means 
of distinguishing between the Soviet Union as i t  had been and as i t  had 
become. It  is thereby the means of warding off attacks by anarchists 
and other anti-communists, as well as Stalinist apologias, all of which 
insisted on a continuity between the policies of Lenin and those of Stalin. 
It also provides the tools for Trotsky's criticism of any specific polic­
ies undertaken by Stalin. However, this dichotomy between the revol­
utionary political leader and the bureaucrat is faced with an obvious 
difficulty - the case of Stalin himself. For Stalin was of the Old 
Guard, he had long been a revolutionary and, for most of their collabor­
ation, the 'wonderful Georgian' had been trusted by Lenin. Unfortunat­
ely he was also at the pinnacle of the regime which Trotsky accused of 
bureaucratic deformation. Trotsky overcomes this problem, at least 
from the point of view of internal consistency, at the same time as he 
deals with two other problems which Stalin creates for his analysis.
The f i r s t  of these problems is the Marxist's genuine theoretical 
difficulty in accounting for the pre-eminent individual, in this case 
the anti-hero, in history. Trotsky frequently insists that to view his 
clash with Stalin, or Stalin's rise to power, in personal terms, is 
quite wrong, that,  for example, 'he who sees only the victories and the 
defeats of personalities understands nothing in the struggle between 
factions in the USSR'."* The fate of individuals, he argues, can only 
be explained in terms of the historical ,  economic, and social forces
1 Writings . . .  (1934-35) (New York, 1971), p. 130.
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which they represent and which, indeed, have placed them where they are. 
I t  is true that, faced with an individual of Lenin's stature, the Marxist 
in Trotsky occasionally capitulates, as when he admits in his diary 
that without Lenin 'there would have been no October Revolution'^ or 
when he laments that on Lenin's death 'Russia lost a man who could not
9
be replaced'. Before Stalin, however, Trotsky feels no such need to 
capitulate. Marxists, after a l l ,  have on other occasions had to account 
for the rise to power of people they considered non-entities - 'the hero 
Crapulinski1 2 of The E ig h te e n th  B r w n a i r e . . .  is an obvtous example and 
precedent. But while a Stalin might be easier to accomodate theoreti­
cally than a Lenin, I think i t  fa i r  to say that Trotsky finds real 
p e rs o n a l  d i f f ic u l ty  in confronting his own defeat and what he regards as 
the betrayal of the revolution at the hands of this provincial boor.
For on Trotsky's account, Stalin can scarcely be said to exist in world- 
historical terms. He is portrayed as a quintessential mediocrity: 
dull ,  boorish, narrow-minded, ideologically primitive, and - as Trotsky 
is so often pleased to note of his opponents - he knows no foreign langn 
uages! His very mediocrity is in a sense grist to Trotsky's theoretical 
m il l ,  for whether or not individuals in general are merely buoys buffet­
ed by historical currents, this particular individual, as Trotsky 
portrays him, can scarcely be anything else.
Trotsky accounts with the same explanation for all  three of 
these problems: explaining a bureaucratic dictatorship whose chief 
single beneficiary is not simply a bureaucrat; accounting for the rise 
to apparent pre-eminence of a single individual; and coming to terms 
with the extraordinary success of this specific mediocrity. His solut­
ion is, so to speak, to collapse Stalin into the bureaucracy. He
1 D ia ry  i n  E x i l e , (London, 1958), pp.45-46.
2 W r i t in g s  . . . ( 1 9  32) 3 p.31 7.
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expresses this solution in two ways, one of which is more colourful,
but the other more serious. One way in which he makes the point
suggests that Stalin had nothing  to do with his position. He is the
bureaucracy' s 'personal pseudonym',^ he is 'not an individual but a 
2caste symbol', he 'did not create the apparatus. The apparatus created
Stalin - after i ts own image'. Except for the special venom which
usually infects his characterizations of Stalin, these statements find
parallels in Trotsky's treatment of significant - and sometimes not so
significant - opponents in a variety of contexts. The Romanovs ,^
5 6Hindenburg and Hitler receive similar characterizations. In all these 
contexts Trotsky attempts to play down the importance of a leader's 
personality in his fate and to emphasize how l i t t l e  of that personality 
is really an autonomous, distinguishable element of the socially moulded 
face he presents to the world. Since Stalin has come to head the bur­
eaucracy, i t  is to i t  rather than to him that we should look to explain 
his position.
Nonetheless we must look to him, for there is a second quest­
ion to be asked of all political leaders except hereditary ones - why 
one person succeeded rather than the other contenders. In Stalin's 
case this question is particularly important, given the fate of his 
many eminent rivals.  In answering this question, Trotsky again insists 
that the ini t iat ive comes from the bureaucracy, but i t  comes to S ta lin ,  
not because his personality is a tabula rasa  on which the bureaucracy 
can simply write at will. Rather i t  comes to him because he is
1 W ritings . . . ( 1933- 34 ) ,  p.273.
2 W ritings . . . ( 1 9  37- 38) , p  .127 ,
3 W ritings . . . ( 1935-  36),  (New York, 1970), p.101.
4 The Russian R evolu tion , vol. l .  p.65.
5 The S truggle  A gainst Fascism in  Germany, p.255.
6 Ib id . ,  p.406.
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inherently just  the sort of man who is suited to preside over the
bureaucratic destruction of the revolution. His role in the revolution,
Trotsky insists ,  was insignificant,  and even at the end of the Civil
War he was ' s t i l l  in the shadows pol i t ical ly1 2."* Moreover, though
he had undeniably been a revolutionary, his cast of mind was always
that of a bureaucrat. In his biography of Stalin, Trotsky cites an
art icle Stalin had written in 1920, on 'Lenin as Organizer and Leader of
the Russian Communist Party' and he comments:
. . .  The art icle is interesting because not only in the t i t l e  
but in his whole conception of him, Stalin acclaims Lenin pri ­
marily as an organizer and only secondarily as a political 
leader. . .  I t  is no exaggeration to say that no other Marx­
i s t ,  certainly no other Russian Marxist, would have so con­
structed an appraisal of Lenin... Yet i t  is no accident 
that Stalin looked upon the organizational lever as basic; 
whatever deals with programmes and policies was for him 
always essentially an ornament of the organizational found­
a t ion^
Trotsky considered i t  natural that the bureaucracy should seek 
out and promote Stalin, for he combined the necessary aura of the revol­
ution with a practical,  dull, narrow-minded and prosaically bureaucrat­
ic personality and intel lect .  'Before he fel t  out his own course', 
Trotsky writes, 'the bureaucracy fe l t  out Stalin himself. He brought 
i t  all the necessary guarantees: the prestige of an old Bolshevik, a 
strong character, narrow vision, and close bonds with the political 
machine as the sole source of his influence. The success which fell 
upon him was a surprise at f i r s t  to Stalin himself. I t  was the f i r s t  
warm welcome of the new ruling group, trying to free i t se l f  from the 
old principles and from the control of the masses, and having need of a
1 Stalin. An Appraisal of the Man and His In flu e n c e (London, 1947), 
p.335.
2 Ib id . pp.352-53.
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reliable arbiter in i ts  inner affairs.  A secondary figure before the 
masses and in the events of the revolution, Stalin revealed himself as 
the indubitable leader of the Thermidorean bureaucracy, as f i r s t  in i ts 
mids t ' J  On this view the fate of individuals exemplifies the reigning 
state of historical ,  economic and social forces. The triumph of glori­
ous individuals like Lenin and Trotsky is,  then, attributable to the 
ascendancy of glorious historical forces - the victory of the working 
class through i ts vanguard, the Bolsheviks, The triumph of mediocrit­
ies is,  likewise, no argument against their being mediocre; i t  is simply 
a manifestation of the ascendancy of mediocre historical forces.
Indeed Trotsky argues that in certain circumstances mediocrity
is required  of leaders; i t  becomes, as i t  were, an asset of world histori
cal significance. In his autobiography, Trotsky concedes that a counter
revolution might spawn great men, 'but i ts f i r s t  stage, the Thermidor,
demandsmediocrities who can' t  see father than their noses. Their
strength lies in their political blindness, like the mill-horse that
thinks he is moving up when really he is only pushing down the belt-
2wheel. A horse that sees is incapable of doing the work*. Stalin 
on this view is simply the mi 11-horse of the bureaucratic decimation of 
the party:
To the leading group of the party (in the wider circles 
he was not known at al l) he always seemed a man destined 
to play second and third fiddle. And the fact that to-day 
he is playing f i r s t  is not so much a summing up of the 
man as i t  is of this transitional period of political 
backsliding in the country. Helvetius said i t  long ago, 
'Every period has i ts great men, and i f  these are lacking, 
i t  invents them'. Stalinism is above all else the auto­
matic work of the impersonal apparatus on the decline of 
the revolution.3
1 The Revolution Betrayed ,  p.93.
2 My L ife ,  p . 513.
3 Ib id ,  p .505 .
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But Stalin was a quite extraordinarily powerful and independ­
ent 'mi 11-horse1 2. Notwithstanding Trotsky's recurrent prediction that 
Stalinism was about to collapse, he knew only too well that in the mean­
time i t  was Stalin's opponents - real, potential and imagined - together 
with millions of ordinary citizens and, at least from 1937, a whole 
generation of faithful Stal inists ,  who perished while Stalin survived. 
Trotsky was also aware of the 'vile leader-cult,  attributing to leaders 
divine qualities'^ of which Stalin was the focus and beneficiary. It  
was necessary, therefore, for Trotsky to explain not only how Stalin 
came to lead, but also how he attained and maintained his extraordinary 
dominance. And since Trotsky again looked to the bureaucracy, he had 
to explain how Stalin's dominance was in i ts interests.
The explanation which Trotsky chose owed, I believe, a good 
deal to Marx's discussion in The 18th Brumaire of the relationship bet­
ween Bonapartism and i ts class base. Marx had argued, as we have seen, 
that the French peasants were unable to organize to protect their class 
interests,  but required domination by a 'representative [who] must at 
same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an un­
limited governmental power that protects them against the other classes 
and sends them rain and sunshine from above'. According to Trotsky - 
well before he alleged that the Soviet Union was ' Bonaoartist' - the 
bureaucracy too, though for quite different reasons, could not do with­
out authoritative leadership and domination. It was an incoherent 
stratum as a result of i t s  internal contradictions, the contradictions 
between i t se l f  and the masses and between i ts activi t ies and economic 
requirements. Though a ruling stratum, i t  i t se l f  required a rigid
1 Writings . . . (19 34- 35), p.124.
2 SW. Vol.l, p.303 see above pp. 92 - 101.
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'mono1ithism1 23 and an ar t i f i c i a l ly  inflated 1superarbiter1 to be able to 
survive and rule:
An apparatus that sees i t se l f  forced to find within i t se l f  
sanctions against i t se l f  cannot help being dominated by one 
person. The bureaucracy needs a super-arbiter and for this 
i t  nominates the one who best meets i ts instinct for survival. 
That is what S t a l in i s m  is - a preparation for Bonapartism 
inside the party. ..1
The contradictions within the bureaucracy i t se l f  have led 
to a system of handpicking the main commanding staff;  the 
need for discipline within the select order has led to the 
rule of a single person and to the cult of the infall ible 
leader . ..2
In the party, the plebiscite regime has been established 
conclusively. The bureaucracy, not daring to bring 
questions up for decision by the masses, is forced to find 
a 'boss' in order to sustain i ts own monolithic unity - with­
out which i t  would be doomed to col lapse .3
Stalin's personal position, then, far from being a refutation
of the bureaucracy' s dominance, was a function of that dominance. I t
was not due to his own talents,  or was due to them only to the extent
that they satisfied the bureaucracy' s needs. One of these needs was
for a dominating ' infal l ible '  leader.
4 The Sources of Bureaucratic Dominance
This analysis merely pushes the fundamental problem back one 
step. For i f  the mediocrity which Stalin incarnates is that of the 
bureaucracy then i t  remains to be explained how this rapacious clique 
came to dominate the f i r s t  workers' state. One can distinguish three 
partly related elements in Trotsky's explanation. The f i r s t  element 
appears in occasional, scattered comments on the general fate of revolut­
ions, and suggests a general theory of post-revolutionary development, 
which the Soviet Union exemplifies. A revolution, Trotsky suggests, 
is i n e v i t a b l y  followed by a 'downswing' in which weariness, apathy and-
1 W r i t i n g s . . .  (19 30)* p.2 06.
2 W r i t i n g s . . .  (19 34-35), p. 1 71 .
3 W ri t in g s . . . ( 1 9  30), p.335.
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disillusionment set in and reactionary forces have an opportunity to 
prosper. (Marx took this view of the Thermidorean reaction in the French 
Revolution, and Trotsky developed i t . )  In the Soviet Union, then, not 
Stalin's polit ical skill nor Trotsky's lack of i t ,  but objective concomit­
ants of revolutionary upheaval explain the 'backsliding', the 'downswing' 
of the revolution. On this view i t  is not pre-determined that the 
forces of reaction will be victorious, but i t  can be expected that they 
will come strongly into play.
The second element in Trotsky's explanation is an amalgam of
forces related specifically to the development of the Russian Revolution,
and i t  includes events which should have taken place but did not, and
other permanent structural problems which had led to a realignment of
class forces and to great stresses on the revolutionary leadership. The
major event which should have occurred but had not was the spread of the
revolution through the advanced countries of Europe, in the absence of
2which 'socialism cannot be bui l t ' .  The 'delay' of the revolution in 
Europe had left  the Soviet Union isolated in a capital ist  sea and had, 
Trotsky claimed, intensified the already massive 'contradictions' 
involved in preparing socialism in a backward country. Among these 
contradictions were 'the heritage of the capital ist  and precapitalist 
contradictions of old czarist-bourgeois Russia... the contradiction bet­
ween the general cultural-economic backwardness of Russia and the tasks
3
of socialist  transformation. . . ' ;  the post-revolutionary weariness, 
apathy and quest for order of the working-class, and the upsurge of 
classes hostile to the proletariat  after the introduction of NEP. At 
different times Trotsky isolates individual 'contradictions' from among
1 See W r i t in g s . . .  (1932)3 p.289; The R evo lu tion  Betrayed> p.88.
2 The S t a l i n  School o f  F a l s i f i c a t io n  (London, 1974), p . l l l .
3 W ritings . .  . ( 19 30-31), p . 206.
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those listed and calls them fundamentalJ but i t  is clear that he 
regards this whole complex of factors as contributing to the reaction­
ary build-up of forces favouring reactionary leadership and militating 
against the power of revolutionaries. Even if  a healthy leadership 
did exist ,  i t  would have to face these problems; the sin of the Stalin­
ists was that ' instead of reducing them, the policy of the present
2leadership aggravates them'.
The third element in Trotsky's explanation deals with the 
question of why the bureaucracy in particular had been strengthened to 
such a degree. To answer this question, Trotsky considers himself 
forced to introduce some novelties into Marxism since, he explains,
Marx never envisaged a proletarian revolution in a backward country,
3and Lenin never foresaw so prolonged an isolation of the Soviet state.
As theorist of the laws of proletarian dictatorship in an underdeveloped 
country, and as theorist of post-revolutionary bureaucratization, Trotsky 
has thus had to be original. He believed, as we have seen^that any 
workers' regime would require a centralized state to transform society 
and prepare the way for socialism, and he agreed with Marx and Lenin 
that ultimately this state structure with i ts dist inct and privileged 
group of professional bureaucrats would be eliminated. In the period 
of transition, however, especially in a poor country, Trotsky argues, 
a dist inct bureaucracy must be maintained. It  is required to arbitrate 
in the struggle for scarce resources, to stimulate maximum production, 
and to police and regulate distribution. And so long as these functions 
need to be performed, elements of capitalism, such as wage incentives,
1 e.g.:  'In this reaction of weariness, quite inevitable after every 
great revolutionary tension, lies the chief cause of the consolidation 
of the bureaucratic regime and the growth of that personal power of 
Stalin, in whom the new bureaucracy has found i ts personification' ,  
W ritings (1932), .39; 'the fundamental causes for the existing con­
tractions are innerent in the isolation of the Soviet Union',
W ritings (19 3 0 ) , p .137.
2 W ritings . . . ( 1 9 3 0 ) ,  p.137.
3 The R evo lu tion  Betrayed,  p.56.
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must survive to encourage the bureaucrats to perform them. Bureau­
cracy has a necessary role as policeman, arbitrator and distributor so 
long as 'contradictions'  and economic scarcity persist.  And so long as 
bureaucracy has this role, bureaucrats have an institutional base for 
the power and privilege which they seek to protect and enhance:
If the state does not die away, but grows more and more des­
potic, if the plenipotentiaries of the working class become 
bureaucratized, and the bureaucracy rises above the new 
society, this is not for some secondary reasons like the 
psychological rel ics of the past, etc. ,  but is a result of 
the iron necessity to give birth to and support a privileged 
minority so long as i t  is impossible to guarantee genuine 
equali tyJ
How then is the transition to be made from this heavily bureau­
cratized state to the socialist  society where, after Saint-Simon and 
Engels, Trotsky believes, 'the present method of commanding human beings  
will give way to one of d isp o sin g  over th in g s ’. On this question 
Trotsky is no more enlightening than any other socialist thinker who 
chooses to combine e t a t i s t  means with anarchist ends. The key for 
Trotsky, as for Marx, was the expansion of economic production to the 
point where itwould be possible ' to satisfy all human needs'. Since 
the only positive role Trotsky appears to envisage for the bureaucracy 
is as a sort of policeman-foreman-distributor in situations of scarcity, 
i f  one eliminates the scarcity then the bureaucrat will also disappear 
as if by magic, or at  least by definition. Again, Trotsky explains 
that bureaucracies are the result not of the tasks to be performed but of 
the class structure of society 'carried over' into these organizations. 
Therefore, when classes disappear and there is plenty for al l ,  there 
might be o rg a n iza tio n s  but not bureaucracies  or a s ta te  in the old sense - 
a special apparatus for holding in subjection the majority of the people.
1 I b id . , p.55.
2 W ritings . . . ( 1 9 3 2 ) , p . 183.
3 W ritings . . . ( 1 9 3 3 - 3 4 ) ,  p.226.
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But though the bureaucrat will disappear, there will be a good
deal lef t  for somebody to do, for:
The process of the liquidation of the state takes place along 
two different roads. To the extent that the classes are 
being liquidated, i . e . ,  dissolved in a homogeneous society, 
coercion withers away in the direct sense of the word, dropp­
ing out forever from social use. The organizational functions 
of the state,  on the contrary, become more complex, more 
detailed. They penetrate into ever-new fields which until 
then remained as if beyond the threshold of society (the 
household, children's education etc.) and for the f i r s t  -j 
time subject them to the control of the collective mind.
Trotsky, in other words, displays a typical form of ' revolutionary
optimism', not to say utopianism, which can be traced back at least to
Saint-Simon: function upon function is piled upon projected organizations,
coercion is wished away, and the problem of bureaucracy is deemed to be
solved.
It is perhaps also worth noting here that Trotsky, unconscious­
ly following a distinguished Marxist tradit ion, manages to stand Tocque- 
vi l le  and Weber and not only Hegel on their heads. The growth of bur­
eaucracy on his view varies directly with economic backwardness, scarcity 
and social dislocation, and inversely with equality and affluence.
Trotsky acknowledges that a bureaucracy has a role in promoting economic 
development, but his view of bureaucracy as a sort of scaffolding which 
can be dismantled once the building is completed allows him to evade some 
of the central structural problems of modern society.
1 I b id .3 pp.215-16.
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5 Bureaucracy: Caste or Class?
On Trotsky's argument, then, there is inevitably a post­
revolutionary 'downswing' which threatens to enthrone some reactionary 
element or other; there has been such a downswing in the Soviet Union 
and i t  has enthroned a contemptible bureaucracy; and this should come 
as no great surprise (though i t  did) because such a bureaucracy has 
considerable source of power in a transitional,  under-developed society. 
Now i f  all this is true, one might expect that the danger most to be 
feared in the Soviet Union is the consolidation of this bureaucratic 
dictatorship. One might also wonder whether i t  is enough to talk simply 
of the 'deformation' or 'degeneration' of the revolution: even i f  the 
ini t ial  promise of the revolution is conceded, has this promise survived 
or has i t  been totally destroyed? Trotsky, however, continually denied 
that the bureaucracy could stabilize i ts rule. Though bureaucracy 
came to occupy the centre of Trotsky's immediate focus of attention soon 
after 1923, i t  took him much longer - in fact,  until a year before his 
death - to acknowledge i t  as a potentially major institution in the 
general course of historical development. The development of an aware­
ness of the importance of bureaucracy, a development which Trotsky did 
much to create and further within Marxism, is repeated in microcosm 
within his own thought. Trotsky's reluctance to acknowledge the long­
term significance of bureaucracy, and his repeated resistance to,those 
who suggested i t ,  are interesting not simply as a piece of intellectual 
biography; they are also of interest as a case study of some of the 
difficult ies faced by a Marxist in dealing with one of the fundamental 
developments of the modern age.
Trotsky describes the options facing the Soviet Union in terms 
of a Manichaean struggle between the forces of the proletariat and those 
of capitalism. The Soviet Union was surrounded by hostile capitalist
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powers, and internally a similar conflict between bourgeois and pro­
letarian forces was taking place. For most of his l ife i t  was incon­
ceivable to Trotsky that the bureaucracy might constitute a rival in  
i t s  cun r ig h t  to either or both of these great protagonists. In 
The Neu C o u r s e where Trotsky is concerned with a disease afflict ing 
some party leaders rather than a stratum of parvenu  bureaucrats, the 
problem is not yet confronted directly. But the enemy is clearly 
identified:
...whatsoever the speed of our economic successes may be, 
our fundamental political line in the military ceils must 
be directed not simply against the Nepmen, but primarily 
against the renascent kulak stratum, the only historically 
conceivable and serious support for any and all counter- 
revolutionary attemptsJ
Throughout the 1920's despite his slowly dawning recognition that i t  was 
Stalin who was his most significant Party opponent, Trotsky warned that 
the real danger came not from Stalin or his direct supporters, but from 
e x te r n a l  forces pushing on them 'from the Right, not from the Right 
wing of our party - the Right wing of our party serves only as a trans­
mitting mechanism - the real,  basic danger comes from the side of the
2bourgeois classes who are raising their heads. . . '  Indeed in the 1920s 
Trotsky quickly forsook the insights displayed in his early warnings 
against the i n t r i n s i c  danger that bureaucratism might affect leaders and 
insisted that the growth of bureaucratism was purely the result of the
3
pressures exerted by hostile classes. In 1929, on the eve of the
' liquidation of the kulak as a class ' ,  Trotsky explained that:
...The problem of Thermidor and Bonapartism is at bottom 
the problem of the kulak. Those who shy away from this 
problem, those who minimize i ts  importance and distract 
attention to questions of party regime, to bureaucratism, 
to unfair polemical methods, and other superficial manifest­
ations and expressions of the pressure of kulak elements upon.
1 The Challenge o f  the  L e f t  Opposition,  p.91.
2 The S t a l i n i s t  School o f  F a l s i f i c a t io n ,  .111 .
3 See The Third  I n te r n a t io n a l  A f t e r  Lenin,  pp.158; 160; 164; 224.
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the dictatorship of the proletariat  resemble a physician who 
chases after symptoms while ignoring functional and organic 
disturbancesJ
Throughout this period, while Stalin was steadily consolidating his own
position, and although, as Lewin has pointed out, ' the Rightist dangers
2against which they were fighting were phantoms', Trotsky and the rest 
of the Left repeatedly warned the party against the threat of renascent 
bourgeoisie.
With the crushing of millions of 'kulaks' in the 1930's this 
warning became singularly inappropriate, both because they could not now 
seriously be regarded as an imminent threat to anyone and because the 
bureaucracy i t se l f  appeared more than a l i t t l e  independent of them.
Trotsky certainly acknowledged that there had been a significant weaken­
ing of the 'bourgeoisie' with Stalin's ' l e f t '  turn. But i f  many of the 
native bourgeoisie had been eliminated or crushed, this was no reason 
for Trotsky to alter his conception of the general course of social
3
development. With one significant exception, Trotsky always insisted 
that i f  the proletariatwere to be defeated, in the Soviet Union and 
everywhere else, i t  could only be at the hands of world capitalism.
All that the liquidation of the kulaks meant was that the weapons and 
means available to the capital ist  opponents of communism had been 
changed and their price since, say 1927, had been somewhat raised.
But, as Trotsky began increasingly to be asked, why should 
this be so? Why should a stratum which, as he so often emphasized, had 
enormous power and resources at i ts  disposal, which was directly respons­
ible for the 'degeneration' of the revolution, be doomed to swing 
between bourgeois and proletarians? The importance of the answer to
1 Wri tin g s  . . .  (19 29), p . 11 3.
2 P o l i t i c a l  U ndercurrents in  S o v ie t  Economic Debates^ (Princeton,1974)»p.69.
3 See below, pp.211-16.
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this question stemmed from what Trotsky and almost a l l  who debated 
him took to be i t s  consequences: i f  the bureaucracy's rule were capable 
of stable, autonomous development, then the Soviet Union was no longer 
a workers' state and the revolut ion had been in vain, or worse than 
in vain.
Trotsky was, as i t  were, constantly f igh t ing  a ba t t le  on two 
fronts . On one f ro n t  were massed Sta l in  and the ex is t ing ru lers of the 
Soviet Union, and Trotsky's e f fo r ts  were here directed to showing that 
they had d is tor ted and deformed the achievements of the revolut ion.
On the other f ron t  were those who agreed with Trotsky about the S ta l in ­
i s t s '  i n iq u i t y  but went fu r the r  than he to argue that the ex is t ing ru lers 
had transformed the Soviet Union into something other than a workers' 
state. Trotsky was prepared, on the f i r s t  f ron t ,  to in s is t  that the 
revolut ion had been betrayed, but he never conceded to the second f ron t  
that i t  had been 'overthrown'.
For th is  d is t in c t io n  to make any sense, one must be able to 
specify the minimum conditions which a state must sa t is fy  to be a 
'workers' state ' ;one must determine, in other words, some boundary wi thin 
which there is a workers' s ta te, however degenerate, and beyond which a 
workers' state becomes something else. Trotsky recognizes th is ,  and 
from at least as early as 1928, he attempts to s t ipu la te  where the bound­
ary l ie s .  His attempts are not always consistent, but looked at as a 
whole they do form a pattern of re luctant but s teadi ly  growing perception 
of the potential  longevity of  the ex is t ing regime, a perception which 
combines uneasily with his determination to a f f i rm  that the Soviet Union 
is a workers' state.
In 1928 Trotsky rejected the claim of the exi led Democratic . 
Centra l is t  Borodai, that the Soviet Union had ceased to be a workers' 
s ta te, and Trotsky's c r i t e r io n  for  doing so is essent ia l ly  poli t ica l .
One had to determine who had power or at least who had the p o s s ib i l i t y
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of peacefully regaining power. Since, Trotsky insisted, the proletariat 
could gain power by reform, but the bourgeois could not, the Revolution 
had not been defeated.'*'
For the next year this is the basis on which Trotsky attempted 
to demonstrate that the revolution was s t i l l  alive2 and until 1933 i t  
reappeared frequently. But fairly shortly Trotsky began to emphasize 
a quite different set of elements of the workers' state - nationalized 
property, which was rapidly increasing in extent under Stalin, and the 
monopoly of foreign trade. To begin with, Trotsky mentioned these 
elements less as a substitute for his political criterion than as evi­
dence that capitalism, to which these forms of ownership were anathema, 
could not have arrived. But soon Trotsky began to speak of state 
ownership of the means of production as ‘this basic difference which 
determines the c la ss  ch a rac ter o f  a s o c ia l  o r d e r ’. 5 Together with
this new emphasis goes an increasing pessimism about the possibility 
of peacefully overcoming the bureaucracy. By 1933 Trotsky had decided 
that the problem could not be resolved peacefully. In March, after the 
failure of Communist policies in Germany Trotsky announced that the KPD 
was 'doomed' and that 'German Communism can be reborn only on a new 
basis and with a new leadership1;  ^ in July he announced that the Inter­
national as a whole could not be remedied, and in October he declared 
that the Soviet bureaucracy could only be defeated by force.5
Now, i f  one were to insist  on Trotsky's earl ier p o l i t i c a l  
criterion one would be forced to admit that the Soviet Union was no
1 The Neu) In te r n a tio n a l ,  April, 1943, pp. 124 and 125.
2 See W r itin g s .. .  (1929) ,  pp.118; 120; 280.
3 W ritin g s . . .  (19 29 ), p.321.
4 The S tru g g le  A ga inst Fascism in  Germany, p.397
5 W ritings . . . ( 1 9  33-34), pp. 11 7 and 118.
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longer a workers' state. But Trotsky did not admit this.  Instead, 
his supplementary economic criterion, increasingly emphasized after the 
la t ter  part of 1929, became for him and for all orthodox Trotskyists 
the sole and adequate test.  Trotsky now repeatedly reminded Marxists 
that the character of a state is determined by the property relations 
within i t .  The achievement of the October Revolution had been to 
expropriate the possessing classes, to nationalize property and to 
insti tute a planned economy under the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The result of this was that the proletariat  was the ruling class of the 
Soviet Union. So long as this achievement survived, so long as no 
other class came to own the means of production, the proletariat  would 
remain the ruling class. It  is only i f  political 'distortions have 
extended to the economic foundations of the s t a t e t h a t  one can proper­
ly speak of the defeat or overthrow of the revolution.
These propositions rapidly congealed into part of Trotskyist 
political dogma, part of a set of assumptions which were unquestioned, 
indeed unquestionable, and which set the terms within which discussion 
could proceed. I t  was the cr i t ics  who appeared to accept these assumpt­
ions but s t i l l  denied that the Soviet Union was a workers' state that
9
Trotsky treated most seriously, in particular those who argued that the 
Soviet Union was ruled by a new class, the bureaucracy. For from Trot­
sky's premises i t  is a simple inference that i f  the bureaucracy dominat­
ing the Soviet Union is a new governing c la ss3 then the proletariat has 
been expropriated and a new form of exploitative society has come into 
being. As Trotsky put i t ,  ' i f  the Bonapartist r i f f raf f  is a class this
1 W ritings... (19 34-35), p. 1 69.
2 His respect for these cr i t ics  is not, however, always apparent:
"There are some who say that since the actual state that has emerged 
from the proletarian revolution does not correspond to ideal a priori 
norms, therefore they turn their backs on i t .  This is political 
snobbery, common to pacificist  - democratic l ibertarian, anarcho- 
syndicalist and generally, ul t ralef t  circles of petty-bourgeois 
intel l igentsia ' .  Ibid.
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means that i t  is not an abortion but a viable child of history.
If i ts marauding parasitism is "exploitation" in the scientific sense 
of the term this means that the bureaucracy possesses a historical future 
as the ruling class indispensable to the given system of -economy'J 
I t  therefore becomes an issue of pivotal importance to Trotsky to show 
that the Soviet Union's governing 'caste'  was not i ts  ruling class.
In the earl ier  years of opposition, Trotsky was not very bother­
ed about this argument. In 1928, for example, he dismissed the possibility 
that the bureaucracy might be a class, without any obvious awareness 
that this might be seriously suggested:
Centrism is the official line of the apparatus. Its 
protagonist is the party official .  But the officialdom 
is no class. I t  serves c l asses . 2
But during the 1930's Trotsky replied with increasing concern to a wide 
range of dissident Marxists - including Hugo Urbahns, Lucien Laurat, Yvan 
Craipeau, Joseph Carter, James Burnham and Bruno Rizzi. These writers 
differed considerably among themselves on points of detail but to Trotsky 
they all presented essentially the same challenge. All of them denied
3
that the Soviet Union remained a workers' s t a te a lm os t  all of them 
claimed that the bureaucracy was a new exploiting class.
As we have seen, Trotsky was fully alive to the political 
power and economic privilege of the bureaucracy. 'In no other regime', 
he conceded, 'has a bureaucracy ever achieved such a degree of independ­
ence from the dominating class. . .  I t  is in the full sense of the word
4
the sole privileged and commanding stratum in the Soviet society' .  
Nonetheless, this did not make i t  a class, for 'the c la ss  has an except­
ionally important and, moreover, a scientifical ly restricted meaning to
1 In  Defence o f  Marxism (London 1971), p.29
2 'Crisis in the Right-Center Block I,' Neu In te r n a tio n a l ,  De cember 1941, 
p.316.
3 At this stage Burnahm and Carter s t i l l  denied that the bureaucracy 
was an independent class.
4 The R evo lu tio n  B etrayed , pp.248-49.
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a Marxist1 23J  A class must have an independent role and independent 
roots in the economic structure, that is an independent role in product­
ion and a relationship to productive property that is peculiarly i ts own; 
a r u lin g  class, moreover, has to have a quite special relationship 
to property in the means of production - i t  must con i t .  The fact 
that bureaucrats own art icles of consumption is important enough to 
them and to the wretched proletariat ,  but i t  is irrelevant to whether 
they are a class. The bureaucracy had no independent role in product­
ion and no property in the means of productions; i t  'has neither stocks 
nor bonds. I t  is recruited, supplemented and renewed in the manner 
of an administrative hierarchy, independently of any special property
relations of i ts own. The individual bureaucrat cannot transmit to
2his heirs his rights in the exploitation of the state apparatus'.
A bureaucracy is an ' instrument' , a 'hireling'  of class rule which can 
be found in every class society. In the Soviet Union i t  is a particu­
larly overweening, incompetent and expensive hireling, but i t  is not a 
class; i t  is not - since for Trotsky only a class can be - an independ­
ent historical force. It  certainly does rob the society in which i t  
exists,  but so long as i t  does this on the property relations instituted 
in October, 1917, i ts  theft is s o c ia l  p a ra s itism  like that of the modern 
clergy, not c la ss  e x p lo i ta t io n  like that of bourgeoisie. It has the 
power to damage the workers' state,  to weaken i t  in the face of hostile 
classes and for a time to keep i ts own head (even toes!) above water. 
While i t  does not have i ts own forms of production and property, however, 
' i t  is compelled to defend state property as the source of its power
3and i ts  income‘ .
1 W ritin g s . . . ( 1 9  33- 34) , p.112.
2 The R evo lu tio n  B etrayed_, p.249.
3 Ibid .
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Trotsky also seems to be persuaded by a sort of fu n c tio n a l  
argument that a bureaucracy cannot be a ruling class, an argument which 
aroceeds from identifying the function of an institution to deducing 
the roles i t  must, and the roles i t  cannot play. Trotsky does not 
employ this sort of argument very often, but i t  accords with what he 
relieves must be the case in the long term and shou ld  be the case at 
every moment:
...The existence of a bureaucracy, in all i ts  variety of forms 
and differences in specific weight, characterizes every  
class regime. Its power is of a reflected character.
The bureaucracy is indissolubly bound up with a ruling 
economic class, feeding i t se l f  upon the social roots of , 
the la t ter ,  maintaining i t se l f  and falling together with i t .
Soviet bureaucracy, Trotsky concedes, is more independent than any other, 
but since i t  is a bureaucracy i t  cannot ultimately prevail against 
economic classes; there is something intr isical ly subaltern about 
bureaucracy which prevents i t  from ruling in i ts own right.
Conversely, a c la ss  can be identified by i ts  function, i ts  
historic mission', which is to develop the system of production. If a 
purported new class does not do this i t  has simply been wrongly classi- 
iied, for while 'social excrescences can be the product of an "accident- 
cl", (i .e.  temporary and extraordinary), enmeshing of historical circum­
stances [a] social organ (and such is every class, including an exploit­
ing class) can take shape only as a result of the deeply rooted inner
2reeds of production i t s e l f ' .  It  is in this context that Trotsky em­
phasizes that bureaucratic management in the Soviet Union stands in 
*ncreasing contradiction to the requirements of economic development, 
lhat the economy had developed was due to nationalized ownership and 
economic planning, but as the economy progressed
1 W ritin g s . . . (1933- 3 4 ) , pp.112-113. 
c In  Defence o f  M a r x is m p . 7.
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...The more complex i ts requirements became,all the more 
unbearable became the obstacle of the bureaucratic regime.
The constantly sharpening contradiction between them leads to 
uninterrupted political convulsions, to systematic annihilat­
ion of the most outstanding creative elements in all spheres 
of activity. Thus, before the bureaucracy could succeed 
in exuding from i tsel f  a 'ruling class ' ,  i t  came into irrecon­
cilable contradiction with the demands of development. The 
explanation for this is to be found precisely in the fact that 
the bureaucracy is not the bearer of a new system of economy 
peculiar to i t se l f  and impossible without i t se l f ,  but is a 
parasitic growth on a workers' s t a te J
Even where Trotsky is not directly concerned with rebutting the new class
theorists,  his concern with these issues is constantly manifest. The
very notion of 'betrayal'  suggests the special relationship which Trotsky
believes to exist between the bureaucracy and the proletariat - the
bureaucracy threatens from within, and not, as a rival class would, from
without. The various organic metaphors used by Trotsky have a similar
function. Bureaucracy is a 'tumour', an ' ulcer ' ,  an 'excrescence';
i t  is, in other words, a malign growth and not an independent external
enemy. Or, when i ts  description as a 'parasite'  suggests that i t  might
be external, i t  also suggests, in common with the other metaphors, that
i t  has no l i fe independent of the worker's state. But what, then, was
the bureaucracy' s place and role in this struggle? Given i ts power,
the bureaucracy could hardly be irrelevant to the outcome, and given i ts
vices i t  could hardly be considered a reliable ally. Did i ts existence
therefore blur the lines of battle,  did i t  favour one side rather than
another or might i t  constitute a third side i tself? Trotsky's concern'
with questions such as these pervades his attempt to give a Marxist
characterization of Soviet bureaucracy; i t  is particularly evident in
the labels he chooses to describe this bureaucracy - and the shifts of
meaning and replacement which these labels undergo.
1 Ib id . ,  p.8.
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Until 1935 Trotsky described the bureaucracy' s political
tendency as c e n t r i s t .  Centrism, according to Trotsky, occurs in several
forms, including his own prerevolutionary 'conci1iationism'  ^ and i t  is
neither necessarily associated with bureaucrats nor the only political
orientation which bureaucrats can display. It  is 'composed of all those
trends within the proletariat and on i ts periphery which are distributed
between reformism and Marxism, and which most often represent various
2stages of evolution from reformism to Marxism - and vice versa.1 2345 But 
while in capital ist  countries centrism appears in all sorts of temporary, 
transitional and evanescent forms, ' reflecting the evolution of certain
3
workers' strata to the right or to the l e f t ' ,  S o v ie t  centrism has a
4
particularly powerful social base, the 'multi-mi 11ioned bureaucracy .
It is thus a tendency w ith in  the working class. Although based on a 
specific and very powerful stratum of that class i t  is not a counter­
revolutionary but an internal degenerative force. In particular,  i t  
is not a capital ist  force: ' to identify centrism with big capital is
5to understand nothing', and to identify i t  with the petty bourgeoisie
is to understand l i t t l e  more. What is characteriStic of bureaucratic
centrism is not the blatant defence of capital ist  interests but an aimless
and destructive sliding between the proletarian and the capital ist  poles;
representing neither, the bureaucracy is fated to 'zigzag' between them,
to grope for support sometimes on the right,  sometimes on the left .
We are fighting against the centrism of the Stalinist 
bureaucracy (remember: centrism is a tendency within the 
working class i tself)  because centrist  policies may help
1 The Challenge o f  the L e f t  O p p o si t io n , p.265
2 The S tru g g le  Against Fascism in  Germany3 p.190
3 Ib id .  , p.195
4 Ib id .  3
5 W vitings. . . (1929)s p. 216.
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the bourgeoisie to gain power, f i r s t  the petty and middle 
bourgeoisie and, eventually, finance capital. This is 
the historical danger; but this is a process that is by 
no means at the point of completion.^
Trotsky repeatedly explains that centrism 'has not and cannot have its
2own independent l ine ' ,  that i t  is inherently unstable and that ultimate­
ly ' i t  will be ground away between the mi 11-stones of social democracy
3
and communism' . On his account i t  appears that, whereas 'Left and 
'Right' have ceased to be merely relational terms and denote the qualities 
of certain political views and policies, 'centrism' is to be defined 
simply in terms of the points i t  stands between. That i t  is 'bureaucrat­
ic'  suggests its social bias and the manner in which it  will be implement­
ed; that i t  is 'centrist '  suggests merely that we should look to either 
si de.
This absence of a determinate political core is emphasized again 
in the uses Trotsky makes of the Thermidorean analogy. Until 1935 
Trotsky insisted that Thermidor had been not merely a reaction on the 
base of the French Revolution but the f i r s t  victorious stage of counter­
revolution. It was, however, a very special kind of counter-revolution, 
one /vhich was prepared in stealth,  and one of which its early and visible 
abettors neither intended to be, nor were, the ultimate beneficiaries.
Both in the French Revolution and now, members of the reaction w ithin  
the ^evolutionary party aided the interests of, and provided camouflage 
for, counter-revolutionaries too weak to defeat the revolution by open' 
civil war. By so doing, they had masked in France, and threatened to 
mask here, the dawning counter-revolution which they made possible. In 
the 1920s Trotsky regarded the Bukharinists and the bureaucratic centre 
of tie party as the foes within i t ,  but as the 'centre1 23 asserted i t se l f  
at tie expense of the 'Right' , the former became the primary focus of his
1 ibid.
2 Ibid. , p. 223.
3 Ibid. , p. 108.
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attack.
The bureaucrats, however, were not the leaders of the counter­
revolution but merely i ts pawns. In one of his earl iest  public uses of 
the analogy Trotsky explained:
When the term 'Thermidorian' is used among us, i t  is taken 
for a term of abuse. It is thought that the Thermidorians 
were arrant counter-revolutionists, conscious supporters of 
the monarchic rule, and so on. Nothing of the kind! The 
Thermidorians were Jacobins, with this difference, that they 
had moved to the Right...
They reckoned that in the path of the triumph of the revolut­
ion stood the interests of 'a few isolated individuals' .
They did not understand... The Thermidorians thought that 
the issue involved a change of individuals and not a class 
s h i f t J
Again, a month before his deportation, Trotsky wrote to the G.P.U.:
The incurable weakness of the reaction headed by the apparatus 
in spite of i ts  apparent power, lies in the fact that 'they 
know not what they do'. They are executing the orders of the 
enemy classes. There can be no greater historical curse 
on a faction, which came out of the revolution and is now 
undermining i t . 2
Moreover, quite apart from their good intentions - in which Trotsky had
progressively less faith - he insisted that so long as the bureaucrats
remained in power, Thermidor had not arrived. For while Thermidor
was a counter-revolution prepared  in stealth,  i t  could not be achieved
without civil war between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary
forces. Thus i t  was quite inappropriate to identify the growth of the
Stalinist  bureaucracy with the victory of hostile class forces. Trotsky
was adamant that this had not occurred, and he was equally adamant that
i t  was this,  above al l ,  which was to be feared:
A real civil war could develop not between the Stalinist  
bureaucracy and the resurgent proletariat but between the 
proletariat  and the active forces of the counter-revolution.
In the event of an open clash between the two mass camps, 
there cannot even be talk of the bureaucracy playing an
1 The S ta l i n  School o f  F a l s i f i c a t i o n , pp. 11 3; 115.
2 My L i f e ,  p.560.
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independent role. Its polar flanks will be flung 
to the different sides of the barricade.^
Trotsky persisted with his original use of the French parallels
until February 1935 when he announced that the Soviet Thermidor had
2occurred, and, indeed, that i t  had occurred in 19241 But he insisted
that this somewhat drastic change of opinion was not a product of any
change in attitude to the Soviet situation; i t  was the result of a new
appraisal of the French revolution. Trotsky now explained that Thermidor
had not been the f i r s t  stage of the counter-revolution but had been the
transfer of power ' into the hands of the more moderate and conservative
3
Jacobins, the better-to-do elements of bourgeois society' ; in the 
Soviet Union a parallel development had taken place with the crushing 
of the Left Opposition. Moreover, whereas Trotsky had previously 
regarded the Eighteenth Brumaire as the consolidation of the counter­
revolution, he now argued that Bonapartism, too, had occurred on the 
social base of the revolution, and that since the former ruling class 
had not been reinstated, the revolution survived.
Like Marx in the bulk of The 18th Brumaire> Trotsky was seek­
ing to explain the rise of a bureaucratic-military apparatus, headed by 
a leader whom he considered to be mediocre, to apparent independence 
from society and, in particular,  from its ruling class. And like Marx, 
Trotsky concentrated on the struggles in which the ruling class was in­
volved. Already, in describing 'the Papen-Schlei eher government' of 
Germany as Bonapartist, Trotsky had argued that Bonapartism occurs when 
the ruling class under seige ' tolerates '  the elevation of the executive 
to a position of pre-eminence in order to protect what i t  has.^
1 Writings.(19 33-34) ^  p. 11 8.
2 W ritings... (19 34-35), p.174
3 Ibid.
See The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, p .263.4
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When Trotsky argued after 1935 that Stalinism was Bonapartist, he was 
simply transposing to the proletariat his characterization of bourgeois 
Bonapartism. The social base of each differed, but the regime's function 
in each was similar:
By Bonapartism we mean a regime in which the economically 
dominant class, having the qualities necessary for democratic 
methods of government, finds i t se l f  compelled to tolerate - 
in order to preserve i ts possessions - the uncontrolled 
command of a military and police apparatus over i t ,  of a 
crowned 'savior' .  This kind of situation is created in 
periods when the class contradictions have become particularly 
acute; the aim of Bonapartism is to prevent explosions.. J
The employment of the Bonapartist analogy, then, was intended to take 
into account the independence of the Soviet bureaucracy from the prolet­
ariat  without conceding that this independence signified the death of 
the revolution. The mere fact that a Bonapartist bureaucracy enjoyed 
great power did not signify that i t  was a class, nor that i t  had an 
assured future, for Bonapartism 'by i ts very essence cannot long main­
tain i t se l f ;  a sphere balanced on the point of a pyramid must invariably
2roll down on one side or the other' .  Moreover, while the bureaucracy' s 
power and independence now made i ts revolutionary overthrow necessary, 
the special type  of revolution required was a function of the bureaucracy' s 
role and character. Since i t  was not a class, but only the flawed 
instrument of the proletariat ,  a bourgeois co u n ter -re vo lu t io n  would 
have to overthrow not only the bureaucracy but also the forms of property 
established by the revolution. A workers' revolution, on the other hand, 
would leave the forms of property unaltered and would merely supplant 
the bureaucracy; i t  would be merely a p o l i t i c a l  not a s o c ia l  revolution.
1 W r i t in g s . . .  (19 34- 35j ,  p. 206-7.
2 W r i t in g s . . .  (19 34-35),  p.181-82.
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Trotsky continued, until his death, to call the Soviet regime 
Bonapartist and to resis t  suggestions that the bureaucracy was a class, 
just as he continued to reaffirm his revolutionary optimism and confid­
ence in the ultimate victory of the proletariat.^ But if  Trotsky was 
never prepared to concede that the bureaucracy was a class, what he 
ultimately did concede was significant enough. In September 1939
9
Trotsky published 'The U.S.S.R. in War1 2345 in which, though his appraisal
of the existing Soviet regime remained what i t  had been since 1935, he
came to entertain seriously a hitherto rejected possibility.
It  is crucial in this connection to attend to the context in
which this art icle appeared, specifically to the effects of the war on
Trotsky's analysis. Fundamental to Trotsky's argument in 'The U.S.S.R.
in War' is the conviction that capitalism had at last  truly played
i tsel f  out. Trotsky regarded the war as the latest  and most severe
manifestation of the ever sharper contradictions within and between
capitalist  states, and i ts outbreak seemed to him to confirm that
capitalism was not merely moribund but was in i ts 'death agony'. The
war, he wrote, ' at tests  incontrovertibly to the fact that society can
no longer live on the basis of capitalism'. Given what he elsewhere
had called 'the progressive tendencies of the o b je c t iv e  h i s to r ic a l  
4process i t s e l f  and given that the disorganizing core of capitalism was 
the anarchy of production, the societies to emerge from the crisis would 
have to have been purged of this anarchy; their 'productive forces must 
be organized in accordance with a plan'. The future course of human 
development will depend on 'who will accomplish this task - the prolet-
1 W ritings.  . .  (19 30- 40) pp.158-59; I. Deutscher, The Prophet O utcast
(London, 1970), p.507.
2 In  defence o f  Marxisms p.3-26.
3 Ib id . p.10.
4 W ritings. . . (19 37- 3 8 ) p. 68.
5 In  Defence o f  Marxism , p.9.
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ariat  or a new ruling class of "Commissars" - polit icians, administrat­
ors and technicians?' I t  is in terms of this assessment of the effects 
of the war on ca p ita lism  that Trotsky's predictions regarding the Soviet 
Union must be understood.
Trotsky's most important remarks on the future of the Soviet
2Union occur in his discussion of a book, La Bureaucratication du Monde,
o
published in 1939 by Bruno Rizzi. Rizzi argued that the bourgeoisie 
was an exhausted social force and that a new form of society which he 
called ' bureaucratic collectivism', was expropriating the bourgeoisie 
and capitalism throughout the world - i t  had emerged in the Soviet Union, 
was partially achieved in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan and was 
developing via the New Deal in the United States. Rizzi regarded 
bureaucratic collectivism as a historically progressive social order 
between capitalism and socialism, and he argued that there was, there­
fore, no danger of a capital ist  restoration, for this would be a histori ­
cally retrograde step, and history does not move backwards. Rizzi 
insisted that in developed bureaucratic collectivism the bureaucracy 
formed a class which collectively exploited the mass of the population 
and drew surplus from i t .
We have seen the dismissive way in which Trotsky had hitherto 
treated writers who claimed that the Soviet bureaucracy was a class.
Rizzi, on the other hand, was not dismissed in the same way. 'Bruno R.'. 
had, Trotsky wrote, ' the merit of seeking to transfer the question from
1 Ib id .
2 The section of this book which deals with the Soviet Union was re­
published in Paris in 1976 by Editions Champ Libre, as L 'U .R .S .S .:
C o llec tiv ism e  B ureaucratique.
3 For the remarkable story of the identification and discovery of 
Bruno Rizzi, some 20 years after Trotsky had mentioned him, see 
Daniel Bell 'The Strange Case of Bruno R. ' , Nem Leader Sept. 28,1959, 
and Bell, 'The Post-Industrial Society: The Evolution of an Idea', 
Survey> vo1.17, no.2, 1971, pp.143-44.
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the charmed circle of terminological copybook exercises to the plane 
of major historical generalizations'."'  Trotsky nonetheless rejects 
this analysis too, especially on the ground that despite the considerable 
p o lit ic a l  similarities between Stalinism and fascism there is an unbridge­
able gulf between the partical statism of the fascist  regimes and the 
nationalization of the means of production achieved in the Soviet Union. 
But the effect of Rizzi's analysis on Trotsky is obvious, and the way 
in waich he deals with i t  is an index of the distance his views have 
moved under the pressure of recent events, and particularly of the war.
In a let ter  to the American Trotskyist leader James P. Cannon, written 
while 'The U.S.S.R. in War' was being composed, Trotsky wrote, 'The 
U.S.S.R. question cannot be isolated as unique from the whole historic 
process of our times. Either the Stalin state is a transitory formation, 
i t  is a deformation of a worker's state in a backward and isolated coun­
try, or "bureaucratic collectivism" (Bruno R., La Bureaucratisation du 
Monde) is a new social formation which is replacing capitalism throughout 
the world (Stalinism, Fascism, New Deals etc. ) .  The terminological
experiments (workers' state,  not workers' state,  class, not class, etc.)
2rece've a sense only under this historic aspect' .  Again, in the most
frequently quoted passage from 'The U.S.S.R. in War' Trotsky writes:
The historic alternative,  carried to the end, is as follows: 
either the Stalin regime is an abhorrent relapse in the 
process of transforming bourgeois society into a socialist  
society, or the Stalin regime is the f i r s t  stage of a new 
exploiting society. If the second prognosis proves to be 
correct, then, of course, the bureaucracy will become a new 
exploiting class. However onerous the second perspective 
may be, i f  the world proletariat should actually prove 
incapable of fulf i l l ing the mission placed upon i t  by the
1 m  Defence o f  M a rx ism p .12.
2 ib id , p. 1.
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the course of development, nothing else would remain 
except only to recognize that the socialist  programme, 
based on the internal contradictions of capital ist  
society, ended as a Utopia. I t  is self-evident that 
a new 'minimum' programme would be required - for the 
defence of the interests of the slaves of the totalitarian 
bureaucratic society.!
The most obvious thing to be noted about these passages is the
momentous s ta rkn ess  of the alternatives posed and the unrelieved b leakness
of the possibility of failure. Deutscher, commenting on the second
passage quoted, puts i t  well and with empathy:
Perhaps only Marxists could sense fully the tragic solemnity 
which these words had in Trotsky's mouth. True, he uttered
them for the sake of the argument; but even for the sake of
the argument he had never yet contemplated the possibility of 
an utter failure of socialism so closely; he insisted that 
the final ' tes t '  was a matter of the next few years; and 
he defined the terms of the test  with painful precision.2
But these passages represent much more than an alteration of 
mood or of tone. As the dissident American Trotskyists were quick to 
point out, they betray a completely new direction in the movement of 
Trotsky's thought. And in denying that any change had occurred, that
he had been involved in any 'revision of Marxism', Trotsky completely
misses the point. The standard reply of Trotsky and his orthodox 
followers to the charge that 'The U.S.S.R. in War' represents a marked 
deviation from Trotskyism is to construe the charge as one of inconsist­
ency between serious contemplation of the possibility of failure,  and 
historically sanctioned 'revolutionary optimism'. But, Trotsky replies, 
' the Marxist comprehension of historical necessity has nothing in common 
with fatalism. Socialism is not realizable "by i tsel f" ,  but as a 
result of the struggle of living forces, classes and their part ies. . .  
we have full right to ask ourselves: What character will society take
1 I b i d . ,  p.l l .  See also the passage explicitly identifying the war as 
the occasion  for this historic test ,  at pp.17-18.
2 The Prophet O utcast,  p.468.
3 In  Defence o f  Marxism, p - 37 .
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i f  the forces of reaction conquer?'^ I f  this were the point at issue, 
and i f  the problems of determinism and voluntarism were so easily solved, 
Trotsky's reply would be adequate. For, while he had always claimed 
that the Soviet Union was a workers' state, he had frequently insisted 
that the future was not closed, and his whole opposition to Stalinism 
was premised on the necessity for continued and unremitting struggle.
But a willingness to conceive of the possibility of failure  
manifestly is n o t  what is novel about the passages I have quoted. What 
i s  novel is that the 'historic' alternatives have been completely re­
drawn. As we have seen, Trotsky had insisted throughout his previous 
writings that the real threat to socialism in the Soviet Union and in 
the world, the phenomenon constantly to be struggled against, was a 
restoration of capitalism - the bureaucracy was to be opposed for what 
i t  might clear the way to, rather than simply, or even primarily, for 
what i t  was.
On the rare occasions when Trotsky had considered the theoreti-
cal possibility of the stabilization of bureaucratic rule, he was
heavily sceptical, and even on these occasions the possibility of a
third form was l i t t l e  more than raised by Trotsky. I t  was always
overshadowed in his mind by a far more daunting and probable alternative,
a capitalist restoration. In 1937, for example, Trotsky repeated his
long - and deeply - held conviction that:
The struggle for domination, considered on a historical scale, 
is not between the proletariat and the bureaucracy but 
between the proletariat and the world bourgeoisie. The 
bureaucracy is only the transmitting mechanism in this 
struggle. The struggle is not concluded.3
1 I b i d .
2 W r i t i n g s . . .  (1935-36  pp. 121 -22; The R e v o lu t i o n  B e t rayed j  pp.253-54;• 
W r i t i n g s . . .  ( 1937-36J, pp.61-71 .
3 W r i t i n g s . . .  (1937 -38 )3 p.70.
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In 'The U.S.S.R. in War1 2, however, 1 bureaucrat!c collectivism' 
is portrayed not merely as a possible successor to socialism, which i t ­
self would be fairly new for Trotsky, but as the only  possible successor. 
It is true, as Trotsky says, that 'Marxists have formulated an incalcul­
able number of times the alternatives: either socialism or return to 
barbarism' J  but in 'The U.S.S.R. in War', the specific nature of the 
barbarous alternative has completely changed, and even on Trotsky's 
account, let  alone Rizzi 's,  the alternative is in no way a r e tu r n . If 
bureaucratic collectivism triumphs, it  will be, according to Trotsky, 
a totally not kind of social formation, the successor to both capitalism 
and socialism - i t  may be a step downward, but i t  is not a step backward. 
On this view, i t  will be a modern, post-capitalist  phenomenon in which, 
for the f i r s t  time, bureaucracy will have come into i ts own.
6 Marxism, Bolshevism and Bureaucracy
Trotsky is clearly not among the most profound of twentieth
2century thinkers, not even of twentieth century Marxist thinkers. But 
he i s  a thinker who confronted some of the most pressing issues raised by 
the revolution in which he had been involved, and in the process of doing 
so he was led to consider other issues of even more general and contemp­
orary relevance. In the material discussed in the f i r s t  four sections
1 In  Defence o f  Marxism3 p .37.
2 This sentence, like the whole of this chapter, was written before the 
recent publication of Knei-Paz's exhaustive study of Trotsky's thought. 
One great merit of this book is that while the author is highly c r i t i ­
cal of Trotsky as a social and political thinker, he makes a convinc­
ing case for Trotsky's originality and perceptiveness, particularly
as an analyst of the problems of 'backward' societies. The f i r s t  
part of the sentence in my text seems to me to be unaffected by the 
book; I am no longer as confident about the concluding phrase.
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of this chapter Trotsky was, above al l ,  concerned to explain why the 
revolution had borne spoiled fruit .  In the material discussed in the 
f if th section, he was concerned to determine whether the damage was 
irreparable, whether the frui t  could be saved and propagated. In the 
answer to the f i r s t  question, bureaucracy played the central role; in 
the answer to the second, i ts  role was, until 1939,quite overshadowed.
An apparent paradox seems to emerge: when Trotsky seeks the trai tor
of the revolution he systematically overestimates the bureaucracy1s 
role; when he seeks the revolution's real foe, he systematically under- 
estimates this role.
In the f i r s t  case, i t  is not hard to see ways in which the 
concept of bureaucracy might prove useful to a person in Trotsky's 
position. T h e o r e t ic a l ly  i t  allows a Marxist faced with the destruction 
of hostile classes in the Soviet Union to focus attention on a stratum 
whose motivations can be cast in a familiar mode, a stratum which, if  
not a class, acts sufficiently like one in Trotsky's account to be 
plausibly regarded as the culprit  in the betrayal of the revolution. 
Theoretically again, concentration on the bureaucracy is far more sat is­
factory for a Marxist than any attempt to portray Stalin as an independ­
ently significant actor. Id e o lo g ic a l ly  i t  is useful (and is so used 
by Trotsky) as a means of drawing a veil between those consequences of 
the Revolution for which the Bolshevik willingly accepts responsibi 1i t y .
- the revolution i tsel f ;  the dictatorship; the centralized economy and 
the arguments for, i f  not the practice of, rapid industrialization and 
collectivization - and those consequences which should be laid at the 
door of the degenerates and usurpers.
Moreover, i t  is obvious that Trotsky's focus on the bureaucracy 
was more than a random or simply convenient choice. The bureaucracy 
had  grown massively in the period since the revolution, and particularly
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during Trotsky's exile: all social bases of potential opposition -
private and corporate - had been systematically destroyed; classes had 
been emasculated, millions of individuals were killed, deported and 
terrorized. Moreover, there clearly was a close relationship between 
Stalin and the bureaucratic machine, and Stalin's rise is in large part 
attributable to this connection. But even when these points are made,
Trotsky's account is inadequate. On most normal readings of the
disputes of the 1920's , Trotsky was defeated by a skilled p o l i t i c ia n  
who masterfully appealed to a powerful constituency, whereas Trotsky 
himself displayed a striking absence or paralysis of political sk i l l s . ”*
In fact, quite apart from the psychological difficult ies Trotsky may 
have faced in appreciating this,  his whole conception of 'pol i t ics '  was 
an extraordinarily rarefied one. For Trotsky, politics was an h ero ic  
activity,  characterized by courage, self-sacrifice,  'creat ivi ty ' ,  
' in i t ia t ive '  and so on. Coarser ways of conducting affairs were 
'administrative' ,  'corridor sk i l l s ' .  Since much of what commonly goes 
under the name of polit ics is thereby consigned to bureaucratic oblivion, 
and.since even Lenin and Trotsky had not been averse to 'administrative 
measures', Trotsky's dichotomy between the way of the politician and that 
of the bureaucrat is not self  evident. Moreover the very chaos of the 
1930's, which Trotsky deplored, could be characterized with considerable 
plausibility as a victory of the political arm over the bureaucratic, 
rather than, as Trotsky insists ,  the reverse. After a l l ,  i t  is not 
obvious that the economic and technical skil ls which he values inhere
1 See Robert C. Tucker, The S o v ie t  P o l i t i c a l  Mindj (New York, 1972), 
p .107 and his S ta l in  as R evo lu tionary  1879- 1929 j  (New York, 1974), 
pp.292-329 and esp. pp.390-94. See also Adam B. Ulam, Lenin -and 
the  B o l s h e v i k s pp.752-64.
2 See Stephen F. Cohen, o p . c i t . ,  pp.129-32, on the 'revolutionary 
heroic' tradition within the party.
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more in polit icians,  even revolutionary ones, than in bureaucrats, nor
does Trotsky explain why they do. It is difficul t  to see why, for
example, his characterization of the lef t  turn should be preferred to
the following passage from Lewin, in which the description is very similar
to Trotsky's but the analysis and attribution of blame quite different:
Turetsky and Strumilin, both prominent economists,
. . . a t  that time... clearly favoured giving the political 
leadership full freedom of action according to i ts will 
without any guidance or restraint ,  and this was in fact 
occurring. Economics was st i f led,  as were the planners.
The political leadership seized complete control over 
the process and brushed aside strictures,  ' regulators' ,  
sophisticated work on a 'balance of national economy', 
mathematical models of growth, studies of accumulation 
and consumption, research on management methods, studies on 
scientific organization of labor, and many other endeavours, 
which were discontinued during the 1930's and abandoned 
until at least the mid-1950's. But these studies were 
the very tools of planning.!
However, without some dichotomy such as Trotsky's, without
the elevation of bureaucracy  to an even greater role than i t  actually
played, Trotsky's whole distinction between the actual and the potential
fate of the revolution, is placed under threat.
Moreover, even if  the people who supported Stalin can be
called ' bureaucrats' in some meaningful sense, Trotsky's explanation has
nothing useful to say about their fate. If i t  was the 'bureaucrats' who
enabled Stalin to gain power, i t  was these same 'bureaucrats' who scarcely
lived long enough to regret their achievement. If one attempts to
weigh the relative power of Stalin and his supporters, one must take into
account that by mid-1937 he had come to be able to decide personally,
'anything he wanted to, unconstrained by the power of any individual,
2group, institution or laws'. Until 1937 this was not absolutely true,
] P o l i t i c a l  U ndercurrents in  S o v ie t  Economic D ebates3 p.98.
2 T.H. Rigby, 'Stalinism and the Mono-Organizational Scoiety' , in Robert 
C. Tucker (ed.) S ta lin is m . Essays in  H is to r ic a l In te r p r e ta t io n 3 
(Mew York, 1977), pp.53-76.
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and while Sta l in  was purging oppos i t ion is ts ,  ex-opposit ionists  and
potential  oppos i t ion is ts ,  he was replacing them with his own nominees,
S ta l in i s t s ,  who had reason to be gra te fu l .  I f  one were so disposed,
then, one could ta lk  sensibly, i f  not adequately, of Sta l in  as the
'representat ive ' of  these people. But a f te r  about March 1937, when
S ta l in 's  to ta l  personal domination was establ ished, th is  sort of
explanation cannot work, fo r  the brunt of the Ezhovshohina was borne by
these very people. And, as Dr. Rigby has pointed out, there is good
reason to bel ieve ' tha t  something l ike  the Ezhovshohina was planned well
in advance by S ta l in ,  and that the e a r l ie r  purge operations though they
served other purposes, were designed to make poss ib le  the Ezhovshohina'
Early in 1937, Trotsky c lea r ly  recognized that something new was occurr-
2
ing, that the purge was being directed against the S ta l in i s t s ,  but he 
never seemed to recognize the importance of  these events fo r  his analysis.
Clear ly, i f  a bureaucratic s tructure endures, someone w i l l  
benefi t  from the annih i la t ion of m i l l ions  o f  his peers and superiors.
But fo r  an explanation which focuses on 'th e  bureaucracy' to have any 
weight, one must show e i ther  that the l iqu ida t ion  of those who had helped 
Stal in was in th e i r  cun in terests  - th is  presents d i f f i c u l t i e s  in p r in c i ­
ple - or that those who survived the slaughter had real control over 
th e i r  fates - th is  presents pract ical d i f f i c u l t i e s .  And even i f  one 
seeks to argue that measures can be in the in te rests  of  a stratum w i th ­
out being in the in te rests  of a l l  of  i t s  members, one must come to terms 
with the unparal leled magnitude of  the measures directed against the 
bureaucrats; one must explain why in  i t s  aon in te re s ts 3 an already cowed 
and subservient bureaucracy required that i t s  higher levels be almost 
wiped out by the Ezhovshohina. Fina l ly ,  even i f  one t r ie s  to portray .
1 T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in  the USSR3 1917-1967, p • 214.
2 W rit in g s .. .  ( 19 37- 38) ,p .38.
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the Ezhovshchina  as being conducted in the interests of the better 
educated post-E zhovshch ina  leadership, there is then the problem of 
the enormous discontinuity between the pre-and-post- Ezhovshchina 
generations and the difficulty in the light of i t  of attributing all 
that had gone wrong to 'THE bureaucracy1. In the context of Stalin's 
Russia, the term is so vague and the variety of people that i t  must 
encompass so vast, that l i t t l e  explanatory use can be made of i t .
I see, then, no plausible way in which the decimation of the 
bureaucracy in the Ezhovshchina  can be derived from the bureaucracy's 
'caste'  interests.  Far more economical and enlightening is Aristotle's 
account of the ' t radi t ional '  methods by which a tyrant maintains his 
power,"* which Khrushchev has^innocently, confirmed. Or, one might invoke 
a more recent theorist - A1 Capone. Asked what he thought of Mussolini's 
prospects, Capone replied, 'He'll be O.K. i f  he can keep the boys in l ine' .  
Stalin could  keep the boys in line, and the fact that he could, and the 
way in which he did, say as much about h is  role in Soviet politics as 
they do about theirs.
Concepts can, of course, be put to ideological uses even if  
they are analytically quite appropria te  to the tasks in hand. But the 
tenacity with which Trotsky holds to his focus on the bureaucracy, rather 
than Stalin, the party or the dictatorship - despite i ts manifest 
implausibi1i t y , suggests that the ideological and programmatic fu n c tio n s  
which ' bureaucracy' performs are of considerable importance to Trotsky.
But i f  Trotsky greatly underestimated Stalin's power v is - a - v i s  
the bureaucracy, in his theoretical writings for most of his l i fe ,  he 
equally underestimated the role of Stalin-and-the-bureaucracy v i s - a - v i s  
anyone else. This underestimation derived from two central theoretical
1 The P o l i t i c s  (Harmondsworth 1966) pp.224-28. The relevance of
Aristotle's analysis to Stalinism is discussed in some detail by Dr. 
Rigby in the art icle cited above.
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commitments. The f i r s t  of these, set irrevocably soon after 1929, 
was Trotsky's claim that so long as a stratum was not an economic 
class in the s t r i c t  sense, i t  could never wrest ultimate rule of the 
Soviet Union from the proletariat.
It  is striking, given Trotsky's concern with bureaucracy, just 
how vague he leaves the actual specification of i ts social character.
To learn that a social group is a 'tumour' tel ls  us something, but not 
much. To learn that i t  is a 'stratum1 234, a ' layer ' ,  a 'cl ique' ,  
'Bonapartist r i f f raf f '  does not tell  us very much more. This vagueness 
is at f i r s t  sight surprising, but the reason for i t  is clear enough.
On Trotsky's argument, only one thing matters - is i t  a class? If i t  
is not, then what else i t  might be is plainly of secondary importance. 
However, the economic determinism which underlies this position received 
a considerable battering from the Stalinist  state. Echoing Engels, 
Trotsky insisted repeatedly on the complexity of the relationship bet­
ween economic and political forces, and on the vulgarity of any one to 
one formulation of this relationshipJ Going beyond Engels to Lenin, 
Trotsky claims that:
The economic contradictions of the regime do not develop 
in a 'vacuum'. The p o l i t i c a l  contradictions of the 
regime of the dictatorship, even though in the final analysis 
they grow out of the economic, have an independent and also 
a more direct significance for the fate of the dictatorship 
than the economic c r i s i s .2
3
Politics is concentrated economics. Politics decides.
Under the conditions of the transitional epoch, the political 
superstructure plays a d e c i s i v e  role.4
Now the economic determinism which survives in these formulat­
ions is so porous that i t  is hard to know what to make of i t .  To reply,
1 See,e.g. W r i t i n g s . . .  (1930)3 p.86; W r i t i n g s . . .  (1930-31) ,  p. 74.
2 Ib id ,  p.210.
3 Writings. . .  (1932-33)3 p.75.
4 Writings '.. .  (1933-34)3 p.116.
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in the face of these qualifications, that the economic is nonetheless 
the fundamental determinant in the long run seems to me to require 
an act of faith rather than reasoning. Moreover, i t  is hard to see 
what bearing this reply could have on any specific analysis unless some 
time scale is specified.^ If,  as an Althusserian might insist ,  economics 
only determines polit ics 'in the final analysis ' ,  if i t  merely sets 
‘certain l imits ' ,  and if  polit ics is as 'decisive' as Trotsky maintains, 
is he saying in effect any more than that economics influences politics? 
And if  this is all that he is saying, then the acknowledged political 
power of the Soviet bureaucracy might be a fact of equal or greater 
importance than whether i t  is a class or not. If economic determinism 
is weakened or rejected - either in principle or specifically in the 
face of the massive po litica l power of certain groups in the Soviet 
Union - then much of Trotsky's debate seems beside the point. The 
power of a group will depend on many of the factors of which Trotsky 
was so well aware - economic, social, psychological, and polit ical.
It will be important to analyse the specific and changing power resources 
of different groups - ownership or control of the means of production; 
control of the state machine; control of the GPU, of the army, and so on.
1 See Sidney Hook's excellent critique of The Revolution Betrayed
where similar points are made. ('Reflections on the Russian Revolut­
ion' ,  in Reason, Social Myth and Democracy3 (New York, 1966), pp.142- 
180, esp. at pp.152-155.) Hook also points out that Trotsky's own 
comments on specific events and crises conflict again and again 
with this possible rejoinder. Inter alia he cites Trotsky's retort 
to ‘vulgar defenders of the Soviet Union' who defend the regime on 
the ground that 'a further development of the productive forces 
on the present foundations must sooner or later lead to the triumph 
of socialism. Hence only the factor of time is uncertain' . Trotsky 
replies that 'Time is by no means a secondary factor when historical 
processes are in question. It is far more dangerous to confuse the 
present and the future in politics than in grammar'. (The Revolution 
Betrayed p.48). Even more succinct, and in this context singularly 
apt, is Keynes' splendid aphorism that 'in the long run we will 
all be dead'.
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But the question of a regime's stabil i ty and historical importance will 
not easily be amenable to Trotsky's dogmatic clarity,
Trotsky's thought also laboured under another, related, con­
straint .  For Trotsky did not simply insist  that a stratum must be a 
c la s s  in order to rule; he also insisted for most of his l ife that only 
two opposed qroups could now be classes. As many writers have noted, 
this insistence seriously weakened his understanding of Soviet polit ics; 
i t  marred in particular his analysis of the bureaucracy. For i f  the 
bureaucracy was less powerful in relation to Stalin than Trotsky allowed, 
i t  was a good deal more powerful than he allowed in relation to the pro­
le tar iat  and the bourgeoisie. Rizzi put the point well when he charact­
erized the 'b e te  n o i r ’ of orthodox Marxists. According to them, he 
wrote, 'Capitalism is on the watch and the bureaucracy is in the process 
of committing harakiri! Sleep tranquilly, oh valiant c h ev a l ie r3 the 
bureaucracy has quite different intentions!'^ Quite apart from his 
recurrently falsified predictions about Soviet developments, Trotsky's 
concern with spectral foes caused him to neglect earl ier insights, which 
he actually had, into the reasons for bureaucratic growth in modern 
society.
What is most lacking in Trotsky's voluminous writings about 
bureaucracy, and his frequent attempts to analyse the reasons for i ts 
growth, is an appreciation of the administrative imperatives which have, 
led to the growth of bureaucracies throughout the modern world, and of 
the massive opportunities for bureaucratic growth opened up by the 
Russian Revolution in particular. In The Nao Course Trotsky's warnings 
against bureaucratism come closer than any of his later writings to an
1 L ' U .R .S .S .:  C o l lec t iv ism e  Bureaucratique3 p .94.
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understanding of some of the causes of bureaucratic growth. But
when he began to be concerned with a stratum - which indeed was growing -
and with external class forces - which had l i t t l e  to do with this
growth - he did not supplement, but jettisoned his former insights.
The only vestiges of them remained in his explanations of the necessity
of bureaucracy in a ' t ransit ional '  society. But these vestiges were
quite inadequate. Moshe Lewin praises an analysis made by Bukharin in
1928, one which, Lewin claims:
provided a good departure for a serious sociological and 
political analysis of the Soviet state,  in fact,  a basis 
for a genuine political sociology.. .The centralized 
socialist  economy, to consider only this crucial factor, 
created an immense administrative apparatus, and this,  
in turn, set in motion i ts own self-sustaining dynamism. 
Class origin of the office holders was not the problem 
here. . . Petit-bourgeois influence - the other current 
scapegoat - could not but be a part of the story. All 
this seemed obvious to Bukharin, but such an analysis 
had already become heretical since i t  'slandered' the 
'dictatorship of the p ro le ta r i a t ' .1
Perhaps for the same reason Trotsky failed to develop
his earl ier suggestions, and he continued to warn against non-
bureaucratic counter revolution. And i t  is diff icul t  to see how he
could have attended to the real reasons for bureaucratic growth without
a crisis of faith. As he acknowledged in 1939, one basis of that faith -
the allegedly necessary course of historical development - would
have been undermined by recognition of a new 'bureaucratic' society.
But this was not al l .  For i f  the growth of bureaucracy had been
simply  the result of the trends Trotsky had noted in 1923, or i f  i t
had been fully explained by the necessary tasks  involved in transforming
a backward society into a socialist  one, then i t  would be hard to know
whom to blame for i t ,  i f  not the Bolsheviks. Some autonomous
1 . Op. c i t . j  pp.63-64.
226
' forces of react ion' had logically to be at f a u l t ,  fo r  Trotsky's stark 
d is t in c t io n ,  between what had happened and what should have happened, 
to be tenable. And here we have come f u l l  c i rc le .  Just as the 
concept of  bureaucracy had important uses to one who wished to explain 
yet dissociate himself from the fa i lu re  of a costly experiment, so, too, 
concern with 'ho s t i le  class forces' shi f ted attention from the true 
nature and causes of  that fa i lu re .  I f  the concept's uses have some­
thing to do with Trotsky 's chronic overemphasis on 'bureaucracy' in the 
explanation of Stal inism, the standing embarrassment caused by the 
growth and dominance of  the bureaucratic state in the Soviet Union, is 
evident in his reluctance to examine i t s  genuine causes, role and import­
ance.
But even i f  Trotsky had wished to be more discriminating in 
his analysis of Soviet bureaucracy, and even i f  he had simply been a 
Marxist rather than a leading Bolshevik, i t  is not obvious that his 
problems would have been solved. For inadequate appraisal of the role 
and consequences of  bureaucracy in post-revolut ionary society was not 
a Trotsky is t  innovation, and an obsession with iden t i fy ing  the class 
character of a society 's  ru lers neither was born with Trotsky nor died
with him.
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SEVEN
THEORISTS OF 'THE NEW CLASS'
Explanations and theories do not develop in a vacuum; they are 
strongly coloured by the assumptions and presuppositions which a thinker 
brings to his work. Questions arise, and answers are given, in the 
context of conscious or unconscious theoretical frameworks, in terms of 
interests and beliefs that distinguish or seek to distinguish the 
potentially significant from the non-significant, that lay down what 
are seen as 'satisfactory' ways of providing explanations. Such frame­
works are often very resistant to change; most traditions of thought 
are held together by agreement on the important problems and the proper 
ways of solving them rather than by specific solutions. Modern thinkers 
have called such theoretical frameworks the 'paradigm' or 'problematic' 
within which a thinker works.
Marxism has operated, for many thinkers, as such a 'paradigm'.
It has stipulated what the fundamental activities and actors in society 
are and where they are carrying men and societies. Individual societies, 
Marxists have insisted, can only be understood through a proper apprec­
iation of these basic forces: to unravel the nature of a given society, 
one must grasp its class structure; to discover who rules the society, 
one must determine which class owns the means of production; to ascertain 
what the future holds, one must recognize that a new ruling class can 
only supplant an existing one if it is capable of organizing production
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at a higher leve l .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  Marxists have been confident that 
a capitalist society w i l l  u l t ima te ly  f a l l  to a proletarian revolut ion 
and that th is  revolut ion w i l l  pave the way for  a society without classes.
Of course, there is  much more in Marx than th is ,  and his wri t ings 
are i n f i n i t e l y  subtler,  and display many more nuances, than those of most 
of his fol lowers.  'Orthodox' Marxists, however, were not wrong to believe 
that these elements stood at the core of Marx's social theory. Moreover, 
only i f  one appreciates that these and related be l ie fs  were considered by 
many Marxists to hold the key to the understanding of social r e a l i t y ,  
can one understand the r ise ,  nature, and persistence of 'new class' 
theories and the heat which they have generated. S im i la r ly ,  without 
appreciation of the tenacity with which these conceptions have been held, 
i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to comprehend why wr i ters  who have broken with 
Marxism on fundamental issues of fac t  and pr inc ip le  s t i l l  pers is t  in 
t ry ing to f ind new answers to old questions, rather than s h i f t  to asking 
new questions. New class theories are s ig n i f ica n t  Marxist heresies; 
they stop well short of apostasy.
No Marxist has ins isted more strongly on the propositions out­
l ined above than Leon Trotsky. Unti l  the postwar disputes between Yugo­
slavia and the Soviet Union, Trotskyism, as John Plamenatz wrote at the 
time, was ' the only major heresy since the seat of Marxism was shif ted 
to Moscow' and Trotsky himself was 'the a rch-here t ic , more evi l  and more 
dangerous than a l l  the others together ' .^  The doctr inal core of Trotsky's 
heresy was expressed in his claim that the Soviet bure aucracy had betrayed 
the Revolution. As we have seen, precisely because of his role as 
heresiarch, i t  was crucial fo r  Trotsky on the one hand to determine
1 John Plamenatz, 'Deviat ions from Marxism', The Political Quarterly3 
vol.21, 1950, p.48.
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whether Soviet bureaucracy could be a class, and on the other to deny 
that it was one. 'New class' theorists have been prepared to go a good 
deal further than Trotsky; not in disputing the importance of the quest­
ions which he asked, but in rejecting his answers to them.
'New class' theories have appeared in a variety of forms.
In 1869, e.g.^Bakunin asked,
...what do we find throughout history? The State has 
always been the patrimony of some privileged class: 
a priestly class, an aristocratic class, a bourgeois 
class. And finally, when all the other classes have 
exhausted themselves, the State then becomes the 
patrimony of the bureaucratic class and then falls 
or, if you will, rises - to the position of a machined
In 1872, after he had been expelled from the First International, Bakunin
directly attacked Marx:
But in the People's State of Marx there will be, we are 
told, no privileged class at all... but there will be a 
government and, note this well, an extremely complex govern­
ment. This government will not content itself with administer­
ing and governing the masses politically, as all governments 
do today. It will also administer the masses economically, 
concentrating in the hands of the State the production and 
division of wealth, the cultivation of land, the establish­
ment and development of factories, the organization and 
direction of commerce, and finally the application of capital 
to production by the only banker - the State. All that will 
demand an immense knowledge and many heads 'overflowing with 
brains' in this government. It will be the reign of 
scientific intelligence> the most aristocratic, despotic, 
arrogant, and elitist of all regimes. There will be a new 
class, a new hierarchy of real and counterfeit scientists 
and scholars, and the work will be divided into a minority 
ruling in the name of knowledge, and an immense ignorant ~ 
majority. And then, woe unto the mass of ignorant ones!
The writings of the Polish revolutionary, Jan WaoTaw Machajski (especially 
his The Intellectual Worker) were animated by a similar belief that Marx­
ists sought a state in which the 'intellectual capital' monopolized by
1 Reprinted in Sam Dolgoff (ed.), Bakunin on Anarchy3 (New York, 1972) 
p.318.
Ibid., pp. 318-319.2 .
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thei r  c lass ,  the in te l l ig en ts ia ,  would be pre-eminent.1 These themes 
were taken up in anarchist  and ' left-Communist'  cr i t iques of Bolshevism 
in the 1920s and 1930s.
These wr i ters '  place in the genealogy of new class theory is
secure. I t  is not surpr ising,  however, that  thei r  cr i t iques did not have
dramatic repercussions in orthodox Marxist c i rc les .  Bakunin had been
anathemized by Marx; Machajski, who had begun to write his cr i t ique as
a Marxist was, nonetheless,  a minor figure of br ief  fame among exiles in
Siberia,  and could be dismissed as an 'economist'  or,  as Trotsky, a f t e r
2
having been great ly impressed, dismissed him, as an anarchist .
Moreover, another reason why these ideas did not find an 
ea r l i e r  and wider market among Marxists, and especial ly among Bolsheviks, 
is that  the Tat ters '  world view was not yet  unsettled by the recognition 
of a major c r i s i s  which had to be faced and explained. In this connection 
the r i se  in the ' s tocks'  of new class theories bears st r iking resemblances
1. Very l i t t l e  of Machajski's work has been t ranslated from the original 
Russian, though his most important book, Umstvennyi Rabochii, has 
been republished (New York, 1968) with an English introduction by 
Albert Parry. Art icles on Machajski's l i f e  and thought include 
Paul Avrich, 'What is "Makhaevism" ? ' ,  S o v ie t  S tu d ies ,  vol . 17,
1965, pp. 66-75; Anthony D'Agostino, ' I n t e l l igen t s i a  Socialism and 
the "Workers' Revolution": The Views of J . W.  Machajski' ,  In tern a tio n a l
Review o f  S o c ia l  H is to ry ,  vol. 14, 1969, pp. 54-89; Maria Hirszowicz, 
'Socjalizm jako ideologia robotnikow umysTowych' ,  Aneks, no. 9,
1977, pp. 65-86; Wiera Machajska, 'Zycie i poglady Wacfawa Machaj- 
skiego' ,  Wiadomosci, (London), March 4, 1962, p.2; Marshall Shatz,
'Jan WacTaw Machajski The "Conspiracy" of the In t e l lec tua l s ,  Survey, 
no. 62, 1967, pp.45-57. In the 1930s Max Nomad, who had been a 
disciple  of Machajski' s ,  brought'him to the at tent ion of American 
Marxists. See also Marian Sawer, 'Theories of the New Class from 
Bakunin to Kuron and Modzelewski: The Morphology of Permanent Protest '  
in Marian Sawer (ed. ) ,  Socia lism  and the Hew Class: Toward the Anal­
y s i s  o f  S tru c tu ra l  In eq u a li ty  w ith in  S o c i a l i s t  S o c i e t i e s , {Adelaide, 
1978), a t  pp. 5-8.
2 . See My L ife ,  p.129.
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to the development of what Thomas Kuhn ca l l s  'normal science' .  Kuhn 
observes that :
. . . t h a t  enterpr ise  [normal sciencel seems an attempt to 
force nature into the preformed and re la t ive ly  inf lexible 
box that  the paradigm supplies.  No part of the aim of normal 
science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed those 
that  will not f i t  the box are often not seen at  a l l .  Nor do 
sc ien t i s t s  normally aim to invent new theories ,  and they are 
often intolerant  of those invented by others.  Instead, 
normal-scient if ic research is directed to the ar t icula t ion 
of those phenomena and theories that  the paradigm already 
suppli e s . I
Kuhn also draws at tent ion to the role of c r i s i s  in the development
of novel s c i en t i f i c  theories ,  and a f t er  discussing three examples of
the emergence of a new sc i en t i f i c  theory he remarks,
These three examples are almost ent i re ly  typical .  In each 
case a novel theory emerged only a f t e r  a pronounced fai lure in 
the normal problem-solving a c t i v i t y . . .The novel theory seems 
a d i rec t  response to c r i s i s  . . . F ina l l y ,  these examples share 
another char ac ter i s t i c  that  may help to make the case 
for the role of c r i s i s  impressive: the solution to each of
them has been at  l eas t  pa r t i a l l y  anticipated during a period 
when there was no c r i s i s  in the corresponding science; and  ^
in the absence of c r i s i s  these ant icipat ions had been i gno red /
From at  l ea s t  the 1930s, Western Marxists have been confronted with a
plent i ful  and steady supply of cr i ses .  One response has been the
elaboration of theories of a 'new c la s s ' .
1 Theories of a Global New Class
In 1939 and 1940 there appeared a number of new class theories 
of a special sort :  g lo b a l  theories which suggested that  a new class ,  
unforeseen by Marx, was coming into power throughout the developed world. 
Like Trotsky's ref lect ions  in 'The USSR in War', these writings were 
stimulated by a combination of S t a l in ' s  success in the Soviet Union and
1 The S tru c tu re  o f  S c i e n t i f i c  R evo lu tions ,  (Chicago, 1970), p.24.
2 Ibid., pp.74-75.
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the extraordinary breakdowns, changes and fascist successes in capital­
is t  states of the 1930s.
The most famous of these books, James Burnham's The 
Managerial R e v o lu tio nJ was the culmination of the author's spli t  with 
the American Trotskyist movement. Like the ideas of Trotsky himself, 
Burnham's movement away from Trotskyist orthodoxy began under the 
pressure of 'the Russian question' . In 1937, Burnham and another 
Trotskyist, Joseph Carter, attempted to challenge Trotsky's view that 
the Soviet Union was a worker's state governed by a bureaucratic caste. 
They argued, on the one hand, that the proletarian dictatorship was 
essentially a -p o li t ic a l  rather than an economic concept, and that once 
the proletariat had ceded all political power to the bureaucracy as in 
the Soviet Union, one could no longer speak of a workers' state. On the 
other hand they s t i l l  admitted that the bureaucracy was not a class, 
insisted with Trotsky that the Soviet 'economic structure remains un­
changed' and had to be defended, and that the bourgeoisie had not been
reinstated. They asked that the Soviet Union be defined as 'neither a
2workers nor a bourgeois s ta te ' .  There is in this contribution, as 
Rizzi already saw in 1939, 'a great deal of confusion... a confusion 
appropriate to that state of mind where ideas are in the process of
3
forming'. And this effort  to change the official Trotskyist analysis 
met with l i t t l e  success. I t  was opposed by Trotsky, failed to win 
substantial support and was not publicly pressed by Burnham. However
1 First printed in 1941; (reprinted Harmondsworth, 1962).
2 Organizing Committee for the Socialist Party, Internal Bulletin, 
No. 2, November, 1937, pp. 11 - 14.
3 L 'U .R .S .S . C o lle c tiv ism e  B ureaucra tique3 p. 39.
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after the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland,
and of Finland, and the incorporation of the Baltic states,  Burnham,
Carter and Max Shachtman led a dissident wing of the Socialist
Workers' Party in denying that socialists were obliged to support the
Soviet Union simply because, whatever i t  did in the war i t  was s t i l l
a workers' state struggling in an imperialist war. Burnham insisted,
at this stage, that i t  did not matter how one defined the Soviet
bureaucracy and state; the only relevant decisions to be made were
concrete assessments of the Soviet Union's activi t ies in the war:
The dominant issues dividing the ranks of our party 
and the International are not dialectics or sociology 
or logic.To pose the question in this manner is an 
evasion or fraud. ..
This conflict of strategical orientations is the central 
political issue, and nothing else. 1
Trotsky replied, insistently and repeatedly, that the 'conflict of
strategical orientations'  was not, and for a Marxist could not be, the
central issue. And there was a sense in which he was right,  for by
arguing that discussion could be confined to discrete and separable
'concrete' issues, the membership of the opposition were challenging
much more than they admitted, and Trotsky was not simply being evasive
in insisting that they were.
As the intensity of Trotsky's attachment to the 'workers' state'  
theory - in all i ts  permutations - attested, there had always been much 
more to his analysis of Soviet bureaucracy than mere classification. 
Indeed, Trotsky insisted that nothing less than the validity of Marxism 
was at stake in this debate:
1 'Science and Style' ,  reprinted in Leon Trotsky, In Defence o f  Marxism3 
pp. 250-51.
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...The remarks. . .  to the effect that you do not now 
pose for the decision of the party the question of 
the nature of the Soviet state signify in reality 
that you do pose this question, i f  not juridically,  
then theoretically and poli t ically.  Only infants 
can fail to understand this. This very statement 
likewise has another meaning, far more outrageous 
and pernicious. It  means that you divorce politics 
from Marxist sociology. Yet for us the crux of the 
matter lies precisely in this. If i t  is possible 
to give a correct definition of the state without 
util izing the method of dialectical materialism; 
i f  i t  is possible correctly to determine politics without 
giving a class analysis of the state,  the question , 
arises: is there any need whatsoever for Marxism ?
In other words, Trotsky was accusing Burnham of apostasy; and
in his le t te r  of resignation from the Workers' Party which he and Max
Shachtman had formed one month earl ier ,  Burnham confessed that:
by no stretching of terminology can I any longer 
regard myself or permit others to regard me as 
a Marxist.2
Yet, as The Managerial Revolution makes abundantly clear in i ts 
relentless determination to answer the questions which Trotsky posed, 
both Trotsky and Burnham were mistaken on this point. Burnham's 
journey to apostasy took much longer than he seems to have anticipated: 
his most famous work, and the earl ier ,  similar theses of Bruno Rizzi and
3
the non-Bolshevik, democratic Marxist, Lucien Laurat, were merely . 
heresies.
Burnham's heresy in The Managerial Revolution took the form of 
denying that capitalism was the last  form of antagonistic society, and . 
of arguing that,  while the prospects of achieving socialism seemed slim, 
the probability that capitalism would be replaced throughout the world
1. In Defence o f Marxism,, p.98.
2. 'Letter of Resignation from the Workers' Party' ,  in Leon Trotsky,
Xn Defence o f Marxism, p. 257.
3. Marxism and Democracy, (New York, 1940), f i r s t  published as
Le Marxisme en F aillite?3 (Paris, 1939).
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by a new form of class society was very great indeed. Burnham argued 
that this new form of class society, which he called 'managerial society', 
was coming into being throughout the modern world, and that i t  was most 
fully developed in the Soviet Union, was less, but significantly,  developed 
in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and was increasingly evident m 
America. As we have seen, Bruno Rizzi had already, in an odd, confused 
and at times evil book,'*' come to a very similar conclusion. Unlike 
Burnham, however, Rizzi s t i l l  maintained that the new social formation, 
'bureaucratic collectivism', would ultimately be succeeded by socialism. 
Laurat 's analysis shared a great deal with those of Burnham and Rizzi, 
though since he condemned the Bolshevik Revolution, Laurat did not 
consider i t  the definitive test  of the proletar iat ' s  maturity, 
and he exhorted the workers to struggle against the new despotism 
which was emerging throughout the world.
1. Surprisingly, Trotsky had nothing at all to say about the 
odious anti-Semitic passages in Rizzi 's book. See, e.g.
La Bureaucratisation du Monde3 pp. 291 - 300,'La Question J u iv e ’. 
Rizzi explains that the Nazis are acting correctly in this 
question, though they do not quite realise why. Jews are 
pre-eminently capital ists ,  and as representatives of this dying 
class,  they also need to be eliminated by the representatives 
of the more 'progressive' new class:
The racist  struggle of national socialism and of 
fascism is fundamentally only an ant i -capi tal is t  
struggle led by the new social synthesis, in a 
theoretically erroneous, but practical ly.' just ,  - 
f ashion . .Hitler is right,  and we [the workers] 
are wrong. We must correct ourselves and become 
anti-Jewish because we are ant i -capi tal i s t .
(Op. c i t . 3 pp. 295-296).
Rizzi pauses for a moment to deal with a possible objection 
that his anti-Semitism clashes with his respect for Marx and 
Trotsky:
We respect and honour Marx and Trotsky and several of our 
obscure friends of the Jewish race. Certain very beaut­
iful flowers push, isolated, through the dung, but 
collectively the Jewish people has become a pile of 
capi tal is t  dung. (Ib id3 p.300).
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The most striking feature of these theories, and the one 
which distinguishes them from more recent theories emanating from within 
the ' social is t '  states,  is that none of them is simply concerned with 
socialist  states. The belief that socialism would be a successor to 
capitalism on a world scale, rather than a mere international compet itor3 
was, after al l ,  basic in classical Marxism. Laurat, Rizzi and Burnham 
retained the scope of the original drama but inserted a new character.
Laurat identified the new class as ' piuto-technocratic' in the West 
and 'bureau-technocratic' in the Soviet Union; Rizzi was content with 
Trotsky's ' bureaucracy1; Burnham believed that 'managers' were 
introducing 'managerial society' throughout the world. Burnham, for 
example, explains that:
...though Russia did not move toward socialism, at the 
same time i t  did not move back to capitalism. This is 
a point which is of key significance for the problem of 
this book. All of those who predicted what would happen 
in Russia, friends and enemies, shared the assumption 
. . . . t h a t  socialism is the'only al ternative' to capitalism; 
from which i t  followed that Russia - since presumably i t  
could not stay s t i l l  - would either move toward socialism 
or back to the restoration of capitalism.
n e i th er  o f  these a n t i c ip a t e d  developments has taken p l a c e . . .
The only way out of the theoretical jam is to recognise 
that the assumption must be dropped,that socialism and 
capitalism are not the sole alternatives, that Russia's 
motion has been toward neither capitalism nor socialism, 
but toward managerial s o c i e t y 3 the type of society now in  ^
the process of replacing capital ist  society on a world scale.
Like Trotsky, these authors were convinced that capitalism was
moribund. On the one hand, there was the Depression and the probability
- by the time that Burnham wrote, the fact -  of war. On the other hand,
the very measures which capital ist  states were taking to overcome their
problems were incompatible with capitalism. Above all this was true of the
enormous growth in the size and activity of the twentieth century state.
Laurat argued that in Italy and.Germany, rule by the capital ist  class
had already given way to rule by a monopolist and financial aristocracy,
and he continued:
1. op. c i t . , pp.53-54.
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but even this restricted fraction of the capital ist  
class does not enjoy absolute power. It  is compelled 
to share economic power to an increasing extent with 
the State apparatus^with the fascist  bureaucracy. In 
view of the innumerable economic functions exercised 
by the State in our day, that bureaucracy is not to be 
confounded with the bureaucracy which existed under 
Liberal capitalism. Being an economic factor of 
f i rs t - rate  importance, the State to-day becomes the 
forcing-house of a new class of exploi ters. . . .  1
Rizzi and Burnham both emphasized that the capital ist  state always does
and must play a secondary role. Now, however, though the state was
being called to intervene in the economy ostensibly on behalf of
capitalism, in doing so i t  was inevitably changing the whole structure
2of the economic system. Rizzi and Burnham make this point frequently
and with the substitution of 'managers' for 'bureaucrats' ,  Burnham's
conclusion is identical to the following passage from Rizzi:
. ..Exploiting this new function [intervention in the 
economy after the 1929 crash.], i t  [the State] gradually 
transferred the political sceptre from the hands of the 
bourgeoisie into those of government organisms Which, from 
day to day, grew to excess and became l i t t l e  by l i t t l e  
their own government, the government of a social class, 
which has the bureaucracy for i ts  core...The bureaucratic 
class is in the process of formation, while the bourgeois 
class is disintegrating. 3
These authors all considered the growth of the state and of 
state functions as the most important vehicle for the rise of the new 
class. Indeed Rizzi concentrated almost excl usively on this and on 
developments associated with, or contributing to i t .  But to minds 
willing to dismiss distinctions between the nature of s..tate 
intervention and control in the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and America, 
other distinctions remained to be blurred. The most important of these
1 Op. c i t .  , pp. 198.
2 Rizzi, La Bureaucratisation du Monde3 p. 121, 131, 172, 235;
Burnham, Op. c i t . , p . 74, 102.
3 La Bureaucratisation du Monde3 p. 139. See Burnham, op. c i t . ,  ppi 138 ff.
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was that between state and non-state functionaries. Since they did 
not deny that private corporations s t i l l  existed in the West, and 
since they recognized that, in America particularly, the state did 
not yet completely direct corporate activi tes,  Laurat and Burnham s t i l l  
had to explain the role of private corporations. This involved two 
moves: f i r s t ,  to argue that capital ists had been virtually expropriated
in corporations by someone else; second, to argue, or at least to claim, 
that these expropriators were part of the same group as those who were 
coming to run the state.
There were two sources on which to base the f i r s t  of these moves. 
One, on which Laurat explicitly relied, was Marx's predictions in Volume 
III of C ap ita l  that the capital ist  was becoming superfluous in modern 
large-scale industry, and was being replaced by the non-owning manager, 
as the company underwent 'socialization from within' . Thus Laurat drew
attention to a 'separation between capi tal ist  property and the directive
1 2 function of the capital ist '  and to the rise of 'a new oligarchy' and
he explained that:
Karl Marx points out all this in his 'Capital ' ,  and in 
his 'Theories of Surplus Value'. Our whole demonstration 
is based on his analysis. . .The exception of his day has 
become the rule of ours. 3
Burnham, on the other hand, did not rely on these elements in
Marx to make this point. Indeed, so far as I know, he never mentions
Marx's predictions in this connection. Instead he referred to The Modem
C orporation and P riva te  Property  published in 1932 by Adolf A. Berle
and Gardner C. Means. This book was
the f i r s t  major attempt to provide detailed empirical data 
about stock ownership in order to substantiate the claim 
that shareholders were becoming less influential in the 
conduct of corporation affairs,  and that the 'control'  
function of ownership was being superseded by that of management.
1. Op. a i t .  3 p.190^
2 . Ib id ,  p. 191.
3. Ib id .
4. Theo Nichols, Ownership3 C ontrol and I d e o l o g y (London, 1969), p.19.
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Burnham had referred to this book before. In 1933, when he was already a
Marxist but not yet a Trotskyist, he reviewed the book in The Symposium>
a journal which he edited for i ts  four-year existence with the l i terary
cri t ic Philip Wheelwright. Burnham praised the book very highly but
made three criticisms of i t .  First,  he argued that i t  was inadequate
because i ts  authors appeared either not to have read Marx, not to have
understood him or, as he put i t ,  ' for that variety of reasons that so
insistently operates, . . . having understood him and being unwilling to
accept their understanding... '  1 234 Burnham continued:
any poli t ical ,  economic, or social study at the present 
time is fated by a neglect of Marx to remain, however 
bri l l iant ly,  wandering among scientific symptoms. I t  is  ^
the Marxian analysis that cuts through to the major organs/
Secondly, and quite extraordinarily in the light of his later work,
Burnham objected to 'the almost universal error, where the subject
matter is social and thus involves human activity,  of projecting
3
stat ist ical  trends too confidently into the future. . . '
Finally, and most important, Burnham insisted that Berle and Means 
were mistaken in thinking that they had identified a major social 
revolution, for:
a major social revolution is a change in the basic property 
relation. The mistake of the authors is in their belief 
that the relation they deal with is basic. Or, in other 
words, the change they describe is a change within the 
structure of capitalism, not from capitalism to a new social 
order. 4
The Managerial Revolution might be described as an attempt to rectify 
the f i r s t  defect and duplicate, somewhat noisily, the other two.
1 The Symposium3 vol . 4, 1933, p. 259.
2 Ibid3 pp. 259-260.
3 Ibid3 p. 262. Compare George Orwell's complaint that in
The Managerial Revolution, Burnham is 'at  each point. . . predicting 
a continuation o f the thing that is  happening \  ‘James Burnham 
and the Managerial Revolution', The collected Essays3 Journalism 
and Letters o f George Orwell3 Vol. IV, (London, 1968), pp. 172-73.
4 The Symposium, p .273.
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In that book Burnham insists that the growth of the large corporation
and the technological developments of modern industry have left  owners
in control only of small businesses, and have led to a completely
different social category coming to control the large corporations:
These changes have meant that to an ever-growing extent the 
managers are no longer, either as individuals or legally 
or historically, the same as the capitalists.  There is a 
combined shift:  through changes in the technique of 
production, the functions of management become more 
distinctive, more complex, more specialized, . and more 
crucial to the whole process of production, thus serving 
to set off those who perform these functions as a separate 
group or class in society, and at the same time those who 
formerly carried out what functions there were of management, 
the bourgeoisie, themselves withdraw from management, so 
that the difference in function becomes also a difference 
in the individuals who carry out the function. 1
There was, then, an omnipotent state in the Soviet Union and, in the
West, an unprecedentedly active one linked to a completely new group of
corporate controllers. The la t ter  were also members of the new class.
This crucial but scarcely argued-for connection between state
and non-state functionaries is made plausible largely because of the
definitional vagueness so characteristic of 'new class' discussion. Thus
Laurat simply points to the rise of technicians in all fields and assumes
that their interests, at least vis-a-vis anyone else, will converge.
Burnham relies on modern developments to encourage the rise of a new
type of man - not ex-seminarians or postcard painters, but technically
2competent administrators - in both government and private industry.
It  is their determination, not to say obsession, to identify and 
demarcate a new ruling class, which indicates the profoundly Marxist 
nature of these theories. Trotsky had insisted that to a Marxist the
1 Burnham, op. cit.3 p. 82.
2 See Burnham, op. oit., p. 105, p. 141.
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birth of a new class was not a haphazard affair but signalled 
profound economic developments and indicated that the new class was 
economically more progressive than the former ruling class. So Laurat, 
Rizzi and Burnham emphasize that the coming economic system is a great 
economic advance on the capitalism which i t  replaces. So too its 
progressive elements are familiar to most Marxists:
1. The increasing organic fusion between the State and the 
economic system; the development . . .o f  'control levers' ;  the 
rapidly increasing centralization of a 111 economic activity; ‘ 
the development of decentralized control lacking co-ordinat­
ion in the direction of centralized and co-ordinated control.
2. The development of property towards more and more collect­
ivis t  forms (increase in the numbers of the shareholding 
public, the decline of the private sector of the economic 
system before the advance of the public sector); the broad­
ening of social legislation; the development of increasingly 
col lect ivist  legal forms. 1
Laurat, i t  is true, believes that such a system will be less progressive 
than i t  might be unless the proletariat  can win control over i t ,  but he 
also has no doubt that the new ruling class is economically superior to 
the old.
Again, Trotsky insisted that a ruling class must own the means 
of production, and an emormous amount of ink, and some blood, has been 
spi l t  as a result of new class theorists'  attempts to show that what the 
new class has amounts to ownership. Rizzi was one of the f i r s t  to sound 
an oft-repeated note by arguing that the bureaucracy owned property as 
much as the capitalists had, but that i t  owned i t ,  as i t  exploited the 
proletariat  and drew off the surplus value which the la t ter  produced, not 
individually but collectively, 'en b l o c True, Rizzi concedes, this 
is a different manner of ownership from bourgeois ownership, but, he 
insists repeatedly, i t  is ownership nonetheless. Burnham, too, is 
determined to show that his managers 'own' the means of production. He
1 Lucien Laurat, op. o i t . } p. 211.
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agrees with Rizzi as to the collective nature of managerial ownership; 
he goes on to claim that, pace Berle and Means, there is no distinction 
between ownership and control and that since the managers are in control
obsessed with the term 'ownership1 than are those who argue with Trotsky: 
he dismisses the importance of legal property, but he too gives primacy to 
the new class's collective economic exploitation and total economic control.
Finally, what in other circles might pass for arid terminological
disputes gain substance here from what orthodox and heretics agree are 
the consequences of identifying the c la s s  which owns the means of prod­
uction. As Burnham explains:
In most types of society that we know about, and in all 
complex societies so far, there is a particular,  and 
relatively small group of men that con tro ls  [for the orthodox 
read 'owns'] the chief instruments of production.. .Where there 
is such a controlling group in society...we may speak of this 
group as the socially dominant or ruling class in that society.
It is hard, indeed, to see what else could be meant by 'dominant' 
or 'ruling'  class. Such a group has the power and privilege and 
wealth in the society, as against the remainder of society.2
And Rizzi also reveals what must, in the case of Russia, have been
The 'clerk'  who, following Trotsky, is only the transmission 
mechanism of imperialism, has ruled in Russia for over twenty 
years and rules a country which takes up a sixth of the cont­
inents, with a population of 180 millions. Obviously, the clerk 
has alarming proportions, much greater than those of his masters 
themselves. Such domination requires a ' s taff '  which on the 
national scale, represents for us a class. To reinforce i t ,  
this class pushes i ts domination into all domains of society, ♦ 
and where i t  encounters resistance, bypasses i t  by climbing 
over mountains of corpses. The bureaucratic regime of the 
U.S.S.R. has f i r s t ,  sacrificed the communist party and the Third 
International, then the Red Army i tsel f .  Tasks of this magnitude
of the means of production, they therefore own them.'*' Laurat is less
an extraordinarily powerful argument for many Marxists:
1
2
3
Op. c i t . , pp. 99.
I b i d . ,  p. 93.
L ’U .R .S .S . : Co l lec t iv i sm e  Bureaucratique,  p. 48.
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2 Theories of a Communist New Class
The Second World War, the collapse of Fascist  regimes in Germany 
and I t a ly ,  and the d i s t inc t ly  unMarxist postwar concern with contrasts 
between democracy and t o ta l i t a r i an ism,  laid global new class theories to 
r e s t  for a time; the more fashionable theories of 'convergence' between 
Communist and noncommunist s t a t es ,  that  followed them in some quarters in 
the West, owe much to ideas such as Burnham's, however. With the es tabl i sh­
ment of communist rule in Eastern Europe another form of new class theory 
has been developed, primarily by dissidents within communist s t a t es ,  meant 
to explain the, to them, dis i l lus ioning nature and development of those 
s t a tes .  There are fundamental differences between the 'global '  new class 
theor i s t s  discussed ea r l i e r  and these ' s o c i a l i s t '  new class theor i s t s .
The former claimed to be identifying and explaining a world-wide phenom­
enon; the l a t t e r  have more rest rained and r ea l i s t i c  ambitions. The former, 
especial ly Burnham, claimed that  industr ial  managers and analogous function­
ar ies  were inheri t ing the earth;  the l a t t e r  believe that  the new class is 
based on the p o l i t i c a l  bureaucracy which forms around the Communist party.
The former saw the new class as a phenomenon of the developed  world, as a 
su ccesso r  to advanced capital ism; the l a t t e r  see i t  as a means of bringing 
rapid indus t r ia l iza t ion to the less developed areas of the world. And 
there are many other differences between these two groups of wri ters and 
within each group. What is therefore st r iking is the s imi lar i ty  between the 
moulds into which the i r  di f ferent  analyses were poured.
The most famous and po l i t i ca l l y  prominent of the l a t t e r  wri ters is 
Milovan Dji las,  a one-time leader and ideologist  of the Yugoslav Communist 
Party.  Anyone famil iar  with Trotsky's p o s t - 1923 writings will experience an 
extraordinary sense of de ja  vu in tracing Dji las '  road through heresy to 
ultimate apostasy. Djilas'  ref lect ions on ' bureaucracy1 and 'bureaucratism' 
began as part  of the Yugoslav critique of the Soviet Union a f t er  the Cominform 
s p l i t  of 1948 and the Rajk t r i a l  of 1949. In 1949, Djilas s t i l l  hoped to
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limit criticism of the Soviet Union to foreign policy, to 'relations bet­
ween Socialist States' .1 234 But by 1950 he had become the most outspoken 
public cr i t ic  of the Soviet Union, and in a speech to Belgrade students in 
March of that year he became the f i r s t  Party leader to ask publicly whether 
the Soviet Union was s t i 11 a social i s t  state.  Djilas explained that the 
dictatorship of the proletariat  could develop in one of two ways: either 
toward its own disappearance or ' in the direction of strengthening and
transformation of bureaucracy into a privileged caste which lives at the
2expense of society as a whole'. The la t ter  development, he argued, had 
occurred in the Soviet Union. Like Trotsky, Djilas was careful to dis­
tinguish this claim from a far more dangerous one:
. . . In the Soviet Union, there are no economic bases for the 
creation of a new class. What is happening there, the outward 
manifestations of which we see, does not mean and cannot mean a 
return to capitalism. This is actually a matter of new phenomena 
which arose on the ground and within the framework of socialism 
i t s e l f . . .There we see the creation of a privileged bureaucratic 
centralism, temporary transformation of the state into a 'force 
above society' .  (Some of the reasons for this are the fact 
that the U.S.S.R. was for a long timethe only socialist  count- * 
ry, that i t  was backward, surrounded by capitalism, that the 
masses had a relatively weak conscious role in the struggle 
for socialist  building and that there were relatively weak for­
eign and internal revolutionary forces) . . . 3
In November, Djilas published a series of art icles on 'Contemp­
orary Themes' which again dealt with 'the phenomenon and essence of the 
Soviet Union'. Djilas now claimed that rather than exhibiting a 'cr isis  
of socialism', the Soviet system was,
state capitalism.. .a restoration and counter revolution of a 
special type. . .  because i t  does not restore the old individual  ^
capi tal ist  ownership. . .  but state (in fact, capital ist)  ownership.
1 See Ernst Halperin, The Triumphant H e re tic ,[London, 1958), pp. 106-9.
2 Milovan Djilas, 'On New Roads to Socialism', Address delivered at 
the Pre-election Rally of Belgrade Students, March 18, 1950, 
(Belgrade, 1950), p. 10.
3 Ib id .,  pp. 12-13.
4 Quoted in A. Ross Johnson, The Transformation o f  Communist Ideology: 
The Yugoslav Case, (1945-1953),(Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p. 103.
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Djilas1 position here, as Trotsky could have explained to him, was 
incoherent. For while he called the Soviet system state capitalism: 
he had merely advanced from calling the bureaucracy a ruling stratum  
to calling i t  a ruling c a s te .  According to the tradition to which 
both Trotsky and Djilas belonged, however, either the f i r s t  characteriz 
ation must be inaccurate or the bureaucracy must be a c la s s .  But, as 
Trotsky's example also reveals, a Communist leader, even a heretical 
one, has the greatest difficulty in referring to post-revolutionary 
bureaucracy as a class. In an art icle entitled 'Class or Caste ?' 
published in April, 1952, Djilas explained the difficulty.  He recog­
nised, as Trotsky had, that the Soviet bureaucracy had accumulated 
many of the advantages of the traditional ruling classes: i t  had
exclusive control over production and distribution; i t  grabbed'the 
lion's share of the surplus for i tself 'and i t  lived at the expense 
of the 'direct  producers [who] have no r ights ' .  However, the 
bureaucracy was not a class, for ' i t  does not own the means of 
production in the traditional sense, because ownership is collective 
rather than individual' and because:
the individual cannot pass his position on to his progeny, 
nor indeed is his unique set of privileges necessarily passed 
on to anyone. For the bureaucracy does not reproduce i t se l f  
as a set of individuals, or as a set of positions. Rather, i t  
perpetuates i t s e l f  as a body, drawing its members both from 
its own ranks and from the peasantry and proletariat .  If we 
look at the bureaucracy in this light we can see that i t  
is a new historical phenomenon...
1 Milovan Djilas, Parts  o f  a L i fe t im e ,  ed. M. D. Milenkovitch, 
(New York, 1975), p-176.
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Since i t  is not a class, though i t  shares many of a class's
characteristics,  Djilas concludes that,
It must be something else, and that can only be a 
caste. The essential characteristic of a caste is 
that privileges of all kinds are accorded on the 
basis of functions performed, and not on the basis 
of ownership.
Like Trotsky, Djilas had no doubts about the importance of the
characterization one chose:
It is very important, both for us in Yugoslavia and 
for socialism in general, to be sure of the answer. If 
the bureaucracy were a new class, i ts victory could not 
be prevented; i t  would be inevitable because i t  is 
brought about by objective social processes. Thusi f  we 
were dealing here with a class, a new class, and not a 
caste, the struggle against the bureaucracy would be 
futi le and utopian, and we who fought against i t  would 
be comic, reactionary figures. But since the bureaucracy 
is not a class, but a reactionary antisocialist  tendency 
that appears in the transition from capitalism to 
Communism, the struggle against i t  £s revolutionary and 
progressive. And i t  can succeed...
Djilas's position was quickly challenged by two Yugoslav 
Communists, Zvonimir Kristi and Janez Stanovnik, who argued that as 
the collective owner of the means of production the bureaucracy was the 
Soviet Union's ruling class, that this had always been the case in the 
Soviet Union and that i t  had been the case in Yugoslavia before 1948. 
According to Kristi:
The emergence of a new class in the Soviet Union... 
was as important theoretically as polit ically.  I t  showed 
the necessity of a 'dialectical critique of Marx, expecially 
of his theory of the transition period and the dictatorship 
of the pro le ta r i a t ' , for there existed 'a separate^soci a l - 
economic system between capitalism and communism'.
1
2
3
Ib id . ,  pp.175-176.
Ibid, P. 177.
A. Ross Johnson, op. Git. ,  P'. 108.
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Djilas replied:
The truth which Marx affirmed.. .cannot lightly be 
ignored. He showed in Das Kapital that after capitalism 
and capitalists no new class can arise or come to power...
Even i f  we assume that Marx was wrong or that he could 
not see everything in advance, nevertheless the Marxist 
question remains: Is the formation of a new class on
the basis of not only the same forces of production but 
the same production relations (the exploitation of labor 
by capital) possible after the expropriation of the 
capital ists ? If that is possible, then why was the ,
expropriation of the bourgeoisie a historical inevi tabi l i ty. . .
Hitherto, Djilas had been a rather outspoken exponent of the
corporate Yugoslav attack on Moscow. I n ' 1953, he took the unprecedented step
of shifting his attack from the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia, and in a series
of art icles which led to his expulsion from the Party, he bit terly
attacked the atti tudes,  behaviour and mores of the Communist leadership
and insisted that the main danger was not the bourgeoisie or capitalism
but bureaucratic despotism of the Soviet type. His attack was replete
with bi t ter  characterizations of bureaucratic behaviour, snobbishness
and social exclusiveness, but while Djilas proposed a number of measures
to allow greater democracy, he s t i l l  contented himself with pointing to
the danger of bureaucratic perversion of the revolution and did'not suggest
that a new class had emerged.
2In The New Class , Djilas took this final step, a step Trotsky 
never took. In other ways, too, he went further in repudiating the 
movement to which he had given his l i fe than any other comparable Party' 
leader, including Trotsky. An index of how much further than Trotsky he 
chose to go, can be found by comparing what the two writers were referr­
ing to as 1 bureaucracy1. When Trotsky attacked the 'bureaucrats' who 
had betrayed the Revolution, he always distinguished between them and 
the p o li t ic a l  leaders such as himself, whose power had been usurped.
1
2
quoted in ib id , p. 109. 
(New York, 1957).
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For Djilas, on the other hand, the ruling bureaucracy was the 
political leadership, and all other strata,  including Burnham's
i
managers, were subordinate to i t .  In other respects, however, Djilas 
was quite orthodox. He was well aware that a class must be shown to 
own the means of production before i t  can be said to rule, and so he 
explained that:
As defined by Roman law, property constitutes the use, 
enjoyment, and disposition of material goods. The 
Communist political bureaucracy uses, enjoys, and disposes 
of nationalized property...
The new class obtains i ts power, privileges, ideology, 
and i ts customs from one specific form of ownership - 
collective ownership in which the class administers 
and distributes in the name of the nation and society. . .
To divest Communists of their ownership rights would be 
to abolish them as a class.
Lest anyone s t i l l  doubt that the bureaucracy is a ruling class, Djilas
shares Rizzi's confidence that the very excesses for which Communist
rulers have been responsible decide the issue, for:
If these parties had not at the same time been the 
beginning of new classes, and i f  they had not had a 
special historical role to play, obligatory ideolog­
ical unity could not have existed in them. Except 
for the Communist bureaucracy, not a single class or 
party in modern history has attained complete ideol­
ogical unity. None had, before, the task of trans­
forming all of society, mostly through political 
and administrative means. For such a task, a complete, 
fanatical confidence in the righteousness and nobility 
of their views is necessary. Such a task calls for 
exceptional brutal measures against other ideologies 
and social groups. I t  also calls for ideological 
monopoly over ^ociety and for absolute unity of the 
ruling class.
Indeed, while the class had exercised dreadful tyranny over those whom 
i t  ruled, i t ,  too, had a historic ' task ' ,  though hardly the one predicted 
by Marx. It  had to introduce modern industry to the less developed East. 
And Djilas occasionally cuts across the outrage he feels by insisting 
that 'one reason for total tyranny is historical; the people were forced
1
2
3
See op. c i t .  3 pp. 42-43. 
Ib id , pp. 44-45.
Ib id , pp. 76-77.
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to undergo the loss of freedom in the i r r e s i s t i b l e  drive toward 
economic change!*
Dji1 as is par t i cular ly  interes t ing because he ran the whole
2
course from orthodoxy to heresy and, a f t e r  The New Class3 to apostasy.
One need not, however, be as po l i t i ca l l y  eminent, nor move as far ,  as 
Dji las,  to adopt a new class analysis.  For dissidents within communist 
s t a t es ,  and for Marxists elsewhere who are disi l lusioned with the progress 
of such s t a te s ,  a new class analysis requires an i n i t i a l  doctrinal  
heresy, but thereaf ter  can be readi ly combined with the categories and 
inte l lectual  baggage which l ie  to hand. I t  is thus not surpr ising,
'no accident ' ,  that  wri ters as diverse as the dissident  American 
Trotskyis t ,  Max Shachtman, the Poles, Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski 
and the Yugoslav philosopher Svetozar Stojanovic’, should exhibi t  s t r iking 
s imi l a r i t i e s  not merely in the form but also in the substance of the i r
3
analyses.  Like Trotsky, these authors i n s i s t  that  the October Revolution 
was a workers'  revolut ion,  but they go on to argue that  bureaucratic
1 • Ib id ,  p. 98.
2 In his The Unperfect Society. Beyond the New Class3 (London, 1969), 
Djilas argues that  the Communist system const i tutes a refutat ion of 
his tor ical  materialism. See pp. 101-02 and 125.
3 Shachtman was leader,  i n i t i a l l y  with Burnham,of a group of American 
Trotskyists who broke with Trotsky and the majority wing of American 
Trotskyists in 1940. He took with him the Party journal ,  The New 
In terna tiona l3 and his a r t i c l e s  on the Soviet Union appeared there 
until  the close of the magazine in 1958. These a r t i c l e s  have been 
collected in Max Shachtman, The Bureaucratic Revolution: The Rise o f  
the S ta l in is t  S ta te_, (New York, 1962). Kuron and Modzelewski 
published t he i r  ‘Open Letter  to Communist Party Members' in 1965, 
a f t e r  having been expelled from the Party in November of the previous 
year.  They were brought to t r i a l  in July,  1965, and sentenced to 
several years '  imprisonment. Their Open Letter is included in 
George Lavan Weissman, ed. ,  Revolutionary Marxist Students in  Roland 
Speak Out (1964-1968), { New York, 1972). Kuron is again active 
po l i t i c a l l y  and is a prominent member of the Committee for Workers' 
Defence (KOR). Stojanovic was l a t e r  a member of the ‘Belgrade Eight ' .  
His analysis is contained in 'The S t a t i s t  Myth of Social ism' ,
Between Ideals and R ea lity3 (New York, 1973), pp. 37-75.
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degeneration led to the installation of a new ruling class; Stojanovic, 
for example, explains that the October Revolution was a ' social is t  revolution 
par excellence, although a new form of class, s ta t i s t  society was born 
with Stalinism'1 2. Shachtman, constantly wrestling with Trotsky's ghost, 
developed an ingenious argument to solve the problem of ownership. The 
capi tal is t ,  he explained has individual property rights in the means of 
production, from which his power derives, and he therefore does not always 
need immediate control over the political apparatus. The proletarian, on 
the other hand, since he has no property rights, only comes to own the 
means of production through his control of the state; deprive him of that 
and he has nothing. Kuron and Modzelewski and Stojanovid are less 
bothered by the problem of bureaucratic ownership than Shachtman; like
Rizzi, they stress that i t  is collective rather than individual,
and that such ownership is not unprecedented.
Shachtman makes another distinction which is very often echoed
by those new class theorists who remain socialists:  that between property
relations and property forms. Trotsky, Shachtman argued, was beguiled
by the property forms in the Soviet Union - state ownership - but ignored
the real relationships between groups, which had changed completely,
notwithstanding these forms, since 1918:
...what Trotsky called the political rule of the working 
class was actually i ts class rule; - tViis had been brought 
to an end by the counter-revolution of the Stal inist  bureaucracy - 
roughly in the period between 1933 and 1936 - which established 
new property relations while retaining more or less intact 
the old property forms ( i .e.  state property) and thereby set 
up a new, reactionary, hitherto unprecedented state with a 
new ruling class. 2
1 Stojanovic, op. c i t . 3 p. 38.
2 New In terna tiona l3 September, 1942, p. 237.
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Kuron and Modzelewski similarly distinguish between state and
what they call s o c ia l  ownership:
...The concept of state property can conceal different 
social, contents, depending on the class character of 
the s t a t e . ..
State ownership of the means of production is only a 
property form, the property belongs to the social groups 
controlling the s t a t e . . .Political power is the power over 
the process of production and distribution.
And Stojanovic, ostensibly writing of the Soviet Union, also explains
that:
So long as the new state apparatus represents the interests of 
the working class and the labouring masses as a whole, Marxists 
can consider the system built  upon these foundations to be 
socialist  (more specifically, state socialist) .  However, 
i t  is well known that the state apparatus, from i ts  very 
inception has a second tendency as well - to emancipate i t se l f  
from society, to become its master and to give the pursuit 
of i ts  own interests priority over all others. When this indeed 
does happen, in my opinion, i t  is no Jonger possible to speak of 
s ta te  s o c ia l is m , but only of s ta tis m .
All of these writers agree that the system they cri t icize is no
longer'genuine‘ socialism and has outlived i t s ' historical '  purpose - to
force industrialization. I t  is now an exploitative system destined to
fall and to be replaced by genuine socialist  relations of production.
According to Kuron and Modzelewski, who are particularly mechanistic in
this regard, the bureaucracy's ' task ' ,  and therefore i ts 'class goal' was
to increase production, at the expense of consumption. Beyond a certain
level of productivity, however:
Keeping production as the goal of production after the 
construction of the industrial base has been completed - 
under conditions of industrial 'saturation' - c rea te s  a
c o n tra d ic tio n  between the  a lready developed^ in d u s tr ia l  
ca p a c ity  and the  low le v e l  o f  consumption.
1 Kuron and Modzelewski, op. c i t . 3 P .  18.
2 Stojanovic^, op. c i t . 3 p. 43.
3 Kuron and Modzelewski, op. c i t . 3 p. 43.
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The result of this contradiction will be economic crisis 
within the existing system, and the result of that is predicted in 
familiar terms:
This general crisis of social relations flows from the 
fact that the productive relations, on which the power of 
the bureaucracy is based, have become an obstacle to the 
development of the economy and the source of i ts  cr isis ,  
and that all segments of society are without hope of 
progress or of satisfying their minimum class interests 
within the framework of the system. Thus, no more than 
the economic crisis can be overcome on the basis of present 
productive relations, can the general social crisis be 
overcome within the framework of present social relations, 
which only aggravate the cr is is ;  i t  can be overcome only 
by the abolition of the prevailing production and social 
relationships. The only road to progress is through rev­
olution . 1
3 Marxism and Theories of the New Class
The analyses which I have discussed clearly differ from each 
other in many ways. In particular,  there are sharp differences over the 
nature of the groups which make up the new class. One line of such 
theories, deriving originally from Bakunin and Machajski, suggests that 
the source of the new class's distinctiveness is i ts education and training; 
this strongly Saint-Simonian claim lies at the heart of 'technocratic'  
new class theories and is a strong element in the 'managerial' thesis.
Within this line, however, one would have to distinguish sharply between 
two sub-strands. On the one hand, Saint-Simon, many 'new-skilled class'  
Marxists and, for that matter, convergence theorists in general, tend to 
argue that the skilled owe their positions to industrial and technological 
developments in modern society which have occurred independently of their 
will or their plans. In Bakunin and Machajski, on the other hand, the
1 Ibidj p . 68.
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story is altogether more vo lun ta r is t :  Marxists in te n d  to make over
the state to serve th e i r  in te res ts ,  and they must be opposed.
A second l ine  of new class theory, of which Trotsky is an 
important precursor, suggests a new class which has l i t t l e  in common 
with the in te l le c tua ls  attacked by Bakunin and Machajski; the las t  
accusation which Trotsky would have made against Sta l in  is that he led 
a despotism o f  the in te l le c tu a ls  1 This l ine  draws on the r ich and 
almost wholly bad associations of the word 'bureaucrat1: pervasive, 
p a ra s i t ic ,  thugs, power-wielders, administrators of  a brutal and wholly 
unimaginative kind. This l ine  usual ly stresses the power and control 
posi t ion of  the new class v is -a -v is  the masses rather than the i r  
i n t r i n s i c  sources of d is t inct iveness. Again th is  l ine  has i t s  vo luntar is ts  
and those who, l i ke  D j i 1 as and Kuron and Modzelewski, believed that th is  
class o r ig in a l l y  had a h is to r ic  task to perform. Among the voluntar is ts  
there are some who bel ieve that establ ishing the new class was the aim  
of Lenin and his fo l lowers , though th is  accusation comes usual ly and 
more readi ly  from outside the t ra d i t io n  altogether. New class theoris ts  
more usually argue that there was an unforeseen degeneration, that the 
revolut ion had been betrayed by a r is ing  class of power-hungry 
bureaucrats.
These two l ines - the ' technocratic* and the 'bureaucratic '  - 
can also be interwoven, as they are in Laurat's suggestions, which Stojanovic 
repeats, that 'bureaucrats' form the f i r s t  stage of  the r ise of  the new 
class, and then give way to ' technocrats ' .
Given these and other dif ferences between new class theor is ts ,  
the amount they have in common is a l l  the more s t r i k in g .  They a l l  pick 
out a group of power - or ski 11-wielders and a l l  i n s i s t  tha t ,  although 
Marx did not predic t the importance of th is  group, i t  has now become 
dominant. They a l l  claim that the group with which they are concerned
has displaced e i ther  or both of the protagonists in Marx's h is to r ica l
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drama: all agree that i t  has displaced the proletariat in the 
socialist  states,  and those who claim to detect the convergence of 
capitalism and communism argue that i t  has dispossessed, or is in the 
process of dispossessing, capitalists in the capital ist  states. Finally, 
and most important of a l l ,  they are all convinced that the group on 
which they focus is a c la s s  which owns or threatens to own the means 
of production, and that this matters; that only classes can rule a 
society, and that the group they discuss is a ruling class.
It  is not surprising that concepts such as ' bureaucracy‘ and 
' technocracy1 should have been prominent in new class theories. The 
massive twentieth century growth of bureaucratic personnel, on the 
one hand, and the increasing importance of those with training and 
technical ski l ls ,  on the other, are crucially important developments 
in modern societies. Orthodox Marxists frequently underplay the 
significance of such developments, by comparison with the alleged 
importance of capitalists and proletarians; disenchanted Marxists, used 
to emphasizing the importance of large-scale social groupings, are well 
placed to notice and draw attention to such developments.
I t  is not obvious, however, that a n a ly s is  is aided by a det­
ermination to identify a society's ruling class, old or new. Where analysis 
requires careful distinctions between power-wielders and executors, 
leaders and led, power and indispensability, new class analysis tends 
to blur these crucial distinctions. It can also serve to overemphasize 
the importance and power of the designated group, at the expense of forces 
which f i t  such theories less well, such as individuals or small groups of 
political power-holders. As we saw in the preceding chapter, for example, 
vis-a-vis the Russian population in the 1930s, the Russian 'bureaucracy! 
had awesome power; vis-a-vis Stalin, millions of 'bureaucrats' discovered 
after 1937, i t  had distinctly less. Within the bureaucracy i t se l f ,  Burnham's
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technical managers were fa r  less powerful than the i r  p o l i t i c a l  masters.
In the face of the d ive rs i ty  of'new class' theor ies, and the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  they face, what, then, accounts fo r  th e i r  persistence and 
the vocabulary and preoccupations which they so manifest ly share ?
R izz i 's  often repeated charge of  plagiarism against Burnham can be 
quickly dismissed. I t  is un l ike ly  to be true of Burnham - Rizz i,  for  
example, had very l i t t l e  to say about changes w i t h i n  the modern 
corporation - and i t  ce r ta in ly  cannot be generalized to other new class 
theor is ts .  Very few people have been able to obtain, l e t  alone, read, 
R izz i 's  book, and, with the exception of his discussion of  the Soviet 
Union, they have missed l i t t l e .  Another suggestion which has been pressed 
strongly in the case of  the early Yugoslav c r i t ique  of  Stal inism, is that 
the Yugoslavs, and one might argue, m u ta t is  m u tand is3 l a te r  heret ics such 
as the Chinese, have taken up Trotsky's arguments, fo r  as Plamenatz puts 
i t  wel1:
He has forged weapons that no l ibe ra l  could use e f fe c t i v e ly ,  
but they are ready to hand fo r  every communist who quarrels 
with Moscow. The Yugoslavs are already using them;and they 
won't ijjse them the less f ree ly  because they denounce th e i r  
maker.
This seems to me to catch a good deal of  the t ru th ,  but i t  does not 
explain 'new class' analyses which preceded Trotsky's arguments or the 
special importance that Trotsky himself and those who argued with him 
attached to those arguments. Moreover, in the Yugoslav case i t s e l f ,  i t -  
is not clear that the protagonists had read or were influenced by Trotsky's 
wri t ings
1 o p . o i t . , .p.55. See also Roy Macridis, 'Stal in ism and the Meaning 
of  T i to ism ' ,  W orld  P o l i t i c s 3 Vol . 4, 1951-52, p p .235-37.
2 Milovan D j i las ,  P a r ts  o f  a L i f e t im e } p.19. and A. Ross Johnson, 
op. c i t . , p . 237.
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More recently, i t  has been argued that new class theories are
adopted in an attempt to influence revolutionary action, that
these theories should be assessed primarily in terms 
of their expressive and mobilizing functions, and as 
a protest against patterns of social organization which 
are assumed in other theories of industrial society. In 
terms of the Marxist theory of history i t  obviously makes 
more sense to symbolize relations of dominance as class 
relations than to attempt to mobilize the masses against 
abstractions such as ' bureaucratic deformat ions1-
This 'expressive1 element certainly has been important in many new class 
theories, but i t  seems to me that i t  is only one use among several to 
which such theories can be put, rather than an explanation for them.
Trotsky and, for some years, Djilas re s is te d  calling the bureaucracy a 
class precisely because they believe that classes are borne by objective 
historical forces, that they have historical ' tasks'  to perform, and that 
resistance to a 'new class'  would be fut i le.  Again, except for the pen­
ultimate chapter, which contradicts the arguments of the whole of the book, 
Rizzi used his 'new class'  analysis to argue that 'bureaucratic collectivism' 
was inevitable and should not be resisted by workers, even in Italy and 
Germany; only capitalists because they were obsolete, and Jews because 
they were capital ists ,  should be. Nor did Burnham draw revolutionary lessons 
from his analysis.
New-class theories can be used for a variety of purposes, though often 
and within Communist countries necessarily, they will be used by opponents of 
the existing rulers. But their common features do not stem from the uses 
to which they are put. Rather they share what they do because they are a 
natural, though not the only possible, way in which a Marxist heretic can 
analyze a society, especially one with growing numbers of 'bureaucrats' and 
‘technocrats' ,  from within a tradition which provides a restricted range of 
fundamental categories.
1. Marian Sawer, 'Theories of the New Class from Bakunin to Kuron and
Modzelewski: The Morphology of Permanent Protest ' in Marian Sawer,
(ed) ’ op. o i t .  , p.  13.
PART FIVE
CONCLUSION
EIGHT
MARXISM AND BUREAUCRACY
Terms which are used in t h e o r e t i c a l  d iscuss ion ,  polemic and 
popular t a l k ,  commonly have f a i r l y  'open t e x t u r e ' :  i t  is  f r e q u e n t l y  d i f f ­
i c u l t  to d i s t i n g u i s h  the meanings o f  such terms from those o f  others  
dea l ing w i th  r e la te d  phenomena, and a s in g le  term can be used in  a v a r i e t y  
o f  senses. This i s  m a n i fe s t l y  t rue  o f  ' bureaucracy ' .  As we have seen,
throughout i t s  h i s t o r y  the term has been p e c u l i a r l y  m a l leab le ,  useful  in 
polemic and on ly  w i th  d i f f i c u l t y  dusted down and imported i n t o  the 'va lue -  
f r e e '  academy. I t  i s  r i c h  in a s s o c ia t io n s ,  both f o r  those who have used 
i t  and f o r  those to  whom they appeal . The te rm 's  t e x tu re  has not ' c losed '  
p e rc e p t i b l y  in recent  years nor w i l l  i t ,  so long as bureaucrac ies evolve,  
and remain impor tant  fea tu res  o f  modern s ta tes .
I t  would be unwise to  d iscard  the term as too vague, or  too 
c lu t t e r e d  w i th  d i f f e r e n t  meanings, to  be i n t e r e s t i n g .  On the one hand, 
a w r i t e r ' s  concept ion o f  bureaucracy and i t s  r o le  o f ten  re v e a ls ,  l i k e  a 
k ind o f  Rorschach t e s t ,  as much about the w r i t e r ' s  thought or  about the 
t r a d i t i o n  w i t h in  which he w r i t e s  as i t  does about the phenomena w i th  
which he purpo r ts  to  dea l .  On the o ther  hand, un l ik e  b lo t s  o f  in k ,  the 
va r ious phenomena to which the term has been app l ied ,  are o f  profound 
importance in  modern s o c i e t i e s .  The percept iveness and accuracy o f  what 
a w r i t e r  has to  say about ' bureaucracy ' i s ,  consequent ly,  o f  more than 
psycho log ica l  i n t e r e s t .
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I Bureaucracy: From Marx to Theorists of the New Class.
It  is obvious, merely from a glance at the writings discussed 
in this thesis,  that there is no single, comprehensive, 'Marxist' attitude 
to, or analysis of, bureaucracy. Moreover, though they are hardly a 
random or uninfluential sample, the authors I have discussed certainly 
do not exhaust the field. However, their Marxism is not a cloak worn 
lightly and easily discarded, nor is i t  merely a fashionable pose.
They all belong, or belonged, to a tradition which regarded Marx's thought 
as i ts source, a tradition which, though i t  allowed a fair  amount of 
tampering and reinterpretation, took this source as quite unparalleled in 
insight and authority and was profoundly influenced by i t .  This common 
lineage has led to the recurrence of certain preoccupations, limitations 
and difficult ies in their views of society and polit ics;  and though there 
are, of course, many 'Marxisms', I do not consider i t  likely, or even 
very plausible, that these recurrent patterns find no reflection or re­
petition in the thought of other writers deeply influenced by Marx.
As we have seen, the concept of bureaucracy did not play a 
primary role in Marx's own analysis of contemporary society; in his 
portrayal of the future society, i t  was altogether swept from the stage.
By the time we come to Trotsky and the new class theorists,  there has been 
a striking about-face: bureaucracy has come to play a central and u l t i ­
mately the central role. Marx contemptuously, if  not convincingly, 
dismissed Bakunin's arguments in Statism  and Anarchy, but Marx never 
became involved in long and agonizing debates over the precise role and 
social character of bureaucracy in pre- and post-revolutionary society. 
Some of his successors were ultimately interested in l i t t l e  else.
One obvious reason for this shift  in emphasis is that the world 
has changed. Bureaucratic institutions and personnel, i t  need no longer 
be argued, are more prominent and their effects more pervasive than they
were in nineteenth-century Europe, or Russia, and no broadly conceived 
social and political theory which lef t  them out of account could now be 
taken seriously. I t  might be argued, then, that Marxists have simply 
responded to these changes, that they have merely had to look around them 
to realize that bureaucracy now required closer attention than earl ier 
Marxists had given i t .
This suggestion, which focuses on the facts outside the theory 
rather than the theory i t se l f ,  is plausible, yet i t  leaves a good deal 
out of account. First of a l l ,  i t  says nothing of the co n tin u in g  reluct­
ance of many Marxists to give a central place to bureaucracy in their 
analysis of society: i f  'heretical '  Marxists seize on the importance of
bureaucracy in the modern world, 'orthodox' Marxists have traditionally 
not done so.
Marxists have been well aware of the existence, and some have 
stressed the importance, of state institutions and personnel. Apart from
the fact that Marx wrote a fair  amount about these matters, had he not 
considered ' bureaucracy' incompatible with socialism, he would not have
come to insist  that i t  be smashed. Yet, the following passages from
the contemporary Marxist, Nicos Poulantzas, though verging on caricature 
and at this time of day slightly bizarre, are not devoid of basis in 
Marx's own writings on capital ist  society:
By power, we shall designate the  ca p acity  o f  a s o c ia l  
c la ss  to  r e a l i z e  i t s  s p e c i f i c  o b je c t iv e  i n t e r e s t s . 1
. . .  The various social institutions,  in particular the 
institutions of the state,  do not, s t r ict ly speaking, have 
any power. Institutions,  considered from the point of view 
of power, can be related only to s o c ia l  c la sse s  which ho ld  
power. . . 2
Marx and Engels adopt an unvarying theoretical line on 
this problem: this relative autonomy of the bureaucracy 
from the dominant classes is absolutely and exhaustively 
determined by the relations between the capital ist  state 
and the class struggle. Since the bureaucracy has no 
power of i ts  own, i ts  relative autonomy is none other than
1. Nicos Poulantzas, o p . c i t . ,  p.104.
2. Ib id ,  p . 115
that which devolves on this state in the power relations 
of the class struggle; state power is held by classes, 
since the state is in fact only a power centreJ
Göran Therborn has recently argued, on similar lines, that ' the state
as such has no power; i t  is an institution where social power is con-
centrated and exercised'. Much of this argument follows from
Poulantzas' in i t ia l ,  explicitly stipulative,  definition of 'power'.
But the stipulation is not theoretically innocent, nor is i t  simply
a travesty of Marx's thought on class or bureaucracy.
Again, when one considers how confident Marxists were that
bureaucracy would not be required after the revolution, the following
remark of Isaac Deutscher, whose Marxism survived every discouragement,
has considerable force:
As I looked through some of the classical Marxist 
writings on bureaucracy I was struck by how relatively 
optimistically - one might say 1ightmindedly - 
Marxists approached the problem.3
This 'lightmindedness', I have argued, is not confined to Marxists: 
Saint-Simon, who was far more explicitly and perceptively concerned with 
the imperatives of administration than Marx was, shared i t .  On the other 
hand, as Weber demonstrated, one did not need the experience of Stalinism 
to dispel i t .  The condition i t sel f  deserves some comment, for i t  did 
not die with Marx, nor was i t  without consequence for subsequent attempts 
by Marxists to analyze bureaucracy in both 'capi tal is t '  and ' social ist '  
societies.
Thirdly, i t  is also significant that those Marxists who have 
sought to give prominence to powerful bureaucracies in their theory 
have not found i t  an easy matter. On the contrary, for many Marxists,
1. Ib id 3 p . 351.
2. Göran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class Do When i t  Rules ?3
(London, 1978), p.132.
3. Isaac Deutscher, 'The Roots of Bureaucracy' in Marxism in  Our Time3 
(London, 1972), p.196.
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the attempt to find a central role for bureaucracy has burst apart 
commitments and beliefs which hitherto had appeared interconnected and 
compatible, i f  i t  has not cast them adrif t  altogether. In this context 
i t  is not at all accidental that, as Albrow noticed, 'a theoretical 
dispute over bureaucracy has so often been the ostensible reason for 
many partings of the way in the Communist world - between Bolsheviks 
and Mensheviks, Trotsky and Stalin, Stalin and Tito, Tito and Djilas';^ 
the l i s t  could, of course, be extended.
Finally, and in the light of the foregoing, paradoxically, 
the increased importance of bureaucracy in contemporary society does not 
by i t se l f  account for the overemphasis on the concept which one finds 
in the writings of people such as Trotsky, Rizzi and many other new- 
class theorists.  While i t  would be foolish indeed to consider the career 
of ' bureaucracy1 within Marxism in vacuo} i t  would be equally foolish 
to attempt any such consideration without attending to the logic of the 
theory i t se l f ,  to gaps within i t ,  and to constraints which i t  imposes.
2 Marxism, Bureaucrats and Bureaux
A number of contemporary Marxists have recognized, and some 
are seeking to rectify,  the lack of a highly developed theory of politics 
within Marxism. Colletti ,  for example, calls on Marxists to 'realize 
that Marx's own discussion on the State never developed very far! and 
he has sought 'to draw attention to a particular fact - the weakness 
and sparse development of political theory in Marxism . . .  the political 
movement inspired by Marxism has been virtually innocent of political .
1. Albrow, o p .c i t . j  p.78.
theory'. Miliband, similar ly, has pointed out that:
i t  is as well to recognise that . . .  'the corpus of Marxism' 
has very definite l imitations in terms of the construction 
or reconstruction of a Marxist poli t ics - one of these 
l imitations is that available classical writings are simply 
si lent or extremely perfunctory over major issues of poli t ics 
and pol i t ica l  theory: there is a l im i t  to v/hat can properly
be squeezed out of a paragraph, a phrase, an allusion or a 
metaphor.2
The absence of a highly developed Marxist theory of po l i t ics ,  
and the d i f f icu l t ies  and obscurities of such theories as exist, are general 
problems, and stem from a variety of sources. Among these sources, 
one is especially important for our theme, for i t  is central not merely 
to the revolutionary aspirations of Marxists but to Marxist social 
theory generally and to Marxist consideration of bureaucracy in particular. 
This is the emphasis on what are regarded as the sources of poli t ical 
arrangements. A fundamental, almost defining element of Marx's 
thought is the insistence that po l i t ica l  and administrative arrangements 
cannot be successfully analyzed or understood in isolation from their 
socio-economic context. This claim is, of course, not unique to 
Marxism: Saint-Simon made i t  and, though some writers have disputed
1. Lucio Co l le t t i ,  'A Polit ical and Philosophical Interview',
New L e ft Review, no.86, pp.14-15.cf Norberto Bobbio, ' Is There 
a Marxist Theory of the State?', Telos no.35, Spring 1978, 
pp. 5-16; Ernesto Laclau 'The Specif icity of the po l i t ica l :  
the Poul antzas-Mi 1 iband Debate', Ecoyiomy and Socie ty , vol . 4, 
1975, p.87; Gdran Therborn^ What does the R uling  Class Do When 
i t  Rules ?, chapter 1 .
2. Ralph Miliband, Marxism and P o l i t ic s ,  (Oxford, 1977), p.2.
this, i t  was also central to Max Weber's social and political theory. 
There is nothing inherently 'vulgar' about the claim; on the contrary, 
one of the most salutary features of Marxism is the attention i t  draws 
to the powerful and pervasive influence of context in specific areas of 
social l i fe ,  such as polit ics,  law and administration. One has only to 
read the myopic writings of so much of 'organization theory', for example, 
or pick at random a text on the law of property or contract, to feel 
grateful for the Marxist reminder that no institutions exist or develop 
in a social vacuum.
1
1. Weber has been criticized by a number of authors influenced by 
Althusser for working within a 'problematic of the subject ' ,  that 
is ,  for focusing on the motives and actions of social actors. To 
Althusser, on the other hand,
the true 'subjects'  (in the sense of constitutive subjects 
of the process) are . . .  not these occupants or functionaries 
[individual capi tal is ts] ,  are not, despite all appearances, 
the 'obviousness' of the 'given' of naive anthropology,
'concrete individuals' ,  'real men' - but the d e fin itio n  and 
d is tr ib u tio n  o f these places and fu n c tio n s. The true ’subjects ' 
are these defin e rs  and d is tr ib u to rs : the re la tions o f  pro­
duction. (L. Althusser and E. Bali bar, Reading Capital3 
(London, 1970), p.180).
This criticism seems to me to be completely misplaced. One does 
not have to choose between these two 'problematics' . If one is not 
a structural or an economic determinist one can pay due regard to 
the social and economic order in which individuals act without dis­
regarding them as actors, and this is precisely what Weber does in 
his discussions of the 'iron cage' of capitalism, in his pre­
occupation with social relations in Economy and Society (See John 
Rex, 'Typology and objectivity: a comment on Weber's four socio­
logical methods' in Arun Sahay (ed.) Max Weber and Modem Sociology, 
(London, 1971), p.27 and in the following passage which Turner 
quotes from Economy and Society:
Industrialization was not impeded by Islam as the religion of 
individuals . . .  but by the religiously determined structure 
of the Islamic s ta te s , their officialdom and their jurisprudence.
(EaS3 vol. 3, p.1095, quoted in Bryan S. Turner 'The Structuralist 
critique of Weber's sociology', B ritish  Journal o f  Sociology, vol.28, 
1977, p.10). Turner argues that Weber was inconsistent and vaci l lat ­
ed between both problematics, but quite apart from what Weber said  
he was doing in his early methodological essays, in what he actually 
wrote in social theory, I do not see that he needed to, or should 
have made, a choice.
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In broad terms, then, a reminder of the importance of 
context in human a f fa i r s  is unexceptionable. In Marxism, however, 
i t  has rare ly  remained a mere reminder, nor has i t  been cast in 
broad terms. Marxists have been convinced that a speci f ic  part of 
the context is more important than other parts, and that the context, 
thus l im i ted ,  is more worthy of close attention than, say, the 
internal imperatives, constra in ts , or avai lable a l te rnatives among 
legal and administrat ive arrangements. This ordering of p r io r i t i e s  
has frequently had the e f fec t  of d i rec t ing  Marxists'  a t tention to 
social forces which other theoris ts  have ignored or underplayed; i t  
has, on the other hand, also led to certa in recurrent theoretical  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  and l im i ta t io n s .
In approaching these problems, i t  might be useful to recal l  
and dis t inguish two foc i  of a ttention of wr i ters  on 'bureaucracy1 
which have been prominent almost since the term was coined: one
is o f f i c i a l s ;  the other is in s t i t u t io n a l  and organizational structures 
and arrangements. Marxists, and not only they, have f a i r l y  ind iscr iminate ly  
used ' bureaucracy' to re fer  to e i ther  or both. When, fo r  example,
Marx and Lenin ins isted that the ex is t ing state must be 'smashed', they 
l e f t  unclear whether they meant that the ex is t ing forms of organization, 
ex is t ing records, f i l e s  and procedures, were simply to be done away 
wi th , or whether a l l  ex is t ing personnel were to be sacked, or both. These 
are quite d is t in c t  choices, and a lo t  might depend on which of the three' 
is u l t imate ly  adopted. In exposit ion, i t  would be pedantic and not 
especial ly i l lum ina t ing  repeatedly to in s i s t  on d is t inc t ions  which were 
simply not being made. Let us, however, look now at bureaucrats and 
la te r  at bureaux.
( i ) Bureaucrats, Classes and P o l i t i ca l  El i tes
In large part ,  as we have seen, the secondary ro le which Marx
a t t r ibu ted  to bureaucrats was derived from the convict ion,  which he
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shared with Adam Smith, Saint-Simon and much of nineteenth-century 
liberalism, that the motor of social and economic change lay outside 
the state,  in the activi t ies and clashes of social classes. The 
Bonapartist state, pathologically powerful though i t  was, nevertheless 
served the interests of the bourgeoisie. 'Asiatic'  society lacked 
class struggle and was dominated by an omnipotent state: i t  was 
therefore stat ic ,  bereft of internal mechanisms for development, i ts 
'Chinese walls' destined to collapse before the 'heavy ar t i l lery '  
of the European bourgeoisie.
Marx's conviction that social classes are pre-eminent in society, 
that where they exist the state is necessarily subordinate to them, and 
where they are lacking society is s tat ic ,  had two important effects on 
later Marxist thought about bureaucracy. Firstly, though Marxists might 
revile bureaucracy and bureaucrats as much and as fiercely as anarchists 
did, they did not regard them as c e n tr a l ly  important elements of 
contemporary social structures. The existence of powerful bureaucracies 
might raise important tactical or even strategic considerations for 
revolutionaries, just  as the fact that one's opponents have r if les rather 
than sabres might affect one's plans. On the view that the basic 
constituents of, and opponents in, society are social classes, however, 
their 'weapons' can be regarded as secondary in theoretical importance; 
bureaucrats' m asters  are far more important than the bureaucrats themselves. 
This kind of sentiment was nicely expressed by Aneurin Bevan, in 
another context and with a quite different analogy, during the Suez 
cr isis:  Bevan stopped questioning the Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd,
when Anthony Eden appeared in the House, and he remarked, 'why should 
I question the monkey when I can question the organ grinder?' .
It is important to make clear what I am n o t claiming here. Many 
contemporary Marxists have sought to demonstrate that Marx was not vulgar, 
that his view of the relationship between social classes and bureaucracy 
was not 'mechanistic'. Marx, i t  is stressed, did not regard bureaucrats
as completely passive and obedient instruments of a ruling class. He 
had a subtle and sophisticated conception of the relationships within 
and between social classes themselves, and between social classes and 
the state. This is all true. One can point to several passages in 
Marx's works which are not particularly sophisticated, but there is 
little doubt that in a number of writings, in particular, the 18th 
Brumaire, Marx developed a very complex version of historical materialism, 
one in which, to say the least, the state was regarded as having a great 
deal of room in which to transact the business of the ruling class.
However, for someone interested in Marxist analyses of bureaucracy, the 
question of precisely what view Marx had of the relationship between 
classes and bureaucracies is not very important. For even on the most 
complicated 'orthodox' accounts of this relationship, bureaucracy still, 
except in brief situations of crisis, serves classes, at least 'in the 
last instance'. If one's concern is with those who actually or potent­
ially call the tune, and if one believes that, however strong or intelligent 
they might be, monkeys cannot replace organ grinders, then one has little 
cause to be concerned with them. Marxists have had a great deal to say 
about economic classes, and, more recently, much to say about the nature 
of the links between classes and the state. Only in extremis, however, 
have they turned their full attention to analysis of the state and of 
officials.
A second result of the Marxist emphasis on classes is evident in 
the writingsof those Marxists, such as Trotsky and the new class theorists, 
who have paid special attention to bureaucracy. Their worry is that if 
monkeys really do appear to have supplanted organ grinders, then perhaps 
they really are organ grinders. Thus Trotsky, the new class theorists., 
and the theorists of 'state capitalism', notwithstanding their many 
disagreements, are involved in the same, somewhat limiting enterprise.
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They are not concerned to question whether major social and economic
changes must be associated with the rule of mass social groupings, or
whether only one kind  of social grouping can cause such changes. The
special emphasis which they give to phenomena such as the growth in
numbers and importance of bureaucrats,  managers, or technocrats,
then, stems ul t imately from the same source as Marx's rela t ive  lack
of emphasis on such phenomena: the conception of history as basically
the arena of class struggles.
I t  is unfortunate that  so much Marxist discussion of
bureaucracy has been directed along one or other of these two rather
narrow paths. On the one hand, the assumption that  bureaucracies
must serve the in teres ts  of a ruling class is untestable in many of
the forms in which i t  is presented, and par t i cular ly  in Engels' rel iance,
popular once again, on ' the l as t  ins tance ' .  Where i t  is presented in
tes table  form, there is no reason to believe that  i t  is t rue.  One
might, of course,  often discover that  bureaucracies serve the
in te res ts  of economically dominant classes ,  and Marx's analysis of
Bonapartism shows b r i l l i an t l y  how this might be the case even when
i t  is not immediately apparent. But there is no reason to assume i t :
other plausible analyses of Bonapartism, for example, which give
more weight to s t r i c t l y  p o li t ic a l  reasons for Louis Napoleon's
success, are possible,^ and, more generally,  the claim that
bureaucracies are typical ly obliged to serve economically powerful
classes is less axiomatic than many Marxists appear to believe.  Though
Karl Popper simplifies a l i t t l e ,  his conclusion remains apposite:
He [Marx] and the Marxists see economic power everywhere.
Their argument runs: he who has the money has the power;
for  i f  necessary, he can buy guns and even gangsters.  But 
this is a roundabout argument. In fact  i t  contains an 
admission that  the man who has the gun has the power. And 
i f  he who has the gun becomes aware of t h i s ,  then i t  
may not be long before he has both the gun and the money.
1 cf.  Raymond Aron, Main Currents in  Sociological Thought, vol . 1,
(Harmondsworth, 1965) pp.246-60.
2 The Open Society and i t s  Enemies, (London, 1966), vol. 2, p . 12 7.
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On the other hand, insistence on the pre-eminence of classes 
and the need to identify a ruling class, is something of a strai t jacket 
even when attempts arc made to accommodate the importance of new social 
groups. As I argued with regard to Trotsky and the new class theorists,  
social groups whose importance is obvious and fairly novel, such as 
1 bureaucrats1, 'managers' and ' technocrats' ,  can often be taken, through 
a ' redirection' of the Marxist focus on social classes, to 
constitute a new ruling class in situations where their importance is not 
equivalent to power, and where more tradit ional,  quite unSaint-Simonian 
forms of power, such as sacking, gaoling, imposition of exile, or 
execution, retain their effectiveness.
The f i r s t  half of the twentieth century has in a real sense 
been dominated by bureaucrats; their numbers and functions have grown 
at unprecedented rates. The second half of this century, at least in 
industrially developed societies, dependent as they are on planning, 
technology and science, is likely, as Saint-Simon predicted, to be 
dominated by wielders of technical expertise.^ However, neither of 
these groups is particularly well characterized as a ruling class; in 
both cases Weber's distinction between indispensability and power is 
crucial. Stalin's 'bureaucrats' ,  I have argued, resembled a quivering 
jel ly,  rapidly being devoured, more than they resembled a coherent class, 
and though they did, in Weber's sense, exercise Herrschaft der Beamten, 
they were not capable of Beamtenherrschaft. More generally, though 
bureaucracies have always been involved, no bureaucracy by i t s e l f  has 
ever modernized or industrialized a 'developing country' - and yet this 
is arguably the most important social process of the last  two centuries.
Nor do the skil ls of technocrats necessarily ensure them power. Indeed, 
Michel Crozier has argued persuasively that such power as they have is a' 
peculiarly chancy and precarious asset:
1. See e.g. Daniel Bell, The Coming o f  P ost-Industria l Society, (New York, 
1976), pp.339-67 and Alvin W. Gouldner, 'The New Class Project, Part 1 ', 
Theory and Society, vol.6, no.2 September, 1978, pp.153-203.
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. . .  The invasion of  a l l  domains by ra t i o n a l i t y ,  o f  course, 
gives power to the expert who is  the agent of th is  progress. 
But the expert 's  success is constantly se l f-defeating. The 
ra t iona l iza t ion  process gives him power, but the end resul ts 
of ra t iona l iza t ion  cu r ta i l  th is  power. As soon as a f i e l d  is 
wel1-covered, as soon as the f i r s t  in tu i t io n s  and innovations 
can be translated into rules and programs, the expert 's power 
disappears.
As a matter of fac t ,  experts have power only on the f ron t  
l ine  of progress - which means they have a constantly s h i f t ­
ing and f ra g i le  power. We should l i k e  to argue even that i t  
can be less and less consolidated in modern times, in as much 
as more and more ra t iona l ized processes can be operated by 
non-experts. Of course, experts w i l l  f ig h t  to prevent the 
ra t iona l iza t ion  of  th e i r  own t r i c ks  of the trade. But 
contrary to the common b e l ie f ,  the accelerated rate of change 
that characterizes our period makes i t  more d i f f i c u l t  fo r  
them to re s is t  ra t iona l iza t ion .  Their bargaining power is 
constantly diminishing.!
The d is t in c t ion  between ind ispensab i l i ty ,  or at least usefu l­
ness, and power is a n a ly t i c a l l y  o f  the f i r s t  importance, though there 
are, of course, many instances where these assets reinforce each other. 
In many contemporary soc ie t ies, however, r e la t i v e ly  small groups of 
p o l i t i c a l  leaders have succeeded in harnessing the power which modern 
bureaucracies afford3 without ceding th is  power to the bureaucrats 
themselves, or wielding i t  pr imar i ly  in th e i r  in te rests .  Confronted 
by the unprecedented growth and importance of ' bureaucrats' and ‘ techno­
c ra ts ' ,  i t  is easy to underrate or obscure the extraordinary power which 
certain p o l i t i c a l  e l i te s  have been able to amass, p a r t icu la r ly  in th is  
century and p a r t i c u la r ly  in some of  the societ ies which have most 
stimulated new class theories. For the twentieth century is not merely 
the era of  ' the bureaucratizat ion of the wor ld ' ;  i t  is also the century 
of  t o t a l i t a r ia n  'movement' regimes, which re ly ,  ce r ta in ly ,  on the s k i l l s
1. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon3 (Chicago, 1973), 
p.165.
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of experts and on the routines of bureaucrats, but are in no way sub­
ordinate to them. In the past sixty years, the world has witnessed 
examples of unparalleled use of political power, exercised through but 
also over bureaucracies. Pace Hannah Arendt, this is as true of the 
Nazis' domination of German ' bureaucrats'  ^ as i t  is of Stalinism.
In both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union a group of p o lit ic a l  leaders,in part 
characterized in terms of i t s  abili ty to employ and direct bureaucrats 
for political goals, had power which, apart from defeat in war, was un­
challengeable by anyone or any group outside the leadership. In both 
cases, bureaucrats were a vital instrument, and source, of the e l i t e ' s  
power. But just as Trotsky was wrong to attribute Stalinism to 'the 
bureaucracy' ,  so in Germany, as Stephen Miller has pointed out,
I t  may be that the routine administration of murder is more 
horrible to contemplate than the massacres of barbarian hordes, 
but Jews and Gypsies were murdered because the 'final 
solution' was the chief item on the Nazi agenda, not because 
Germany was knee-deep in bureaucratization.2
1. For a stimulating early discussion of some of these issues see 
Frederic S. Burin, 'Bureaucracy and National Socialism: A Recon­
sideration of Weberian Theory' in Robert K. Merton e t a l3 Reader 
in  Bureaucracy3 (New York, 1952) pp.33-47. See also Eugene 
Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay, 'Freedom, Law and the Bureaucratic 
State' in Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier (eds.), Bureaucracy:
The Career o f  a Concept3 (London, 1979), (forthcoming), and Stephen 
Miller, 'Bureaucracy Baiting',  The American Scholar3 vol.47, no.2, 
1978, pp.205-22 esp. at pp.206-09.
2. Stephen Miller, o p .c i t . 3 p.207. Though those who consider i t  crucial 
-to identify the 'ruling class'  of a society are particularly prone
to underestimate political el i tes ,  they are not alone. As I 
mentioned above (pp.138-39), Weber too at times ignored his dist inct­
ion between power and indispensability. Burin appears unaware 
that Weber made such a distinction, but he is nonetheless right to 
cri t icize Weber's
exaggerated estimate of the p o li t ic a l  importance of technical 
expertness. "The 'polit ical master,"'  he said, "finds himself 
in the position of the 'di let tante'  who stands opposite the 
expert". And with an eye on none other than Frederick the Great, 
he added that "the absolute monarch is powerless opposite the 
superior knowledge of the bureaucratic expert." Applied to 18th 
century absolutism such a statement may be debatable. Applied to 
the dilettante Hitler, whose contempt for experts as men was only 
matched by the success with which he used them as his tools, i t  
becomes absurd.(op. c i t . j P . 4 3 . )
In this century, precisely because of the enormous 
growth in the size, power and pervasiveness of the modern 
bureaucratic state,  that state has become a crucial source of 
power for those who can control i t .  This is generally true, but 
i t  is especially important in those societies where a party has 
gained a monopoly of political power, and the independent power 
of social classes and of other potentially ‘constraining1 forces, 
such as parties, parliaments, the press, trade unions and an 
independent judiciary, has been, at least for a period, effectively 
destroyed. One problem, and an important one, is how such a 
political monopoly comes to be attained. A history of 'oriental 
despotism1 is clearly helpful, but i t  is not essential.  Once a 
monopoly has been attained, however, a quite separate issue arises: 
what scope for independence and for influencing the subsequent 
course of history does such a monopoly allow? The experience of 
recent decades is that i t  allows very great scope indeed, and 
that where this scope has been realized, bureaucrats are l ikel ier  
to be the servants of rulers - perhaps officious and often brutal 
servants - rather than rulers themselves.
To point to the extreme power of leaders of a one-party 
state - power which is especially pervasive where the economy 
is state-owned - is not to suggest that this power is unlimited. 
Convergence theorists and latter-day Saint-Simonians are thus 
correct in pointing to the tensions which can develop between 
s t r i c t  political control and the imperatives of administration and 
technical innovation. But the existence of tensions does not 
guarantee the mode in which they will be resolved or, indeed, that 
they will be resolved at al l .  Lenin recognised such tensions, but 
l i t t l e  was done to ease them. The post-Stalin leadership of the
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USSR has similarly had to grapple with problems which the much 
vaunted ' scient i f ic  and technical revolution' poses for Party 
controlJ  The pressures are obvious and acute, but there is ,  to 
say the least ,  no secular trend toward the supplanting of the 
Party by technical experts and administrators. Indeed the 
peremptory manner in which the CPSU's 'leading role'  and 
administrative prerogatives were reasserted in the light of 
alarm at the Czech events of 1968, is an instructive reminder 
of the power of polit ical leaders in societies where external 
constraints are few.
Questions about the interrelations between political 
el i tes ,  bureaucrats and social classes are exceedingly complex, 
and cannot be answered at an abstract,  supra-historical or 
supra-social, level or by imprecise invocations of the ' relat ive 
autonomy' (how relative? how autonomous?) of poli t ics.  In some 
societies,  such as eighteenth and nineteenth century England, 
social classes enjoyed a great deal of independence from polit ical 
leaders and bureaucrats, and dominant classes provided the personnel 
of polit ical and bureaucratic leadership, and maintained considerable 
political authority. In other societies, such as the 
'Oriental despotisms' >polit ical rulers faced few societal constraints 
from outside the polity. In Russia, for example, from the Mongol 
invasion onwards, i t  was the s ta te  which was central,  and social strata
1 See T.H. Rigby and R.F. Miller, 'P o litic a l and A d m in is tra tiv e  
A sp ec ts  o f  the  S c i e n t i f i c  and T echnica l R evo lu tio n  in  the  
U .S .S .R . (Canberra, 1976), and S u rve y , vol. 23 (1977-78).
2 T.H. Rigby, 'The Soviet Corrmunist Party and the Scientific 
and Technical Revolution', in T.H. Rigby and R.F. Miller, 
op. c i t .  , pp.16-23.
were subservient to i t .  According to Wittfogel, lack of internal
balance of forces, within these ' states[sj stronger than society'
typically resulted in a 'cum u la tive  tendency o f  unchecked power ' ,
and in personal autocracyJ Eisenstadt has analysed a very wide
range of 'historical bureaucratic polit ies '  and though in these
societies the polity had considerable autonomy, the interplay
between rulers, bureaucrats, and social strata led to extremely 
2varying results.  Bureaucrats vied repeatedly, on the one hand
with political rulers, and on the other with social strata,
religious groups, local notables and so on. In a passage which
sounds almost platitudinous, but is in fact a programme for
detailed research, Eisenstadt points out:
the bureaucracy's polical orientations in a 
centralized bureaucratic political system can be 
fully understood only in connection with the 
bureaucracy' s status and function in the social 
structure, and i ts  relation to the constellation 
of political forces within that structure . . .  Also 
we have observed that the social and political 
conditions affecting in any society, the development 
of the political orientations of the bureaucracy 
were not fixed; rather, they tended to change 
according to the relative strengths of the social 
forces and the outcome of the political struggle 
among them.3
These reminders of the obvious are not without contemporary relevance 
In all contemporary states - 'plural ist '  and ' total i tar ian'  
'developed' and 'developing' - the importance of bureaucrats is too 
manifest to be insisted on or denied. Compared with other social 
groups, bureaucrats stand in a very special relationship to the 
wielders of political power. Bureaucrats enable  such power to be 
exercised. Though political power might grow 'out of the barrel
1 Karl A. Wittfogel, O rien ta l D espotism , pp.105-107.
2 S.N. Eisenstadt, The P o l i t i c a l  System s o f  Empires (New York, 
1969), passim .
3 I b id ,  pp.292-93.
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of a gun', i t  can no longer be e x e rc ise d  over substantial periods 
of time without professional executors and administrators. In 
both modern and 'modernizing1 2 states,  governments do more than 
ever before, and few political decisions can be carried through 
without the activity of large number of officials employed by 
administrative organizations.
Bureaucrats interpret directives and translate them 
into regulations; they give effect to political decisions and 
enforce them. Moreover, bureaucrats, do not merely tra n sm it 
orders from rulers to ruled; they affect considerably the decisions 
actually taken and the results these decisions ultimately have. 
High-level bureaucrats commonly delimit the 'options' among which 
leaders choose, and the range of options presented will frequently 
be related to the interests and preferences of other bureaucrats.
The very fact that bureaucrats have been called upon to perform 
such a wide range of functions has i ts own consequences: bureaucracies
have established procedures and routines which limit the ways in 
which decisions will be carried out, and, indeed, the sorts of 
decisions which can real ist ical ly be made. In most bureaucratic 
states,  bureaucracies have sought to resist  attempts to change 
their procedures, reduce their numbers, or abolish established 
departments.^ In modern states they have been highly successful 
in this.  As Robert Brown has pointed out, ' large, complex, 
centralized bureaucracies are so organized as to defend themselves -
1 See S.N. Eisenstadt, op. c i t .  , esp. at pp.159-72.
2 For a fascinating account of one such 'success' ,  see Leslie 
Chapman, Your D isobed ien t S e rv a n t, (London, 1978).
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maintain certain of their properties in a steady state - by 
various administrative devices against both external and internal 
disruptive forces 1 2. ^
None of this should be surprising, and i t  should not be
ignored given the extraordinary increases in the size and scope
of operations of bureaucracies, the difficult ies of supervising
many of their act ivi t ies ,  and the amount of negotiating and
'mediating' between el i tes and representatives of social groups,
which bureaucrats do. However, analysis of these activi t ies is
not necessarily furthered by using the fairly blunt instrument of
class analysis. The existence of systematic and institutionalized
hierarchy within existing bureaucracies, about which the young
Marx wrote perceptively, often makes i t  difficul t  to talk sensibly
about the ' interests '  of a bureaucracy en b loc .  Moreover, individual
departments, particularly those involved in social welfare services,
often distinguish sharply between their own interests,  or those
of their ' cl ients '  and those of their superiors, and in the
modern 'welfare states'  this tendency is unlikely to diminish.
On the other hand, particularly where bureaucratic recruitment
is open to a wide range of social groups, the existence of regular
procedures for promotion through the hierarchy makes internal
power struggles quite unlike, and to a considerable extent
unrelated to, conflicts of class. In any event, in societies
with long- and well-established traditions of professional service,
bureaucracies, like armies, will often be extremely reluctant to supplant
political leaders, and will,  as Weber noted, continue 'impersonally' to
2serve while political leaders supplant each other.
1 Robert Brown ' Bureaucracy: the Utility of a Concept', in 
Kamenka and Krygier (eds.), op. c i t .  , p.145.
2 cf. Reinhard Bendix, 'Bureaucracy and the Problem of Power' 
in R.K. Merton e t  a i 3 op. c i t .  , p.129.
Twentieth century social and political theory will be 
unable to ignore bureaucracies. It is not evident, however, 
that theory will gain a great deal either from assuming that 
bureaucrats inevitably stand in the shadow of social classes, or 
from a determination to show that bureaucrats cast just  such 
shadows themselves.
(i i ) Bureaucracy and Administration
Emphasis on the context in which bureaucracies operate 
has not merely influenced the attention which Marxists have given 
to bureaucrats; i t  has also influenced Marxists' treatment of 
administration and administrative organizations. Certainly, in 
order to understand the development, nature and consequences of 
organizational forms, i t  is necessary to attend, not merely to 
organizations themselves, but to the environments in which they 
exist and have to operate. This point has been readily appreciated 
by other macro-sociologists, such as Weber, whose interest,  like 
that of Marx, has not been in bureaucracies for their own sake, 
but in the role which they play in economics, politics and 
society. The point has, after some delay, fi l tered through to 
'mainstream' organization theory. , Contemporary organization theorists 
have shown, for example, that an organization's environment has 
potent effects on the amount and quality of information available 
to organizational decision-makers, on relative effectiveness of 
different sorts of administrative structures and strategies, on 
the resources available to the organization, and on much else besides.
1 For a discussion of 'information uncertainty' and 'resource 
dependence' approaches to organization theory, see H. Aldrich 
and S. Mindlin, 'Uncertainty and Dependence: Two Perspectives 
on Environment', in L. Karpik, ed., Organization and Environment, 
(London/Beverly Hills,  1978), pp.149-70.
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Organizations, i t  is now being increasingly stressed, are 'open'
rather than 'closed' systems; few writers are any longer surprised
that an attempt to approximate the Weberian ideal type of
bureaucracy in, say, Turkey or Iran might lead to 'dysfunctional' ,
or at least unexpected, consequencesJ
Yet, as Weber insisted so strongly, context is not al l .
Administrative institutions,  like legal ones, are not infinitely
malleable, and i f  one is obliged to handle many complex tasks
efficiently and on a large scale, the administrative options
available are not unlimited. However, when one seeks to address
administrative questions, one is faced with the fact that ,  as a
Danish political scientist  has recently observed:
Marxism lacks a theory about the inner structure of 
organizations, and about the relationship between 
this structure and the efficiency of organizations. 
Marxism is f i r s t  and foremost a theory about external 
conditions, i . e . , 'material and structural political 
conditions on which organizations are dependent. If 
we concern ourselves with a detailed analysis of 
organizations, Marxist theory, as i t  has traditionally 
been formulated, does not give us many useful starting 
points.2
At f i r s t  sight, this claim might appear extraordinary, and false. 
After a l l ,  in their repeated criticisms of ' bureaucracy' ,  Marx 
and Lenin were not referring only to officials,  but were attacking 
governmental institutions and forms of organization. In his f i r s t  
attacks on Hegel's Philosophy o f  R ig h t,  Marx was not merely 
interested in those who held government posts, but was concerned 
to analyze the institutional sources of their behaviour, such as
1 See especially the articles by Presthus which are cited in 
the bibliography. I t  remains true, however, that 'even 
analyses from an explicitly open-systems point of view tend 
to take the social and political context of organizations 
for granted . . .  the organization theory l i terature has so 
far paid scant attention to the characteristics of organizations 
in socialist  and non-Western ("developing") countries' .
(Fred W. Riggs, 'Organizational Structures and Contexts', 
A d m in is tra tio n  and S o c ie ty , vol. 7, 1975, p . 151).
2 Bengt Abrahamsson, Bureaucracy or P a r tic ip a tio n :  The Logic o f  
O rg a n iza tio n , (Beverly Hills/London, 1977), p.91.
hierarchy. S im i la r ly ,  when Marx and Lenin ins is ted that the 
p ro le ta r ia t  must 'smash' the sta te, they ins isted that th is  
'bureaucratic '  state must be replaced by in s t i tu t io n s  of an 
altogether d i f fe re n t  kind. They c lear ly  believed that such 
in s t i tu t io n a l  re-arrangement would have important consequences.
Marx always believed that communist society would have no need fo r  
bureaucracy, and, at least ,  a f te r  1871, he was convinced that 
bureaucratic i n s t i t u t io n s  could and should be replaced by 
non-bureaucratic ones soon a f te r  the proletarian revolut ion.
By mid-1917 Lenin's thought had undergone a s im i la r  development.
One could argue on the basis of  these wr i t ings that 
Marx and Lenin, on the one hand, and Max Weber, who is obviously 
not open to Abrahamsson' s c r i t i c i s m ,  on the other, were in fac t  
a l l  addressing s im i la r  problems; they merely came to d i f fe re n t  
conclusions. On th is  view, Marx, and Lenin during 1917, could 
be regarded as 'op t im is ts '  about the d ispensabi l i ty  of bureaucratic 
in s t i t u t i o n s ,  while Weber was a pessimist. The d i f f i c u l t y  with 
th is  view is that i t  ignores the enormous gu l f  between the questions 
which Marx and Lenin were prepared to ask about organizations, 
and those which Weber considered important. Weber did not merely 
arr ive at d i f fe re n t  answers to problems which he, Marx, and Lenin 
considered worth solv ing; he ins is ted that there were in t rac tab le  
problems in contemporary society, about which revolut ionary Marxists 
had nothing useful to say. These problems would, Weber bel ieved, 
not disappear a f te r  a Marxist seizure of power, but, on the 
contrary, would be accentuated.
One perennial concern of c r i t i c s  of bureaucracy has 
been the re la t ionship  between administrat ive organizations and 
o f f i c i a l s  to th e i r  ostensible con tro l le rs .  This had been a concern
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of Mill and of  Weber and i t  was almost  the sole focus of  Marx's 
comments on a dmi n i s t r a t i ve  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Marx was convinced t h a t  
contemporary bureaucra t i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  served the i n t e r e s t s  of  the 
bourgeoi s i e .  Af te r  1851, he decided t h a t  e x i s t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
would not  be amendable to cont rol  by the p r o l e t a r i a t .  The a n t i -  
bu r eaucra t i c  measures which he endorsed and advocated in The 
C ivil War in  France were a l l  intended to enable f i r s t  the 
p r o l e t a r i a t ,  and l a t e r  the whole community, to cont rol  i t s  
f u n c t i o n a r i e s .  Lenin ' s  advocacy of  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r evolut ion in 
The S ta te  and Revolution  was, s i m i l a r l y ,  almost  t o t a l l y  addressed 
to the problem of  render ing o f f i c i a l s  responsive and accountable 
to the community - though,  perhaps to a l l a y  Kautskyi te f e a r s ,  Lenin 
i n s i s t e d  t h a t  po s t - r e vo l u t i o na ry  admi n i s t r a t i on  would be a very 
simple mat t e r .
Marx's and Lenin ' s  concern - to ensure t h a t  admin i s t r a to r s  
were f i rmly c on t r o l l e d  by t h e i r  r u l e r s  - i s ,  of  course ,  an impor tant  
one.  However, as Weber, and for  t h a t  mat t e r ,  Mi l l ,  were well 
aware,  the re  is  no a p rio ri  reason to be l i eve  t h a t  the form of  
o rgan iza t i on  which al lows maximum popular  cont rol  wi l l  a l so be 
adequate to the t asks  i t  i s  c a l l ed  on to perform. There i s ,  for  
t h a t  ma t t e r ,  no a p rio r i  reason to be l i eve  t h a t  i t  wi l l  be 
inadequate;  t h a t  i s  an empir ical  mat t e r  which can only be resolved 
by i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  comparat ive ana l ys i s  and t h e o re t i c a l  
r e f l e c t i o n .  However, i t  i s  j u s t  t h i s  which i s  completely 
lacking in the a t tempts  of Saint-Simon,  Marx and Lenin to show 
t h a t  admi n i s t r a t i on  in the new s oc i e ty  would be conducted
completely differently from government in the oldJ
Of course, after the Russian Revolution, Lenin's 
enthusiasm for 'proletarianization'  was subordinated to, though 
not extinguished by, a strongly Weberian insistence on the 
importance of administrative imperatives, the role of expertise, 
the in te r n a l  requirements of effective administration. In 
i t s e l f  this is not proof that Weber or Lenin were correct in 
believing in the superiority of Prussian models of administrative 
organization or, in Lenin's case, the 'Taylor system': their
choices bear obvious traces of the epoch at which they lived, and 
they may both have been wrong. They were correct, however, to 
emphasize that even, or especially, after a socialist  revolution
1 One might have expected Goran Therborn's new book, What does 
the R uling  Class Do When i t  Rules?  , to represent an advance 
in this respect. Therborn is determined to examine 
organizational forms: he confesses that 'Marxists have 
devoted unbelievably l i t t l e  systematic attention'  (p.26) 
to problems of state organization, and that 'we are s t i l l  
only at the beginning of a Marxist study of the state'  (p.33). 
Unfortunately, Therborn's only interest in organizational 
forms is a s t r ic t ly orthodox one: to show 'the class 
character of the organizational form of the state'  (p.144).
He says nothing about possible sources of organizational 
differences, either within or outside organizations, other 
than class relations. Yet, class relations were not the 
only things which might affect organizatons that changed 
between, for example, feudalism and capitalism. Furthermore, 
Therborn's insistence that,  unlike Western, capital ist ,  
administration, Soviet administration is 'a genuinely 
working-class technique of organization . . .  which constitutes 
the specific technology of the proletariat as the ruling 
class, that is ,  of the socialist  state'  (p.56) is dubious, 
to say the least.  One is reminded of Robert Miller's comment 
on Soviet reception of work by the Polish administrative 
theorist,  Staro^ciak:
It [Staro^ciak' s book] clearly differentiates between 
the nature and problems of socialist  and capital ist  
administrative systems, arguing that the principles 
of the la t ter  are not applicable to the former.
This orientation is undoubtedly congenial to Soviet 
specialists,  who are visibly embarrassed by the 
extent to which they have to borrow from the Western 
l i terature in conceptualizing the new approaches to 
administrati on.
(Robert F. Miller, 'The New Science of Administration in the 
U.S.S.R.' ,  A d m in is tra tiv e  Science  Q u a rte r ly , September, 1971, 
p. 253).
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governments of mass societies will lace a range of complex tasks 
to perform and that the administrative alternatives open to them 
will be profoundly influenced, and limited, by that fact. Lenin's 
difficulty was that he did not recognize i t  soonerj
Just how limited these alternatives are, remains 
controversial. Some light is shed on these matters by related 
controversies among organization theorists,  the vast majority of 
whom begin with Weber's ideal type. It has become clear that 
not all of the characters tics of the type are as closely 
interrelated as Weber appears to have believed. Nor does close 
approximation to this 'package' necessarily  lead to enhanced 
organizational performance. Many writers have argued that 
organizations most like the ideal type are best suited to, and 
likely to be found in, mass administration involving large 
routinized workflows and operating under relatively predictable 
conditions. They are not as well suited to tasks requiring 
f lexibi l i ty and innovation, and/or not involving large flows 
of work. For these second sorts of administration, i t  is argued, 
organizations
should permit more leeway for improvization and personal 
responsibi 1 i t y ; minimize the number of^ixed rules; 
de-emphasize the principle of hierarchical authority 
in favour of decentralization, team-work, and only 
conditionally activated lines of communication; define 
the individual's area of competence and responsibility 
less s t r ic t ly;  and emphasize personal authority (expert 
or functional authority), personal relationships, and 
personal commitment to the organizational goal.^
1 The most recent Chinese group of leaders appears to be coming to 
realize i t .  The slogan, ' i t  doesn't matter if  a cat is black or 
white, so long as i t  catches mice' is vintage, post-1917, Leninism.
2 Renate Mayntz, 'The Study of Organizations', Current Sociology , 
vol. 13, no. 3, 1964, p.101. The li terature in this area is 
vast. See esp. Tom Burns and G.M. Stalker, The Management o f  
Innovation  (London, 1961), who make this point by means of a 
contrast between 'mechanistic' and 'organic' organizations, and 
Arthur Stinchcombe, 'Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of 
Production: A Comparative Study1 2, Adm inistrative Science Q uarterly , 
vol. 4, 1959-60, pp.68-87.
I t  has also been suggested that  the increasing importance
of ski l led professionals in l a t e- i ndus t r i a l  and now post- industr ial
soc i e t ies ,  works to subvert r igid hierarchies of administrat ive
authori ty.  One of the f i r s t  wri ters to emphasize this  consequence
of professional izat ion was Talcott  Parsons, who suggested that
Weber's type included fundamental contradict ions between the
elevation of knowledge and special izat ion on the one hand, and of
legal-rat ional  authori ty and rules ,  on the other.  According to
Parsons, the 'professional izat ion '  of modern organizations was
leading to a di f ferent  form of administrat ion,  one where
instead of a r igid hierarchy of status and authori ty 
there tends to be what is roughly, in formal s ta tus ,  
a "company of equals",  an equal izat ion of status 
which ignores the inevitable gradation of dis t inct ion 
and achievement to be found in any considerable 
group of technical ly competent persons.!
On the basis of this  and similar  arguments, William Delaney has
suggested that  a model of the ' postbureaucrat ic ' type of
administrat ive organization should be developed, at  leas t  for
'contemporary American and, possibly,  other highly indust r ial ized 
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soc i e t i e s ' .  Some more recent work has been devoted to 
developing such a model. Writers such as W.G. Bennis^ and Robert 
Brown^ have drawn at tent ion to the effects  of contemporary rapid 
social change, of automation and of computerization on organizational 
s t ructure ,  and par t icular ly  on the future of hierarchical  authori ty.
1 ' Int roduct ion'  to Max Weber, The Theory o f  S o c ia l and Economic
O rg a n iza tio n , (New York 1964, f i r s t  published in English 
1947), p .60.
2 William Delaney, 'The Development and Decline of Patrimonial 
and Bureaucratic Administrat ions' ,  A d m in is tra tiv e  Science  
Q u a rte r ly , vol . 7, 1963, p.498.
3 W.G. Bennis, 'The Coming Death of Bureaucracy' in A.C. Athos 
and R.F. Coffey (eds . ) ,  Behaviour in  O rganiza tions: a 
m u ltid im en sio n a l Approach (New Jersey,  1968), pp.256-66.
4 Robert Brown, op. c i t .
Blau and Meyer argue that
the advanced technology of the twentieth century 
necessitates information feedback and specialized 
ski l ls ,  which are incompatible with an authority 
structure resting on blind obedience to orders 
issued through a chain of command. As a result,  
authority becomes depersonalized, and impersonal 
mechanisms of control displace old-fashioned 
discipline and command authority, thereby mitigating 
one of the least pleasant aspects of work in bureaucracies.
According to Brown, existing hierarchical structures may well
disappear, to be replaced by
'extended families' of inter-connected and self­
programming computers under whose direction automated 
machines would carry out all the routine tasks created 
by large work flows . . .  teams of specialists,  and 
their associated administrators would deal with the 
remaining tasks.
In these circumstances, Brown suggests, the concept of bureaucracy 
in i ts Weberian sense will have l i t t l e  work lef t  to do.
The fact that Weber's ideal-type has been subjected to 
criticisms and modifications such as these is not in i t sel f  
remarkable. Given the rapidity of change in this century, i t  is 
more remarkable that his formulation has retained i ts  influence 
for so long. Even if  the ideal type had to be rejected, Weber's 
writings would remain of central importance for our purposes.
Their importance transcends the specifics of the ideal-type, just 
as the importance of Marxism transcends the analytical difficult ies 
of class analysis. One invaluable legacy of Marxism is the 
attention i t  draws to social and economic forces which social 
and political theory cannot afford to overlook. Weber's writings, 
similarly, focus attention on some of the fundamental act ivi t ies ,  
constraints and imperatives of our time, which theorists and
1 P.M. Blau and M.W. Meyer, Bureaucracy in  Modem S o c ie ty  (New 
York, 1971), p.145.
2 Robert Brown, op. c i t .  , p.150.
revolut ionary ideolog ists  ignore at th e i r  p e r i l .
Moreover, the ideal type i t s e l f  has fa r  from los t  i t s  
usefulness. Whatever else i t  has seen, our century has witnessed 
an unprecedented growth of massive organizations dealing with 
large and continuous work flows. In re la t ion  to many important 
organizations, such as c i v i l  services, armies and mass production 
industr ies ,  the ideal type is  o f  d i rec t  and continuing relevance. 
Not only has th is  been the case h i the r to ,  but, as Blau and Meyer 
observe:
In many ways, undoubtedly, bureaucracies w i l l  continue 
to conform to the Weberian model. Division of  labor 
and specia l izat ion are i f  anything becoming more 
intense; ru les,  regulat ions, and organizational codes 
w i l l  continue to p ro l i fe ra te ;  e f f ic iency  w i11 be 
stressed ( i f  not achieved) no less than before. '
I t  is  not c lear how soon or how easi ly  bureaucratic
mass administrat ion w i l l  give way to a computer-centred, spec ia l is t
dominated, 1 2postbureaucratic'  type. The changes which Bennis
and Brown envisage w i l l  not occur immediately or universal ly :
they w i l l  face considerable resistance from with in and outside
ex is t ing bureaucracies, and in many societ ies they simply w i l l  not
be technical ly  feasible fo r  a very long time to come. Brown's
project ions are in part based on M i l l e r ' s  account of Soviet plans
fo r  a nationwide, computerized Automated System of Control (A.S.U.)
which has received strong Party backing, even though i t  promises
to narrow the Party's room fo r  a rb i t ra ry  p o l i t i c a l  intervention.
I t  is  therefore worth keeping in mind some impediments to the
rea l iza t ion  of th is  scheme, which M i l le r  notes:
A number of obstacles remain, to be sure. For one 
thing,  the designers of the system have probably 
oversold i t s  technical capacity to de l iver  what is 
expected of i t ,  especia l ly in view of the present
1 Blau and Meyer, op. a i t . ,  pp.118-19.
2 R.F. M i l le r ,  'Organizing fo r  the S c ie n t i f i c  and Technical 
Revolut ion',  in T.H. Rigby and R.F. M i l le r ,  (eds.),
op. o i t .  , pp.94-100.
state of the computer arts in the U.S.S.R. For 
another, the po l i t ica l  and intra-bureaucratic r iva lr ies  
over control of the system and its  functions are 
formidable. Finally , there is a d ist inct possib il i ty  
that po l i t ica l  conservatives in a post-Brezhnev era 
wil l  decide not to go through with the fu l l  programme 
so as to protect the ir  threatened decision-making 
prerogatives.1
Finally , there is one important element of what I have 
called the Weberian 'challenge' to socia l ists ,  which survives 
crit icisms of his ideal type. One can, I think, distinguish 
between two forms of this challenge - a 'strong' and a 'weak' 
form. Weber was committed to both forms, but we need not be, and 
not every effective crit ic ism of the former need affect  the la t te r  
at a l l .  The 'strong' form is the claim that the 'bureaucratic'
type of organization is indispensable in modern society because i t
is ,  other things being equal, always the most 
rational type from a technical point of view, 
the needs of mass administration make i t  
today completely indispensable. The choice is 
only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism in 
the f ie ld  of administration.2
I t  is this claim which organization theorists have been most 
concerned to test ,  and there is no doubt that Weber was committed 
to i t .  However, not all  of his crit icisms of soc ia l is t  prophecies 
rest on this claim. Often he singled out one feature in part icular  
of modern administrative organizations which distinguished them 
from others and made them part icular ly  ' inescapable': their
dependence on professional o f f ic ia ls  with 'rational specialization 
and t r a i n in g ' . 0 Thus the ' f i r s t  thing with which socialism also 
must reckon' is 'the necessity of a long training in s k i l l s ,  always
1 R.F. M i l le r ,  'The Role of Law and the Scient i f ic  and Technical 
Revolution1 23, paper presented at 7\ Revolution in our Age:
The Transformation of Law, Justice and Morals', Canberra 
Seminar in the History of Ideas, 2-4 August, 1975, p.17.
2 AW/;, vo l . 1, p.223, quoted above at p.124.
3 See above, p.128.
increasing specialization and management by a skilled officaldom 
shaped in this way. The modern economy can be managed in no 
other way1 23.
Some of the most telling criticisms of Weber's ideal
type rest on the weaker position which I have outlined: hierarchy
of authority within organizations will not endure, i t  is argued,
precisely because of the increasing importance of skilled
professionals. While strains within Weber's conception are
revealed by these observations, this should provide l i t t l e
consolation for the subjects of this thesis. If the weak position
is correct, there is no reason to believe that organizations
designed to accommodate specialists,  whatever their internal
arrangement, will be any easier to control or eliminate than
bureaucracies. Indeed, notwithstanding their more 'democratic'
internal structure, ' postbureaucratic' organizations will present
considerable obstacles to democratic, or other, forms of control.
Such obstacles, I have argued, are not necessarily insuperable.
However, since 'the actual scope for mass participation in a
2computerized management system is virtually ni l ' ,  i f  such
organizations do come to predominate we might once again be
threatened with 'the delusion as i f  administration and political
governing were mysteries, transcendent functions only to be trusted
3
to the hands of a trained caste' .
1 'Der Sozialismus', pp.497-98, quoted above at p.135.
2 R.F. Miller, 'The Role of Law and the Scientific and Technical 
Revolution', p.12.
3 Karl Marx, The Civil War in France, p.169, quoted above at 
p.108.
3 Bureaucracy and Utopia
Hitherto I have discussed Marxist social and political 
theory. I have argued that characteristic patterns of thought 
can be identified among the writers I have discussed, and that 
these patterns derive from several of the centrally important 
categories and theoretical presuppositions of Marxist social 
theory. But to end an account of Marxist attitudes to bureaucracy 
here would really be to stage Hamlet without the prince. For, 
like Saint-Simonianism, Marxism was not simply social theory; 
i t  was also prophecy; indeed, i t  was the most influential prophecy 
to come out of nineteenth century Europe.
In the second part of this thesis,  I emphasized that 
Marx's prophecy, like Saint-Simon's, was full of strains and 
internal tensions; many of these strains and tensions were 
'actualized' by the Bolshevik revolution. In particular the 
revolution, and Lenin's post-revolutionary writings and experience, 
revealed two dist inct kinds of strains. The f i r s t  kind resulted 
from comparison between the hopes and predictions of Marx, and what 
ultimately took place in the Soviet Union. This gap between 
Marxist prophecy and Soviet practice is of course not necessarily 
a ' falsif icat ion'  of Marxism. Many Marxists have attempted, with 
greater or lesser success, to distinguish Marxism from the Bolshevik 
experiment, by arguing, in brief,  that the lat ter  was the wrong 
revolution, undertaken in the wrong place at the wrong time.
This argument raises many questions concerning the relationship 
of Marxism to the Bolshevik seizure of power, and of Marxism to 
backwardness - questions which I do not propose to discuss here.
A second kind of strain,  however, which was already evident in 
Marx's own writings, is in terna l to these writings and is thus
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less easy to dismiss. For th is  is the tension, to which I have 
frequently re ferred, betueen several of Marx's own fundamental 
goals, as well as between those of his successors such as Lenin 
and Trotsky. Moreover, as we have seen, Saint-Simon manifested 
and ignored s im i la r  ambivalences in his own thought.
In some revolut ionary theories, coyness about the 
existence and possible consequences of enduring administrat ive 
imperatives would be less curious than i t  is in Marxism. Like 
the judge in an ar ia competition who awards the prize to the 
second competitor immediately a f te r  having heard the f i r s t ,  a 
revolut ionary might seek to overthrow an ex is t ing government or 
social order, though he had no confidence that i t s  successor would 
be much superior. One might accuse such a revolut ionary of 
i r r e s p o n s ib i l i t y , but his vision of the future would not necessari ly 
be incoherent. However, there is , as we have seen, a basic 
incoherence in Marxist a t t i tudes to administrat ion in post- 
revol utionary society. Marxists have always ins is ted that 
post-revolut ionary society w i l l  be immeasurably superior to 
contemporary society, and one extremely powerful Saint-Simonian 
strand in Marxism is i t s  insistence that a major element in th is  
super io r i ty  w i l l  be i t s  superior competence, the e f f ic iency  and 
good husbandry, which w i l l  d is t inguish the organization and 
management of post-revolut ionary society. Bureaucratic 'parasit ism' 
together with the c a p i ta l i s t  'anarchy of production' w i l l  both 
be at an end. On the other hand, another source of the appeal 
of  Marxism has been i t s  vision of a society without government.
Not merely Marx, but Saint-Simon, who considered administrat ion 
an integral part of  productive a c t i v i t y ,  and the great Marxist 
organizers, Lenin and Trotsky, a l l  shared an apparent i n a b i l i t y
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to see the potentially 'bureaucratic'  consequences of their 
hopes, and the impediments which these consequences would raise 
to the achievement of other socialist  goals. They all manifested 
and ignored similar ambivalences in their thought. Any attempt 
to account for these deepseated and sustained ambivalences 
must, in the nature of the case, be conjectural; i t  does not, 
however, seem to me fanciful to pay attention to what might be 
called revolutionary metaphorics.
In the f i r s t  chapter of this thesis, I sought to 
indicate that attacks on bureaucracy have been more often than 
not, of a completely undifferentiating sort. Critics of 
bureaucracy have rarely bothered to be precise about exactly what 
target they were aiming at,  or to discuss whether, as Mill insisted, 
bureaucracy might be useful in some contexts and for certain 
purposes, although harmful elsewhere. This was especially true 
of those cr i t ics who believed that a social revolution was necessary 
and inevitable. In revolutionary critiques, bureaucracy stood 
doubly condemned: loathesome and oppressive in i tsel f ,  and the
instrument of a hated ruling class. Given the 'holist ic '  way 
in which bureaucracy was appraised and condemned, i t  would have 
taken a major effort  of will and thought, to appreciate, and then 
to insist ,  that some at least of the characteristics of bureaucratic 
organization stemmed from administrative imperatives which would 
equally confront pre- and post-revolutionary societies. Such an 
effort  was not often undertaken by nineteenth century revolutionaries. 
Instead, the most common metaphor for bureaucracy was that of 
a 'parasi te ' .  Saint-Simon saw existing officials as purely 
parasitic; Marxists again and again resorted to metaphors of 
parasitism and disease when discussing bureaucracy in capital ist
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society,  and Trotsky resusci tated these metaphors in his attacks 
on S ta l i n i s t  bureaucracy. Such metaphors combined well with 
these thinkers '  fai th in the cleansing and p u r i f y in g  force of 
revolution,  to allow certain problems to d i s s o l v e .  Saint-Simon and 
Marxists believed that  many i ns t i t u t ions  in exis t ing society would 
survive in the society of the future;  indeed they r e l i e d  on the 
survival of industry to form the basis of that  society.  But only 
useful ,  important, and heal thy  forms of ac t iv i ty  were to survive. 
Like a highly effect ive and select ive cancer treatment the 
Revolution would leave the healthy elements of exist ing society 
unscathed, but would consume and destroy i t s  diseased parts .  
Prominent among these would be the dreadful paras i te ,  1 bureaucracy1.
In fac t ,  compared with administrators of e a r l ie r  times, 
contemporary bureaucrats do much more and on the whole do i t  
be t ter .  Given the extraordinary twentieth century inf la t ion of 
demands for benefits from the s t a t e ,  for economic and social r ights 
as opposed to merely pol i t i ca l  ones, demands which Marxists and 
other soc ia l i s t s  have done so much to mould, bureaucrats and 
special ized administrat ive organizations are no more paras i t ic  
than arms and legs. Some wri ters might object to this extension 
of ac t iv i ty  on, for example, l a i s s e z - f a i r e  or anarchist  grounds. 
Marxists, as we have seen, are not in a good posit ion to do so.
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